








HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1850-1909

VOL. IV

1862-1864



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HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED STATES

FROM
THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
TO
THE END OF THE ROOSEVELT
ADMINISTRATION

BY
JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.LITT.

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AMERICAN CIVIL WAR DELIVERED AT OXFORD;
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR

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TO
MY MOTHER



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OF

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HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER XVII

A RECAPITULATION of the salient events of the year ending with the spring of 1862 will be useful. April 12, 1861, the Confederate government began the war by the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The Northern and Southern people, who had confronted one another since the election of Lincoln, now prepared for conflict. The appeal to arms to try the cause which Congress had failed to settle by compromise met with a vigorous response from the North and from the South. Both organized armies. The parties to the war were, on the one hand, the Union, composed of twenty-three States with twenty-two million people, and, on the other hand, the Southern Confederacy, made up of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, eleven States in all, with a population of nine million. The cause of the war was slavery: the South fought to preserve and extend it; the North fought to repress and further restrict it. The real object was avowed on neither side. The North went into battle with the preservation of the Union blazoned on its banner, the South with resistance to subjugation. There was a meas-

ure of truth in each battle-cry. The North denied the right of secession, the South resolved to exercise it; and since there was substantial unanimity in the Confederate States, the war became one of conquest to be carried on by the invasion of the South by Northern soldiers. Three months went by while the armies were being organized. July 21, 1861, 29,000 Union soldiers and 30,000 Confederates met in battle at Bull Run, Virginia: the Union army was signally defeated. With no signs of discouragement and with unabated enthusiasm, the North rose up again. In October the Confederate troops defeated the Federals at Ball's Bluff on the upper Potomac; this victory following the battle of Bull Run aroused in the Southerners a well-sustained confidence that they would in the end win their independence. But fortune turned, and the United States gained victories. In November, 1861, Port Royal, South Carolina, was taken, and with the new year Federal successes followed swiftly. General George H. Thomas overcame the Confederates at Mill Spring, Kentucky. General Burnside and Commodore Goldsborough took Roanoke Island, North Carolina. Flag-officer Foote captured Fort Henry. Grant, after one of the truly decisive battles of the war, forced the surrender of Fort Donelson on the 16th day of February, 1862, and seven weeks later repelled at Shiloh the northward advance of the Confederates, which was designed to retrieve their loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. Curtis drove the Confederates out of Missouri. Pope captured Island No. 10, and Farragut took New Orleans. Congress prohibited slavery in the Territories, abolished it in the District of Columbia, and, on the initiative and recommendation of President Lincoln, offered the slave States pecuniary aid in case they should take measures to emancipate their slaves.

These events bring us down to April, 1862. In the last chapter the story left McClellan with an army of 100,000 men besieging Yorktown. Up to April 11 there was no time when the Union army did not outnumber the Confederate, three to one; moreover, the Union general had the

authority of his government to make an assault.¹ Not to break the Confederate line of thirteen miles which stretched from the York River to the James² was an error; indeed it is true, as Joseph E. Johnston wrote, that "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."³ April 17 Johnston took command in person at Yorktown, and at that date the Confederate army had reached the number of 53,000.⁴ From this time on perhaps nothing could have been better than a continuance of the scientific siege operations which McClellan had begun soon after his arrival before Yorktown. He went on erecting siege works and planting heavy Parrott guns and mortars against the Confederate fortifications, maintaining an active correspondence with the department at Washington and with his wife at home. In his letters to the President and to the Secretary of War he resented bitterly that McDowell's corps had been withdrawn from his command; he complained of the smallness of his own force, and intimated that he was outnumbered by the Confederates; he had much to say of the rainy weather and of the roads deep with mud. To his worshipping wife he told of the disadvantages he was laboring under and of his many troubles in a tone that at times degenerated into childishness; indeed some of his letters sound like the utterances of a youth un-grown rather than of the captain of a great army. Others show him to be a prey to illusions. Not only "the rebels," but the "abolitionists and other scoundrels" are aiming at

¹ Official Records, vol. xi. part iii. pp. 76, 97, 425, 436; part i. pp. 14, 15. By the title of Official Records I designate the government publication: War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I. is to be always understood unless there is mention otherwise. In making references to these records the abbreviation O. R. will be used.

² April 6 the President telegraphed McClellan: "I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River, at once." — O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 14. McClellan wrote his wife: "The President very coolly telegraphed me yesterday that he thought I had better break the enemy's lines at once! I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself." — Own Story, p. 308.

³ April 22, to Lee, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 456.

⁴ Johnston's Narrative, p. 117

his ruin. It is the men at Washington to whom he refers when he writes, "History will present a sad record of these traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims."¹ The President, yearning for the success of McClellan and willing to do anything in his power to bring it about, sent him Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, which reached him April 22. Still McClellan did not open a general attack from his batteries. April 28 he called for some 30-pounder Parrott guns from Washington, and brought forth this answer from the President: "Your call . . . alarms me chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"²

Crossing to the Confederate lines, one is impressed with the good fortune of the South in having an able commander for its principal army at the commencement of the war instead of being obliged, as was the North, to grope about through bitter trial and sickening failures. Johnston coolly watched the operations of his adversary, and made up his mind that Yorktown would be untenable when McClellan's elaborate siege operations were set in motion. Desirous of avoiding the loss of life which a bombardment would occasion, he timed nicely his evacuation of Yorktown and the adjacent works, withdrawing his army on the 3d of May, three days before the contemplated opening of a general fire from the heavier Union batteries. McClellan's procrastination had given the Confederates a precious month, in which they commenced the reorganization of their army, gave some measure of training to the Virginia militia, and brought reinforcements from the South.³ The evacuation of Yorktown took McClellan by surprise.⁴ Nevertheless he gave orders for immediate pursuit, while he himself remained at Yorktown to superintend the

¹ Letters to his wife, McClellan's Own Story, p. 310, *ante, et seq.*

² O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 126, 130.

³ See vol. iii. of this work, pp. 606, 616.

⁴ "The action of the enemy almost always disappointed McClellan." — Gen. Francis Palfrey, who was in McClellan's army in the Peninsular Campaign: Papers of the Military Historical Society of Mass., vol. i. p. 155.

embarkation of Franklin's division on transports which were to go up the York River.¹ Hooker with his division overtook the enemy and began the battle of Williamsburg, which was fought without a plan, under confused orders and defective disposition of forces, and, though somewhat relieved by a brilliant exploit of Hancock, then commander of a brigade, resulted in a Union defeat and considerable loss. McClellan arrived on the field at about five o'clock in the afternoon, receiving, as he always did, loud and enthusiastic cheers from his men; but the battle of Williamsburg was over. He made a disposition of forces for the conflict which he expected would be renewed on the morrow; but that night the Confederates marched away from Williamsburg on their retreat to Richmond. McClellan followed with almost incredible slowness. The march from Williamsburg to the place where his army went into camp on the Chickahominy, a distance of forty to fifty miles, consumed a fortnight.² The roads of course were bad, and Virginia mud is a factor to be taken into account in the consideration of many campaigns; but the young general exaggerated these obstacles and the inclemency of the weather, even as he overestimated the force of the enemy.³ Lincoln, who was undoubtedly weary of this constant grumbling, and observed that the Confederates marched in spite of bad roads and made attacks in spite of rough weather, once said: "McClellan seemed to think, in defiance of Scripture, that Heaven sent its rain only on the just and not on the unjust."⁴

¹ "Curiously enough, there was almost always something for McClellan to do more important than to fight his own battles." — Palfrey, *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Mass.*, vol. i. p. 156.

² Committee on Conduct of the War, part i. p. 20; Webb's *Peninsula*, p. 83.

³ In a somewhat merry mood McClellan enlivens his book with an anecdote of which he more than once thought during this campaign and from which he might have drawn an apposite lesson. McClellan asked an old general of Cossacks who had served in all the Russian campaigns against Napoleon how the roads were in those days. "My son," he replied. "the roads are always bad in war." — Own Story, p. 275.

⁴ Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 414.

On the morning of May 11 McClellan, who had then covered nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg, learned that the Confederates had evacuated Norfolk and destroyed the iron-clad *Merrimac*,¹ thereby leaving open to the Federal fleet the James River, which offered to the Union general a line of advance on Richmond more advantageous in every important military consideration. It made available to him the co-operation of the navy; it saved him the risk of braving the fever-breath of the Chickahominy swamps; it would have enabled him to threaten the most important communication of the Confederate capital with the States farther South.

McClellan is wise after the event, and in his report of August 4, 1863, and in his book acknowledges that the approach to Richmond by the James was a safer and surer route than the one adopted;² but, unable to admit that he ever made a mistake, he ascribes his evident failure in strategy to the administration at Washington. Having asked repeatedly for reinforcements, he finally sent to the President on May 14 a respectful and reasonable despatch, the gist of which was: "I ask for every man that the War Department can send me by water." Four days later the Secretary of War replied that while the President did not deem it wise to uncover the capital entirely by sending the available forces by the water-route, he had, however, ordered McDowell with his 40,000 men to march from Fredericksburg overland and join the Army of the Potomac either north or south of the Pamunkey River.³ He then directed McClellan to extend his right wing north of Richmond in order to establish this communication as soon as possible.⁴ This command, declares McClellan, "is the reason for my not operating on the line of the James." His excuse is not borne out by his own private correspondence of the time, which contains not even the vaguest

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 164.

² Ibid., part i. p. 28; McClellan's Own Story, p. 346; see, also, McClellan's article, The Century Company's War Book, vol. ii. p. 173.

³ The Pamunkey was the south branch of the York River.

⁴ O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 26, 27.

allusion to a desire for such a movement; in fact, the tenor of all his despatches and letters is that he expected to fight Johnston's army between the Chickahominy River and Richmond.¹ Moreover, he knew on the 11th of May of the destruction of the *Merrimac*, and did not receive notice of the promised reinforcement by McDowell until the 18th. The full week intervening was his for considering and adopting the plan of moving on Richmond by the line of the James River. This he had unhampered power to do, and this is exactly what he ought to have done.

As soon as the destruction of the *Merrimac* was known, the *Monitor* and a number of gunboats started up the James. Their approach caused more of a panic in Richmond than did any direct menace of McClellan's army of 100,000 during the whole of the Peninsular Campaign. There were, indeed, anxious hearts in the capital city when the Union troops first appeared before Yorktown; but when McClellan, instead of attacking the Confederates, went on with his scientific siege operations, anxiety gave way to wonder and to contempt for his generalship. The fall of New Orleans was a blow, and the destruction a fortnight later of the *Merrimac* — "that great gift of God and of Virginia to the South"² — seemed disaster crowding upon disaster. Although McClellan's military ability was despised, the march of his well-trained and well-equipped army towards the capital of the Confederacy could not be looked on without apprehension. While there was a quiet confidence in Johnston, strictures on Jefferson Davis were not uncommon. Of him who was now acting as military adviser to the President and became later the greatest Southern commander, the Richmond *Examiner*, standing for a widely held opinion, said: "Evacuating Lee, who has never yet risked a single battle with the invader, is com-

¹ See despatches in O. R., and letters to his wife in Own Story; testimony before Com. on Conduct of the War; also Webb's Peninsula, p. 87; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 384; Swinton's pamphlet, McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed, p. 22.

² Richmond *Examiner*, May 13.

manding-general;" and after Yorktown had been given up, sneered at "the bloodless and masterly strategy of Lee."¹ We must bear all these circumstances in mind to understand the fear with which the people heard that the *Monitor* and the Federal gunboats were at City Point, within thirty-two miles of Richmond, then within twelve miles, then within eight. Davis had himself baptized at home and the rite of confirmation administered to him in the Episcopal Church of St. Paul's. He had appointed by public proclamation a day for solemn prayer.² A prey to anxiety, he insisted that his wife and family should go to Raleigh. The families of the Cabinet secretaries fled to their homes. These facts and the adjournment of the Confederate Congress the previous month seemed to lend confirmation to a report now gaining ground that Richmond would be abandoned. The packing of trunks was the work of every household; refugees crowded the railroad trains; people fled in panic from the city with nothing but the clothes they had on. Nor was it baseless fear that made them flee.³ New Orleans, they thought, had been ignobly surrendered; what should save Richmond? Davis's letters to his wife breathe discouragement. I have told the people, he wrote, "that the enemy might be beaten before Richmond on either flank, and we would try to do it, but that I could not allow the army to be penned up in a city."⁴

¹ Richmond *Examiner*, April 21, May 6. General Lee's campaign in western Virginia the previous autumn had been considered a failure (see vol. iii. of this work, p. 489). "The press and the public were clamorous against him." — Long's *Life of Lee*, p. 130.

² John M. Daniel, in an editorial in the *Richmond Examiner* of May 19, wrote: "In truth, these devotional proclamations of Mr. Davis have lost all good effect from their repetition, are regarded by the people as either cant or evidences of mental weakness. . . . When we find the President standing in a corner telling his beads and relying on a miracle to save the country instead of mounting his horse and putting forth every power of the Government to defeat the enemy, the effect is depressing in the extreme."

³ I have made up this description from the files of the *Richmond Dispatch*, *Examiner*, and *Whig*; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i.; Mrs. Davis's *Memoir*, vol. ii.; Pollard's *Second Year of the War*.

⁴ Mrs. Davis's *Memoir*, vol. ii. p. 273; see, also, p. 271.

Alexander H. Stephens, a close observer of events in his Georgia home, said to a confidential friend: President Davis "acts as if he had not any confidence in the attainment of independence. I suspect he intends to imitate the career of Sydney Johnston. That is the way I read some of his conduct."¹ The evidence seems good that the government archives had been sent to Lynchburg and to Columbia.²

May 15 the *Monitor* and the Federal gunboats reached Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond on the James River. There they encountered a heavy battery and two separate barriers formed of piles, steamboats, and sail vessels, and found the banks of the river lined with sharpshooters. As the boats advanced, the Confederates opened fire; this was soon returned and the battle was on.³ Richmond heard the sound of the guns and was not terrified, for the panic-stricken had left the city and the resolute citizens had stemmed the current of alarm. On the previous day the General Assembly of the Commonwealth had resolved that the capital should be defended to the last extremity, and appointed a committee to assure President Davis that all loss of property involved in this resolution would be cheerfully submitted to by the State and by the citizens. Davis said to the committee: It will be the effort of my life to defend the soil of Virginia and to cover her capital. I have never entertained the thought of withdrawing the army from Virginia and abandoning the State. If the capital should fall, the necessity of which I do not see or anticipate, the war could still be successfully maintained on Virginia soil for twenty years. To the sound of the enemy's guns Governor Letcher affixed his hand and seal to a call for a meeting at the City Hall for the purpose of pro-

¹ Life of Stephens, Johnston & Browne, p. 415.

² A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i. p. 126; Pollard's *Second Year of the War*, p. 32. The Confederate Secretary of War gave, May 10, the order to have a large part of the records and papers of his department packed in boxes for removal. — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 504.

³ See the different reports of this battle in Moore's *Rebellion Record*, vol. v., Docs. p. 132 *et seq.*; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 178.

viding for the defence of Richmond. News that the Federal gunboats had been repulsed was received before the time of the meeting, and added joy to the enthusiasm with which the assembled citizens listened to the pledges of the governor and mayor that the city should never be surrendered.¹ Confidence was restored, and not again during this campaign of McClellan's was it so rudely disturbed. Here had been a fine chance for an energetic Union general who had studied to advantage his enemy. After the naval engagement of May 15, Seward, who was then on a visit to the scene of operations, expressed the opinion that a force of soldiers in cooperation with the navy on the James River "would give us Richmond without delay."² Of this Fabian commander who had failed to take advantage of the favors lavished upon him by fortune, the public of the Confederacy as well as the generals had their opinion confirmed, and could not conceal their derision at his lack of enterprise.³

In truth, if the hopeful North and the anxious South could have known McClellan's inward thoughts during these days, there would have been reason neither for hope on one side nor anxiety on the other. In his letters to his wife he spoke of his defeat at Williamsburg as "a brilliant victory," and asserted that he had given the Confederates "a tremendous thrashing." May 12 he asked, "Are you satisfied now with my bloodless victories?" and three days later he wrote, "I

¹ Richmond *Whig*, May 16, 19; *Dispatch*, May 16; *Examiner*, May 16, 19; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i. p. 125; Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. v., Docs. p. 424; Pollard's Second Year of the War, p. 33. For comment on this, see John M. Daniel's editorial in the Richmond *Examiner* of May 16.

² Seward to Stanton, May 16, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 178. The President, Chase, and Stanton were at Fortress Monroe from May 5 to 11. Chase wrote McDowell May 14: "With 50,000 men and you for a general I would undertake to go from Fortress Monroe to Richmond by the James River with my revenue steamers *Miami* and *Stevens* and the *Monitor* in two days." — Life of Chase, Warden, p. 433, also *ante*, *et seq.*

³ Richmond *Dispatch*, May 16 to 28; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, vol. i. p. 125.

think that the blows the rebels are now receiving and have lately received ought to break them up.”¹

I have already spoken of the President's order of May 17² directing McDowell to march with his corps from the camp opposite Fredericksburg towards Richmond to reinforce McClellan. This junction was never made. Stonewall Jackson now appeared upon the scene, and confounded the plans of the administration and McDowell.

It is hardly conceivable that the President and his advisers in Washington could have more effectually released the Confederate army from the main object of their consideration, the defence of Richmond, than by the disposition of forces in the Shenandoah valley and in western Virginia. Scattering of troops instead of concentration, variety in design instead of unity, the selection of generals who represented sections of political sentiment instead of applying to these appointments the sole test of merit, are obvious criticisms of their administration of affairs. Banks had a little army in the Shenandoah valley; Frémont, for whom the Mountain Department had been created, had another in western Virginia; to McDowell with his corps was assigned the special duty of protecting the Federal capital. All three forces should have been under the command of one man of military ability. The appointment of Banks had little to recommend it; and Frémont, who was appointed solely to placate the radical Republicans, was, in view of the military and administrative incompetence shown in his egregious failure in Missouri, a choice blameworthy in a high degree.³ The negotiations between Lincoln

¹ McClellan's Own Story, pp. 353, 355.

² O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 28.

³ More than a month before the assignment of Frémont to this duty, Francis P. Blair, Jr., who was in spite of their personal quarrel a competent and honest witness, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: Frémont “was in a perfect panic of fear when he himself was in the field [in Missouri] and the enemy seventy miles off, and he himself surrounded by 35,000 or 40,000 men, well armed and equipped and with eighty cannon. I don't mean by this that he was in ‘bodily fear,’ but that he was paralyzed by his incapacity to deal with great affairs, overwhelmed by a

and Frémont at the time of his assignment to this command are a travesty of military business; they would have seemed appropriate in the appointment of a collector of the port of New York or Boston. Having yielded to the solicitations of the friends of "the pathfinder," that a place be made for him, the President was then subjected to strong pressure to increase his army to a size commensurate with his dignity. The force in the Mountain Department was supposed to be 25,000; unable to resist the influences, Lincoln detached Blenker's division of 10,000 from McClellan and gave it to Frémont. As a consideration Frémont had promised to undertake a campaign which involved a long march over the mountains and had in view the seizure of the railroad at or near Knoxville and the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee. This project, though dear to the President's heart was impracticable and romantic.¹ Frémont made no serious attempt to execute it; and the mischief of the plan was that it kept a small army in western Virginia, where only two or three brigades were actually required, when these troops were imperatively needed in the Shenandoah valley as a reinforcement to Banks.

In the early days of May the situation in the Shenandoah valley and mountains was broadly as follows. Banks had 9000 men at Harrisonburg, with orders from the War Department to fall back upon Strasburg. Shields with a division of

responsibility to which he was unequal." — Part iii. p. 173. This testimony was given Feb. 7, and the date of Frémont's appointment is March 11. See vol. iii. of this work, pp. 468, 481; also Ropes's Story of the Civil War, part ii. p. 115.

¹ See correspondence between Frémont and Lincoln, June 16, O. R., vol. xii. part i. pp. 660, 662; Lincoln to McClellan, March 31, O. R., vol. v. p. 58. Blenker was taken from McClellan just as the latter was about to start for the Peninsula, "at the expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan." See J. D. Cox's article in the Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 278. General Cox held a command under Frémont. On the President's anxiety for the occupation of East Tennessee, see Ropes's Story of the Civil War, vol. i. pp. 200, 206, 213; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 96. For the condition of things in East Tennessee and the pressure on the President to send an army there for the relief of the Unionists, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. chap. iv.

10,000 at Newmarket had been under Banks, but had now been ordered to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg. Frémont had 15,000 troops of the Mountain Department stationed at different points in the Shenandoah Mountains; one of these detachments, 3500 strong, was under Milroy at a place called McDowell, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, less than forty miles from Staunton; another detachment under Schenck, 2200 strong, was at Franklin, thirty-four miles north of McDowell.¹ Stonewall Jackson had an effective force of 20,000.² Thus the Union troops in the theatre of operations outnumbered the Confederate in the ratio of at least three to two, without taking into account General McDowell's army of 30,000, which was watched by a Confederate force of about 10,000.³ Had there been a proper disposition of the means at hand, Jackson, who took the offensive, would have been opposed at each point by an equal force; as a matter of fact he outnumbered his enemy in each affair and each battle. In the planning of this campaign, the correspondence between Generals Lee and Jackson cannot fail to elicit admiration from men used to military affairs. Lee made some pertinent suggestions, emphasizing that they were merely for Jackson's consideration; for, he wrote from Richmond, "I cannot pretend at this distance

¹ I give round numbers for the different bodies of troops. I have arrived at these from various returns in the O. R., corrected by the correspondence and official reports. The *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 209, has been of assistance.

² Jackson's report of May 3 gives his force of three brigades as 8397. O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 879. Ewell wrote, April 16, that he had over 8500 men and his division was "increasing very rapidly." Ibid., p. 850. There does not seem to have been any detachments from this force. Reinforcements had been ordered to Ewell, but were afterwards recalled. Edward Johnson had two brigades of three regiments each; 3500 is not, therefore, a high estimate of his force. This makes a total of 20,397, and I am inclined to think that Jackson's batteries of artillery should be added. See *Ropes's Civil War*, part ii. p. 117.

³ For the Confederate force, see Lee to J. E. Johnston, May 8, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 500. I have previously referred to McDowell's army as 40,000: such it became after the junction of Shields.

to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution.”¹ In reply Jackson asks in a deferential manner for reinforcements. “Now, it appears to me,” he said, “is the golden opportunity for striking a blow. Until I hear from you I will watch an opportunity for attacking some exposed point.”² Lee regrets very much his inability to send reinforcements. Jackson meanwhile had proposed three plans of operation, one of which he was disposed to adopt; Lee in reply tells him to choose that which seems to him best.³

Jackson promptly matured his plan. Sending for Ewell, whose division was a constituent component of his force, he directed, in personal conference, the part he should play in the undertaking about to commence. He had himself determined to strike at Milroy, leaving his own place at Swift Run Gap to Ewell, who should endeavor to hold Banks in check. By a swift march in a circuitous route in order to mask his movement, Jackson pushed on with his three brigades to Staunton: there he was joined by four companies of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute, who were glad to serve in defence of their loved valley, under their whilom professor,⁴ now venturing forth to great renown. West of Staunton he united with Edward Johnson's two brigades, and with his army now increased to nearly 12,000 he advanced on Milroy, whom he found, May 8, at McDowell. In response to an appeal for help, Schenck, by a march of thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, had joined Milroy, and as ranking officer had taken command. He knew that he had a superior force to contend against, and his despairing questions bring to light the mismanagement on the Union side at the outset of this campaign. “Where is General Banks at this juncture? Where is Blenker's

¹ April 25, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 866.

² April 28, *ibid.*, p. 870.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 872, 875, 878.

⁴ See p. 461, vol. iii. of this work.

division?" he asked, and the day before, he had demanded from Frémont, his commanding general, "Answer me where you are, and with what force." Frémont, indeed, should have been in supporting distance, but he was fifty or sixty miles away.

Jackson had secured a hill overlooking the village of McDowell, whence could be seen the position of the Federals, and to some extent their strength. Milroy obtained permission to make a reconnaissance: the reconnaissance became a sharp engagement and a Union defeat. "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday," was the despatch of Jackson to Richmond. Schenck retreated that night, and was pursued by the Confederates to Franklin, where on May 14 he was joined by Frémont.¹ Jackson, however, anticipating Joseph E. Johnston's orders received later,² had begun the day before to retrace his steps with the design of co-operating with Ewell in an attack on Banks in the Shenandoah valley. This same plan had at the same time occurred independently to Johnston and to Lee.³ Jackson was a true Puritan soldier; it grieved him to march or to fight on the Sabbath. In his pursuit of Schenck, military considerations compelled him to press forward on Sunday, May 11, but having a chance for rest he dedicated half of the following day to "thanksgivings to Almighty God."⁴ Two days later at McDowell, part of one of the regiments of the Stonewall brigade mutinied. The men had volunteered for twelve months, their time had expired, and they now maintained that to apply to their case the Conscription Act passed only thirty

¹ My authorities for this account are the correspondence in O. R., vol. xii. part iii.; Jackson's, Schenck's, Milroy's, and Frémont's reports with despatches, *ibid.*, part i.; Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 285 *et seq.*; Dabney's Life of Jackson.

² Dabney (p. 353) says Jackson received from Lee an order of May 11 to return, but no such despatch or letter is printed in the Official Records.

³ Johnston to Ewell, May 13, Taylor to Lee, May 14, Lee to Jackson, May 16, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 888, 889, 892.

⁴ Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 258; Dabney, p. 353.

days before was a breach of faith: they laid down their arms and demanded their discharge. Their colonel called upon Jackson for instructions. "What is this but mutiny?" he thundered. "Why does Colonel Grigsby refer to me to know what to do with a mutiny? He should shoot them where they stand." Jackson at once gave orders appropriate to this outburst of wrath, and the mutineers promptly returned to their duty. Continuing his rapid march, he rested the whole of Friday, May 16, to observe the national day of prayer appointed by President Davis.¹ Pressing on through Harrisonburg, he united with Ewell near Newmarket, and with an army now 17,000 strong² began a series of brilliant movements in which his undoubted genius had free scope, owing to the mistakes of Banks and of the War Department at Washington.

Stanton failed utterly to divine the situation. May 9 he repeated a former order to Banks to fall back upon Strasburg and to send Shields's division to General McDowell at Fredericksburg if the enemy was not in force in his front. Stanton was possessed with the fear of a direct attack on the Federal capital. "The probabilities at present point to a possible attempt upon Washington while the Shenandoah army is amused with demonstrations," he said in his despatch. "Washington is the only object now worth a desperate throw." Therefore Shields must march with all possible speed to support McDowell.³ Banks deprecated the detachment of this force, presaging his misfortune,⁴ and if he had been a soldier he would have protested with satisfying reasons against it, as Stonewall Jackson objected a week later when Johnston proposed to withdraw Ewell from his command.⁵

¹ Dabney, pp. 353, 354.

² I cannot account entirely for the reduction of Jackson's force since the first part of May. I feel certain, however, of the correctness of both of my statements.

³ To Banks, May 9, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 150.

⁴ In a letter to Geary, May 9, *ibid.*, p. 154.

⁵ See correspondence, *ibid.*, p. 894 *et seq.*; Dabney, p. 359.

The possibility that Jackson would make a raid down the Shenandoah valley does not seem to have entered the mind of Stanton, for he further weakened Banks by ordering him to detach two of his regiments to relieve other men who had been guarding the railroad from Strasburg to Front Royal. Banks instantly complied, but telegraphed, "This will reduce my force greatly, which is already too small to defend Strasburg if attacked."¹ The War Department had warning enough. J. W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, telegraphed, May 18, that the condition of affairs in the valley threatened disaster: the enterprising and vigorous Jackson, reinforced by Ewell, had begun a march northward with a view of destroying his railway, and he asked whether it would not "be most judicious to order back Shields to co-operate with Banks."² Shields was not so far along on his march toward General McDowell that he could not have been brought back in time to frustrate the Confederate plan; but his orders were not changed. May 20 Frémont telegraphed Banks that Jackson had passed the Shenandoah mountain and was reported to be moving towards his front:³ this despatch must have been transmitted to Washington. Moreover, on the 21st, Banks understood the situation, reported it with substantial correctness to Stanton, estimating with practical accuracy Jackson's and Ewell's united force at 16,000; to oppose this he had 6000 men, besides artillery, at Strasburg, and 2800 guarding the railroad between Strasburg and Manassas.⁴ Still Shields was permitted to keep on. May 22 he joined McDowell. The next day, Friday, the President and the Secretary of War paid General McDowell a visit for the purpose of making the final arrangements for his march towards Richmond. The General said that he could move the following Sunday. Do not start on Sunday,

¹ From Strasburg, May 16, O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 522; see, also, part iii. p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, part iii. p. 202.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁴ *Ibid.*, part i. p. 523.

Lincoln by indirection said. Get a "good ready" and start on Monday. Thus it was arranged.¹

The gratification of the President and his War Secretary at the condition of McDowell's army and their anticipation of its successful and imposing advance was followed by bitter disappointment at the news which awaited them on their return to Washington. Jackson had swooped upon a small Federal force at Front Royal and routed it.² Fearing that his retreat would be cut off, Banks had abandoned Strasburg, and, fighting on the way, "ran a race" with Jackson to Winchester.³ Despatch after despatch that came from the theatre of operations to the War Department piled alarm on alarm. Reinforcements were ordered to Banks from Baltimore; Harper's Ferry sent him part of its garrison. At four o'clock on this 24th day of May, the President—it is he who now sends the most important despatches—directed Frémont to move from Franklin to Harrisonburg with the purpose of operating against the enemy for the relief of Banks. Between Strasburg and Winchester the Federal column was pierced. Receiving reports of this fighting, Lincoln at five o'clock suspended the order which had been given McDowell to unite with McClellan, and instructed him to send 20,000 men to the Shenandoah valley with the view of capturing Jackson's forces. To expedite these movements the Secretary of the Treasury went to Fredericksburg. At daybreak on Sunday, May 25, Jackson routed Banks at Winchester and, with hot pursuit of the "mass of disordered fugitives" and on the very point of destroying the entire force, drove them across the Potomac River. "There were never more grateful hearts

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 213; *ibid.*, vol. xi. part i. p. 30; Warden's Chase, p. 435; McDowell's testimony, Report of the Joint Committee on Conduct of the War (this will hereafter be referred to as C. W.), part i. p. 263. "I called their attention to the fact," testifies McDowell, "that once before I had moved on Sunday and had been very much condemned for it all over the country. But I said I was ready to do so again." Reference is made to Bull Run. See vol. iii. of this work, p. 455.

² May 23.

³ May 24. Lincoln's expression.

in the same number of men," wrote Banks, "than when at midday of the 26th we stood on the opposite shore."¹

The despatches sent to Washington on Sunday, which were largely from panic-stricken men,² alarmed the President and the Secretary of War. Their paramount object, which on Saturday was the capture of Jackson's army, now became mixed with fear for the safety of the capital. "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching on Washington," telegraphed Stanton to the several governors of the Northern States. "You will please organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State."³ This despatch and the response to it, reflecting the alarm at the capital, caused wild excitement at the North; it was afterwards spoken of in Massachusetts as "the great scare." The militia and home guards of many of the States were called out; regiments, among them the New York Seventh, were hurried to Baltimore and to Harper's Ferry. The President took military possession of all the railroads in the country.⁴ "I think the time is near," said Lincoln in a despatch to McClellan, "when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington."⁵ Part of

¹ Banks's report, O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 551; see Jackson's report, *ibid.*, p. 703; Correspondence, *ibid.*, p. 643, part iii. pp. 219, 222; Warden's Chase, p. 435. Banks himself, however, had no lack of physical courage.

² This may be said of only one despatch of Banks.

³ MS. War Department archives. In Stanton's handwriting.

⁴ MS. War Department; Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. v., Diary, p. 17; Schouler's Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 334; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 297; Clark's History of the N. Y. Seventh, vol. ii. p. 56; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 161; Appleton's Ann. Enc. 1862, p. 107. The order taking possession of the railroads is in Stanton's handwriting, although signed by Meigs.

⁵ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 32. After getting this, McClellan wrote his wife: "I have this moment received a despatch from the President, who is terribly scared about Washington, and talks about the necessity of my returning in order to save it. Heaven save a country governed by such counsels! . . . Banks has been soundly thrashed, and they are terribly alarmed in Washington. A scare will do them good, and may bring them to their senses." May 26 he wrote: "I feared last night that I would be ordered back for the defence of Washington." — Own Story, pp. 396, 397.

McDowell's force was recalled to the capital city. "Our condition is one of considerable danger," wrote Stanton, "as we are stripped to supply the Army of the Potomac and now have the enemy here."¹ McDowell had promptly sent off Shields with his division, who now retraced the steps he had taken but a few days before; the rest of the force for the Shenandoah valley followed after. McDowell himself went to see the President for counsel and then took command in person. May 26 it was known that Banks had effected his crossing of the Potomac at Williamsport, that the Federal capital was secure,² and that Harper's Ferry still remained in our possession, and its garrison with the reinforcements on the way ought to be able to resist any probable attack.³ Hearing of the movements of Shields and Frémont, Jackson began on May 30 a rapid retreat.⁴ The President had a distinct plan for his capture or destruction which was to be accomplished by the converging movements of the several forces upon Strasburg, surrounding him and cutting off his retreat to the south. In the direction of this campaign Lincoln issued instructions in person⁵ or by telegraph to the different commanders, and from the White House and War Department continued daily to despatch orders. The plan was too complicated to succeed,⁶ being such an one as Lee himself would hardly have undertaken at so great a

¹ May 25, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 241.

² Stanton and Meigs were again alarmed for the safety of Washington, May 29, on information received from Banks. The information should not have been credited. Their fear was groundless and was not shared by the President. O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 532 *et seq.*; part iii. p. 275.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 248, 251.

⁴ Jackson's report, *ibid.*, part i. p. 707.

⁵ Shields as well as McDowell had been called to Washington.

⁶ History of the Civil War in America, Comte de Paris, Am. ed., vol. ii. p. 47. General Sherman wrote his brother: "Banks's repulse was certain. Three converging armies whose point was in possession of the enemy was worse generalship than they tried to force on me in Kentucky of diverging lines with a superior enemy between. Our people must respect the well-established principles of the art of war, else successful fighting will produce no results." — Sherman Letters, p. 155.

distance from the field of operations. Moreover, in Banks and Frémont Lincoln had imperfect instruments for military designs; it was too much to expect that they would be efficient in a piece of intricate strategy.

The President urged Banks to follow the Confederates as they retreated, but he and his soldiers were demoralized. The commander of the Harper's Ferry garrison received like instructions; but while Jackson was retreating, some of his men, fearing an attack from the dreaded Confederate general, ran away.¹ Both of these forces should have been at Jackson's heels harassing him, but they did practically nothing. It was five o'clock on the afternoon of May 24, while at Franklin, that Frémont received the order to march southward to Harrisonburg. For what he considered abundant reasons in the matter of unobstructed roads and available supplies, he went northward instead, and failed to communicate with the War Department for two days, when the President learning of his whereabouts sent him this sharp despatch: "I see you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?" Receiving his excuses without a word of censure in rejoinder, Lincoln urged him forward. Although complaining of stormy weather, heavy roads, and many stragglers, and deeming it imperative to give his army one day's rest, Frémont promised to be at Strasburg with his 17,000 men Saturday, May 31, at five o'clock in the afternoon. The President had directed McDowell to be at Front Royal within supporting distance of Frémont at the same time. McDowell pushed forward Shields's division with celerity, and had it at the appointed place a day in advance; the rest of his 20,000 troops came up in time to be of assistance. But Frémont failed. Jackson made a swift march in spite of storm and mud. "Through the blessing of an ever-kind Providence," he wrote, "I passed Strasburg before the Federal armies under Generals Shields

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 290 *et ante*, also pp. 296, 303; part i. p. 531 *et seq.*

and Frémont effected the contemplated junction in my rear.”¹ Frémont and Shields pursued the Confederate general. There were two more battles in which he was victorious; indeed, after he had eluded the two armies May 31 and June 1, his safety was practically assured. June 8 the President ordered that the pursuit be stopped.² Stonewall Jackson's campaign of one month was distinguished by rapid marches, energetic and successful fighting. With an effective force of 17,000 he had won a number of battles, taken rich spoil and many prisoners, alarmed Washington, and prevented 40,000 men from joining the Union army before Richmond.³

A careful study of this campaign leaves one doubting the wisdom of sending the detachment from McDowell to the Shenandoah valley. It must be borne in mind that Lincoln then knew almost exactly the size of Jackson's army.⁴ McDowell called the President's order “a crushing blow,” obeyed it with “a heavy heart,” and argued against it with a force it is difficult with the facts now before us to counter-vail:⁵ indeed we may easily believe that if he had commanded all the troops except McClellan's he would have managed affairs better than did the President. Although he made the mistake at first of underestimating Jackson's force,⁶ it is certain that with the special duty assigned him of protecting the Federal capital he would have run no risk on that score. A suspension of his forward movement, the sending of part of his force directly to Washington, whence it could easily be brought back, would have made that city absolutely secure, and kept his army well in hand for offensive opera-

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 277 *et seq.*, part i. p. 645 *et seq.*, also p. 711; Dabney.

² O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 653, part iii. p. 354. McDowell spoke of Frémont's “vigorous pursuit,” *ibid.*, p. 325.

³ On this campaign the *Life of Stonewall Jackson* by Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson (vol. i.) may be read with interest; see *Ropes's Civil War*, part ii. p. 115 *et seq.*

⁴ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 32; vol. xii. part iii. p. 243.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁶ This error lasted only two days. *Ibid.*, pp. 221, 243.

tions should Jackson cease his advance. The dispiriting effect of this campaign's failure and the disorganization consequent on this derangement of McDowell's plans were apparent as late as June 27,¹ so that a large part of his army was neutralized at a time of active operations about Richmond. Jackson's design went no further than to threaten an invasion into Maryland with a menace to the Federal capital; he sent word to Richmond that if the authorities would increase his force to 40,000 he would march on Washington, but it was not practicable to furnish such a reinforcement.²

It is true that Richmond was easily ours if McDowell with 30,000 or 40,000 men had joined McClellan, and the joint army had been handled with the energy which the situation demanded; but since McClellan did not skilfully dispose in battle his hundred thousand, it is difficult to believe that he would have managed the larger undertaking better. Moreover his feeling towards McDowell was unfriendly. Their respective orders were difficult to harmonize, and efficient and generous co-operation on McClellan's part was hardly to be looked for.³ But McDowell thirsted to retrieve his defeat at Bull Run, and had he arrived near the scene of action on the Chickahominy a little before May 31, it is possible that under the command of McClellan or independently he would have struck a decisive blow.

McClellan seemed to be aware that while Jackson was making havoc in the Shenandoah valley he should embrace the opportunity to strike at Johnston. "The time is very near when I shall attack Richmond;" "We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," were his telegrams on successive days to the President.⁴

¹ McDowell's Testimony, C. W., part i. p. 266.

² Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 266; Dabney, p. 386; J. Davis to Jackson, O. R., vol. xii, part iii. p. 905.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 27, 28, 30, part iii. pp. 176, 184; Webb's *The Peninsula*, p. 87.

⁴ May 25, 26, O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 32, 33.

McClellan had an army of 100,000; Johnston had 63,000.¹ Yet it is doubtful whether McClellan would have taken the initiative. He never reached his "ideal completeness of preparation,"² and he fell short of understanding the opposing commander, even as he failed to arrive at a correct estimate of the enemy's force. "Richmond papers," he telegraphed, May 27, "urge Johnston to attack, now he has us away from gunboats. I think he is too able for that."³ On the same day in a letter to his wife he told of his arrangements for "the approaching battle. The only fear," he continued, "is that Joe's⁴ heart may fail him."⁵ Four days later Johnston did attack, and with a measure of success, owing to McClellan's faulty disposition of his force. At the time of this battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines (which took place May 31), McClellan, who had advanced from Williamsburg on the east side of the Chickahominy, had only two of his five corps on the Richmond side of the river. It is true that a division of his army was necessary, for a part of it must be left on the north side of the river, both to cover the railroad that ran to White House, his base of supplies, and furthermore to insure a safe and effective junction with McDowell, which, as we have seen, was expected as late as May 24. But McClellan's distribution of his strength was wrong; for, inasmuch as Johnston could in little more than half a day concentrate

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 204. For Johnston's force I have followed the computation of G. W. Smith, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 219, but Johnston in his article in that book estimates his own force at 73,928 (p. 209). Robert M. Hughes in his biography of Johnston, p. 148, seems to accept this figure. See an interesting computation of General F. W. Palfrey in *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Mass.*, vol. i. p. 170, where he arrives at the figure of 71,000, but he places McClellan's army at 100,000 to 110,000. All the authorities of weight, however, agree that the Federals outnumbered the Confederates at the time of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, in about the proportion of 3 to 2.

² General F. W. Palfrey, *Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, vol. i. p. 168.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 193.

⁴ Joseph Johnston.

⁵ McClellan's *Own Story*, p. 397.

nearly the whole of his army for an attack on the Union troops on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, McClellan should have placed his larger force to meet the greater danger.¹

Johnston, knowing of the anticipated forward movement of McDowell, had determined to fall upon the Union army on both sides of the river before the junction could be effected; but when he learned that McDowell had abandoned the march southward, he resolved to strike at the two Union corps nearest to Richmond.² May 31 was the appointed day. The afternoon and night before, a tropical storm had raged. Sheets of fire, lightnings sharp, and dreadful thunder-claps were fit precursors of the strife waged by the artillery of man.³ Water poured down from the clouds, and the treacherous Chickahominy, which had already risen from the spring rains, became a torrent, increasing the danger of the divided Union army and the eagerness of Johnston to give battle. Roads deep with mud and difficult for his batteries could not induce delay. Saturday, May 31, at some time after twelve o'clock, he attacked with vigor the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, drove them back, and came near inflicting on them a crushing defeat.

General Sumner saved the day at Fair Oaks. For two days McClellan had been ill at his headquarters, at Gaines's Mill, on the north side of the river, but was not incapacitated for business. This Saturday morning he should have feared for his bridges which maintained communication between the two wings of his army and which the flood in the river threatened to carry away. Common prudence, suggesting the possibility of attack, should have urged him to send at once

¹ Walker's Hist. of the Second Army Corps, p. 20; General F. W. Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 176; Comte de Paris, vol. ii. p. 53; Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 131.

² From Johnston's report one would gather that he supposed only Keyes's corps had crossed the river. He did not alter his plan until after the morning of the 28th. O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 555.

³ "All night long, Zeus, the lord of counsel, devised them ill with terrible thunderings. Then pale fear gat hold upon them." — The Iliad, vii. 477.

Sumner's corps to the other side of the Chickahominy ; but he delayed until he heard the sound of Johnston's guns, and then sent word to Sumner to be ready to move at a moment's warning. Sumner, every inch a soldier, knew the battle was on and thirsted to have his part in it. Comprehending the danger better than his chief, he at once marched his two divisions to his two bridges, halted, and anxiously awaited further commands. The order at last came to cross the river. Sumner's corps went over the swaying and tossing bridges, and preserved McClellan's left wing from rout. By the close of day the Confederates had driven the Federals on the left of their line back a mile or two, while those on the right, reinforced by Sumner, had held their own. But the Southern army had suffered a grievous loss in the severe wounding of General Johnston, who, knocked from his horse by the fragment of a shell near the end of the fight, was borne unconscious from the field.¹ McClellan was at no time during the day on the side of the river where the fighting took place ; the orders that he gave are dated from his headquarters north of the Chickahominy.

The result of the battle, Johnston's only partial defeat of the Federal left wing, instead of a rout, as had seemed probable, gave McClellan a great chance, which he seemed to appreciate. You ought to be able now to "hold your own," he sent word at five o'clock to Heintzelman.² "I will post everything during the night so as to be able to cross at New Bridge to-morrow."³ The bridges by which Sumner had gone over had become impassable, and orders were given

¹ Davis wrote his wife June 3: "The poor fellow [Johnston] bore his suffering most heroically. When he was about to be put into the ambulance to be removed from the field, I dismounted to speak to him; he opened his eyes, smiled, and gave me his hand, said he did not know how seriously he was hurt, but feared a fragment of shell had injured his spine." — Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 292.

² Heintzelman commanded the third corps and outranked Keyes, who had the fourth corps. Sumner commanded the second corps and outranked Heintzelman.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 203.

from headquarters to throw others across the river. At 8.15 Sunday morning, June 1, New Bridge was finished and fit for the use of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Meanwhile the battle had been renewed, the Confederates were driven back, losing the ground which they had gained, and a great victory seemed within the grasp of the Union army. An able and energetic commander would have been with his fighting troops at daylight; he would have ordered several brigades to take the heights from which the Confederates commanded New Bridge; the approaches to this bridge uncovered, he would have brought across the river the major part of his two corps who had not been in the engagement of Saturday; and, encouraged by the unimpaired morale of his troops,¹ the chances are more than even that he would have beaten the Confederate army and taken Richmond. McClellan did nothing of the sort. After his despatch to Heintzelman and the order for building the bridge, his native irresolution laid fast hold of him. He did not reach the field of battle Sunday until the firing had ceased, but his soldiers, highly gratified at his appearance, received him with "unbounded enthusiasm."² "Our faith in our commander was then absolute," writes General Palfrey, "and our admiration for him unlimited." The Union troops had pushed forward to within four miles of Richmond. Sumner, the ranking corps commander, asked McClellan if he had any orders to give. The answer was: No, I have no changes to make. I am satisfied with what has been done. The left wing of his army fell back to the lines it had occupied before the battle.³ The action of

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 749.

² General Peck's report of June 2.

³ In addition to authorities specifically cited, see Correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. part i. and iii.; Reports of Johnston, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Richardson, Hooker, Sickles, part i.; Testimony of McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, C. W., part i.; as to the bridges, Barnard's report, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 112; his pamphlet on the Peninsular Campaign, p. 9; Walker, Palfrey, and Webb in works hitherto referred to; Johnston, Narrative, and Article in Century War Book, vol. ii.; G. W. Smith's article, *ibid.*; Life of Johnston, Hughes;

the two days may be summed up as a partial success of Johnston, and in the end a repulse of the Confederates.¹

Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; G. W. Smith, Confederate War Papers; McClellan's Own Story. In the criticism of McClellan I have followed Walker, Hist. of the Second Army Corps, p. 21, and Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 199. Both were present at the battle.

I have not stated the chance of going into Richmond, June 1, as strongly as have some writers, for the reason that I do not believe the Confederates were badly demoralized. Barnard speaks, Jan. 26, 1863, of "the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated" (O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 131). Feb. 18, 1863, General Sumner testified: "When Johnston was knocked from his horse and taken in a litter to Richmond, the rebel army became a confused mob" (C. W., part i. p. 366); also Heintzelman (p. 352). Webb (p. 117) writes the Confederates were "in a panic" June 1. I do not think the contemporary evidence supports these statements. Generals Sickles and Hooker, in their reports of June 7 and 8, speak of "the hurried retreat" and "wild confusion" of the enemy, June 1 (O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 819, 824; see comment of G. W. Smith, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 259 *et seq.*; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, chap. viii.), and the Confederate General D. H. Hill says in his report, undated, "Armistead's men fled early in the action" (O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 945; see comment of Walker, Hist. 2d Corps, p. 49). I hardly think such a condition in two parts of the field warrants the general statement that the whole army was demoralized.

The N. Y. *Herald* correspondent telegraphed from McClellan's headquarters, June 6, that the "greatest consternation" had prevailed in Richmond, June 1. Barnard, in his political pamphlet published in 1864, quotes William Henry Hurlbut as to the disorderly retreat of the Confederates (p. 9). In Richmond, if we may consider the Richmond *Dispatch*, *Examiner*, and Jones's Diary sufficient authority, there was no panic; "anxiety" and "painful suspense" prevailed, but nothing more. The newspapers and Jones maintained that on both the days the Confederates had been successful. This belief grew with the inaction of the Union army, and allowed full course to the rejoicing over Stonewall Jackson's victories in the Shenandoah valley, which had begun before the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.

I suppose that by the morning of June 1 the Confederate soldiers generally knew that Johnston was wounded, and were much depressed by the mishap. General McClellan was not aware of it June 1; his despatch to Stanton at noon of that day makes no mention of it. Nor did he apparently know of this misfortune to the Confederates until June 6, when he speaks of it as a matter of news in a letter to his wife (Own Story, p. 399). General Richardson, writing June 4, does not refer to it (Moore, Reb. Rec., vol. v. Docs., p. 87). The fact that Johnston had been wounded was published in the Richmond *Dispatch* of June 2, and entered by Jones in his Diary as of that date (vol. i. p. 132).

¹ Hamley, Operations of War, p. 173. The total Union loss was 5031, the Confederate 6134. — Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 219.

June 1 Robert E. Lee was placed in command of the Confederate army, but did not assume the direction of affairs until the fighting of that day was over.¹ While Davis had unbounded confidence in Lee, and Stonewall Jackson thought that he had military talents of a high order,² no one could at that time have dreamed of his latent genius. The Army of Northern Virginia (by this name it became known shortly afterwards) regarded him as the most distinguished of engineers, but they retained a vivid impression of his failure the previous autumn in western Virginia, and neither officers nor men were hopeful that he would direct with energy and ability operations in the field.³ Johnston had won their confidence and respect; all looked upon his hurt as a calamity, and few, if any, believed that his loss had been repaired. Lee at once summoned his general officers in council. Longstreet, the commander of a division, did not regard this as reassuring; he thought secrecy in war was necessary, and that a discussion of plans with brigadiers was either harmful or useless. Lee listened intently to their accounts of the late battle and to their present opinions; he disclosed nothing, but, when the tone of the conversation became despondent at the progress of the siege which the invaders were conducting, he endeavored to cheer up his officers, and in this was assisted by Davis, who joined the council before its members separated.⁴ Afterwards Lee made a careful survey of the position of his army, and directed that it be at once strongly fortified. He had some difficulty in overcoming the aversion to manual labor which obtained

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 568; Smith, *Century War Book*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*. In the interim between Johnston and Lee, G. W. Smith had command.

² Davis's *Confederate Government*; *Life of Jackson*, Mrs. Jackson, p. 234. When Jackson, who had been very desirous for reinforcements, heard of the appointment of Lee as military adviser to the President, he said to a friend: "Well, madam, I am reinforced at last." — Dabney, p. 335.

³ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 112; *Life of Lee*, Long, p. 163; *Richmond Dispatch*, July 9, 1862.

⁴ Longstreet, p. 112; Davis, p. 130; Long, p. 162.

among the Southern soldiers,¹ but his constant personal superintendence combined with his pleasing authoritative manner to push things forward, so that he soon had his defensive works well under way.² In one respect at least the substitution of Lee for Johnston was a gain for the Southern cause. Johnston and Davis could not work together, and while the fault lay more with the Confederate President,³ the general was not wholly blameless. Johnston's letters at this time are marked by an acerbity which is not absent even when he is writing to Lee, for whom he had undoubtedly a profound respect. But no one could quarrel with Lee, who in his magnanimity and his deference to his fellow-workers resembles Lincoln. Between the courtly Virginia gentleman, proud of his lineage, and the Illinois backwoodsman who came out of the depths, the likeness, in this respect, is as true as it is striking.

The harmony between Davis and Lee was complete. Something had already been done in the way of bringing reinforcements from the South, and under the new command this movement went on with vigor. In reading the orders, the despatches, the history of the army at this time, one seems to feel that a new energy has been infused into the management of affairs. Lee had a talent for organization equal to that of McClellan. In a few days he had matters well in hand and had gained the respect of the officers of his army. Unremitting in industry, he rode over his lines nearly every day. June 6 he noted "the enemy working like beavers," and wrote Longstreet: "Our people seem to think he will advance to-morrow morning. If so, I directed that he should be resisted."⁴ Longstreet, who commanded the Confederate right, had expected an attack at any moment since the battle of Fair Oaks.⁵ In six days subsequent to that battle the

¹ Letter of Davis to his wife, June 11, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310.

² Long, p. 165 *et seq.*

³ See vol. iii. p. 459.

⁴ O. R., vol. xi, part iii. p. 577.

⁵ Letter of June 7 to Johnston, *ibid.*, p. 580.

Confederate defences were so far advanced that Lee had good ground for his hope that he could repel an assault.¹

Although McClellan was in sight of the spires of Richmond, he had no intention of attempting to break through by storm the Confederate line of intrenchments. The weather was unfavorable. The heavy rains continued, and the Chickahominy became a flood interfering with the desired crossing of troops from the north to the south side of the river. The roads were so bad that the movement of artillery — an arm in which the Federals excelled — was extremely difficult if not impossible. The freshet in the James River was the greatest that had been known since 1847. In one street of Richmond the water came nearly up to the hubs of wagon-wheels, and owing to the condition of the roads the task of supplying the Confederate army was laborious and irksome. When Burnside visited, June 10, McClellan's headquarters, it took him four and a half hours to cover nine miles. He reported to Stanton that it was impossible to move artillery, and "but for the railroad the army could not be subsisted and foraged."²

McClellan was begging for reinforcements, and the War Department did its best to comply with his demands. McCall's division of McDowell's corps was ordered to join him, and regiments were sent him from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe. These troops went forward by water as McClellan desired. It had been intended to send him the residue of McDowell's army, and this general wrote: "I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service."³ The President strained every nerve to help McClellan, but was unable to do all that he wished. June 15 he wrote: I now fear that McDowell cannot get to you either by water or by land in time. "Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at

¹ Long, p. 167.

² O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 224; see also p. 223 and part i. pp. 45, 46; Richmond *Dispatch*, June 5, 6, 7, 11; Richmond *Whig*, June 7; letter of Davis to his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310.

³ June 8 or 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 220.

elbows and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again.”¹ At the time the order was given McCall to join the Army of the Potomac, Stanton telegraphed McClellan: “Please state whether you will feel sufficiently strong for your final movement when McCall reaches you.” The reply came promptly: “I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery.”² June 12 and 13 McCall’s division joined him: this with the troops from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe gave him a total reinforcement, since the battle of Fair Oaks, of 21,000.³ The weather had now become fine. The roads were dry.⁴ It actually looked as if McClellan were going to give battle. June 13 his adjutant telegraphed Burnside: “General McClellan desires me to say that there is a prospect of an engagement here shortly;” and five days later he himself telegraphed the President: “After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit.”⁵ But a preposterous overestimate of the enemy’s force and a shrinking from an order that would result in the profuse shedding of blood led him again to hesitate: he did not give the word that would have brought on a desperate battle. Perhaps at

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 181.

² O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 46; part iii. p. 219.

³ Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. p. 230.

⁴ Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. pp. 223, 225, 226; Richmond *Dispatch*, June 13, 14; McClellan’s letters to his wife, June 11, 14, 15, Own Story, pp. 403, 404.

⁵ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 227, 223. I append most of McClellan’s despatch of June 18. “Our army is well over the Chickahominy, except the very considerable forces necessary to protect our flanks and communications. Our whole line of pickets in front runs within six miles of Richmond. The rebel line runs within musket-range of ours. Each has heavy support at hand. A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works . . . After to-morrow, we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.” See also letter to his wife, June 15, Own Story, p. 405.

this time his irresolution and timidity stood his army in good stead. McClellan had 105,000 to Lee's 64,000,¹ and when we take into account that a portion of his force was necessary to guard his communications on the north side of the Chickahominy, he had not preponderance enough to justify a direct attack on an army strongly intrenched. It is evident from Lee's and Davis's letters that nothing would have gratified them more.² Whatever discouragement had prevailed immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks had vanished. "We are better prepared now than we were on the first of the month," wrote Jefferson Davis, June 23, "and with God's blessing will beat the enemy as soon as we can get at him."³

As McClellan gave expression in writing to his many vacillating moods, it is difficult to know exactly what was his real plan, but we may accept the one which he outlined to his wife. "I shall probably," he gave her to understand, "make my first advance June 17 or 18. The next battle will be fought at 'Old Tavern,' on the road from New Bridge to Richmond. I think the rebels will make a desperate fight, but I feel sure that we will gain our point. . . . I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the 'Old Tavern' I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault."⁴ It was substantially this same plan that Lee, who seemed to know McClellan as well as did McClellan himself, divined and undertook to thwart. "Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments," he wrote Jackson, "he will move by positions ["gradual approaches" is the expression Lee employs in a previous letter] under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of Richmond."⁵ It was apparently the

¹ June 20, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 238; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 69.

² Correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. part iii.; Mrs. Davis's *Memoir*, vol. ii.

³ To his wife, Mrs. Davis's *Memoir*, vol. ii. p. 314.

⁴ Letter of June 15, *Own Story*, p. 405.

⁵ June 16, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 602.

conventional design of an engineer officer, and was foreseen independently by Davis, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.¹ Knowing the Federal superiority in artillery, it is little wonder that they regarded the movements of the Union army with apprehension. Perhaps they did not guess what Lee seemingly took for granted, that McClellan's procrastination would bring to naught his strategy. Nothing indeed could have been more dangerous to the Union forces. Encamped in the swamps of the Chickahominy, unaccustomed to an atmosphere so damp and malarious, drinking the water of the marshes, his soldiers suffered from diarrhœa and fevers, many of them also from scurvy, with the natural result that the morale of his army had lowered distinctly from the 1st to the 20th of June.² But more than this, his delay was even fatal in that it afforded Lee time to mature and execute a project which needed a greater genius than McClellan to frustrate. Davis visited the lines of the army frequently, and from his own observations and friendly intercourse with the commanding general, comprehended the situation and saw clearly the problem to be solved. "The enemy," he wrote June 13, "keeps close under cover, is probably waiting for reinforcements, or resolved to fight only behind his own intrenchment. We must find if possible the means to get at him without putting the breasts of our men in antagonism to his heaps of earth."³ As a measure towards this end, Lee decided to reinforce with two brigades Jackson, who was still in the Shenandoah valley, directing

¹ D. H. Hill, the general of a division, wrote, June 10: "The enemy has now ditched himself up to the very gates of Richmond. In a week or two weeks at furthest he will open his siege batteries and the capital must fall." — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 587. Davis wrote his wife, June 11: "The enemy's policy is to advance by regular approaches covered by successive lines of earthworks, that reviled policy of West Pointism and Spades which is sure to succeed against those who do not use like means to counteract it." — Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310. Longstreet wrote D. H. Hill, June 16: "I don't think we have as much to apprehend in the way of an attack as the long guns." — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 603.

² C. W., part i. pp. 285, 286, 293; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 228; Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 208.

³ To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 312.

him with his main body to "move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise . . . and sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications."¹ Lee, having made up his mind that a direct assault upon McClellan's left wing was "injudicious if not impracticable," would, with the larger part of his force, cross the Chickahominy and fall upon Porter, who commanded the right wing of the Union army.² Proceeding with caution, he ordered Stuart with his cavalry to make a reconnaissance "around the rear of the Federal army to ascertain its position and movements."³ Having now some apprehension that McClellan, if aware of the weakening of his force by the reinforcement to Jackson, might attack the Confederates, he asked the Secretary of War to influence the Richmond newspapers not to mention the project.⁴ June 16 Lee made a personal reconnaissance of the Federal position north of the Chickahominy, and the question to his military secretary, "Now, Colonel Long, how can we get at those people?" showed that he was still revolving the details of his plan.⁵ Shortly after this he submitted his ripened project to his President, showing that the successful execution of it depended upon the ability of the small Confederate force left before Richmond to hold in check the more powerful left wing of the Federal army which was on the south side of the Chickahominy. "I pointed out to him," writes Davis, in his relation of the

¹ Lee to Jackson, June 11, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 589.

² The clause "while this army attacks General McClellan in front," which follows the cited part in the text of Lee's despatch to Jackson of June 11, prevents me from affirming that Lee as early as June 11 had substantially decided on the plan which he executed. Longstreet (From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 120) states that Lee had intended to attack McClellan's left wing while Jackson fell upon the right: at the suggestion, presumably of Longstreet, this was changed, the day after the return of Stuart from his reconnaissance (June 17), to the plan indicated in the text. See discussion of this subject in Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 165 *et seq.*

³ Lee's report, O. R., vol. xi. part ii. p. 490; Lee to Stuart, June 11, part iii. p. 590.

⁴ Lee to Randolph, *ibid.*

⁵ Long's Notebook, his life of Lee, p. 168.

interview, "that our force and intrenched line between that left wing and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for, . . . as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old *esprit de corps* manifested itself in General Lee's first response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes, but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, 'If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there.'" ¹ Not long after this interview Jefferson Davis wrote his wife: "I wish General J. E. Johnston were able to take the field. Despite the critics who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service." ²

One week after he had given the order for the reinforcement of Jackson, Lee, apparently reckoning on McClellan's certain inaction, played upon the credulity of his adversary and the fears of the authorities in Washington. He knew that McClellan was in the habit of reading the Richmond journals, which, in view of their faithful regard of his former request, were now asked to publish the news that strong reinforcements had been sent to the Shenandoah valley. One newspaper asserted that Jackson, who now had as many men as he wanted, would drive Frémont and Shields across the Potomac, or, if they made a stand, would gain over them another glorious victory. This was evidence, the editor con-

¹ Davis's Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 132.

² June 23, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 314.

tinued, of the immense military resources of the South; there were men enough to defend Richmond and to swell Jackson's army.¹ McClellan, who had received the same intelligence from deserters, fell into the trap and telegraphed the President, "If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence."² The War Department had like information from other sources, and induced the President to withhold troops from the Army of the Potomac that otherwise would have been sent. Yet Lincoln suspected this action of the Confederates to be a "contrivance for deception,"³ but seems to have been alone in his suspicion.

Meanwhile Jackson was swiftly and stealthily moving his army towards the Chickahominy. To be present at the personal conference which Lee desired, he left his troops fifty miles from Richmond with orders to continue their progress; and, riding with haste, met in council at mid-day on June 23 the commanding general, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill. Lee set forth his plan of battle, and assigned to each of his generals the part he should play. Jackson said that he would be ready to begin his attack on the morning of the 26th.⁴

While these astute soldiers were constructing this snare, what was McClellan doing? He had noted, June 23, the "rather mysterious movements" of the enemy; he had heard the next day that Jackson was marching towards him with the intention of attacking his rear, and that Confederate troops from Richmond intended to cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge.⁵ He ought to have been cudgelling his brains to guess Lee's plan and to devise measures to

¹ Richmond *Dispatch*, June 18; D. H. Hill, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 347; Richmond *Examiner*, June 19.

² June 18, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 233.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 232, 234, 236.

⁴ Dabney, p. 434; Longstreet, p. 121; D. H. Hill, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 347.

⁵ Own Story, p. 408; O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 49; part iii. p. 248.

thwart it; yet there is no evidence that McClellan was at this time gravely anxious. He had been engaged in writing an essay in the form of a long letter to the President, instructing him in the matter of military arrests and the exercise of military power in general, dictating to him what should be the course of the government in dealing with slavery: in short, the general admonished the chief magistrate with regard to his civil and military policy in the conduct of the war. Those parts of the letter that were not insolent were platitudes, and denoted a scattering of thought which augured ill in a man who had supreme responsibility. The injunctions that trenched upon the ground of the President would have been unbecoming in a general flushed with victory; in a commander who was not backed up by success they were outrageous. Not Lee nor Grant in any portion of his brilliant career can be conceived to have written to his President this letter of McClellan's.¹

McClellan was getting ready for his gradual advance. The first step, which was taken by Heintzelman June 25 in front of Seven Pines, resulted in a skirmish, but led to nothing further. All attention is now concentrated on the north side of the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 25th, McClellan visited Fitz John Porter's headquarters,² where he was confirmed in the impression that Jackson would assail his rear; and detecting indications of an attack on his front, he made arrangements accordingly.

Through unavoidable delays Jackson was half a day late. A. P. Hill with five brigades waited at Meadow Bridge until three o'clock in the afternoon of this June 26 for Jackson to perform his part; then fearing longer delay, he crossed the river and came directly in front of Porter. This brought on a battle in which the Confederates met with a bloody repulse.

¹ This letter is correctly printed by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 447. While dated July 7, the correspondence (O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 48) shows that it had been substantially prepared by June 20. See remarks of Nicolay and Hay as to this, p. 449 *et seq.*

² Porter commanded the right wing.

In the mean time D. H. Hill and Longstreet, with their divisions, had gone over the Mechanicsville bridge to the north bank of the Chickahominy, but arriving at a late hour of the day, only D. H. Hill's leading brigade took part in the engagement.

McClellan went to Porter's headquarters that afternoon or early evening, while the battle was still on. Obtaining a better idea of Jackson's object, his fear for the communications with his base at White House increased, and that apprehension doubtless entered largely into the consultation with his favorite general. Porter, full of energy and ambition, proposed that he should be slightly reinforced, with the purpose of holding his own on Beaver Dam creek, while McClellan with the main body of the army moved upon Richmond. His alternative was to fall back with his corps to a safer position. While McClellan was with Porter, he came to no decision, but on returning to his own headquarters, he arrived at the conclusion, either from a fuller knowledge of Jackson's movements or from reflection on what he already knew, that Porter's position was untenable, and ordered him to withdraw his troops to the selected ground east of Gaines's Mill, where he could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy which connected the Union right and left wings and were indispensable should a further retreat become necessary. Porter received this command at two o'clock in the morning, and at daylight began the movement, which was executed without serious molestation and in perfect order. At first he had hoped to get along without aid, although he requested McClellan to have Franklin's corps ready to reinforce him, but on posting his army in position he made up his mind that his force was too small to defend successfully so long a line, and therefore asked Barnard, the chief engineer of the army, who had conducted him to the new position, to represent to the commanding general the necessity of reinforcement, and also to send him felling axes for defensive purposes. Barnard went to the headquarters of the army on the south side of the Chickahominy at nine or ten in the morning, and being in-

formed that the commanding general was reposing, failed to see McClellan and to deliver any word to him, so that he never received this appeal of Porter for additional troops.¹ This was a grave mischance, and may have lost the Union army the day. Nevertheless, at seven in the morning, Franklin did receive an order to send Slocum's division to assist Porter; but at nine or ten o'clock, when part of the division had crossed the Chickahominy, the order was countermanded, and the troops who had gone over returned to their original position on the south side of the river.

On this Friday, June 27, was fought the battle of Gaines's Mill.² Porter, who had at the commencement of the battle 20,000 to 25,000 men, contended against Jackson, Longstreet, and the two Hills, whose combined forces amounted to 55,000. Lee was in immediate command, and Jefferson Davis was on the battlefield. In their first onset the Confederates met with an obstinate resistance and were driven back. At two o'clock in the afternoon Porter called for reinforcements; and McClellan, who did not visit the field of battle that day, but remained at the army headquarters on the south side of the Chickahominy, ordered Slocum's division of 9000 men to his support. This time they joined him. Porter, who was making a magnificent fight and undoubtedly believed that he held in check the larger part of Lee's army, supposed that his commanding general with the 55,000 troops remaining on the south side of the river would embrace an occasion so conspicuous to overpower Magruder's 25,000 that stood between the Union left wing and Richmond, and to accomplish by a bold stroke the object of the campaign. In balancing the chances, the weight of authority, both Northern and Southern, is that success would have attended this operation. At the Union headquarters it was expected; by the Confederate generals it was feared. But in McClellan's orders and

¹ Porter states that the axes were received too late in the day to be of service.

² Or battle of the Chickahominy.

despatches, either official or private, there is no inkling that he pondered at any time that day so bold a project. Indeed, his estimate of the Confederate force precluded the barest consideration of it. He believed that Lee had 180,000 men, of whom 70,000 had assailed Porter, leaving between McClellan and Richmond, behind intrenchments, 110,000, on whom none but a foolhardy general would think of making a direct attack with an army only half as large. His attitude was confessedly defensive, and he measured the situation as if the Shakespearean saying,

“In cases of defence 't is best to weigh
The enemy more mighty than he seems,”¹

were a maxim of war.

Magruder deceived McClellan, as he had done when the Union army lay before Yorktown; he also misled Franklin, Sumner, and Hooker, by attacking their pickets from time to time, and by opening a frequent fire of artillery on their works. At about five o'clock in the afternoon McClellan, hearing that Porter was hotly pressed, asked Franklin and Sumner if they could spare men for his assistance. Franklin, having now but one division, did not deem it prudent further to weaken his force, and Sumner reluctantly proffered two brigades, which were ordered across the Chickahominy. Nothing shows McClellan's timid tactics more clearly than his hesitation in reinforcing Porter. He loved Porter and would have rejoiced, without a spark of envy, to see him win a glorious victory. His despatches make evident how anxious he was to give efficient support to his right wing, yet, swayed by his overestimate of the enemy's force, he apparently accepted the judgment of his corps commanders without question, when considerations, both military and personal, should have led him to send one half of his left wing to Porter's aid. His telegram to the Secretary of War at the close of the day, that he was “attacked by greatly superior numbers

¹ Henry V., act ii. sc. iv.

in all directions on this side"¹ (the Richmond side of the Chickahominy), remains an ineffaceable record of his misapprehension.

Meanwhile Fitz John Porter, as cool as if he were on parade,² his tactics seemingly without defect, himself in the thick of the fight inspiring his officers and men, repelled the assaults of nearly double his numbers, directed by the genius of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, led on by the courage and determination of the Hills and Longstreet. Higher praise can come to no general than that which Lee and Jackson unconsciously gave Porter in their reports. "The principal part of the Federal army was now on the north side of the Chickahominy," wrote Lee; both speak of the "superior force of the enemy."³ All accounts agree as to the discipline and bravery of the soldiers of both armies. When we consider their small experience in battle, we may describe the impetuous attack of the Confederates as did Jackson the charge of one of their regiments, speaking of it as an "almost matchless display of daring and valor." We may also borrow from him the words "stubborn resistance" and "sullen obstinacy" to describe the work of defence. On the Union side Meade and John F. Reynolds, commanders of brigades, made their mark that day. But skilful as was the general, brave as were the soldiers, 31,000 men, with no intrenchments, with barriers erected along a small portion only of their front, could not finally prevail against 55,000 equally brave and as skilfully led. The end came at about seven o'clock. Lee and Jackson ordered a general assault; the Confederates broke the Federal line, captured many cannon, and forced Porter's troops back to the woods on the bank of the Chickahominy. Then cheering shouts were heard; they came from the brigades of French and Meagher of Sumner's corps which had been sent to the support of their comrades. They came too late to save

¹ At eight P. M., O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 266.

² Walker's Hist. 2d Army Corps, p. 62.

³ Lee's and Jackson's reports, dated, respectively, March 6, Feb. 20, 1863 O. R., vol. xi. part ii. pp. 492, 556. Jackson says "superior numbers."

the day, but they efficiently covered the retreat of Porter's exhausted and shattered regiments, who withdrew dejectedly to the south side of the river.¹

In his despatches during the battle McClellan does not display bewilderment. At five o'clock he thought Porter might hold his own until dark, and three hours later his confidence was only a little disturbed,² but by midnight he had reached a state of demoralization which revealed itself in his famous Savage Station despatch to the Secretary of War. "I now know the full history of the day," he wrote. "On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. . . . The sad remnants of my men behave as men. . . . I have lost this battle because my force was too small. . . . I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or

¹ My authorities for this account are: the correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. parts i. and iii.; McClellan's report of July 15, 1862, and general report of Aug. 4, 1863, *ibid.*, parts i. and ii.; reports of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Magruder, and Fitz John Porter, *ibid.*, part ii.; of Barnard, Heintzelman, and J. E. B. Stuart, part i.; letters to his wife in McClellan's Own Story; Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862*; Davis, *Confederate Government*, vol. ii.; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; Long, *Life of Lee*; Dabney, *Life of Jackson*; letter of J. E. Johnston to Beauregard, Aug. 4, 1862, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 432; Jefferson Davis, *Memoir by his wife*, vol. ii.; McClellan's, Franklin's, and Heintzelman's testimony, C. W., part i.; McClellan's, Fitz John Porter's, and D. H. Hill's articles, *Century War Book*, vol. ii.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Palfrey, *Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, vol. i.; Webb, *The Peninsula*; Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v.; Swinton, *The Army of the Potomac*. See Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 177 *et seq.*

² O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 265, 266.

to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”¹

The news was a terrible blow to the President. The finely equipped army which had cost so much exertion and money, had gone forward with high hopes of conquest, and apparently bore the fate of the Union, had been defeated, and was now in danger of destruction or surrender.² This calamity the head of the nation must face, and he failed not. Overlooking the spirit of insubordination in his general's despatch, with equal forbearance and wisdom, he sent McClellan a reply which, mingling circumspection with gentleness of spirit, offers the most charitable explanation possible of the disaster. “Save your army at all events,” he wrote. “Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. . . . I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. . . . It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government are to blame.”³

The day of Gaines's Mill ended the offensive attitude of the Army of the Potomac. The story now deals with its retreat during the rest of the Seven Days' Battles, as the fighting from June 25 to July 1 is called. The force under McClellan at the beginning of this episode was somewhat less than 100,000;⁴ Lee's force was between 80,000 and 90,000. A few days before the battle of Gaines's Mill McClellan had anticipated a possible severance of his com-

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 61. The date of this is 12.20 A. M., June 28.

² See Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 443; Schuckers's Chase, p. 447.

³ June 28, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 269.

⁴ From a collation of all accounts I feel quite certain that McClellan did not have 100,000 men fit for duty, but I cannot explain the decline in his force from 105,000, of June 20, to less than 100,000, June 25. The only detachment from the force I have found is that of Stoneman's cavalry and two regiments of infantry to guard the communication with White House.

munications with White House by ordering supplies up the James River for the purpose of establishing, if necessary, a new base at a convenient point below Drewry's Bluff. The contingency had now arrived. The defeat of Porter by a superior Confederate force on the north side of the Chickahominy had made it impossible for the Union Army to maintain its communications with White House; and McClellan, assembling his corps commanders at his headquarters on the night of Gaines's Mill, very properly issued the necessary orders to begin at once the movement for a change of base to the James. That he would undertake such an operation had not entered the mind of Lee. The Confederate general felt sure that McClellan would either give battle to preserve his communications, or else would cross the Chickahominy by the lower bridges and retreat down the Peninsula. But, during the forenoon of June 28, Lee, observing clouds of dust, which denoted the Federal army to be in motion, and having learned also that the railroad which brought them supplies had been abandoned, came to the conclusion that retreat down the peninsula was the alternative decided upon, and accordingly lay idle that day prepared to strike at the fit moment a telling blow. McClellan was allowed twenty-four hours to organize his retreat unmolested. Lee's misconception probably saved the Federal army from a crushing defeat, and secured the success of this operation. Many of the Union soldiers were busy that day in burning heaps of commissary and quartermaster's stores, while others loaded railway cars with the ammunition and shells of the siege guns, attached a locomotive under full head of steam, and, applying the torch, ran the ignited and exploding train into the river; still others set about the destruction of some of the officers' baggage. Meanwhile Keyes's corps marched across White Oak Swamp, and took a position to protect 5000 loaded wagons, 2500 head of cattle on the hoof, and the reserve artillery. Later in the day Porter followed. Everything progressed smoothly and in good order. It was a painful though necessary feature of the retreat that twenty-

five hundred sick and wounded who were in a summer hospital, with five hundred attendants, had been left behind.

By sunrise of Sunday, June 29, the Confederates discovered that the Union army, which they had hoped to capture or destroy, had fled towards the James River. Immediate pursuit was given. Most of the troops had already gone by, but Magruder overtook Sumner's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's corps at Savage's Station, and a severe battle took place, in which the Confederates were defeated and the passage of the White Oak Swamp secured for the rear-guard of the Federal army. June 30 was fought the stubborn battle of Glendale, or Frayser's Farm. Longstreet and A. P. Hill contended with McCall's division and Heintzelman's, and part of Sumner's corps. Neither side prevailed, and the Union troops continued their retreat in good order. It was thought that if Jackson had come up at the time he was expected a portion of McClellan's army would have been destroyed or captured. The swift-moving Jackson had apparently been slow. He had been delayed in crossing the Chickahominy from the necessity of repairing the Grapevine bridge which the Federals had destroyed. He was late at Savage's Station, and on reaching the White Oak Swamp found the bridge and the passage disputed by Franklin. Dabney, his admiring biographer, thinks he would have managed somehow to cross the swamp, had not his genius suffered a "temporary eclipse" from sleeplessness and physical exhaustion.¹ At all events, Jackson made no persistent attempt to force a passage at the bridge crossing or at Brackett's Ford, one mile above, and by his failure to support Longstreet and A. P. Hill, an important feature of Lee's plan miscarried. At the commencement of the battle of Glendale, Lee and Davis were so engrossed in watching the operations of their army that they came under fire, the Confederate President narrowly escaping accident. McClellan had left the field before the fighting began, seeking a defensive position for the next day.

¹ Life of Jackson, p. 460.

The morning of July 1 found the whole Union army posted on Malvern Hill, a strong position near the James River. By noon the Confederates appeared. Lee and Jefferson Davis were with their troops. D. H. Hill, now under Jackson's command, learned the great natural strength of Malvern Hill from a clergyman reared in the neighborhood, and going to Willis's Church to meet Lee, who, he writes, "bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before and made no allusion to it," imparted to the general his knowledge of the "commanding height" and "ample area" before them, and made bold to say, "If General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone." Longstreet laughed and retorted, "Don't get scared now that we have got him whipped."¹ Although Lee understood McClellan well and played upon his weaknesses, he did not realize the extreme timidity of his tactics on the day of Gaines's Mill, and doubtless considered it past belief that he could have left exposed to an attack so overpowering a single corps tardily supported by one division to meet the combined forces of the Confederate army. Porter's spirited defence confirmed Lee in his error. Supposing that he had badly defeated the principal part of the Union army at Gaines's Mill, he now thought that he was pursuing shattered divisions and demoralized troops. Jackson had failed to give the crushing blow at Glendale, and while now the promise of success was not so good, yet a victorious army can do much against one in flight after a defeat. Therefore Lee resolved to attack McClellan, and the order was given that opened the battle of Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill and Magruder did the fighting on the Confederate side, but with inadequate support. Although their troops fought bravely and well, they were mowed down by the fire of the splendid artillery and the efficiently directed infantry of the Union army. On the Union side, the burden of the battle was borne by Couch of Keyes's corps and Morell² of Porter's.

¹ Hill's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 391; Hill's report, *O. R.*, vol. xi. part ii. p. 628.

² Both commanded divisions.

They showed themselves able leaders, and Porter's generalship was of a high order. The Confederates were repulsed at all points with a loss double that of the Federals. Hill describes the heroic advance of nine brigades of Magruder across an open field "under the fire of field-artillery in front and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in the rear. It was not war," he declares, "it was murder."¹ In his report he speaks of "the blundering management of the battle."² Nearly all the observers and writers agree that Lee's generalship at Malvern Hill was clearly defective. The attack is condemned and the execution of it censured.

McClellan was not with his fighting troops. Some think that if he had been on the field and seen with his own eyes the victory his devoted soldiers³ had won for him, he would have held his position on Malvern Hill; an energetic general might even have taken the offensive and gained a success of moment. In the Seven Days' Battles McClellan's loss was 15,849; Lee's 20,135.⁴ McClellan with his army retired to

¹ Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 394.

² O. R., vol. xi. part ii. p. 629.

³ "The dear fellows cheer me as of old, as they march to certain death, and I feel prouder of them than ever." — McClellan to his wife, July 1, *Own Story*, p. 442.

⁴ Killed, Union 1734, Confederate 3286; wounded, Union 8062, Confederate 15,909; missing, Union 6053, Confederate 940. — *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 315.

I have despaired at getting at the truth as to the capture of artillery. Lee in his report dated March 6, 1863, says he took 52 pieces. Hill in his undated report says 51. — O. R., vol. xi. part ii. pp. 498, 622. McClellan's statements cannot be reconciled with these nor with each other. McClellan to the President, July 2: "I have lost but one gun;" to Stanton, July 3: "Our light and heavy guns are saved with the exception of one;" address to his soldiers, July 4: "You have saved all your material, all your trains, and all your guns except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy;" to the President, July 4: "We have lost no guns except twenty-five on the field of battle." — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 287, 291, 299; part i. p. 72. McClellan to his wife, July 2: "I have the whole army here, with all its material and guns." — *Own Story*, p. 442. Lee says his army took 35,000 stands of small arms, Hill 27,000; both say 10,000 prisoners were captured.

My authorities for this account of the military operations after Gaines's Mill are substantially those cited in note 1 on p. 43. In addition I have

Harrison's Landing. July 8 Lee fell back to the vicinity of Richmond. After seven days of constant march and fight, both armies needed rest. Their thinned ranks must be filled before active operations could be resumed. In one month, indeed, those citizen soldiers had become veterans. The meed of victory attended the training of one army, and while defeat was the lot of the Union troops, they had not lost honor. They made an orderly retreat, and in the rear-guard fighting had more than once beaten their adversary.

The Peninsular campaign was a failure, and the chief cause of its failure may be ascribed to McClellan. I have spoken of the mistakes of Lincoln and Stanton, wherein they contributed to the embarrassment of the Union army in its operations before Richmond, but it is not just to weigh their errors as heavily as we do those of the commanding general. Lincoln was a civilian called by the voice of the people to a place which on the occurrence of the war became one of unprecedented difficulty. That he would gladly have thrown all responsibility of the movement of armies on a man of military training, is shown by his whole treatment of McClellan. But McClellan was not equal to the position of commander-in-chief, and because of his incompetence the President was forced little by little to invade his province and assume unwonted duties with a result that is not surprising. Lincoln's care to avail himself of all sources of enlightenment is shown by his night journey, June 23, on a quick special train to West Point for the purpose of consulting General Scott, who was too infirm to visit Washington.¹ The traditions of the country were favorable to the occupancy of the War Department by a civilian, and Stanton brought to this office ability, energy, and honesty.² The mistakes of

used the reports of Sumner, Franklin, and Keyes; the testimony of Sumner, Keyes, and Hooker, C. W., part i.; articles of Longstreet and Franklin, *Century War Book*, vol. ii.

¹ N. Y. *Herald, Times*, June 25, 26.

² See J. C. Ropes's remarkable characterization of Stanton, *Story of the Civil War*, part i. p. 225.

Lincoln and Stanton were those of civilians who were constrained by force of circumstances to intervene in military business, while McClellan's trade was war; and when offensive operations had to be conducted on a large scale, he showed himself to be incompetent in his trade. It is no longer necessary to bring proof, indeed it is hardly necessary even to state, that Lincoln desired sincerely and ardently the success of his general. To me it is equally clear that Stanton shared this feeling. The very nature of the case, the combination of patriotism and self-interest, must have made the Secretary eager for victories no matter by what general won. His letters, despatches, and verbal assurances are evidence either that he did all in his power to aid McClellan, consistent with what he deemed his duty elsewhere, and that he would have rejoiced with no feeling of envy at the success of the Peninsular campaign, or that he was black-hearted and treacherous, to a degree inconceivable of one trusted by the most honest and magnanimous of men, Abraham Lincoln.¹

McClellan's failure was due largely to his absurd overestimate of the enemy, which unnerved him when active operations were needed.² Perhaps his tactics would have been

¹ See Stanton to McClellan, April 16, May 4, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 103, 134; McClellan to his wife, June 9, 12, Own Story, pp. 402, 404. Stanton wrote McClellan, June 11: "Be assured, general, that there has never been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms." — O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 47. See, also, Stanton to McClellan, July 5, Marcy to McClellan, July 4, 10, part iii. pp. 294, 298, 310; Stanton to McClellan, July 5, McClellan's Own Story, p. 476; Lincoln's speech at a Union meeting Aug. 6, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 219. For McClellan's side see his letter to Stanton, July 8, and a note of the editor, *ibid.*, pp. 477, 478.

² McClellan seems to have accepted without question the estimates of Allan Pinkerton, the chief of his Secret Service division: these were grossly incorrect. May 3 Pinkerton estimated the Confederate strength at Yorktown under Johnston as 100,000 to 120,000. At this time it did not exceed 63,000, and was probably 10,000 less. June 26 Pinkerton reported: "The

less timid and disjointed had he been on the field when his battles were fought, but he was persistently absent.¹ At Fair

summary of general estimates of the rebel army shows their forces to be at this time over 180,000 men, and the specific information already obtained warrants the belief that this number is probably considerably short of the real strength of their army." — O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 269. Lee's force on that day was between 80,000 and 90,000. It certainly did not exceed 90,000. Pinkerton's general estimates are printed on p. 271, *ibid.* Most of them might have been called camp rumors. Euripides wrote:

"It behoves the man
Who claims the merit of an able chief,
Not to depend upon his spies alone."

So preposterous was McClellan's estimate of his enemy, that General Palfrey writes: "It is impossible that he could have believed that the Confederates possessed such numbers." This notion has met with considerable favor, but in view of McClellan's reiterated expressions I cannot accept it. See O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 11, 51; part ii. p. 20; part iii. pp. 151, 188, 231, 264, 265, 266, 267, 280, 282; McClellan's Own Story, pp. 344, 363.

In a discussion which followed my reading of a paper on the Peninsular Campaign, before the Massachusetts Historical Society in Jan., 1896, the question was raised: Ought the commanding general at that stage of the war to have known with some degree of accuracy the size of the opposing army? I think that may be answered in the affirmative. From the larger population of the North, and its very much greater facilities for equipping an army, the presumption ought to have been that it would have more troops in the field than the South, until at least results began to flow from the Confederate Conscription Act, passed April 16. The veteran General Wool, in command at Fortress Monroe, felt sure that McClellan outnumbered the Confederates. — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 143, 190. A remarkable example of what might have been known is seen in the testimony of Uriah H. Painter, a correspondent of the Philadelphia *Inquirer*, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, July 10. Painter was with the Army of the Potomac from April 2 until about the 22d or 23d of June, and estimated that when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown, they had a force of "perhaps 50,000 to 60,000." His estimate of the number of Lee's troops, shortly before Gaines's Mill, was "about 100,000."

Question. "By what means did you obtain that information, and reach that conclusion?"

Answer. "By getting statements from prisoners, contrabands, and deserters, and learning about different divisions and brigades, and drawing conclusions from the mass of information collected. I have at different

¹ Webb makes some excuse for McClellan in that he did not have a proper staff. — P 182.

Oaks the fighting took place on the south side of the Chickahominy, while he remained on the north side. After Fair Oaks, in an address to his army, he declared in speaking of a conflict near at hand: "Soldiers, I will be with you in this battle and share its dangers with you;"¹ and later in a despatch to Stanton he said, If my army "is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, I can at least die with it and share its fate."² But the next important battle was Gaines's Mill; it was fought on the north side of the Chickahominy, and during its progress McClellan remained at his headquarters on the south side. Nor was he present at the battles of Savage's Station and Glendale, nor at the critical position of Malvern Hill. All writers and observers, with whom I am acquainted, agree that this irresolution arose from no lack of physical courage; moreover, it is inconceivable that he could have retained the confidence and love of his soldiers, and aroused their enthusiasm, had he been delinquent in this respect. The truth is, that an extreme sensitiveness, which would have been creditable indeed to a humanitarian but out of place in the general of an army bent on the offensive, led him always to shun the sight of bloodshed and suffering.³ In short, all

times found a great many of their muster rolls, and learned in that way how many men they had in their regiments." — C. W., part i. p. 292.

It is fair to McClellan to refer to Lanfrey's statement, that Napoleon in his correspondence with the Directory habitually underestimated his own force and magnified that of the enemy. — Tome i. p. 148, note.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his *Life of Stonewall Jackson*, writes: "McClellan forgot that in war it is impossible for a general to be absolutely certain. It is sufficient, according to Napoleon, if the odds in his favor are three to two; and if he cannot discover from the attitude of his enemy what the odds are, he is unfitted for supreme command." — Vol. ii. p. 4. Again he writes: "From his knowledge of his adversary's [McClellan's] character and still more from his attitude, Lee had little difficulty in discovering his intentions. McClellan, on the other hand, failed to draw a single correct inference. And yet the information at his disposal was sufficient to enable him to form a fair estimate of how things stood in the Confederate camp." — P. 5.

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 210.

² June 25, *ibid.*, part i. p. 51.

³ "I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its mangled corpses and poor suffering wounded! Victory has no charms for me when

the circumstances of this campaign, the faults of omission and commission, show that although McClellan was a good organizer and knew how to win the affection of his soldiers, he lacked the quality of aggressive generalship, so essential to the North in their conduct of the war. The criticisms of Generals Francis A. Walker and Francis W. Palfrey, who were with the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, are unanswerable, and appear the more convincing as being offered in a spirit of kindness by men who once believed thoroughly in McClellan, and doubtless threw up their caps when he rode along their lines.

After the victory of Gaines's Mill the Confederate President and generals felt sure of capturing or destroying the Union army, and their confidence was shared by the people of Richmond. The disappointment of all was keen when McClellan reached a safe position on the James River after signalizing the last of the Seven Days' Battles by an acknowledged victory over Lee. There was a disposition on the part of the public to find fault with those in command that the Union army had made its escape, but reflection that induced a better understanding of what had been done led the Southern generals and soldiers, the President and people, to comprehend how great reason they had for rejoicing. The elaborate preparations of the North had come to naught, the siege of Richmond had been raised; and the well-disciplined and splendidly equipped Federal force had been driven back a distance of twenty miles. The spirit of victory was with the Army of Northern Virginia. In those seven days Lee's soldiers began to love him and to acquire a belief that he was invincible, which lasted almost to the very end of the war. The association of Lee and Davis on those battlefields cemented a friendship already close. Lee displayed a considerate deference to his superior, Davis an affectionate concern for his general. "I will renew my caution to you," he wrote Lee,

purchased at such a cost." "Every poor fellow that is killed or wounded, almost haunts me!" — McClellan's letters to his wife, June 2, 23, *Own Story*, pp. 398, 408.

“against personal exposure either in battle or reconnaissance. It is a duty to the cause we serve, for the sake of which I reiterate the warning.”¹ All conditions united to brighten the hopes of the South. To the work of conscription, which was urged with vigor, a response seemed assured that would show the enthusiasm of the people to have been quickened by their army's success.²

¹ July 5, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 632.

² Lee's and Jackson's reports, *ibid.*, part ii.; Richmond *Examiner*, June 28, 30, July 3, 4, 7, 8; Richmond *Dispatch*, June 28, 30, July 5, 7, 9; Davis, Confederate Government, vol. ii.; Davis, Memoir by his wife, vol. ii.

Touching the failure to hurt McClellan more than was done, Davis wrote his wife, July 6: “Had all the orders been well and promptly executed, there would have been a general dispersion of McClellan's army, and the remnant which might have held together could have only reached the James River by first crossing the Chickahominy. Our success has been so remarkable that we should be grateful.” In view of a disposition of Southern writers since the war to rate McClellan's generalship high, see what follows in this letter. Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 322. Joseph E. Johnston wrote Beauregard, Aug. 4, 1862: “I am not sure that you are right in regarding the success of McClellan's ‘strategic movement’ as evidence of skill. It seems to me to be due rather to our having lost two days immediately after the principal fight, that of Friday [Gaines's Mill, June 27] and many hours afterwards, especially on Tuesday [Malvern Hill, July 1]. I was told that the action on that day commenced about six o'clock P. M., but one and one-half or two miles from the field of Monday's engagement. It is said too that a large portion of our army was idle on each of those days. The battle of Malvern Hill (Tuesday) was but fifteen or twenty miles from the middle of McClellan's position on the Chickahominy. The result of that action *terminated our pursuit*. It seems to me that the ‘partial results’ were due to a want of the ‘bulldog tenacity’ you give us credit for. If the enemy had been pressed vigorously on Saturday and Sunday [June 28 and 29], he must have been ruined, could never have fixed himself securely on the James River. He left his position on the Chickahominy without our knowledge, because the wide interval by which he escaped was not observed by cavalry as it should have been. . . . I must confess that the advantages we have gained by what is termed the seven days' fighting are not very evident to me.” — N. Y. *Times*, June 17, 1883.

General Viscount Wolseley wrote in the *North American Review* for Aug. 1889, p. 174: “The retreat to the James was an extremely ably-conducted operation, carried out under great difficulties, and, above all, in the presence of such opponents as Lee and Jackson. It ought not to have succeeded as it did; had the defeated army been pressed as it should have been, it must have been destroyed. For some reason or other, however, Jackson and his army did not show their usual quality in that pursuit.”

Brief reflection on McClellan's despatch of June 28¹ which showed him to be thoroughly demoralized, convinced President Lincoln that the plan for taking Richmond had failed, and that the Union armies must be increased if the end were to be attained towards which the Northern people strove. With a view to starting fresh enlistments, Secretary Seward, furnished with a letter in which the President made clear the need of additional troops, went to New York City, Boston, and Cleveland to confer with men of influence and with as many governors of States as possible. In this letter Lincoln declared: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsakes me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is."² After Seward had conferred in New York City with men of weight and taken counsel by wire in cipher with the President and Secretary of War, it was determined to issue a circular to the governors of the States of the Union, exposing the situation and asking them to offer the President the needed reinforcements. On July 2, in accordance with the secret arrangements, there appeared in the newspapers, in the words of the draft which Seward had made, a letter from the governors requesting the President to call upon the several States for men enough "to speedily crush the rebellion." The President's reply, which was also printed, follows substantially Seward's draft, except that during the negotiations the necessity of the country on one hand and the willing co-operation of the governors on the other had combined to increase the number of troops at first proposed, and the call went forth for 300,000 three years' men.³ Sumner wrote John Bright: "The last call for

¹ *Ante*, p. 43.

² Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 116.

³ Life of Seward, F. W. Seward, vol. iii. chap. xiii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 116 *et seq.*; N. Y. *Tribune*, *Herald*, July 2. For the reason why the names of the governors of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Iowa, and Dela-

three hundred thousand men is received by the people with enthusiasm, because it seems to them a purpose to push the war vigorously. There is no thought in the Cabinet or the President of abandoning the contest.”¹ “We shall easily obtain the new levy,” said Lincoln in a private letter.² It was evident from the first that the people would give the government efficient support,³ although the call came upon them during a period of painful suspense when they were without news from McClellan’s army. The War Department did not hear from McClellan from June 28 to July 1, and not until July 3 could the President have felt sure that his army was safe. Lincoln grew thin and haggard, and his despatches from the first of these days are an avowal of defeat. Stanton, on the other hand, did not realize the truth. June 29 he telegraphed Seward, “My inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond within two days.” Had the Secretary of War been given to dissimulation, or had he not sent a similar despatch to General Wool at Baltimore, we might suppose that he intended to mislead the men of influence and the governors with whom Seward was conferring, in order that the promise for additional troops might be more easily

ware were not affixed at that time to the letter, see *Life of Seward*, p. 110; *N. Y. Herald*, July 9.

¹ Aug. 5, *Pierce’s Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 83.

² To Count Gasparin, Aug. 4, *Lincoln, Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 218. “The enlistment of recruits is now much more rapid than ever before. . . . Our people are beginning to feel a little more serious about the war, but the determination to wage it to a successful termination is stronger and firmer than ever.” — John Sherman to his brother, Aug. 8, *The Sherman Letters*, p. 156. “It would have done your heart good to see the procession of day before yesterday and to-day, the air all aflame with flags, the streets shaking with the tramp of long-stretched lines, and only one feeling showing itself, the passion of the first great uprising, only the full flower of which that was the opening bud.” — Holmes to Motley, Aug. 29, *Motley’s Letters*, vol. ii. p. 86. See letter of Louis Agassiz, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii. p. 577; *Letters of Asa Gray*, vol. ii. pp. 482, 487. Under this call there were furnished 421,465 men. *Phisterer’s Statistical Record*, p. 5.

³ *N. Y. Eve. Post*, July 2, *Tribune*, July 4, *World*, July 2, 3, *Herald*, July 3.

obtained.¹ Seward took the cue readily, and in his draft of the governors' letter explained that the fresh recruits were needed to follow up "the recent successes of the Federal arms."² But the Northern people were not deceived. Learning after five days of suspense that McClellan's army had reached the James River, they recognized that it had been defeated and forced to retreat. The event was spoken of as a disaster, the news of it causing at once a panic in Wall Street. Days of gloom followed. "Give me a victory and I will give you a poem," wrote Lowell to his publisher; "but I am now clear down in the bottom of the well, where I see the Truth too near to make verses of."³ There was a noticeable disposition to find fault with Stanton, whose folly in stopping recruiting⁴ at the time of the Union successes in the spring was bewailed. Not nearly so marked was the disposition to censure McClellan for the misfortune that had befallen the North, while Lincoln escaped with less criticism from the country at large than either.⁵

Meanwhile Congress was in session, an observer of military events and a diligent worker in its sphere, though exercising less relative sway and attracting less attention than in a time of peace, for the war caused the executive to trench upon its power and directed all eyes to his acts and the work of his armies. Nevertheless the senators and representatives labored

¹ See the despatches, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 270 *et seq.*; Julian's Political Recollections, p. 218; Pope's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 455.

² Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 104. This was written as early as June 30, before the full tidings of McClellan's retreat were known, but Seward's diplomatic circular of July 7 would have done credit to McClellan himself. See p. 111.

³ Lowell's Letters, vol. i. p. 322.

⁴ See vol. iii. p. 636.

⁵ New York Times, July 3, 4, Herald, July 4, 6, 8, 10, Tribune, July 4, 5, World, July 4, Eve. Post, July, 3, 5; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 83; The Sherman Letters, p. 156; August Belmont to Thurlow Weed, July 20, Belmont's Letters, privately printed, p. 66; Julian, Political Recollections, p. 218; Chandler's Senate speech of July 16, Life of Chandler, Detroit Post and Tribune, p. 234; Letters of Asa Gray to Darwin, July 3, 29.

with zeal, sagacity, and effect. The laws of this session show how much an able and honest Congress may accomplish when possessed of an earnestness and singleness of purpose that will prevail against the cumbrous rules which hedge about the action of a democracy's legislative body, unfitting it for the management of a war.¹

Congress at this session² authorized the President to take possession of the railroads and the telegraph lines when the public safety required it,³ recognized the governments of Hayti and Liberia, passed a Homestead Act, established a Department of Agriculture, donated public lands to the several States and Territories for the purpose of founding agricultural colleges, and authorized the construction of a railroad to the Pacific Ocean, giving it aid in land and in government bonds. It created a comprehensive and searching scheme of internal taxation which became a law by the President's approval July 1. This might be briefly described with a near approach to accuracy as an act which taxed everything. So impressed are two writers with its burdensome character that they have added to their summary of its provisions, as an apt description of it, Sydney Smith's well-known humorous account of British taxation in 1820.⁴ Under this act of Con-

¹ This was the 2d sess. of the 37th Congress, which lasted from Dec. 2, 1861, to July 17, 1862. Of the nature of its work in general, see Julian, May 23, Speeches, p. 182; Sumner, June 27, Works, vol. vii. p. 144; Wade, June 28, *Globe*, pp. 3000, 3002; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 80 *et ante*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. chap. v.; Riddle, Life of Wade, p. 318.

² For important work of this session already mentioned, see vol. iii. p. 630.

³ Approved Jan. 31.

⁴ Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i. p. 433; W. C. Ford, *Lalor's Cyclopædia*, vol. ii. p. 577. Their citation is from Sydney Smith's article on America, *Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1820. Smith wrote: "Taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot—taxes upon everything which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste—taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion—taxes on everything on earth, and the waters under the earth—on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home—taxes on the raw material—taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man—taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug that restores him to

gress, distillers of spirits, brewers of ale, beer, and porter, all other manufacturers, wholesale and retail dealers, men in all kinds of business, whether their trade was to supply necessities or luxuries, or to furnish amusements (such as proprietors of theatres and circuses and jugglers), lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and dentists were required to pay for licenses. A duty of twenty cents per gallon was imposed on spirits, one dollar per barrel on malt liquors, and that on tobacco and cigars was heavy. Many products and nearly all manufactures and articles were taxed, and carriages, yachts, billiard-tables, and plate, also slaughtered cattle, hogs, and sheep, railroad bonds, passports, legacies, and distributive shares of personal property. A duty of three per cent. was laid on the gross receipts of railroads, steamboats, and toll-bridges, on dividends of banks, savings institutions, trust and insurance companies, on the gross receipts from advertisements in newspapers, etc., and on the salaries and pay of officers and persons in the service of the United States above an exemption of \$600. On the gross receipts of railroads using other power than steam and of ferry-boats the duty was one and one-half per cent. One tenth of one per cent. was exacted on the gross amount of auction sales. A tax of three per cent. on incomes less than \$10,000, and of five per cent. on incomes over \$10,000 with an exemption of \$600 was imposed,¹ although certain deductions were allowable in making the return. Upon the income of citizens residing abroad, there was laid a tax of five per cent. without the usual exemption. Stamp duties were imposed upon every species of paper used

health — on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal — on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice — on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribands of the bride — at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay." — P. 77. Cæsar wrote of Scipio's taxation in Asia: "*In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria, ostiaria, frumentum, milites, arma, remiges, tormenta, vecturæ imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur.*" — *De Bello Civili*, III., xxxii.

¹ Income derived from interest on notes or bonds of the United States was only taxed one and one-half per cent.

to represent or transfer property, on medicines or preparations, perfumery, cosmetics, and playing-cards. The duties on imports were increased by an act approved by the President, July 14.

Next to the tax and appropriation bills, the most important measure of this session of Congress, the Confiscation Act, dealt with a subject which attracted during the whole course of its consideration much attention from both Senate and House. The act as finally passed and approved iterated the penalty of death for treason, but allowed the court at its discretion to commute the punishment to fine and imprisonment; defined the crime of rebellion and annexed a penalty to it; directed the President "to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits, and effects," of all military and civil officers of the Southern Confederacy or of any of the States thereof, and, after sixty days of public warning, confiscated likewise the property of all "engaged in armed rebellion" against the United States "or aiding or abetting such rebellion;" freed forever the slaves of those convicted of treason or rebellion, and also the slaves of "rebel owners" who took "refuge within the lines of the [Union] army" or in any way came under the control of the Federal government; denied the protection of the Fugitive Slave Act to any owners of escaped slaves except those loyal to the Union, and forbade any military or naval officer to surrender any fugitive to the claimant;¹ gave authority for the colonization

¹ This result had been aimed at by an act to make an additional article of war approved March 13, but it had not been fully accomplished (see speech of Grimes in the Senate, April 14, *Life of Grimes*, Salter, p. 186). Sumner declared in the Senate, July 16: "The infamous order No. 3 which has been such a scandal to the Republic is now rescinded. The slave everywhere can hope." Reference is made to order No. 3 of General Halleck, issued from St. Louis Nov. 20, 1861, which was obnoxious to the radical Republicans. It forbade fugitive slaves "to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march." — *O. R.*, vol. viii. p. 370. Halleck maintained that "it was a military and not a political order." — Letter to F. P. Blair, Greeley, *American Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 241.

Congress did not repeal the Fugitive Slave Law, although Sumner would have been glad to propose it had there been a chance of success. — *Pierce's*

of "persons of the African race made free" by this act; authorized the President to employ negroes as soldiers; and gave him power to amnesty the rebels by proclamation and to make exceptions from a general pardon.

The bill which had been reported by Senator Trumbull from the Judiciary Committee and the one which the House had originally passed were more stringent in their provisions, and therefore more satisfactory to the radicals of the Senate, of whom Sumner, Wade, and Chandler were the leaders, than the act finally agreed to; but even this act was more acceptable to them than the measure which the conservative Republicans of the Senate with the aid of the Democrats and the Unionists of the border States, had, on a decisive vote, succeeded in adopting. Of this Chandler declared, June 28, the day on which McClellan began his retreat to the James: "I do not believe the bill is worth one stiver. It is utterly worthless as a bill to confiscate property." The subject went to a committee of conference, and while it was pending, senators and representatives were in gloom over the misfortune and failure of the Army of the Potomac.

The bill "was at last passed," wrote Sumner, "under the

Sumner, vol. iv. p. 71. June 9 Julian offered a resolution in the House instructing the Judiciary Committee to report a bill to repeal it, and, although the House was disposed to go further in striking at slavery than the Senate, this resolution was laid on the table, 17 Republicans voting with 19 Unionists (all but two of these from the border slave States) and 30 Democrats, making a total of 66 for such action to 51 against. — *Cong. Globe*, p. 2623; Julian's *Polit. Rec.*, p. 218.

The Fugitive Slave Law continued to be enforced where legal processes could apply. The Washington despatch to the New York *Herald*, May 16, said: "The Fugitive Slave Law is being quietly enforced in this district to-day, the military authorities not interfering with the judicial process. There are at least four hundred cases pending." See *Life of Garrison*, vol. iv. p. 51, note 1. General J. D. Cox writes me, under date of March 26, 1896: "The anti-slavery sentiment grew so rapidly in the field that the right to reclaim a fugitive slave in camp was never of any use to slaveholders. Officers said 'You may take him if you can find him,' but the rank and file took care that he should not be found." See paper "Dealing with Slavery," by Channing Richards, *Sketches of War History*, vol. iv., Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion.

pressure from our reverses at Richmond." It is, he added, "a practical act of emancipation. It was only in this respect that I valued it. The Western men were earnest for reaching the property of the rebels.¹ To this I was indifferent except so far as it was necessary to break up the stronghold of slavery."² That "the Confiscation Act was more useful as a declaration of policy than as an act to be enforced" is the mature judgment of John Sherman,³ who in the Senate took an active part in the discussion of the measure. Yet the clause which affirmed the death penalty for treason was no empty form of words, for many Republicans, Unionists, and Democrats at this time thought that the "leaders of the rebellion" ought to be hanged, and that such in the end would be their fate.⁴

The Confiscation bill agreed upon in conference was enacted by the House July 11, and by the Senate one day later. It now became bruited abroad that the President would veto the bill, and many legislators were anxious lest Congress and

¹ On the sentiment of Ohio and Illinois, see Wade's and Trumbull's remarks, Senate, June 28, *Globe*, pp. 3001, 3005.

² To Bright, Aug. 5, Pierce's Sumner, p. 82. Cf. Senate debate of June 28 with that of July 8 and 12; on the latter day the bill was passed; see N. Y. *Eve. Post*, July 18.

³ Recollections, vol. i. p. 316; see Alex. Johnston in Lalor's Cyclopædia, vol. iii. p. 933; Whiting, War Powers of the Constitution, p. 409.

⁴ See Willey's and Preston King's remarks in the Senate, *Globe*, pp. 945, 3375. At a meeting of the Conservative members of Congress in Washington, June 28, Richardson, of Illinois, who since the death of Douglas was the leader of the Democrats of that State, said that he "was in favor of applying the halter to the leaders of the rebellion," and William Allen, of Ohio, made a similar declaration. One of the resolutions adopted spoke of inflicting such punishment "on the guilty leaders as will satisfy public justice." - Washington corr. N. Y. *Herald*, June 28. Sumner had previously in the Senate made a manly protest against this sentiment. "People talk," said he, "flippantly of the gallows as the certain doom of the rebels. This is a mistake. For weal or woe, the gallows is out of the question. It is not possible as a punishment for this rebellion." - Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 77.

In addition to authorities quoted, see on the Confiscation Act, *Cong. Globe*, 2d sess., 37th Cong. *passim*; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 3 *et seq.*; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i. p. 373; Julian's speech on Confiscation and Liberation, May 23; S. S. Cox, Three Decades, p. 249.

perhaps the people should come into collision with the Executive. To ascertain in view of the many dangers thickening about the country, if this might not be avoided, Senator Fessenden and another gentleman had a consultation with the President. They found the rumor to be true. Lincoln's chief objection arose from his interpretation of the act to mean that offenders might be forever divested of their title to real estate. Confiscation to this extent was, in his view, clearly opposed to the explicit assertion of the Constitution, "No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." So strenuous was his opposition to this feature that he had decided to veto the bill, and had prepared a message pointing out his objections, and ending with, "I return the bill to the House in which it originated." Many regarded this measure of confiscation as one of the highest importance. Trumbull declared: "I believe that the passage of the bill and its fair execution is worth more towards crushing the rebellion than would be the capture of Richmond and the destruction of the whole rebel army that is around it to-day." Wade spoke of it as "the most useful of all bills, one that lies deeper in the hearts of the people than anything we have done during the session or can do. If it should fail to meet the approbation of the President of the United States, I can tell him it will be the saddest announcement that ever went out from the Capitol."¹ The tone of some of the radical senators toward the President in the debate of July 16 was bitter,² and by the veto of the bill the suppressed opposition to him in his own party would undoubtedly have been forced to an open rupture. This misfortune was obviated by Congress passing, the day previous to its adjournment, an explanatory joint resolution which removed Lincoln's main objection and was signed by him at the same time with the Confiscation Act itself. His draft of the proposed veto message which he sent to the House with the

¹ July 16, *Globe*, pp. 3375, 3380.

² That may also be said of the debate of July 14.

announcement of his approval of the bill and the joint resolution showed that his construction of the act was different from that of the radical senators, and that its execution in his hands might be attended with a greater regard for the forms of law and the letter of the Constitution than, according to their view, ought to obtain in this time of real danger to the Republic.¹

The disaster to McClellan's army increased the criticism of the radical Republicans, who did not believe that the President was conducting the war with vigor. They found fault with him chiefly because he did not remove McClellan from command and because he did not strike at slavery.² That they were restive at the President's encroachment on the powers of Congress and his failure to exercise his authority by some measure of liberation, had already become apparent in the Senate.³ Inasmuch as Congress had been called upon by the explanatory joint resolution to shape its action in ac-

¹ See the debate in the Senate, July 16. In the Appendix to the *Cong. Globe* are printed the act and the joint resolution. The resolution touched other points than the one objected to by the President. The draft of the veto message is printed in the *Globe*, p. 3406, and in *Lincoln, Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 209; see also editorials of *N. Y. Herald*, July 28, and *N. Y. Tribune*, Aug. 5.

² Adams S. Hill, Washington correspondent *N. Y. Tribune*, at about this time wrote to Sydney Howard Gay, managing editor: "Ten minutes' talk last night with Gen. Wadsworth. The result this. He is cheerful in view of military prospects, but thinks political signs gloomy. I value his testimony because he has, as he says, been with the President and Stanton every day at the War Department—frequently for five or six hours—during several months. He says that the President is not with us; has no Anti-slavery instincts. He never heard him speak of Anti-slavery men, otherwise than as 'radicals,' 'abolitionists,' and of the 'nigger question,' he frequently speaks. Talking against McClellan with Blair, in Lincoln's presence, Wadsworth was met by Blair with the remark, 'He'd have been all right if he'd stolen a couple of niggers.' A general laugh, in which Lincoln laughed, as if it were an argument. W. believes that if emancipation comes at all it will be from the rebels, or in consequence of their protracting the war."—*A. S. Hill Papers*, MS. In this manner I shall indicate the private correspondence which has been kindly placed at my disposal by Professor Hill.

³ For example, Grimes, May 20, *Globe*, p. 2226; Sumner, June 27, *Works*, vol. vii. p. 381.

cordance with the wish of the Executive conveyed in a channel unknown to the Constitution, the feeling broke out, in the debate of July 16, that the President had magnified his office. Sherman intimated that they were acting under "duress," while Lane, of Indiana, further declared that the duress was the "threat of a veto from the President." Preston King, of New York, and Trumbull thought that Congress was coerced by this mode of proceeding; and Wade sneered at the practice of learning the "royal pleasure" before they could pass a bill.¹ When Congress adjourned the next day, some of the radical senators and representatives went home with a feeling of hostility to Lincoln, and of despair for the Republic.²

They misjudged him, but not unnaturally, for although he was thinking about slavery as earnestly as any of them, the indiscretion of a general had obliged him to take a position which seemed to them to indicate a reactionary policy. Hunter, who commanded the Department of the South, issued an order, May 9, declaring free all the slaves in South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia. The first knowledge of this came to Lincoln through the newspapers one week later. Chase urged him to let the order stand. "No commanding general shall do such a thing upon *my* responsibility without consulting me," was the President's reply.³ May 19 he declared Hunter's order void, and in his proclamation appealed to the people of the border slave States to adopt some measure for the gradual abolishment of slavery, and accept the compensation for their slaves proffered them by the President and by Congress.⁴ "I do not argue," he said, — "I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes

¹ *Globe*, p. 3375 *et seq.*

² Julian, *Recollections*, p. 220; Washington despatch to N. Y. *Herald*, July 17, also editorials of July 17, 18.

³ *Warden*, p. 433.

⁴ See vol. iii. p. 631.

common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it."¹ This fervent and reasonable appeal did not convince those to whom it was addressed, but it showed the people of the North that the President desired to rid the nation of slavery if it could be done in a constitutional manner. In spite of the muttering at Washington, the declaration that Hunter's emancipation order was void received general approval throughout the country, since many Republicans, who were eager to see blows struck at slavery from any quarter, felt that they must yield to Lincoln, who had the power and responsibility.²

Two events happening previously to this indicated that the administration was keeping step with the march of human freedom. The first man in our history to suffer death for violating the laws against the foreign slave trade was hanged at New York in February.³ In April Secretary Seward con-

¹ Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 156.

² N. Y. *Herald*, May 17, 20, *Tribune*, May 19, 20. R. H. Dana wrote Sumner, June 7: "If two papers were opened—one for Hunter's proclamation and the other for the President's present position on that point—to be signed *only by voters*, the latter would have three to one in Massachusetts."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. But see Governor Andrew's opinion in his letter to Stanton, May 19, Schouler's *Mass. in the Civil War*, p. 333. Chase, urging the President to let Hunter's order stand, had written: "It will be cordially approved, I am sure, by more than nine-tenths of the people on whom you must rely for support of your administration."—Warden, p. 434. Senator Grimes wrote his wife: "The President has to-day rescinded Hunter's proclamation. The result will be a general row in the country. All the radical Republicans are indignant but me, and I am not, because I have expected it and was ready for it. . . . But the end must come, protracted by the obstinacy and stupidity of rulers it may be, but come it will nevertheless."—Salter, p. 196.

³ Sumner's *Works*, vol. vi. p. 474; DuBois, *Suppression of the Slave Trade* p. 191. On the subject generally of the coastwise slave-trade and

cluded an honorable and efficient treaty with Great Britain for the suppression of the African slave trade.¹

How the government could treat slavery and the slaves to redound to the advantage of the Union cause was made the overpowering question in Lincoln's mind by his visit of July 8 to the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, which brought home to him with telling force the disastrous event of the Peninsular campaign. Gradual emancipation of the slaves, compensation of their owners, and colonization of the freed negroes, — this is the policy that he adopted. So vital did he deem some action of this kind that he could not allow the senators and representatives of the border slave States to go home on the adjournment of Congress before he had brought the matter again to their attention. July 12 he called them to the White House, and asked them earnestly if they would not adopt his policy and accept compensation for their slaves. He spoke of the hope entertained by "the States which are in rebellion" that their sister slave communities would join their Confederacy. "You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces and they can shake you no more forever. . . . If the war continues long . . . the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion — by the mere incidents of war. . . . Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for **your** people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event." He then told them and the public of a difficulty he had to contend with, — "one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong." Out of

the non-enforcement of the laws against it, see DuBois, pp. 154, 162, 178, 180-187.

¹ Ratified by the Senate, April 24, without dissent. "Sumner hastened to the State Department to inform the Secretary of the vote. Seward leaped from his lounge, where he had been sleeping, and exclaimed: 'Good God! the Democrats have disappeared! This is the greatest act of the administration.'" — *Pierce's Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 68.

General Hunter's order the discord had lately arisen. "In repudiating it," Lincoln continued, "I gave dissatisfaction if not offence to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me and increasing." In conclusion he averred that "our common country is in great peril," and besought them to help him save our form of government.¹ A majority of the representatives of Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri, and Maryland in the two houses of Congress, twenty in number, replied that the policy advocated seemed like an interference of the national government in a matter belonging exclusively to the States; they questioned the constitutional power of Congress to make an appropriation of money for such a purpose; they did not believe that the country could bear the expense proposed; they doubted the sincerity of Congress in making the offer, and thought that funds for the compensation of slave owners should be placed at the disposal of the President before the border States were called upon to entertain such a proposition.² One other objection must have weighed with them, which is only hinted at in their reply. It was a

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 109.

² McPherson, *Political History of the Great Rebellion*, p. 215. In the course of their reply they said: "It seems to us that this resolution [of March, see vol. iii. p. 631] was but the annunciation of a sentiment which could not or was not likely to be reduced to an actual tangible proposition. No movement was then made to provide and appropriate the funds required to carry it into effect; and we were not encouraged to believe that funds would be provided." Senator Henderson, who made an individual reply favorable to the President's views, wrote: "I gave it [the resolution of March] a most cheerful support, and I am satisfied it would have received the approbation of a large majority of the border States delegations in both branches of Congress, if, in the first place, they had believed the war with its continued evils—the most prominent of which, in a material point of view, is its injurious effect on the institution of slavery in our States—could possibly have been protracted for another twelve months; and if in the second place they had felt assured that the party having the majority in Congress would, like yourself, be equally prompt in practical action as in the expression of a sentiment."

Minority replies favorable to the President's position were made by seven representatives and by Horace Maynard of Tennessee, as well as by Senator Henderson. McPherson, p. 217 *et seq.*

part of the plan that payment for the slaves should be made in United States bonds, and while negro property had become admittedly precarious¹ the question must have suggested itself, whether, in view of the enormous expenditure of the government, the recent military reverses, and the present strength of the Confederacy, the nation's promises to pay were any more valuable. Gold, which June 2 was at three and one-half per cent. premium, fetched now, owing to McClellan's defeat and the further authorized issue of paper money,² seventeen per cent.: its price from this time forward measures the fortunes of the Union cause.

During a drive to the funeral of Secretary Stanton's infant son, the day³ after his interview with the border State representatives, Lincoln opened the subject, which was uppermost in his mind, to Seward and to Welles. The reverses before Richmond, the formidable power of the Confederacy, made him earnest in the conviction that something must be done in the line of a new policy. Since the slaves were growing the food for the Confederate soldiers, and served as teamsters and laborers on intrenchments in the army service, the President had "about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued."⁴ In truth, he was prepared to go as far in the path to liberation as were the radical Republicans of Congress. The inquiry therefore is worth making, why he did not recommend to Congress some measure to this end, which, with his support, would undoubtedly have been carried. It would appear reasonable that if the President under the rights of war could emancipate the slaves, Congress with the executive approval

¹ Henderson said that in Missouri "a third or more of the slaves owned at the time of the last census" had been lost. — McPherson, p. 219.

² The Act approved July 11 authorized the additional issue of \$150,000,000 United States legal-tender notes.

³ Sunday, July 13.

⁴ Diary of Secretary Welles, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 121; Welles's article in the *Galaxy*, Dec. 1872. C. E. Hamlin says that Lincoln read to the Vice-President, June 18, a draft of a proclamation freeing the slaves. — *Life of Hannibal Hamlin*, p. 429.

should have the same power ; but Lincoln evidently believed action in this matter to lie outside of the province of the legislative body. Ready as he himself was to declare free the slaves in all the States which continued "in rebellion" after Jan. 1, 1863, he remarked in the message submitted with the proposed veto of the Confiscation Act, "It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State."¹ An edict of the President would be more impressive and would influence public opinion in the country and in Europe more than could a legislative act that was passed only after long debate and the consideration of various amendments, and was in the end perhaps a compromise in conference committee. Moreover a sagacious statesman in the position of chief magistrate, could better time the stroke. Again it is possible that Lincoln intended to secure gradually the co-operation of Congress in his policy, and began by proposing this further step towards compensation — for the offer of compensation was an indispensable part of his plan — which would meet one objection of the border State men. July 14, the day after his conversation with Seward and Welles, he asked the Senate and the House to pass a bill placing at his disposal a certain sum in six per cent. bonds to be used by him in paying for slaves in any State that should lawfully abolish slavery. This request was not well received in the Senate.

¹ As an indication of sentiment in Congress, I quote from Sumner's speech in the Senate of June 27: "There are senators who claim these vast War Powers for the President and deny them to Congress. The President, it is said, as commander-in-chief may seize, confiscate, and liberate under the Rights of War, but Congress cannot direct these things to be done. . . . Of the pretension that all these enormous powers belong to the President and not to Congress I try to speak calmly and within bounds. . . . But a pretension so irrational and unconstitutional, so absurd and tyrannical, is not entitled to respect. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Wade] . . . has branded it as slavish. . . . Such a pretension would change the National Government from a government of law to that of a military dictator. . . . That this pretension should be put forward in the name of the Constitution is only another illustration of the effrontery with which the Constitution is made responsible for the ignorance, the conceit, and the passions of men." — *Works*, vol. vii. p. 139.

Grimes and Sherman did not recognize the right of the President "to introduce a bill here," and it was only after an effort on the part of Sumner that the message and the bill were referred to the Committee on Finance. Sumner also proposed that Congress defer their adjournment in order to consider the subject, but could not get his resolution before the Senate.¹ On the day before the adjournment of Congress there was introduced in the House of Representatives from the select committee of emancipation a bill providing for the issue of bonds to the amount of \$180,000,000 to be used for the compensation of loyal owners of slaves in the border States and in Tennessee, when any one of them should by law abolish slavery, and for the appropriation of \$20,000,000 to be expended in colonizing the freed negroes. Owing to the lateness of the session, the bill was not considered.²

July 17 Congress adjourned. Five days later Lincoln read to his cabinet, to the surprise of all, probably, except Seward and Welles, a proclamation of emancipation which he purposed to issue. In it he said that he intended to recommend to Congress, at its next meeting, the adoption of a practical measure of compensation. He reiterated that the object of the war was the restoration of the Union; "and as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object," he declared that on January 1, 1863, all slaves in States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States was not recognized should be thenceforward and forever free. Various suggestions were offered, but all of the cabinet except Blair gave the policy proposed a full or qualified support. Blair demurred, on the ground that it would cost the administration the fall elections. Seward pleaded for delay, saying, in substance: "Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so

¹ *Cong. Globe*, p. 3322 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 3394.

important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government. It will be considered our last *shriek* on the retreat. Now, while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war." The President had not seen the matter in this light; the wisdom of Seward's objection struck him with force; and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside, waiting for a victory."¹

The secret of this conference was well kept.² The radical Republicans, ignorant of the President's determination to strike at slavery when the proper time should arrive, continued their criticisms of his policy. His order of August 4 for a draft of 300,000 nine-months militia³ combined with the general gloom that deepened as the summer went on, to intensify this fault-finding,⁴ which culminated in The Prayer of Twenty Millions, written by Greeley and printed in the New York *Tribune* of August 20. All who supported your election, he said, and desire the suppression of the rebellion, are sorely disappointed by the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of rebels. "We require of you, as

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 125 *et seq.*; Carpenter, *Six Months at the White House*, p. 20; Chase's *Diary*, Warden, p. 440.

² An inkling of it got into the newspapers, but with incorrect details. See *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 13; Washington despatch to N. Y. *Tribune*, Aug. 21. The reports were not credited.

³ Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1862, p. 128. Only 87,588 men were furnished under this call.—Phisterer, p. 5.

⁴ N. Y. *Tribune*, Aug. 5; *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 7, 8; *Independent*, Aug. 21. Sumner wrote Bright, Aug. 5: "I wish . . . that the President had less *vis inertiae*. He is hard to move. He is honest but inexperienced. Thus far he has been influenced by the border States. I urged him, on the 4th of July, to put forth an edict of emancipation, telling him he could make the day more sacred and historic than ever. He replied: 'I would do it if I were not afraid that half the officers would fling down their arms and three more States would rise.'" — Pierce's *Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 83.

the first servant of the republic, charged especially and pre-eminently with this duty, that you EXECUTE THE LAWS. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipating provisions of the new Confiscation act; [that] you are unduly influenced by the counsels, the representations, the menaces of certain fossil politicians hailing from the border slave States; [that] timid counsels in such a crisis [are] calculated to prove perilous and probably disastrous. We complain that the Union cause has suffered and is now suffering immensely from your mistaken deference to rebel slavery. We complain that the Confiscation act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your generals, and that no word of rebuke for them has yet reached the public ear. Frémont's proclamation and Hunter's order were promptly annulled by you, while Halleck's No. 3,¹ with scores of like tendency, have never provoked even your remonstrance. We complain that a large proportion of our regular army officers with many of the volunteers evince far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion. I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation act."²

Lincoln did not read this open letter, which was addressed to him only through the columns of the New York *Tribune*, until August 22. He replied at once in a letter which was printed the next day in the *National Intelligencer* of Washington, and was also telegraphed to Greeley, appearing in the evening edition of the *Tribune*.³ The President said: "If there be in it

¹ See note 1, p. 60.

² This letter occupies two and one-half columns of the *Tribune*. I have cited little but the heads of the discourse, and have not indicated the ellipses by the usual dots. Only the last part of the letter is printed in Greeley, *The American Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 249.

³ Greeley, *The American Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 250; J. C. Welling, N. A. Rev. *Reminiscences of A. Lincoln*, p. 523; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 152.

[your letter] any statements or assumptions of facts which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."¹

Lincoln and Greeley may be looked upon as representative exponents of the two policies here outlined. There was in

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 227.

their personal relations a lack of sympathy, because they did not see things alike. Lincoln knew men, Greeley did not; Lincoln had a keen sense of humor, Greeley had none; indeed, in all their intercourse of many years, Lincoln never told the serious-minded editor an anecdote or joke,¹ for he knew it would be thrown away. Greeley and the *Tribune*, though not so powerful at this time in forming public opinion as they had been from 1854 to 1860, exerted still a far-reaching influence and gave expression to thoughts rising in the minds of many earnest men.² No one knew this better than the President, who, in stating his policy in a public despatch to Greeley, flattered the editor and those for whom the *Tribune* spoke. His words received the widest publication,³ and were undoubtedly read by nearly every man and woman at the North. They were sound indeed. His position could not have been more cogently put. His policy was right and expedient, appealed to the reason of his people and inspired their hopes.

How large a following Greeley had cannot be set down with exactitude. His letter was more than a petition like that of "the three tailors of Tooley Street," which one of his rivals deemed modesty itself compared with Greeley's,⁴ yet it was far from being the prayer of twenty millions. Lincoln had the majority with him before his reply, and his reply made many friends. In spite of the misfortune of the Army of the Potomac, he still had only to announce clearly his policy to obtain for it the support of a host of plain people.⁵ An

¹ Greeley, *Recollections of a Busy Life*, p. 404.

² A. K. McClure writes: "Notwithstanding the loyal support given to Lincoln throughout the country, Greeley was in closer touch with the active loyal sentiment of the people than even the President himself, and his journal constantly inspired not only those who sincerely believed in early emancipation, but all who were inclined to factious hostility to Lincoln, to most aggressive efforts to embarrass the administration by untimely forcing the emancipation policy." — *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, p. 295.

³ Greeley printed them, Aug. 23, in his telegraphic news, and, Aug. 25, in the editorial columns, following with a feeble rejoinder.

⁴ *N. Y. Herald*, Aug. 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 25; *World*, Aug. 21, 25; *Eve. Post*, Aug. 25; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Aug. 25; *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 25, 26, 27. The

enthusiastic mass-meeting in Chicago listened to the reading of a poem whose theme was the July call for troops. "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more," now became the song of the soldiers and the watchword of the people.¹

Until the spring of 1862 the government of Great Britain preserved the neutrality which had been declared by the Queen's proclamation at the beginning of the war.² As we have now come to the period when this neutrality was violated to the injury of the United States, and as it certainly would not have been violated had the feeling of the dominant classes been friendly to the North, reference must again be made to English sentiment on our Civil War. In classifying English sentiment as it prevailed in the autumn of 1861, and in suggesting certain excuses for the preponderating opinion of those whose political and social position was high,³ I omitted a consideration of weight. The sympathy of the British government and public with Italy during the war of 1859, and the progress made in that war towards Italian liberty, impressed upon the English mind the doctrine that a body of people who should seek to throw off an obnoxious dominion and form an orderly government of their own, deserved the best wishes of the civilized world for their success.⁴ Why, it was asked in England, if we were right to sympathize with Italy against Austria, should we not likewise sympathize with the Southern Confederacy, whose people were resisting the subjugation of the North?⁵ This argument swayed the judgment of the

editorial in the *N. Y. Tribune* of Aug. 27 is an indication that the tide of public sentiment had turned against Greeley.

¹ *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 21; *Old War Songs, North and South*, S. Brainard's Sons, Cleveland.

² See vol. iii. p. 417.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 502, 509.

⁴ *Lecky, Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. p. 490.

⁵ The traditional sympathy of the English for the weaker party may have been a contributing cause. See *Pierce's Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 152. R. P. Collier, a friend of the North, said in the House of Commons, Feb. 23, 1864: "Our sympathies are always on the side of the weak against the strong—

liberal-minded Grote,¹ and colored other opinion which was really dictated by interests of rank or of commerce and manufactures.

The divisions of sentiment in the spring of 1862 were the same as in the preceding autumn. The "Torifying influence"² which had affected English Liberals as a result of the Trent affair had been modified by victories of the Union armies in the Southwest.³ The belief obtained that the North would win and that England would get cotton; but as the spring wore on and no further progress was made, as the stock of cotton diminished and as the distress of the operatives in Lancashire increased, sympathy turned again to the South. Those who favored action on the part of the government, first by mediation, which, if not accepted by the North, should be succeeded by the recognition of the Southern Confederacy and the breaking of the blockade, grew stronger in their expressions. Men of this opinion watched the Emperor of the French, hoping that he might initiate the policy dear to their hearts which they could not persuade their own government to venture upon.⁴ The main body of the aristocracy and the highest of the middle class desired that the great democracy should fail, partly because it was a democracy, partly because it enacted high protective tariffs, partly because the division of a great power like the United States which had constantly threatened Great Britain with war would redound to their political advantage; but with that portion of the middle class engaged in commerce and manufactures the desire that overshadowed all else was that the war should come to an end so

on the side of those who are struggling for independence against those who are struggling for conquest." — Hansard, 1010.

¹ Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. p. 488.

² See vol. iii. p. 543.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 599, 630. The Earl of Malmesbury, a Conservative, makes this entry in his diary, London, May 23: "There is a rumor that the Confederates have been defeated, and Beauregard taken prisoner, which everybody regrets. The feeling for the South is very strong in society." — *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, vol. ii. p. 273.

⁴ Adams to Seward, April 25, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1862, p. 77.

that England could get cotton and resume the export of her manufactured goods to America. The reports of the burning of cotton at the South, and the falling off in the demand of the North for English merchandise consequent on the enforced economy of the times, intensified this feeling. The North could terminate the war by the recognition of the Southern Confederacy; and the irritation was great over her persistence in the seemingly impossible task of conquering five and one-half millions of people. "Conquer a free population of 3,000,000 souls? the thing is impossible," Chatham had said; and this was applied with force to the case in hand.¹

The friends of the North remained as sincere and active as in the previous autumn, but like the patriots at home they had days of discouragement at the small progress made towards a restoration of the Union. The most significant and touching feature of the situation is that the operatives of the North of England, who suffered most from the lack of cotton, were frankly on the side of the United States. They knew that their misery came from the war, and were repeatedly told that it would cease in a day if the North would accept an accomplished fact; but discerning, in spite of their meagre intelligence, that the struggle was one of democracy against privilege, of freedom against slavery, they resisted all attempts to excite them to a demonstration against its continuance. They saw their work fall off, their savings dwindle, their families in want even to the prospect of lacking bread, yet they desired the North to fight out the contest. Two careful writers who themselves sympathized with the United States say that a majority of Englishmen were of like opinion; that majority therefore must have been composed largely of the operatives of Lancashire and their kind.²

¹ Gregory's speech in the House of Commons, July 18, Hansard, 550.

² Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. p. 485; but he also states: "A majority of the upper, and perhaps of the middle classes soon came to sympathize decidedly with the South, and they were the classes who were most powerfully represented in the press, in society, and in parliament." — Goldwin Smith, *The United States*, p. 258, and *Macmillan's Magazine*, Dec

If the indictment which Americans bring against the governing classes of England for their sympathy with the South is maintained at the bar of history, it will be because they sympathized with a slave power, and thereby seemed to admit their own government and people to have been wrong on the slavery question for a generation. The attempt of Englishmen to persuade themselves that slavery was not the issue of the war is a case of wilful blindness. This was a fact patent to all observers: The South held slaves, the North was free. Lincoln had been elected President for the reason that he represented the opposition to the extension of slavery, and his election was the cause of the secession and the war. If the North won, slavery would certainly be restricted and perhaps abolished; if the South gained her independence, slavery would be ratified and extended, and the African slave trade probably revived. Professor Cairnes and John Stuart Mill told the English public this in logic impossible of refutation, but the majority of voters remained unconvinced.¹ Nothing could be less candid than many of the current expressions. In 1861, when the avowed object of the war was the restoration of the Union, it was said, Make your war one against slavery and you will have the warm sympathy of the British public;² yet Lincoln's plan of compensated emancipation was pronounced chimerical and its proposal insincere, issued for the purpose of affecting

1865; see, also, speech of Thomas Hughes, "John to Jonathan," delivered in Boston, Oct. 11, 1870, printed in *Vacation Rambles*.

¹ Mill wrote in *Fraser's Magazine* for Feb., 1862: "But why discuss on probable evidence notorious facts? The world knows what the question between the North and South has been for many years and still is. Slavery alone was thought of, alone talked of. Slavery was battled for and against, on the floor of Congress and in the plains of Kansas; on the slavery question exclusively was the party constituted which now rules the United States; on slavery Frémont was rejected, on slavery Lincoln was elected; the South separated on slavery, and proclaimed slavery as the one cause of separation." Cairnes's book on the "Slave Power" was published between March and June. "The fact is the real issue is slavery."

— Louis Blanc, London, July 21, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 98.

² See vol. iii. p. 510.

European opinion.¹ Gladstone, a friend of the North in January,² was later swayed by the sentiment of the powerful classes. April 24 he told the men of Manchester that the "deplorable struggle" was the cause of their misery, but that if the heart of the South were "set upon separation" she could not be conquered, and we must be careful therefore not to alienate her 6,000,000 or 10,000,000. He argued against the call of sympathy for the North on the ground that the contest was between slavery and freedom, declaring, "We have no faith in the propagation of free institutions at the point of the sword."³ When William E. Forster said in the House of Commons that he believed it was generally acknowledged that slavery was the cause of the war, he was jeered with shouts, "No, no!" and "The tariff!" When he returned, "Why, Vice-President Stephens said that the South went to war to establish slavery as the corner-stone of the new republic," his retort was apparently looked upon as only the usual House of Commons repartee.⁴

The government of Great Britain was guilty of culpable negligence in permitting in March the sailing of the *Florida*, a vessel equipped for war, which had been built at Liverpool for the service of the Confederates. Sincere and diligent inquiry on the part of the authorities at Liverpool would have disclosed her true character and destination, and a friendly disposition towards the United States would have detained

¹ Cairnes, p. 163.

² See vol. iii. p. 541.

³ *Times*, April 25.

⁴ July 18, Hansard, 537. My authorities for this account other than those directly cited are: the files of the *Times*, *Daily News*, *Spectator*, and *Saturday Review*, especially the *Times* of June 11, 23, 28, July 3, 5, 8, 9, 12; the *Daily News*, June 25, July 3, 5; the *Saturday Review*, May 31, June 7, 14, 21, July 5; the *Spectator*, May 31, June 14, 21, July 5; Charles Francis Adams's Diary; Adams's letters to Seward, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862; McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, vol. ii.; Life of Lord Palmerston, Lloyd C. Sanders; Thomas Hughes, "John to Jonathan," Boston, Oct., 1870, Vacation Rambles; letters of Bright, Cobden, the Duke and Duchess of Argyll to Sumner, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.; Letters on England, Louis Blanc, vol. ii.

her until sufficient legal investigation could be made in proceedings for her condemnation. From Liverpool the *Florida* went to Nassau. There the animus of the authorities was favorable to the Confederacy, but the evidence of the *Florida's* character was so conclusive that, in spite of their disinclination to perform an obvious duty, it was impossible to avoid seizing her. Judicial proceedings were instituted for her condemnation, but she was released. "In my opinion," writes Chief Justice Cockburn, the British arbitrator at the Tribunal of Geneva, "the *Florida* ought to have been condemned, and there was a miscarriage of justice in her acquittal."¹

While the British government "neglected to use due diligence for the fulfilment of its duties as a neutral,"² it took care to commit no positive act of hostility. In answer to a question Lord Palmerston stated, in the House of Commons, June 13, that the government had no present intention "of offering mediation between the two contending parties" in America, and that it had received no communication on the subject from France. Seventeen days later this attitude was modified, when, in referring to the sufferings and privations in the cotton-manufacturing districts, which were endured

¹ My principal authorities in the case of the *Florida* and *Alabama* are contained in two British Blue-books entitled "Papers relating to Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva" (1872). There were five arbitrators, Count Sclopis, M. Staempfli, Baron d'Itajubá, named respectively by the King of Italy, President of Switzerland, and Emperor of Brazil. Charles Francis Adams was the American, and Chief Justice Cockburn the British arbitrator. In these books are printed the opinions and arguments of these five. In the case of the *Florida* I have relied mainly on the opinion of the three disinterested members of the board. In the consideration of this and the *Alabama* the mere designations part i. and part ii. will be understood to refer to these Blue-books. As to the *Florida*, see Count Sclopis, part i. p. 32, M. Staempfli, p. 14, Baron d'Itajubá, p. 28. See also Adams, p. 18. Chief Justice Cockburn dissented from these opinions, part ii. p. 116. The quotation from him in the text is on p. 140. See Adams to Russell, Feb. 18, and Russell's reply, Dip. Corr., 1862, pp. 39, 40; Bulloch, *The Secret Service of the Confederate States*, vol. i. The *Florida* was built under the name of the *Oreto*.

² Baron d'Itajubá, part i. p. 28.

with "the most heroic fortitude and patience," he said that they would offer mediation if there were a chance of success.¹

By July 11 it was known in London that McClellan had met with serious reverses before Richmond and had been forced to retreat to the James River. Those who sympathized with the South to the extent of desiring that their government might openly aid the Confederacy were full of glee at the turn affairs had taken, while the main body of the aristocracy and middle class, who opposed intervention of any sort, also showed evident satisfaction. What encouragement could be given the South through speeches, through leaders in the press, and through social influence, they gave with an open hand; yet an analysis of the different expressions discovers a warm sympathy with the South only in those who had plainly a fellow-feeling for the aristocracy across the sea, for deep in the hearts of those who were unbiassed by the traditions of their order lay a secret distrust of their own arguments and a perception of the truth that the South was fighting to preserve slavery. Rather was the moving spirit one of hostility to the North, and perhaps it was not so much hostility as it was irritation that the United States should seem to be so blind to the interests of civilization. Before McClellan's defeat was known, the *Times* had spoken of "this insensate and degenerate people,"² and the tenor of its preaching was, "The war can only end in one way. Why not accept the facts and let the South begone?"³ When the misfortune of the Union army was learned, the leaders in the *Times* glowed with impatience and remonstrance against the continuance of a hopeless struggle. Englishmen will probably never realize how these words stung the Northern people in their time of trouble.⁴ Nothing illustrates better the power

¹ Hansard, 543, 1214.

² July 9.

³ Thus paraphrased by the *Spectator*, July 12.

⁴ "The Russian minister said they [the English] had no sensibility

of a journal than the utterances of the "Thunderer," which irritated Americans more than any speech of Palmerston, any despatch of Earl Russell, and I think I may safely add any violation of Great Britain's neutrality.¹ Let one imagine how different would have been the feeling between the two English-speaking nations had the ability and influence of this newspaper been on the side of the North!²

The majority of English voters for whom the *Times* was alike the oracle and the organ had a fit representative in the Prime Minister Palmerston, who seemed to have some sort of political relations with the editor of the journal.³ The *Times*

themselves, and hence could not understand it in others. He thought well of Lord Palmerston because he could depend on what he said. 'Mais cet homme a la peau dure comme un rhinocère.' "—Diary of Charles Francis Adams, entry June 13. With rare generosity Mr. Charles F. Adams allowed me to use his father's diary in manuscript and to print the extracts from it in this chapter and in chap. xxii. In some measure they will show its value to me; but the careful reading of the diary has given me, moreover, an understanding of English sentiment and the course of the English government which I could have obtained in no other way.

¹ "The *Times*, which is aware that its articles weigh in America more heavily than despatches, writes every now and then as if it wanted war."—The *Spectator*, July 12.

² "During the whole reign of the Ten-pounders—*i. e.* from 1832 to 1867—the *Times* affected the governing opinion almost too deeply. At one period which lasted years, it was hardly possible to pass a law of which the *Times* disapproved. It was most difficult to appoint any man whom the *Times* condemned to great office, while the man to whom the *Times* pointed as one who ought to rise, as a rule did rise, sometimes very fast indeed."—The *Spectator*, Nov. 10, 1894.

"The *Times*, existing as an organ of the common, satisfied, well-to-do Englishman, and for as much play of mind as may suit its being that."—Matthew Arnold, Essay on the Function of Criticism (1865). See, also, Kinglake's *Invasion of the Crimea* (London, 1888), vol. ii. p. 232 *et seq.*

³ After making a note of a conversation between Palmerston, Delane, the principal editor of the *Times*, and himself, Adams writes: "Delane was evidently sounding in order to guide his paper by ministerial policy. I have always attributed the obvious ill will to us visible in the *Times*, the *Post*, and the *Globe* to the disposition of the premier. Without committing himself or the government to any one of them, it is quite notorious that he conciliates their good will by suffering them to conjecture his wishes."—Entry in Diary, May 10.

did not favor mediation or intervention on the part of Great Britain alone, and so argued in its leader of July 18. On this day, long looked forward to by the active friends of the South, took place, in the House of Commons, the debate on Lindsay's resolution that the government ought seriously to consider the propriety of offering to mediate between the United States and the Southern Confederacy. Four speakers supported the motion; two opposed it, one of whom was William E. Forster. Lord Palmerston closed the debate in expressing the hope that the House would be content to leave the matter in the hands of the government. Lindsay thereupon withdrew his motion.¹ Nevertheless, after McClellan's defeat the inimical feeling towards the North increased rapidly. The distress in the cotton-manufacturing districts was sore,² and it was natural that the English governing classes desired the most speedy possible settlement of the American difficulty. It would be shallow to find fault with them for thinking the North would fail in its effort to conquer the South, since the

¹ Hansard, 511 *et seq.*

² "The shadow of the American calamity is creeping with a slow but steady advance over the shining wealth of our cotton districts and threatening it with a temporary but total eclipse. Little by little the darkness grows; first one town and then another is swallowed up in the gloom of universal pauperism; the want is urgent, and the prevalent idleness is at least as menacing as the want; young women in large numbers are thrown upon public charity without proper accommodation by night, and with no proper avocation by day; young men accustomed to the constant strain of mechanical exertion are suddenly left to the undesirable companionship of their own restless minds. The rates are becoming so heavy that in some places 50 per cent. of the expected returns have to be remitted on the ground of poverty; the benevolence of the most opulent is stretched, and that of the generous is over-taxed; and yet we have an autumn and winter of probably deepening gloom before us." — *Spectator*, July 19.

"The cotton famine is altogether the saddest thing that has befallen this country for many a year. There have been gloomy times enough before this. We have seen Ireland perishing from actual starvation, and England half ruined from commercial distress. War and rebellion have taken their turn among the troubles from which a great nation can scarcely expect to be long free. But in the worst of our calamities there has seldom been so pitiable a sight as the manufacturing districts present at this moment." — *Saturday Review*, July 26.

opinion of our friends was the same.¹ The working people still desired the North to fight it out.²

The most culpable act of negligence is yet to be recorded. As early as June 23 Adams called the attention of Earl Russell to a "more powerful war steamer" than the *Florida* which was being completed at Liverpool and which was nearly ready for departure. This ship became on her second christening the *Alabama*. Adams asked that she be prevented from sailing unless the fact should be established that her purpose was not inimical to the United States.³ The communication was referred to the proper department, and in the course of business reached Liverpool, where the sympathy of the community with the Confederate States was notorious. The surveyor of the port, who undoubtedly suspected for whom the ship-of-war was intended, took care to shut his eyes to any condemning evidence, and made a colorless statement which was submitted by the Commissioners of Customs in London to their solicitor, and was adjudged by him to be sufficient ground for advising against her seizure. The commissioners in their communication to the Lords of the Treasury concurred in the opinion of their legal adviser, but

¹ "The last news from your side has created regret among your friends and pleasure among your enemies. I am grieved at it. . . . I do not lose faith in your cause, but I wish I had less reason to feel anxious about you." — Bright to Sumner, July 12. "There is an all but unanimous belief that you *cannot* subject the South to the Union. . . . I feel quite convinced that unless cotton comes in considerable quantities before the end of the year, the governments of Europe will be knocking at your door." — Cobden to Sumner, July 11. "We have just heard of the apparent defeat of your army before Richmond. At least, such is the construction put on the telegraphic news here. Will it only excite the government the more to more determined efforts — or will it tend to induce a disposition to concede a separation? We are all speculating." — Duke of Argyll to Sumner, July 12. "I cannot believe in there being any Union party in the South, and if not, can the continuance of the war be justified?" — Duchess of Argyll to Sumner, July 12. All these from Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

² On this subject in general see the *Times*, July 14, 16, 18, 21, 22; the *Daily News*, July 11, 16, 22, 29; the *Spectator*, July 12, 19, Aug. 2; *Saturday Review*, July 12, 19, 26, Aug. 2, 9; Adams's letters to Seward and his diary for July.

³ Part ii. p. 180.

said that "the officers at Liverpool will keep a strict watch on the vessel."¹ All these papers came to Earl Russell, who, on the advice of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General,² suggested to Adams that the United States consul at Liverpool (Dudley) be instructed to submit to the collector of the port any evidence that confirmed his suspicion. Adams and Dudley were indefatigable, and July 9 Dudley addressed to the collector a letter which no impartial man could have read without being convinced that the vessel in question was designed for the Southern Confederacy. The greater part of his statements, writes Chief Justice Cockburn in his opinion dissenting from the award of the Geneva Tribunal, "could not have been made available in an English Court."³ But the moral evidence was complete, and needed only time and opportunity to convert it into legal proof. It is not surprising that in the analysis of the historical laboratory the result reached is that the collector, the solicitor, and the Commissioners of Customs knew in their hearts that the *Alabama* was intended for the Confederate government, secretly wished that she might get away, and since they had not strictly a legal case against her persuaded themselves that they were performing their official duty. Chief Justice Cockburn, who puts the best face possible upon the action of the English authorities, intimates that at this juncture these officials should have addressed an inquiry to the Messrs. Laird, demanding for whom this warship was designed. "If it had been," he adds, "the high character of these gentlemen would doubtless have insured either a refusal to answer or a truthful answer. The former would have helped materially to establish a case against the

¹ Part i. p. 36.

² This was the opinion signed June 30: "If the representation made by Mr. Adams is in accordance with the facts, the building and equipment of the steamer is a manifest violation of the Foreign Enlistment act, and steps ought to be taken to put that act in force and to prevent the vessel from going to sea."—Part i. p. 36; see also Earl Selborne, *Memorials*, vol. ii. p. 421.

³ Part ii. p. 183.

vessel, the latter would have justified her immediate seizure.”¹ This criticism is unanswerable. To require from Dudley direct proof which he must procure in a hostile community, with the quiet opposition probably of an unsympathetic and technical bureaucracy, was unfriendly and exasperating.

Three weeks had passed since the customs officials at Liverpool and London had been enjoined to find out the truth, but had they actually conspired to suppress it, they would hardly have acted differently. They showed no disposition to search for proof, and carped at the evidence offered them.² July 17 Adams wrote Dudley to employ a solicitor and secure affidavits to submit to the collector. Four days later Dudley and his solicitor brought to the collector direct proof. Six persons deposed to the character and destination of the vessel; five of whom showed it to be reasonably probable that the *Alabama* was destined for the Southern Confederacy, while the sixth, a mariner of Birkenhead, swore that “it is well known by the hands on board that the vessel is going out as a privateer for the Confederate government to act against the United States under a commission from Mr. Jefferson Davis.”³ We cannot detain the vessel, says the collector. Insufficient evidence, says the solicitor of customs. You are both right, say the commissioners. The work of getting the *Alabama* ready went on with swiftness and zeal, while the Circumlocution Office moved with the pace of a snail. The papers went to the Lords of the Treasury.

Meanwhile Adams had retained a Queen’s Counsel of eminence, R. P. Collier, to whom the six depositions and two additional ones were submitted. Collier’s opinion is in no uncertain tone. “I am of opinion,” he wrote, “that the collector of customs would be justified in detaining the vessel. Indeed, I should think it his duty to detain her. . . . It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Enlistment act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter. It well deserves

¹ Part ii. p. 184.

² Adams, part i. p. 37.

³ Part ii. p. 185.

consideration, whether, if the vessel be allowed to escape, the Federal government would not have serious grounds of remonstrance.”¹ This opinion went to the customs authorities at Liverpool. “It was the duty of the collector of customs at Liverpool,” declares Cockburn, “as early as the 22d of July to detain this vessel.”² The collector would not act, and referred the matter to his superiors, the Commissioners of Customs. Insufficient evidence is still the word of the assistant solicitor of customs, who adds, I cannot concur in Collier’s views. At this stage of the proceedings, writes Cockburn, “it became in my opinion the duty of the Commissioners of Customs at once to direct the seizure to be made. Misled by advice which they ought to have rejected as palpably erroneous, they unfortunately refused to cause the vessel to be seized.”³

In the mean time Adams had sent the affidavits, the opinion of Collier, and many other papers relating to the case to Earl Russell. “I ought to have been satisfied with the opinion of Sir Robert Collier,” wrote Russell in after years, with a candor which does him honor, “and to have given orders to detain the *Alabama* at Birkenhead.”⁴

Now ensues a scene which, useful as it would have been to the writer of an opera-bouffe libretto, or to Dickens for his account of the Circumlocution Office, completely baffles the descriptive pen of the historian. The papers received from the Commissioners of Customs and those which Adams had sent Russell were submitted to the law officers of the Crown, one set reaching them July 23, the other July 26; that is to say, they reached the senior officer, the Queen’s Advocate, on those days. Sir John Harding, who was then the Queen’s Advocate, had been ill and incapacitated for business since the latter part of June; in fact, his excitable nerves and weak constitution had succumbed to the strain of work, and he was now verging on insanity. At his private house these papers

¹ Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 152.

² Part ii. p. 190.

³ Part ii. p. 190.

⁴ Recollections and Suggestions, Earl Russell, p. 235, see, also, p. 332.

lay for five days. Work on the *Alabama* went on briskly, and everybody in the kingdom was satisfied with having done his duty. The collector had referred the matter to the Commissioners; the Commissioners had referred it to the Lords of the Treasury; the Lords and Earl Russell had referred it to the law officers of the Crown. The papers on which perhaps depended war or peace between two great nations either received no notice whatever, or were examined only by a lawyer who was going mad.¹ Finally, on July 28, the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General got hold of the papers. Their report was conclusive. "We recommend," they said, July 29, "that without loss of time the vessel be seized by the proper authorities."² It was too late. The *Alabama* had left port that morning, and under pretence of a trial trip had gone out to sea. Yet she was still on the Welsh coast, only fifty miles from Liverpool, where the most ordinary energy on the part of the London and Liverpool authorities would have been sufficient to effect her apprehension before she started on the career which was to do so much in driving the American merchant marine from the high seas.³

¹ Part ii.; Mozley's *Reminiscences*, chap. xcii. vol. ii.; Lord Selborne's account in Reid's *Life of Lord John Russell*, p. 313; Sir H. James's statement in the House of Commons, March 17, 1893; Lord Selborne's letter in reply, Sir H. James's answer, and Selborne's rejoinder, *Times*, March 24, 1893.

² Part ii. p. 188.

³ "*You have been,*" said Cobden, May 13, 1864, "*carrying on hostilities from these shores against the people of the United States, and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is estimated that the loss sustained by the capture and burning of American vessels has been about \$15,000,000, or nearly £3,000,000 sterling. But that is a small part of the injury which has been inflicted on the American marine. We have rendered the rest of her vast mercantile property for the present valueless.*" "There could not," said William E. Forster, May 13, 1864, "be a stronger illustration of the damage which had been done to the American trade by these cruisers than the fact, that, so completely was the American flag driven from the ocean, the *Georgia*, on her second cruise, did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she saw no less than seventy vessels in a very few days." — Hansard, quoted in Sumner's speech on the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, Sumner's Works, vol. xiii. pp. 77, 78.

As nothing in the way of negligence could have been so unfriendly, and nothing could have been more derogatory to honest neutrality than the action of the British authorities and government in this case,¹ it is little wonder that an English writer of standing has asserted that every cabinet minister rejoiced at the escape of the *Alabama*,² and that before the end of 1862 the gossip about London ran that Earl Russell himself had given warning to the *Alabama* to go before the order to stop her could be sent.³ Again, it has been stated frequently by American writers that the English government — meaning the ministry — connived at the escape of the Confederate privateer. All these statements are untrue. It is certain that at least four cabinet ministers — the Duke of Argyll, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Milner Gibson, and Earl Russell — regretted deeply the escape of the *Alabama*. Touching the first three, no evidence need be adduced, and no charge further than negligence and indecision at an im-

¹ "The Government of Great Britain neglected to use due diligence for the fulfilment of its duties as a neutral." — Baron d'Itajubá, part i. p. 41. "The example of the *Oreto* made it the duty of the British authorities to be on their guard against acts of this kind. They, nevertheless, did not in any way take the initiative, on the representations of Dudley and Adams, with the view of inquiring into the true state of affairs, although they had given an assurance that the authorities should take the matter up. After sufficient evidence had been furnished, the examination of it was so much procrastinated, and the measures taken to arrest the vessel were so defective, that she was enabled to escape just before the order for her seizure was given." — M. Staempfli, part i. p. 48. "The neutrality of Great Britain was gravely compromised by the vessel named the *Alabama*." — Count Sclopis, p. 55. Most of my facts have been drawn from the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Cockburn.

Since writing this, vol. ii. of the Memorials, Family and Personal, of the Earl of Selborne (who at the time was Solicitor-General) has appeared. I have read carefully his statement and argument. I see no reason to modify any expression I have used. I have added to my account that Selborne (then Roundell Palmer) and the Attorney-General gave Russell an opinion June 30. — *Ante*, p. 86.

² "There was not one of her Majesty's ministers who was not ready to jump out of his skin for joy when he heard of the escape of the *Alabama*." — Mozley's *Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 141. "Mozley, then, I believe, a regular writer for the *Times*." — Selborne Memorials, vol. ii. p. 428.

³ Russell's statement to Adams, Diary, entry Nov. 15.

portant juncture can be brought against Earl Russell. Cobden wrote Sumner: "Earl Russell was *bona fide* in his desire to prevent the *Alabama* from leaving, but he was tricked and was angry at the escape of the vessel."¹ The most intelligent and decisive appreciation of the Foreign Secretary's attitude was expressed by Charles Francis Adams before the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, in words honorable to both men, who had contended as ardently in conversation and letter as the courtesy of diplomatic usage would permit. "I am far from drawing any inferences," he said, "to the effect that he [Earl Russell] was actuated in any way by motives of ill-will to the United States, or, indeed, by unworthy motives of any kind. If I were permitted to judge from a calm comparison of the relative weight of his various opinions with his action in different contingencies, I should be led rather to infer a balance of good-will than of hostility to the United States."²

That ship-builders and ship-owners of Liverpool and other ports exulted in the escape of the *Alabama*, is doubtless true; that the prospect that she would destroy the shipping of England's greatest rival on the sea at the outbreak of the war occurred to them and gave them joy, is more than probable; that there were members of the House of Commons who shared these feelings, cannot be gainsaid; and that the same ideas may have entered the minds of some members of the cabinet, it would be impossible to deny: but I should be loath to believe, since indeed there is no evidence of it, that they affected the official action of any minister. Lord Palmerston's hand is not apparent in any part of the proceedings, although as First Lord of the Treasury he probably ought to have been acquainted with the progress of the case. His spirit seems to have run through every department of the

¹ May 2, 1863, Morley's Cobden, p. 584. Spencer Walpole, on the authority of a letter from the Duke of Argyll of Dec. 5, 1872, makes the statement that Russell in cabinet meeting proposed that the *Alabama* be detained in the event that she entered any British port, and actually drafted a despatch directing this. He was supported in this by no one but the Duke of Argyll, and the design was abandoned. — Life of Russell, vol. ii. p. 355.

² Part i. p. 24.

government, but affected the department of Foreign Affairs less perhaps than any other, since Earl Russell was a rival leader of the Liberal party and had been talked of for Prime Minister at the time the Queen sent for Palmerston. Many other things go to show that Russell considered himself supreme as Foreign Secretary. Perhaps the main duty of an English Prime Minister, next to upholding the honor of his country, is to retain his majority in the House of Commons. Palmerston had alienated the radicals, chief of whom were Cobden and Bright, and as a set-off had won golden opinions from the conservatives, who displayed little anxiety to turn him out of office.¹ The radicals were on the side of the North through thick and thin, while many of the conservatives sympathized with the South. Lending countenance to the Southern cause was therefore the better method of keeping his majority,² and to do this Palmerston would, in John Bright's opinion, stick at nothing, not even war.³ He deemed the feeling of the North towards England unreasonable,⁴ and such was his real or affected indignation at General Butler's notorious woman order⁵ that he wrote Adams a private and

¹ Life of Palmerston, Ashley, vol. ii. p. 205.

² Adams wrote Seward August 8: "Lord Palmerston has been steadily laboring to counterbalance the loss experienced on the liberal side by corresponding gains from the opposition. . . . That the American difficulties have materially contributed to this result, cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the leading liberals are the declared friends of the United States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate subdivision of America into many separate States which will neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative class of the aristocracy, who dread the growth of liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them. The practical effect upon our interests is rather disadvantageous, as it renders our enemies frank and bold, whilst it makes our friends conscious of the labor of working against the stream and therefore hesitating and timid in our defence. The indications of this are constantly visible in Parliament." — State Dept. Archives, MS.

³ Adams's Diary, entry July 4.

⁴ Letter to Gladstone, April 29, Ashley's Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 224.

⁵ When New Orleans was taken Butler was made commanding general. The women of the city continually insulted the Union officers and soldiers

confidential note which the minister considered offensive and insolent in tone and an insult to his country.¹ It must be remembered that while Adams was trying to stop the *Alabama* the English public and officials were pondering the news of the Union reverses before Richmond. The reports, which were indeed gloomy enough, were exaggerated, until one day in July there was exultation in London and Liverpool over a telegram which said that McClellan's army had surrendered, or at all events was on the point of capitulation.² Confidence in the Confederates' ultimate success was general, and undoubtedly contributed to the laxity of the English officials in their performance of the duties imposed on them by neutrality. We may be sure that if McClellan had taken

For example : one woman deliberately spat in the face of an officer in full uniform as he was on his way to church ; a woman emptied from a balcony a vessel of dirty water on Admiral Farragut and Colonel Deming in full uniform as they were walking along one of the principal streets. Butler gives other instances : these were the most pronounced insults. He thereupon issued an order, May 15, that if any female should insult in any manner a Union officer or soldier, "she should be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation." This order caused a cry of rage in the English press and House of Commons. The strongest expression that I have found is from the *Saturday Review* of June 14, "Unless the author of this infamous proclamation is promptly recalled, let us hear no more of 'the ties which bind us to our transatlantic kinsmen.' No Englishmen ought to own as kinsmen men who attempt to protect themselves from a handful of women by official and authoritative threats of rape. The bloodiest savages could do nothing crueller — the most loathsome Yahoo of fiction could do nothing filthier." The English did not understand American soldiers. All evidence which I have found sustains Butler's statement that there was no case of abuse of the order by a Northern soldier. The insults ceased. See Butler's Book, p. 414 *et seq.*

It is probable that this order was the main cause of Butler's removal from the command of New Orleans. It grievously incensed the ladies of this city, many of whom were of French extraction. Their bitterness made itself felt in the remonstrances of Mercier, the French Minister at Washington. The removal of Butler emanated from Seward. A partial support for this statement will be found in Butler's Book, p. 533 ; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 139 ; O.R., liii. p. 526 ; iii. ii. p. 505 ; Welles's Diary, i. p. 304.

¹ Adams's Diary, entry June 10 ; see letter from Louis Blanc, London, June 19, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 68.

² *Times* and *Daily News*, July 19 ; letter from Louis Blanc, London, July 21, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 100.

Richmond in June, the *Alabama* would not have escaped in July.

The *Alabama* left Liverpool without guns or munitions of war of any kind; these as well as coal were brought to her at the Azores by two British vessels which sailed from England about the middle of August.¹

However unfriendly the action of England was in the case of the *Alabama*, it must be borne in mind that the fault was one of omission. The British government, unlike the Emperor of the French, was during the whole war innocent of any overt acts of unkindness. The Queen's speech at the prorogation of Parliament, August 7, declared that her Majesty had still determined to take no part in the contest on the American continent.²

Again, though the dominant sentiment of England toward the North is to be deplored and the want of due diligence in the performance of her duties as a neutral is unquestioned, her atonement has been ample. English books, magazines, and newspapers are full of sincere admissions that the public opinion of the country took a wrong direction. In the treaty of Washington³ the regret which Great Britain expresses at the escape of the Confederate cruisers is all that can be asked in the way of moral reparation from a high-spirited people conscious of their strength. As far as pecuniary damages⁴

¹ Part i. p. 38; part ii. p. 191.

² Hansard, 1209; see the correspondence between James M. Mason, the Confederate envoy, and Earl Russell from July 17 to August 2, *Life of J. Davis* by his wife, vol. ii. p. 332 *et seq.* Lord Ranelagh, who had had a talk with the Emperor Louis Napoleon, thus wrote the Earl of Malmesbury, August 30: "I was very much struck by a conversation about America, for in the most open manner after dinner he said he was quite ready to recognize the *South*, but Palmerston would not do so, and he could not unless Palmerston did. The result of this (pretended?) frankness is that Slidell in Paris tells every one that England is the cause of the South not being recognized. He abuses England, and says we are their enemy; in fact, we are in the happy position of being hated by both North and South." — *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, vol. ii. p. 277.

³ Made in 1871 and provided for the Arbitration of Geneva.

⁴ The award of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration for damages done by the *Florida*, *Alabama*, their tenders, and the *Shenandoah* was a gross sum

were concerned, the terms submitting the dispute to arbitration made absolutely sure our case, which was already very strong. That the score has been wiped out should be recognized at the bar of history and in the court of honor.

We must now return to McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, whom we left, after their masterly retreat, in camp at Harrison's Landing on the James River. "I need 50,000 more men," he telegraphed July 1, "and with them I will retrieve our fortunes."¹ Already this request had been in some measure anticipated by the President; 5000 of McDowell's corps had been sent to him, Burnside at New Berne, N. C., was directed to send all reinforcements possible, and Halleck was asked for a detachment of 25,000 troops from the Western army.² Halleck protested that so material a reduction of his force would necessitate the surrender of territory already acquired, and the postponement of the projected expedition to Chattanooga.³ The President, who was earnest for the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee, replied that he need not send a man if it would weaken or delay this expedition or endanger any important point now held.⁴ Within two days Lincoln informed McClellan that Halleck could spare no troops, and that it would be impossible to send him promptly 50,000 or any considerable force. "Save the army, material and personal," he added, "and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept."⁵ The events of the "Seven Days" had not diminished his confidence in his general. "I am satisfied,"

of \$15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States.

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 281.

² Ibid., pp. 271, 281. These orders and this request are of June 28, the day of the receipt of the demoralized despatch of McClellan from Savage's Station, and of Lincoln's benignant reply, *ante*.

³ July 1, *ibid.*, p. 285.

⁴ July 2, *ibid.*, p. 286.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 286, 291.

he said in a despatch, "that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."¹ In the mean time McClellan had raised his demand for reinforcements to 100,000, to insure the capture of Richmond and the bringing of the war to an end. This new demand did not affect the kindly feeling of the President and the Secretary of War, who ordered reinforcements to him from Burnside, from Hunter, and from Washington, while the President begged Halleck for 10,000 infantry.² Nothing could have been warmer than Stanton's expression of confidence and assurance of support.³ But something occurred about this time (what it was I have not been able to ascertain) which shook the unreserved trust of Lincoln and Stanton in McClellan. "The private and very confidential letter" of Seward to Weed, of July 7, reflects some change of feeling on the part of the administration, and is all the more remarkable inasmuch as Seward was the constant friend of McClellan. "Notwithstanding," he wrote, "the light thrown upon the position of our army on the James River, most painful doubts come up from there now, upon the question whether it can, in any case, however reinforced, make a successful or hopeful attack upon Richmond. If that is impossible, reinforcements sent there will only aggravate the impotence of its position. Meantime the suggestion comes up, of course, that the insurgents, holding McClellan in his present position with a small force, will immediately organize a new and vigorous campaign against Washington."⁴

¹ July 3, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 291.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 291, 294, 298.

³ "Be assured that you shall have the support of this department and the government as cordially and faithfully as was ever rendered by man to man."—Stanton to McClellan, July 5, *ibid.*, p. 298. "Also there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes. No man had ever a truer friend than I have been to you and shall continue to be."—McClellan's Own Story, p. 476. See McClellan's reply, *ibid.*, p. 477.

⁴ Seward's Life, vol. iii. p. 114.

July 8 Lincoln made a visit to the army, and, seeking information which should lead him to a decision, asked McClellan and his corps commanders if the army could be safely removed. McClellan thought that it would be a "very difficult matter;" Sumner and Heintzelman deemed it possible, though entailing the abandonment of our cause; Porter said it was impossible, and would ruin the country; while Franklin and Keyes were sure that the removal might be effected, and that it was the proper course to pursue. McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Porter expressed the opinion that the health of the army was good, but Franklin and Keyes maintained the contrary. All agreed that the army was secure in its present position.¹ The President could come to no decision, and in his perplexity of mind felt the need of better military advisers than there were in Washington. The armies of the West, as contrasted with the Army of the Potomac, had accomplished positive results, and to the ability there developed he looked for aid. A fortnight previously he had placed General John Pope, who had achieved fame by the capture of Island No. 10, and had enjoyed a popular reputation for greater military capacity and energy than McClellan, in command of the newly christened Army of Virginia, composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont. His eyes now turned to Halleck, the commander in the West, who was versed in the theory of military art, had written books on tactics and international law, and was generally regarded with favor. July 2 Lincoln asked him, "Could you make me a flying visit for consultation?" July 11 he ordered "that Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department under his charge."² It is probable that this appoint-

¹ Lincoln's memorandum from McClellan's headquarters, July 9. Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 201. See also letter of Keyes to the President, July 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 313.

² Ibid., pp. 286, 314.

ment was suggested by General Scott, when the President saw him at West Point in the last days of June, and that it was favored by Stanton and by Pope.¹ Halleck came to Washington unwillingly. The mixture of politics with military affairs, the disposition of an influential part of the press to cry down a general who would not carry out the policy of the radical Republicans, had instilled in him a strong distaste for the capital, which was augmented by his poor opinion of the negro. He had already declined invitations from the President, but the order of July 11 left him no option.²

In the interim, before Halleck's arrival in Washington, the opposition to McClellan grew in virulence. It may have been increased by his so-called political letter which he had handed to the President at Harrison's Landing,³ although Chase, who seems at this time to have been the head of the opposition, makes no reference to it in his diary, notes, or private letters. The Secretary of the Treasury and the radicals who sympathized with him, and represented an active sentiment in the Northern States, were disposed to rate high the talent of a general who would seize every opportunity to strike at slavery. McClellan's conservatism increased their bitterness against him, whereas they found in Pope a commander whose ideas of a vigorous prosecution of the war agreed with their own, and whose ability gave them reason to expect results in the field from an army under his command which they had hoped for in vain from Butler and Frémont. Pope had gone to work with energy, concentrating his troops in front of Washington in a position where they could protect the capital or undertake active operations. The exposition of his plans and the frank expression of his very positive opinions before the Committee on the Conduct of the War must have won the hearts of the radical senators and

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 2; Welles, Lincoln and Seward, p. 192.

² Halleck to McClellan, July 30, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 343; Warden's Chase, p. 448.

³ Dated July 7. Printed in O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 73; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 447. Vide *ante*.

representatives who heard his testimony, although the freedom of his confidences was not in accordance with the best military tradition.¹ Dining with Chase, he made no secret of his opinion of McClellan's incompetency and indisposition to active movements, and said that he had urged the President to displace McClellan before the arrival of Halleck; confident that slavery must perish, he favored the use of any instrument that would weaken the enemy.² Yet Pope had at the outset made an honest attempt to work in harmony with McClellan. The two generals in their correspondence show equal sincerity and a like desire to overcome the enemy, but their plans were irreconcilable. McClellan proposed after receiving heavy reinforcements to resume the offensive from his present position, while Pope plainly implied that the wide separation of the two armies was dangerous.³ Believing, as he did, that a move upon Richmond from the James River as a base was too hazardous an operation, and that the two armies ought to be united and advance upon the Confederate capital from the north,⁴ he gave his meaning to McClellan with a delicacy that was noteworthy in a man whose expression was ordinarily blunt. Of his bluntness he gave signal proof in another way. In an address issued to his army for the purpose, he afterwards said, of creating in it "a feeling of confidence and a cheerful spirit which were sadly wanting,"⁵ he announced: "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which

¹ This was July 8, C. W., part i. p. 276.

² This was July 21, Warden's Chase, p. 438; Schuckers's Chase, p. 448.

³ Pope's letter of July 4, McClellan's reply of July 7, O. R., vol. xi. part iii pp. 295, 306.

⁴ Testimony before the Committee, C. W., part i. p. 280.

⁵ C. W., Supp. part ii. p. 105.

I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear."¹

This address lacked wisdom and tact. To the officers and soldiers of the three corps which made up his Army of Virginia, it was unjust and almost insulting. Their ill success had come from the imperfect strategy devised at Washington and from incompetent leadership rather than from the want of bravery. Regarded also as a slur upon the Army of the Potomac, it made almost every officer in it his enemy. Pope followed up his address with four orders which caused commotion at the time, and have since given rise to much discussion in the Confederate and the Union books on the war. Orders No. 5 and 6 and the greater part of Order No. 7 were at least unnecessary, although Ropes maintains, after an impartial discussion of them, that they were justified by the laws of war.² A penalty threatened in Order No. 7 calls for mention. Non-combatants who fired upon Union soldiers from houses should, if detected, "be shot without awaiting civil process." Order No. 11 provides for the arrest of all disloyal male citizens within the lines of the Union army. Those who took the oath of allegiance should be permitted to remain at their homes; those who refused to take it should be sent farther South, and if found again within our lines, "be considered as spies and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law;" those who violated their oath of allegiance should be

¹ Date of this is July 14, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 474.

² The Army under Pope, p. 9. Order No. 5 gave occasion for acts of pillage and outrage, and Pope issued an order, Aug. 14, rebuking those who had misinterpreted and abused it, and threatening them with punishment. — O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 573.

shot.¹ For Order No. 11 there is, in the opinion of Ropes, "absolutely no justification." It was, moreover, impossible of execution. I have found no instance of the enforcement of the extreme penalty or even of attempt at its enforcement.² Even Chase wrote Pope mildly disapproving it.³ From Winchester, a town constantly bandied between the Union and Confederate armies, a lady whose sympathy was entirely with the South wrote to the wife of Stonewall Jackson seventeen days after the issue of the order, "That threatened oath of allegiance has been so long delayed that we hope it may not be carried out."⁴ Nor have I found a case of summary punishment that substantiated the menace of Order No. 7. In truth, any serious intention of carrying out these orders would have been abandoned after Jefferson Davis had threatened to retaliate, and after Pope and his army had entered upon their active campaign, which from the start was a series of reverses. The address and the orders are such as were hardly to be expected from a trained and experienced soldier; they bear the stamp of a pugnacious civilian. General Pope in after years affirmed they were issued on the direct prompting of Stanton.⁵ Certain it is that the orders were shown to the President before they were published, and the most obnoxious one, Order No. 11, was in his hands twenty-four hours without receiving a manifestation of disapproval.⁶ The radical Republicans were convinced that the Army of the Potomac under McClellan had been coddled. The Secretary of War undoubtedly shared this conviction,

¹ These orders are printed in O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 50 *et seq.* The date of Order No. 7 should probably be July 20 (see Ropes), that of Order No. 11 is July 23.

² Some references to these orders and proceedings under them in the Confederate Correspondence may be found in O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 669; vol. xii. part iii. pp. 919, 923.

³ Aug. 1, Schuckers, p. 378.

⁴ Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 369.

⁵ In conversation with General J. D. Cox four or five years before Pope's death.

⁶ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 359; vol. xii. part iii. p. 500.

which suggested the advisability of giving the troops in Virginia to understand that rough work lay before them. Moreover, "the barbarity of rebel warfare" was a common tenet at the North, where it was believed that undue leniency in many respects had been shown by our generals to the Confederates.¹ The orders of Pope were looked upon as the announcement of a change of policy, and when Chase set down in his notes, "General Pope seemed to me an earnest, active, intelligent man, and inspired me with the best hopes,"² he unquestionably spoke for the radical Republicans in Washington and in the country at large. Perhaps we shall gain a better understanding of these orders if we attribute to them the ulterior purpose of affecting public sentiment at a time when fresh enlistments in the army were earnestly desired.

Jefferson Davis ordered that notification be sent to the general-in-chief of the armies of the United States that the Confederacy would not consider any of the commissioned officers captured from Pope's army as prisoners of war.³ Halleck probably made no reply to this communication; indeed he regarded some of the orders as "very injudicious," and advised Pope, on the authority of the Secretary of War, to modify Order No. 11 in the direction of leniency.⁴ Some of the officers of the Army of Virginia who were taken prisoners were sent into close confinement as felons;⁵ but with the end of Pope's brief career in Virginia, this wrangle ceases, having gone no great way beyond fulminations.

Those who made a hero of Pope continued their strife against McClellan. "My dear Mac," wrote Burnside, July 15, after his visit to Washington, "you have lots of enemies."⁶ The radicals so far prevailed with the President that after

¹ See, for example, letters of John Sherman to his brother, May 19, Aug. 24, Sept. 23, *Sherman Letters*, pp. 151, 157, 164.

² Schuckers, p. 448.

³ July 31, Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. ii. p. 315.

⁴ Aug. 6, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 359; vol. xii. part iii. p. 540.

⁵ *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, Jones, vol. ii. p. 148.

⁶ *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 472.

sending 9000 or 10,000 troops to Harrison's Landing, he withheld further reinforcements, detaining Burnside with his force at Fort Monroe.¹ Rumors of McClellan's disloyalty were in the air, and the subject must have been alluded to in cabinet meeting, for Chase records in his diary: "I said that I did not regard General McClellan as loyal to the administration, although I did not question his general loyalty to the country."² It was about this time that he and Stanton advised the President to remove McClellan and send Pope to the army on the James.³ This, Lincoln would not do, but, owing to the representations of Pope that cordial co-operation from McClellan could not be expected, or perhaps for other reasons, he offered the command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside, who peremptorily declined it.⁴ This was known only to a few. The President's perplexity was painful, but he would decide nothing further until he should have a chance to consult Halleck, whose arrival was awaited by all with the hope that he would prove the long-sought-for leader. He reached Washington July 23, and the next day went to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the James River. McClellan told his chief that his plan was to cross the James River, attack Petersburg, an important railroad centre, and cut the communication between Richmond and the States farther South. Halleck maintained this project to be impracticable and full of risk, and nearly if not quite talked him out of it. He further laid down as a military necessity the concentration of the Army of the Potomac with Pope's army unless a reinforcement of 20,000 would enable McClellan to attack Richmond with a strong probability of success. McClellan thought he should require 30,000 additional troops,

¹ Letters of July 15, 17, McClellan's Own Story, pp. 449, 472.

² July 22, Warden, p. 440.

³ Schuckers, p. 447.

⁴ Burnside's testimony, C. W., part i. p. 650; McClellan's Own Story, p. 458. This offer was made between July 18 and 30, and probably before Halleck's arrival in Washington on the 23d. — General J. D. Cox's Reminiscences, MS.; also, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 326, 330.

but after reflection said in a second interview that there was "a chance," and he "was willing to try it" with the number promised by the President. He also expressed the opinion that while the junction between his and Pope's forces might be made without exposing Washington, the withdrawal of his army would have a demoralizing influence on the soldiers, and that it would be better to maintain his present position until reinforcements should be furnished him adequate to an aggressive movement.¹ His despatches to Washington which followed Halleck's visit are an enforcement of this view. There also ensued between him and his chief an exchange of friendly and sympathetic letters.² July 30 an order to send away his sick was despatched from Washington, the reason given for it being "to enable you to move in any direction."³ August 3 Halleck telegraphed him: "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this."⁴ Burnside's letter of the day before throws some light on a council which led to this determination. "My dear Mac," he wrote, "I am much worried at the decision they have chosen to make in regard to your army. From the moment I reached Washington I feared it would be so, and I am of the opinion that your engineers had much to do with bringing about the determination. When the conclusion was arrived at, I was the only one who advocated your forward movement."⁵

The decision was a choice of evils made on the side of safety, a natural result of the balancing of chances in which the poor promise for the future of McClellan's failures in the past outweighed the many disadvantages of his withdrawal from the Peninsula. The hesitating manner in which he agreed to resume the offensive with a reinforcement of 20,000 indicated that when that number reached him he would cry

¹ Memorandum of Halleck, July 27, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 337.

² July 30 and Aug. 1, *ibid.*, pp. 343, 345.

³ *Ibid.*, part i. p. 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵ McClellan's Own Story, p. 472.

for more. Indeed, the promise was drawn from him by his anxiety to retain the army in its present position. The withdrawal of it to the neighborhood of Washington would be notice to the country that the plan of his Peninsular campaign was a failure. He suspected, moreover, that a part of the design was to supersede him in the command of the Army of the Potomac.¹ Halleck, in a friendly letter to him, explains clearly the grounds of the decision. McClellan and his officers estimated the enemy's forces in and about Richmond at 200,000, and he had raised his demand for reinforcements to 35,000, a number which it was impossible to send promptly. To keep his army in camp on the James during the sickly months of August and September, a probable necessity according to his plan, would weaken it sadly by disease. The delay would not only be dangerous to the health of his soldiers, but might expose Pope to the attack of the larger part of the Confederate army, while McClellan was in a position where he could render no assistance.²

Although the estimate of Lee's force was greatly in excess of the actual number, it was one generally credited. Meigs, who was, I believe, the only officer in high position to record any doubt of it, had, by a careful collation of the reports in the Richmond and Wilmington, N. C., newspapers, and by intelligent deductions therefrom, arrived at the opinion that it did not exceed 105,000.³ As a matter of fact, it numbered about 80,000,⁴ with reinforcements slowly arriving. While therefore the decision was based upon incorrect information, the judgment of the authorities in Washington, of McClellan and of Keyes,⁵ that the Army of the Potomac would need to be largely reinforced before it could safely take the offensive,

¹ See his letters to his wife during July.

² Aug. 6, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 82.

³ *Ibid.*, part iii. p. 340. Keyes held the prevalent opinion. See letter to Meigs, July 27, *ibid.*, p. 338.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 645; Allan, *Army of N. Va.*, p. 149, note iii.

⁵ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 332. Keyes wrote letters to Lincoln and Meigs, undermining his commander.

is a case of a sound conclusion from a false premise. McClellan had an effective force of 90,000.¹ Considering that there were intrenchments around Richmond and that Lee was the abler general of the two, McClellan ought to have had double the force of the enemy before venturing on an attack. The question must then have arisen, Can he handle so large an army? Criticism is silent on those who at that time gave a negative answer.²

Nevertheless, in his despatch replying to Halleck's order, McClellan made out a strong case. "Your telegram," he said, "has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. . . . This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. . . . With the assistance of the gunboats I consider our communications as now secure." I urge "that this order may be rescinded," that this army "may be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive." Pointing out reinforcements that were available, he continued: "Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defence of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided. . . . I entreat that this order may be rescinded."³ The events of the next two years added a tremendous force to the logic of this despatch, making evident, as they did, that McClellan's plan was better than that of Halleck; and the conclusion may be drawn, that it would

¹ Halleck's memorandum, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 338.

² See *Der Feldzug in Nord-Virginia in August, 1862* (Hannover, 1881), Major F. Mangold, p. 45.

³ Aug. 4, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 81.

probably have been better to reinforce the Army of the Potomac for the purpose of offensive operations in the autumn from its base on the James River.¹ The necessary troops could have been furnished, for Halleck had promised 20,000, and if Lincoln had reverted to his first impulse and drawn 25,000 from the West, leaving their places to be filled from the new levy, he would still have been in the region of safety; indeed, these 45,000 joined to the Army of the Potomac and a victory near Richmond were more favorable to the military situation in the West than the Western army intact and severe reverses in Virginia. The remaining troops needed could have been sent from the Army of Virginia, if an active campaign for Pope were given up, and it were deemed safe to intrust the defence of Washington largely to the new recruits which were now fast coming forward.² Forasmuch as Washington was more valuable to the Confederates than Richmond to the North, the possibility could not be ignored, that Lee should leave his capital with a slight defence, and with the main part of his army make a vigorous attack on Washington.³

¹ See Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 242. General J. D. Cox thus reports a conversation had with McClellan near Alexandria, Aug. 31: "McClellan discussed his campaign in the Peninsula with apparent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing to do in that emergency was to reinforce his army there and make it strong enough to go on with its work and capture Richmond. He said that if the government had lost confidence in his ability to conduct the campaign to a successful end, still it was unwise to think of anything else, except to strengthen that army and give it to some one they could trust. He added explicitly: 'If Pope was the man they had faith in, then Pope should have been sent to Harrison's Landing to take command, and however bitter it would have been, I should have had no just reason to complain.' He predicted that they would be put to the cost of much life and treasure, to get back to the position left by him." — Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS. Cf. Napoleon to Carnot, May, 1796, Lanfrey, tome i. p. 107.

² In addition to the call for 300,000 three-years men, of which mention has been made, a call for 300,000 nine-months militia was issued Aug. 4.

³ See Keyes's opinion given to Lincoln July 9. Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 202; his letters to Lincoln and Meigs, O. R., vol. xi. part iii pp. 313, 338. In reckoning the available supply of troops, some thought must be given to the large number absent from the army. This had at-

All these considerations must have occurred to Lincoln and to Seward, who, in the many civil and military councils that took place before a decision was reached, were apparently the only men, except Burnside and possibly Halleck, to speak a good word for McClellan. The President was capable of resisting the unanimous opinion of his advisers, but he himself had lost confidence in the ability of his general to make an effective forward movement, no matter how large his resources and how favorable the opportunity. If, as Ropes points out, the government had reposed the same trust in McClellan that they did in Grant two years later, they would without doubt have furnished him what he asked for and permitted him to execute his plan.¹ That he had forfeited their confidence was a natural result of his career as commander, yet in truth he was now more worthy of trust than when he first took command of the Army of the Potomac. His private correspondence is used by historical writers to show his conceit and lack of a proper spirit of subordination, even contempt of the government in Washington;² but from the day on which he handed his Harrison's Landing political letter to the President³ a different spirit is manifest. His self-importance is still conspicuous, his complacency and puerile vanity; also the usual complaints, the expressed lack of faith in the administration, boasts that he will take Richmond, uncompromising condemnation of those who do not agree with him, detraction of Stanton, disdain of Pope, and early suspicions of Halleck.⁴ There is still somewhat of the feeling that he is necessary to the salvation of the country, and that in his political letter he has shown himself a master-

tracted the attention of Lincoln, causing him to admonish McClellan, who was taking measures to bring back the absent officers and soldiers, and correct the evil. — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 319, 321, 323.

¹ The Army under Pope, p. 11.

² See vol. iii. of this work, p. 496 *et seq.*

³ July 8.

⁴ Aug. 4, "Halleck has begun to show the cloven foot already." Aug. 10, "Halleck is turning out just like the rest of the herd." — Own Story, pp. 462, 465.

spirit, his policy shining with Christian feeling and humanity in contrast with that of Congress and of Pope.¹ But notwithstanding the persistence of the old failings, reflection and his reverses are making a better man. "There never was such an army, but there have been plenty of better generals;" "I have tried to do my best honestly and faithfully for my country. That I have to a certain extent failed I do not believe to be my fault, though my self-conceit probably blinds me to many errors that others see."² These and similar expressions draw us to the writer with sympathy, and when we take into account that no man can go unscathed if his acts are interpreted by his inmost thoughts, a careful reading of these affectionate and confidential letters of McClellan to his wife cannot fail to force upon us the conviction that he had been improved by adversity, and to make us regret that the President could not see him as clearly as it is now given us to do. The acerbity which he displayed in his official letters must have incensed even a man with Lincoln's poise of temper and judgment; indeed this fault, if allowed to sway us too far, will lead us to do injustice to McClellan, for his geniality and sincerity in private intercourse show another and better side to the man, who too frequently dipped his pen in gall.

In answer to McClellan's able and warm protest against the removal of his army from the James River, Halleck replied at once: "The order of the withdrawal . . . will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness."³ If McClellan had been a great general with the high spirit that such greatness ordinarily carries, he would not have submitted tamely to the thwarting of his plans,⁴ a sequence to his supersession by Halleck, whom he considered his inferior and whose appointment he

¹ Own Story, pp. 461, 463.

² Ibid., pp. 447, 453.

³ Aug. 5, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 82.

⁴ See Allan, *Army of N. Va.*, p. 153.

deemed a blow to his self-respect:¹ he would have resigned his commission. Here, though, must be taken into account the problem of the working man,—how in that event was he to get a living for himself, his wife, and child. He had already written his friend William H. Aspinwall, a man of large business connections in New York City, that if he lost the command of the Army of the Potomac he should give up the service; anticipating this contingency, he adds, “Be kind enough to cast your eyes about you to see whether there is anything I can do in New York to earn a respectable support for my family.”² This was July 19. Three weeks later his feeling is thus expressed: “Their [the government’s] game is to force me to resign; mine will be to force them to place me on leave of absence.”³ The natural and comprehensible desire to continue receiving the pay of a Major-General was one reason, if not the main reason, why he did not resent by a signal act the humiliation of supersedure and the overruling of his plan.

Meanwhile a reconnaissance made towards Richmond at the suggestion of Halleck,⁴ had resulted in a skirmish in which Hooker drove the Confederates from Malvern Hill. It is from this place that McClellan dates his telegraphic report of it to Halleck, adding: “This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only $14\frac{3}{4}$ miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days.” “I have no reinforcements to send you,” was Halleck’s prompt reply.⁵ General Sumner had supported McClellan by sending at the same time a telegram to Washington with the words, “I am convinced that if we had a reinforcement of 20,000 men we

¹ “I am tired of serving fools. God help my country! He alone can save it. It is grating to have to serve under the orders of a man whom I know by experience to be my inferior.” — *Own Story*, p. 453, also p. 455.

² *Ibid.*, p. 451.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

⁴ *O. R.*, vol. xi. part i. p. 76.

⁵ Aug. 5 and 6, *ibid.*, p. 78.

could walk straight into Richmond.”¹ McClellan’s private correspondence and Hooker’s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicate that he entertained the project of a forward movement with the purpose of fighting Lee. This plan was recommended by Hooker, who was so confident of success that he told his commander he would willingly take the advance.² But McClellan was not made of the stuff which ventures disobedience of orders where final ruin or lasting glory is the issue of the move, and the thought was not translated into action. So loath, however, was he to leave his present position, so impelled by a union of military judgment, patriotism, and self-interest, that, after receiving Halleck’s despatches which informed him that the enemy was fighting Pope and that the most urgent necessity existed for getting additional troops in front of Washington, he went to Fort Monroe and across Chesapeake Bay, travelling sixteen hours in order to have a conversation with his general-in-chief by wire, to learn fully about Pope’s movements, and probably to urge with earnestness and force what he had already advised in two despatches of August 12: that he could help Pope with greater certainty and more surely relieve Washington from all danger by a movement on Richmond than by embarking his troops for Aquia Creek. He proposed to make an advance within forty-eight hours, fight a detachment of the enemy between him and the Confederate capital, and if he defeated and captured this estimated force of 18,000, he saw “but little difficulty in pushing rapidly forward into Richmond.” He would need no reinforcements unless he were successful, but would then require them to maintain his communications. At 1.40 in the morning of August 14 Halleck said to him over the wires, “There is no change of plans; you will send up your troops as rapidly as possible,” and then worn out by fatigue and anxiety left the telegraph office for his bed, to the

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 356.

² Letter of Sunday, Aug. 10, Own Story, p. 465; C. W., part i. p. 579.

great disappointment and annoyance of McClellan, who had waited at the other end of the telegraph in hope of a frank interchange of views.¹

All this while the removal of the sick by steamers and transports was going on, but not with sufficient promptness to satisfy Halleck. From the commencement he had urged rapid progress. Expecting impossibilities, tortured with the anxiety and responsibility of his office and with the fear that Pope, who was at Culpeper Court House, and Burnside, who was at Falmouth, were in danger of being crushed, whereupon the enemy would move forward to the Potomac, his telegrams assumed, in McClellan's opinion, an "unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone." "There must be no further delay in your movements," he said. "That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained."²

It is possible but not entirely clear from the correspondence and reports that there was a slight delay at the inception of the movement, caused by McClellan's desire to know what would be done with the army; for this knowledge, he maintained, would enable him to send off the sick to the greatest advantage. But after August 4, the day on which he received the order to withdraw his troops to Aquia Creek, his operations were marked by promptness, order, and zeal. In his despatches he reiterated that there had been no unnecessary delay. From the 8th to the 12th the artillery and cavalry ordered to Burnside were embarked. August 14, the day on which he had hoped to make a final appeal to Halleck for permission to take the offensive, two of his corps began their march towards Yorktown. On the 16th the last of the sick were sent off by water,³ and by August 19 all of the corps

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 86 *et seq.*; part iii. pp. 372, 379; McClellan's Own Story, p. 467; conversation between Hooker and Chase, Sept. 25, Warden's Chase, p. 488.

² Aug. 10, O. R. vol. xi. part i. p. 86.

³ Ibid., pp. 76-90, also part iii. pp. 378, 379. Halleck was not convinced that up to this time the movement had been made with proper celerity. He wrote Stanton, Aug. 30: "The order was not obeyed with the prompt-

had reached their different points of embarkation. Porter's sailed from Newport News the 19th and 20th, Heintzelman's from Yorktown the 21st, Franklin's from Fort Monroe the 23d. Sumner had to wait for transports, but on August 27 reached Aquia Creek, which had also been the destination of the others. Meanwhile McClellan had given Keyes directions to garrison Yorktown temporarily; he himself reported for orders at Aquia August 24, and three days later in response to a request from Halleck reached Alexandria.¹

Our attention is now claimed by Pope's campaign in Virginia, which is from the beginning a story of cross purposes and of energy counteracted by unskilful management and the lack of hearty co-operation. Burnside having refused the command of the Army of the Potomac, in the belief that no one in the service was as well fitted for it as its actual general, and Chase, Stanton, and Pope having failed to induce the President to supersede McClellan with any one else, Halleck finally decided the matter by saying that "McClellan would do very well under orders from himself."² Pope, however, was still troubled "with grave forebodings of the result," and expressed to the President, the Secretary of War, and to Halleck his "desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia and to be returned to the Western country."³ At first the plan seems to have been that Halleck should take command in the field of the combined armies of McClellan and Pope when their concentration had been effected,⁴ but this was abandoned, owing doubtless to his

ness I expected and the national safety, in my opinion, required." — O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739.

¹ Ibid., vol. xi. part i. p. 90 *et seq.* Referring to McClellan's movement after Aug. 14, Halleck wrote Stanton that "it was rapidly carried out." — Ibid., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739; see, also, pp. 578, 580, 590, 599, 605 *et seq.*, noting especially McClellan's confidential letter to Burnside.

² Schuckers's Chase, p. 448.

³ Pope's report of Jan. 27, 1863, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 22.

⁴ Report of Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, Sen. Doc., 1st Sess. 46th Cong. No. 37, part iii. p. 1697.

unwillingness to assume so great a responsibility. Afterwards Halleck writing to McClellan at Harrison's Landing informed him that when the armies were joined, he should be given the command of all the troops, Pope and Burnside coming immediately under his control.¹ Although the language of this letter is plain, McClellan doubted the sincerity of it.² Burnside, the common loyal friend of all, went to the Chickahominy to assure him that the purpose thus announced would certainly be executed,³ but three days later McClellan wrote: "My dear Burn. . . . Yesterday and to-day I have received intelligence from confidential sources leading me to think it probable that Halleck either will not or cannot carry out his intentions in regard to my position as expressed to you."⁴ He may have obtained an inkling of a later scheme that some other general than himself or Halleck was to have the supreme command in the field.⁵

Pope was not allowed to return to the West. By July 29 he had pretty well concentrated his army, which consisted of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel,⁶ and numbered 43,000. Having threatened Gordonsville, an important railroad centre, he forced Lee to send Jackson from Richmond to oppose his advance, and on the 29th left Washington to take command of the operations in the field. From the nature of the case, public sentiment demanded that the rival of McClellan should assume at once a vigorous offensive, and Pope had given proof by his address to his army that to find the Confederates and defeat them was his own purpose and desire. Varro had taken the place of Fabius, and had

¹ Aug. 7, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 360.

² Own Story, p. 466.

³ Aug. 17, *ibid.*, p. 468; see, also, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 590.

⁴ Aug. 20, *ibid.*, p. 605.

⁵ Sen. Doc., 1st Sess. 46th Cong. No. 37, part iii. p. 1697. It is possible that this was the time when the command was offered to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who declined it. See Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 24.

⁶ Frémont had declined to serve under his junior in rank, and at his request had been relieved from command.

vaunted that whenever he should get sight of the enemy he would discomfit him.

Halleck was general-in-chief of all the forces, and, sitting at his office desk in Washington, formed the strategical combinations, and directed by telegraph the movements of his different generals. As happened generally on the advent of the new man, faith in him was unlimited. "If he fails," wrote Chase in his diary, "all fails."¹ Halleck pushed Pope forward to the Rapidan River, in order that by the diversion McClellan might remove his troops safely from the Peninsula, and take a position somewhere in the rear of the Rappahannock.² At Cedar Mountain, Banks, with 8000, attacked Stonewall Jackson, who had 24,000, and of course was beaten.³ This battle swelled the list of controversies with a dispute between Banks and Pope, whether an order had actually been given to attack. Halleck called it a "hard-earned but brilliant success against vastly superior numbers,"⁴ but the truth was in Jackson's stereotyped despatch, "God blessed our arms with another victory."⁵ Two days afterwards, hearing that the Union army had been reinforced, Jackson retired to the vicinity of Gordonsville; somewhat later Pope advanced to the Rapidan, taking a position along the line of that river.

In Richmond Lee was pondering how best he might strike at either Pope or McClellan. From the Northern newspapers and from other sources he knew that discord had arisen between the federal government and the commander of the Army of the Potomac;⁶ but from his understanding of his opponent, he had no idea, even after Hooker's attack at Malvern Hill, that McClellan would advance on Richmond.⁷ He

¹ Warden, p. 451.

² Halleck to Stanton, Aug. 30, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739; Halleck's report, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 6.

³ Aug. 9.

⁴ Aug. 14, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 135.

⁵ Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 327.

⁶ Life of Lee, Long, p. 183.

⁷ Lee to Jackson, Aug. 7, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 925.

now took to studying Pope. Frederick the Great, writes Carlyle, "always got to know his man, after fighting him a month or two; and took liberties with him or did not take accordingly."¹ This task of learning to comprehend one's adversary was made somewhat easy in our civil war, for the reason that most of the opposing commanders had become acquainted at West Point or during their service in Mexico. Longstreet was graduated in the same class with Pope, and undoubtedly conveyed to Lee his judgment of Academy days, that Pope "was a handsome dashing fellow and a splendid cavalryman," who "did not apply himself to his books very closely." Lee accepted the popular opinion of the new commander, as a boastful ambitious man and not a hard student or a close thinker. When he heard of Pope's address to the army, his estimate was lowered: the Federal general had shown contempt for the military maxim of centuries, "Do not despise your enemy."²

As early as August 3 the rumor was current in Richmond that McClellan was stealing away from his base on the James.³ The confederate commander kept a careful watch on his every movement, and by August 13 made up his mind that the Army of the Potomac was "being withdrawn and sent to reinforce Pope." Deciding at once not to pursue McClellan, but to concentrate his forces upon Pope, he ordered Longstreet with his command and Hood with two brigades to Gordonsville, he himself following at four o'clock in the morning of the 15th.⁴

Attention has been so frequently directed to McClellan's failures to seize the supreme opportunity that it is a matter of ordinary fairness to observe that the plan proposed by him was the most promising strategy of this whole campaign, both for security to Washington and for positive results.⁵

¹ Vol. vii. p. 108, Chapman and Hall's 10 vol. ed.

² Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 513, 514, 524.

³ A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. ii. p. 147.

⁴ O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 674 *et seq.*; *ibid.*, vol. xii. part iii. p. 928 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ante.* p. 111.

On the 14th of August there were in Richmond and the neighborhood 30,000 troops at the outside: the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia was in Gordonsville and vicinity. It was on this very day that McClellan tried to have a telegraphic conversation with Halleck when he intended to beg for permission to throw his 81,000¹ soldiers upon Richmond. Himself thirsting to retrieve his failing fortunes by a plan of his own, his men and most of his officers devoted to him, Sumner and Hooker full of the purpose and eager to fight, Franklin and Porter bound to him by hoops of steel, it is not improbable that he would have taken Richmond and held it, the gun-boats maintaining his communications, until the whole energy of the government had been turned to his support.² Yet in this speculation on what might have been, must be taken into account McClellan's lack of promptness, the greater ability and celerity of Lee, who could have been back in Richmond in a few hours, while a day would have sufficed to transport there by rail the troops of Longstreet and Hood. Moreover G. W. Smith had been left in command with instructions "to hold Richmond to the last extremity should an attack be made on it."³ But, as we have seen, Halleck would consent to no alteration of his plan.

When Lee became certain that the Army of the Potomac was marching away from Harrison's Landing, he ordered two more divisions from Richmond to join him, and now outnumbering Pope, determined to make an attack. Pope discovered his plan from a letter of Lee to Stuart in possession of a captured cavalry officer, and knowing that the enemy had the larger force, was wiser in action than he had been in word, and withdrew with all speed behind the Rappahannock River.⁴ From Clarke's mountain Lee watched the movement, and with a sigh of disappointment said to his companion, Longstreet,

¹ Return of Aug. 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 367.

² In this connection, see Porter to Halleck, Aug. 16, *ibid.*, vol. xii. part iii. p. 579.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xi. part iii. p. 677.

⁴ Aug. 18 and 19.

"General, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us thus early in the campaign."¹ He crossed the Rapidan and endeavored to pass the Rappahannock, seeking a favorable opportunity to fall upon Pope; but his attempts were defeated, at times by the vigilance of his adversary and the strength of the Federal artillery, and again by heavy rains and a swollen river.

The story has now reached August 25. Lee had been outmanœuvred and balked in his design of suppressing Pope.² With the exception of the battle of Cedar Mountain, Pope, since he took the field, had done well, and that defeat had not been followed by grave results. His retreat to the line of the Rappahannock had been approved by Halleck, who had telegraphed him to "dispute every inch of ground," and on August 21 promised him adequate reinforcements within forty-eight hours.³ Although of a sanguine temperament, Pope took in his despatches no rose-colored view of his situation. "McDowell's is the only corps that is at all reliable that I have," he telegraphed to his chief. "Sigel, as you know is perfectly unreliable, and I suggest that some officer of superior rank be sent to command his army corps. His conduct to-day has occasioned me great dissatisfaction. Banks's corps is very weak, not amounting to more than 5000 men, and is much demoralized. Kearny's division [of Heintzelman's corps, Army of the Potomac] is the only one that has yet reached me from Alexandria. . . . Banks's corps must be left somewhere in the rear, to be set up again. Sigel's corps, although composed of some of the best fighting material we have, will never do much service under that officer."⁴ Pope,

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 162.

² Lee's own word, *O. R.*, vol. xii. part iii. p. 919.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii. pp. 56, 57.

⁴ Aug. 25, *ibid.*, part iii. p. 653. The contemporary evidence and comments of military critics substantiate these statements, taking into account that in the first part of his despatch Pope referred only to his original army and did not include the two divisions of Reno or Burnside's corps and the division of Reynolds of the Army of the Potomac which had already come to him from Aquia Creek.

whose influence had been materially lessened by his indiscreet address, had in intercourse with his subordinate officers lost still further their confidence by the roughness of his manner and the vacillation of his spirit. Nor had he the trust of his soldiers; the campaign, at best a difficult one, had been made needlessly hard, and the men were now tired out, and suffering from hunger.¹ That in spite of these disadvantages he has won praise for his boldness and strategy thus far in the campaign,² is due to the energy and persistence with which he overcame obstacles.

The indecision of Halleck was amazing, although the President was perhaps responsible for this in some degree. Matters were awry in Alexandria, whither a part of the Army of the Potomac had gone on the way to reinforce Pope, and McClellan had been ordered there to straighten them out. He himself was begging Halleck to let him know if he should have command of the combined armies, as had been promised, but received no reply;³ this may not have been the fault entirely of the general-in-chief. With the desire "to help him loyally" and "render all the assistance in my power," McClellan went two days later to see him, and found him "well disposed," having "had much to contend against."⁴ Porter, now marching from Falmouth to join Pope, was left under the impression that after he had made his junction the operations were to be defensive until all the forces were united and a commander for them designated by the President.⁵ Search was perhaps being made for a general equal to the task, but until he was found, or until it had been decided whether Halleck, McClellan, or Pope should have command in the field, or until the junction of the two armies had actually been made,

¹ As to the last statement, see Col. Franklin Haven's article, *Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, vol. ii. p. 266.

² Col. Thos. L. Livermore, *ibid.*, p. 321.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 93.

⁴ *Own Story*, pp. 529, 530.

⁵ Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter. *Sen. Docs.*, No. 37, part i. p. 319, part iii. p. 1697.

the known untrustiness of the Army of Virginia, the disaffection to Pope of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, should have prompted Halleck to charge caution and again caution to him whose distinguishing trait was impetuosity. Instead of this he intimates in his despatches that aggressive action is looked for without explaining clearly how and when.¹ August 25 he telegraphed, "You may expect orders to recross the Rappahannock and resume the offensive in a few days."² Pope's reply, taken in connection with his other despatch of the same day already quoted, is pathetic in that, like McClellan, he begs for necessary knowledge. "Of course, I shall be ready to recross the Rappahannock at a moment's notice," he said. . . . "You wished forty-eight hours to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. . . . I had clearly understood that you wished to unite our whole forces before a forward movement was begun. . . . I am not acquainted with your views as you seem to suppose, and would be glad to know them as far as my position and operations are concerned. I understood you clearly that at all hazards I was to prevent the enemy from passing the Rappahannock. This I have done and shall do. I don't like to be on the defensive if I can help it, but must be so as long as I am tied to Burnside's forces, not yet wholly arrived at Fredericksburg. Please let me know, if it can be done, what is to be my own command, and if I am to act independently against the enemy. I certainly understood that as soon as the whole of our forces were concentrated you designed to take command in person, and that when everything was ready we were to move forward in concert."³ In his answer Halleck evades the important questions, but makes the statement, "The main object has been accomplished in getting up troops from the Peninsula:"

¹ Caution, however, is suggested, Aug. 22 and 23, O. R., vol. xii, part iii. pp. 625, 630.

² *Ibid.*, p. 642.

³ Despatch of Aug. 25, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 65.

this should have inclined both Halleck and Pope to circumspection until an effective junction were made and both armies were well in hand. What follows: "Just think of the immense amount of telegraphing I have to do, and then say whether I can be expected to give you any details as to the movements of others even when I know them,"¹ shows the irritation of a bureaucrat full of business; it also demonstrates the folly of directing a vital campaign from an office in Washington, and emphasizes the incapacity of the man attempting it, who failed utterly to comprehend the brilliant move, now being made by Lee and Jackson, which resulted in the discomfiture of the Union army.

Turn we now to the Confederate camp. From intercepted letters, Lee felt certain that McClellan's army was on its way to join Pope, and suspected that Cox was coming from western Virginia as an additional reinforcement.² If he were to crush Pope he must therefore do it at once. While the Federal General begged Halleck for detailed instructions and even submitted an order for the disposition of his troops before putting it into force,³ Lee directed all the soldiers in and about Richmond, except two brigades, to be sent to him, but said to Davis, "Should you not agree with me in the propriety of this step, please countermand the order and let me know."⁴ The reply of Davis⁵ makes evident that on the Confederate side there was one able head, who contended against the Federal division of authority, the confusion of generals, the interference of the President and his cabinet. This difference alone weighed heavily in the scales which turned to Southern success. Lee consulted no one.⁶ He devised a plan contrary,

¹ Halleck's despatch is Aug. 26, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 606.

² Ibid., p. 940 *et seq.*; Cox's Reminiscences, MS.

³ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 641.

⁴ Aug. 24, *ibid.*, p. 942.

⁵ "Confidence in you overcomes the view which would otherwise be taken of the exposed condition of Richmond, and the troops retained for the defence of the capital are surrendered to you on a renewed request." — Aug. 26, *ibid.*, p. 945.

⁶ Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 522.

the military critics say, "to the recognized principles of strategy," but some risk must be run, and, while he did not know all of the facts, he knew something of his enemy's inefficiency that was co-operating with his own great ability. In pursuance of this bold project, Jackson, on the morning of August 25, was despatched with 25,000 men on a forced march, his aim being to cross the Rappahannock above the position of the Union army, to move through Thoroughfare Gap, strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear and sever his communications with Washington. He took no transportation but ambulances and ammunition wagons; all baggage was left behind. A few days' cooked rations in the haversacks, some live cattle, some salt for the ears of corn which the men expected to pluck in the fields and roast, were to be the food supply until they could reach the rich stores of the Northern army. Twenty-five miles were covered that day, and Jackson's troops slept at Salem. Commencing the day before, Lee continued for some days to threaten vigorously Pope's front for the purpose of misleading him.

From the officers of his Signal Corps Station, Pope learned, probably as early as noon of the 25th, of the movement of a large body of the enemy,¹ and without suspecting the real aim of the movement, made up his mind by nightfall that their whole force had "marched for the Shenandoah valley by way of Luray and Front Royal."² Ropes, who is friendly to him, maintains that in the afternoon of the 25th, while he was in doubt of the Confederates' design, or even though he believed that they were going into the Shenandoah valley, he should have abandoned his position in the neighborhood of Warrenton, and occupied Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville for the purpose of preserving his lines of communication.³ This move would have frustrated Lee's plan at the outset. Pope was perhaps so plagued by the recollection of his injudicious

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 654.

² Despatch of 9.30 P. M., *ibid.*, part ii. p. 67; see, also, part iii. p. 665.

³ The Army under Pope, p. 45; Civil War, part ii. p. 265.

address to the Army of Virginia, that he would not entertain the idea of further retreat, or perhaps he thought it would be contrary to the orders he had received from Washington, although in this event he had time and opportunity to communicate with the general-in-chief and gain his consent. Halleck, on the other hand, who probably had all the facts by the morning of the 26th, ought perhaps to have taken into account the possibility of Jackson's destination, and suggested a falling back, especially as the movement of the different corps of the Army of the Potomac had not been as rapid as he had expected.

August 26 Jackson marched swiftly on. He went through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, unopposed and unobserved. By evening he had reached Bristoe Station, torn up the railroad track, cut the telegraph wires, severing Pope's line of supplies and his direct telegraphic communication with Washington. He sent a detachment to Manassas Junction which captured rich quartermaster and commissary stores, so that the Confederates obtained the clothes and shoes of which they stood in need, and feasted on Northern bread and meat while Pope's troops went hungry. There was bustle in the Army of Virginia that day, but in the wrong direction. Pope certainly was to blame, affirms Colonel Thomas Livermore, that he did not discover that 25,000 troops were marching twenty miles in his rear, and close to his position. He might have fallen upon Jackson with his superior force, and crushed that wing of the Confederate army;¹ but ignorant of the enemy's movements, he thought that his fight, which he hoped to postpone for two days, should be made at Warrenton, and ordered the disposition of his troops to that end.² About eight o'clock that evening, immediately after writing a despatch to McDowell outlining his plan, he learned that his communications had been severed at Manassas Junction, and taking this news in connection with other information pre-

¹ Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 323.

² O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 69; part iii. p. 675.

viously received, he suspected that a large force of the Confederates was in that vicinity. Full of confidence and eager to meet them, he decided, in the early morning of August 27, to abandon his front on the Rappahannock and march with his main body to Gainesville, — a wise determination, say both Ropes and Allan.¹ This day was spent largely in marching, and was productive of a skirmish between Hooker and Ewell in which Hooker got the better of his opponent. Jackson at Manassas Junction rested and fed his tired and hungry troops. In the evening Pope arrived in person at Bristoe, and learning of the whereabouts of Jackson, and deciding to concentrate his army on Manassas, issued orders at nine o'clock to McDowell, who was at Gainesville, and to his other lieutenants, to march thither at dawn. "If you will march promptly and rapidly," he said to McDowell, "we shall bag the whole crowd," meaning Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.²

An ordinary general might have been satisfied with the capture of stores and the alarm created in Washington, but Lee's strategy went further. He thought Jackson's move would disconcert and delay the reinforcements which were coming from Alexandria, and cause Pope to retire from the Rappahannock in the effort to preserve his communications. He himself with Longstreet's wing proposed to join Jackson, and seize a favorable opportunity, which would probably offer, to give battle.³ Late in the afternoon of August 26, leaving one division in position on the Rappahannock, he started with Longstreet to march by the same route over which Jackson

¹ The Army under Pope, p. 53 ; Civil War, part ii. p. 266; The Army of Northern Virginia, p. 218. William Allan was an officer in the Confederate army, almost constantly at Jackson's headquarters and with him during this campaign. He is a clear and candid writer, and "his abilities as a military critic," in the opinion of Ropes, "were of a high order." — Introduction to Army of N. Va.

² O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 72. "All that talk of bagging Jackson, &c. was bosh." — Porter to Burnside, Aug. 28, *ibid.*, part iii. p. 732. This despatch was transmitted to Halleck and seen by the President.

³ Allan, p. 200.

had so successfully passed. The night of the 27th they spent at White Plains.

As battles are near at hand, it will be well to contrast the opposing forces as they stood on the morning of August 28. Lee had, in the two wings of Jackson and Longstreet, at least 49,000 men. Pope, with the reinforcement of Heintzelman's and Porter's corps of the Army of the Potomac, had no more than 70,000;¹ but the correspondence shows so much straggling from Pope's army on account of hunger, fatigue, and discouragement, that it may be questioned whether any estimate made from the returns would not exceed the number actually under his command. Moreover, it must be said that in the various reports and accounts of these operations discrepancies exist as to the size of both armies. Accepting, however, the figures that Southern authority gives, 49,000 and 70,000, the odds were in favor of the Confederates. In Pope's original army there was but one efficient corps commander. McDowell was a capable man, and served his general loyally; his corps alone was trustworthy.² The corps of Heintzelman and Porter and the men who came to him from Burnside were good soldiers; but a collection of parts of three armies is not, in Ropes's judgment, an army, but merely "an aggregation of troops."³ In this case many of the men lacked confidence in their commander, and if the officers and privates of the Fifth Corps took their cue from Porter, their commander, the defection was still more serious.⁴

¹ Figures agreed on by Allan and Ropes. — Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 197.

² *Ante*, p. 118.

³ Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 218.

⁴ Porter himself felt disdain for Pope. I presume that we shall "get behind Bull Run in a few days if strategy don't use us up," are his words of sarcasm to Burnside. "The strategy is magnificent and tactics in the inverse proportion. . . . I believe the enemy have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions." — Despatch from Warrenton, Aug. 27, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 700. This and other despatches of Porter were transmitted by Burnside to Halleck, and made known to the President, for the reason that they contained almost the sole information of Pope's

To oppose this conglomeration, Lee had a compact, well-disciplined army, that worked like a machine. His two corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, men of eminent military ability, confided in him and loved him. The three wrought together like devoted brothers. Lee gave his orders in general terms, leaving the details to be worked out by his lieutenants according to circumstances. This spirit ran through the whole army. A. P. Hill having better and later information did not hesitate a moment to go contrary to an order he had received from Jackson, his superior.¹ Lee's cavalry officer Stuart kept him thoroughly posted up,² and until the night of August 28 he had regular reports from Jackson, and likewise knew pretty well what his enemy was doing.³ If furthermore we take into account that Lee was a much abler general than his antagonist, that his troops had gained a succession of victories since May, while most of the men under Pope had seen little else than defeat, the story of the next three days will cause no surprise.

Pope with the van of his army reached Manassas at mid-day, August 28, but Jackson had flown. Burning all the stores that he could not transport, he had left the night before, and when Pope arrived at Manassas expecting to strike him, he was some miles away, placing his army in position near the old battle-field of Bull Run, to await the arrival of Longstreet, who, he knew, was fast approaching. Pope was puzzled, but as usual came to a prompt decision, and countermanding orders set on again in pursuit of Jackson. Towards sunset King's division of McDowell's corps came into collision with some of Jackson's troops and fought the battle of Gainesville. The loss was heavy on both sides, and although it was a drawn battle,⁴ King deemed his position

position and movements. — See Burnside's testimony before the Fitz John Porter Court-Martial.

¹ See A. P. Hill's report, O. R., vol. xii, part ii.

² Lee's and Stuart's reports, *ibid.*

³ Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 517.

⁴ Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 77 ; *Civil War*, part ii. p. 272.

critical and retreated to Manassas. Pope was so intent on the capture of Jackson that he took no heed of Longstreet's rapid march, and did nothing to hold Thoroughfare Gap. McDowell had better information and used better judgment. He had proposed to have Sigel's corps, which was temporarily under his command, and one of his own divisions dispute the passage of Longstreet through the Gap, while he himself with two divisions joined in the chase after Jackson; but late in the night of August 27 he received the order from Pope directing him to march with his whole force to Manassas. Impressed with the vital importance of preventing the union of the two Confederate corps, he varied from this unfortunate order to the extent of detaching Ricketts's division and some cavalry to hold Longstreet in check. Meanwhile the Confederate general had reached the Gap, and finding his passage disputed thought himself in a "desperate strait;"¹ but on the morning of the 29th he experienced great relief on ascertaining that Ricketts had withdrawn² and that he could get through the Gap unopposed. At dawn he was in motion, and hearing the noise of cannon before he reached Gainesville, quickened his march and had his troops deployed on the battle-field of Bull Run by noon of that day. The battle of Groveton had already begun. The Union right wing was contending with Jackson.

Pope did not know of the arrival of Longstreet's corps, and expected that McDowell and Porter in pursuance of a joint order sent them in the morning would assail Jackson in flank and rear. These two met about noon, and agreed that the order could not be fulfilled to the letter; but in the

¹ Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 517.

² The McDowell Court of Inquiry, Feb. 14, 1863, speak of this retirement of Ricketts and the retreat of King after the battle of Gainesville as grave errors, and find fault that McDowell was not present with his command when these movements were made. He had gone to Manassas to see Pope, and had "separated himself from his command at a critical time without any order of his superior officer and without any imperative necessity." — *O. R.*, vol. xii. part i. p. 330; *Ropes, The Army under Pope*, p. 82; *Civil War*, part ii. p. 275.

endeavor to carry out the spirit of it they had a misunderstanding. From this time dates the alleged most serious neglect and disobedience of Porter, which constitute the gravest charge against him in the interminable controversy known as the Fitz John Porter case.

At midday there was a lull in the battle, but in the afternoon Pope attacked again with vigor. Although his troops lacked food and were fatigued from the fruitless marching and countermarching of the previous day, they had a stomach for fighting and fought well. It was on both sides a desperate struggle to prevail.

At half-past four, observing that neither McDowell nor Porter had appeared on the field, Pope wrote an order to Porter saying, "I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank and if possible on his rear."¹ Porter in his court-martial declared that he did not receive this order until "at or nearly 6.30": that this is the truth of the matter is the conclusion of the Board of Army Officers of 1878, at whose head sat General Schofield.² Porter made preparations for attack, but before they could be completed darkness came on, and "it was evidently impossible to accomplish any good that night."³ Even had he received the order sooner and assailed the force in his front, it would have availed Pope nothing, for instead of striking at Jackson's flank he would have rushed with his 9000 men against Longstreet's corps of four divisions.⁴ Of Porter's conduct this day it may be said that he rendered to his commander a measure of technical military obedience but not a zealous support.

In spite of his disappointment at Porter's inaction Pope fought on until dark and thought that he had gained a great victory.⁵ The truth, it seems to me, is better conveyed in

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 18.

² Sen. Docs. No. 37, 1st Sess. 46th Cong., part i. p. 251; part iii. p. 1707.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., part iii. p. 1709.

⁵ Despatch to Halleck, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

Lee's letter to Davis, in which he says that the attack of the Union troops was repulsed.¹ The medical director of Jackson's corps, "recounting the many casualties which he had witnessed," said to Jackson: "General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting." "No," was the reply, "it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence."²

The next day, Saturday, August 30, the Second Battle of Bull Run³ was fought on the already historic field. Pope, full of the illusion that he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, readily gave credence to the intelligence that they were retreating.⁴ His reconnaissances this morning and the reports of McDowell, Heintzelman, and Sigel⁵ confirmed him in this view, from which he could not be shaken by the strong representations of Porter,⁶ towards whom, indeed, he felt harshly⁷ for the supposed disobedience of orders the previous day. He was afraid that the Confederates would get away from him, and undoubtedly reasoned that since he must attack them at once he could not afford to wait for Franklin and Sumner with their 20,000 fresh and veteran soldiers, who he knew were on the way from Alexandria.⁸ At noon he

¹ Sept. 3, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 559. Carl Schurz, who commanded a division of Sigel's corps, and who did the principal part of the fighting in the first half of this day's battle, said in his report of the events of the afternoon: "If all these forces instead of being frittered away in isolated efforts had co-operated with each other at any one movement after a common plan, the result of the day would have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the ground we had already taken and occupied in the morning, and which in the afternoon was, for a short time at least, lost again." — *Ibid.*, p. 299.

² Dabney, p. 531.

³ Called by the Confederates the Second Battle of Manassas.

⁴ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

⁵ *Ibid.*, part ii. pp. 340, 413.

⁶ The Army under Pope, Ropes, p. 129.

⁷ See order of 8.50 P. M., Aug. 29, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 509.

⁸ If it had been urged to Pope

"The quality and hair of our attempt
Brooks no division:"

he might have replied with Hotspur that their absence

"Lends a lustre and more great opinion,
A larger dare to our great enterprise."

ordered McDowell's, Porter's, and Heintzelman's corps "forward in pursuit of the enemy," and added, "press him vigorously during the whole day."¹

When the morning broke, writes Longstreet, "we were a little apprehensive that Pope was going to get away from us;" but Lee, though eager for a battle, had made up his mind that he would not attack the Union army in its strong position.² Watching intently and waiting patiently, he saw Pope do exactly what he could have wished, and, backed by his trusting and enthusiastic officers and men, felt that his adversary had delivered himself into his hands. The onset was made. The dejected Northern soldiers, though feeling probably that they were sent to slaughter, fought gallantly, but met with repulse. At the proper moment Lee ordered a counter-attack, which had been anticipated by Longstreet, so close was the harmony between the two. The Union defeat became a rout,³ and at dusk Pope gave the order for a general retreat. At six o'clock Franklin with his corps reached the ground, and found the Warrenton turnpike⁴ "filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field in a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion," he added, "and I immediately formed line of battle across the road [the Warrenton turnpike between Cub and Bull Runs] and attempted to stop and form the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number becoming over 7000 in less than half an hour."⁵ The loss of the Union army since it left the Rappahannock had been enormous, and much greater than that of the Confederates.⁶ Stragglers exceeded the usual

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

² Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 520. Lee had, however, been reinforced during the night by R. H. Anderson's division which he had left on the Rappahannock.

³ It is with some hesitation that I have written this clause. As presenting a contrary view with force, see *Ropes, The Army under Pope*, p. 141; *Civil War*, part ii. p. 299 *et seq.*

⁴ See *Map*, vol. iii. p. 448.

⁵ O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 536.

⁶ *Century War Book*, vol. ii. pp. 499, 500; *Allan, Army of N. Va.*, p. 306.

number. The loss, too, in matériel at the Second Battle of Bull Run was large.¹

Commanding generals rarely own to discomfiture, and Pope was no exception to the common rule. In his despatch to Halleck of 9.45 P. M., before, indeed, he had realized the seriousness of his reverse, he told in euphemistic phrase that he had been forced back from the field, . . . and had withdrawn to Centreville. "The troops are in good heart," he said, "and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. . . . The enemy is badly crippled. . . . Be easy; everything will go well."² It is little wonder that Halleck, who was disposed to construe everything in Pope's favor, thus replied: "My dear General, you have done nobly. Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it. With Franklin and Sumner, who must now be with you, can't you renew the attack?"³ Porter, who had been in the thick of the fight and had come in contact with his men, comprehended the situation better than Pope, and wrote McClellan the night after the battle: "I was whipped, as was the whole army, badly. . . . The men are without heart, but will fight when cornered. . . . I have had no dinner or supper to-day, and no chance of any to-morrow."⁴

During these active operations Halleck in Washington and McClellan at Alexandria were making exertions to forward reinforcements to the contending army. The news that a force of the enemy had come between Pope and Washington and severed his communications,⁵ caused them astonishment and anxiety, and perhaps delayed the departure from Alexandria of Franklin and Cox, for the reason that McClellan took into account the contingency of an attack on the capital

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 558.

² Ibid., p. 79.

³ Aug. 31, *ibid.*, part iii. p. 769.

⁴ Ibid., p. 768.

⁵ Pope could still communicate with Halleck by telegraph via Falmouth (*ibid.*, p. 684), but his line of supplies was the railroad running from Alexandria to Manassas Junction.

by Lee's whole army.¹ The division of authority between Halleck and McClellan worked badly and occasioned misunderstandings. McClellan begged in vain to have his position defined. "I do not wish to act in the dark," he said.² Halleck was mutable in purpose: at one time his opinions and acts took their color from the importunity of McClellan;³ at another from the pressure of Chase and Stanton. The dissatisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War had grown in intensity. They had "long believed that General McClellan ought not to be trusted with the command of any army of the Union." They now thought that he had not been prompt in the withdrawal of his troops from the James River and in the movement of Franklin's corps to the aid of Pope.⁴ August 30 Stanton received a report from Halleck in response to his request for information, which gave them a body of proof to substantiate this opinion;⁵ and on the same day an order was published by direction of the Secretary of War, stating that "General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command."⁶ Since all of this army except 100 soldiers in Alexandria and part of a corps near Fort Monroe had been despatched to Pope, the effect of the order was to deprive McClellan of all actual command, and transfer his troops to the authority of his rival.⁷ Chase exulted over this humiliation, and wrote to

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 96, 97; J. D. Cox, *Reminiscences*, MS. General Cox gives a lively account of affairs in and about Alexandria. Lee expected that Jackson's move would have the effect of delaying these reinforcements.

² O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 97.

³ *Own Story*, p. 530.

⁴ *Warden*, p. 456; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 706.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 739.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xi. part i. p. 103.

⁷ See *Own Story*, p. 532. "McClellan was at this time a little depressed in manner, feeling keenly his loss of power and command, but maintaining a quiet dignity that became him better than any show of carelessness would have done. He used no bitter or harsh language in criticising others. Pope and McDowell he plainly disliked, and rated them low as to capacity for

Thaddeus Stevens: "McClellan at last is reduced to the command of the residue of the Army of the Potomac not sent to Pope. This is late, but well, though not well enough."¹ Whether Halleck knew of this order is not clear,² nor is there a record of the President's approval, although it must be presumed that he gave it. In consenting to the order, he may have been influenced by the harshness of McClellan's expression in his telegraphic counsel of the day before, which suggested, as one course, "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe."³ Lincoln said this day to one of his secretaries, "McClellan has acted badly towards Pope; he really wanted him to fail."⁴ He had moreover read the despatches

command, but he spoke of them without discourtesy or vilification."—Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS.

¹ Warden, p. 457.

² O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 102; McClellan's Own Story, p. 541.

³ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 98.

⁴ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 23. The kaleidoscopic character of the evidence will appear by reference to the variety of opinions of competent and honest military men and critics. Two believe that McClellan did all that a man could do to aid Pope; and one of these intimates that Halleck was especially solicitous for Pope's success, that he might have a lever to use against McClellan. Another is of the opinion that McClellan disobeyed orders in putting off the departure of Franklin's corps from Aug. 28 to Aug. 29. Another feels sure that McClellan was much at fault in not sending Franklin more quickly to the relief of Pope, and intimates that the desire to have the command again shaped his action; a fifth arrives at the conclusion that McClellan was culpable for the detention of Franklin, and that both McClellan and Halleck were to blame for the delay of Cox and Sumner.—Gen. George H. Gordon, Gen. Stephen M. Weld, Col. Theo. Lyman, Col. Franklin Haven, Col. Thos. L. Livermore. *Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, vol. ii. pp. 118, 284, 296, 313, 333.

In spite of the contempt of Pope revealed in McClellan's private letters, and his expectation that the Army of Virginia would be "badly thrashed," it seems to me, reading the evidence in the light of McClellan's undoubted patriotism, that his purpose was good and his spirit right. The remark which General Cox heard him make to Franklin August 29 supports this view. "Go," he said, "and whatever may happen don't allow it to be said that the Army of the Potomac failed to do its utmost for the country."—Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS. It is conceded that if Franklin had been twenty-four hours earlier the result of the Second Battle of Bull Run would have been otherwise, and it may be admitted that if McClellan had been

of Porter to Burnside, and was apprehensive that McClellan's favorite general would not give Pope a zealous support.¹

It must be noted that on August 30, when Stanton issued this order which shelved McClellan, the common belief in Washington was that Pope had gained a great victory at Groveton.² If he had won the Second Battle of Bull Run, or even if he had not fought on the 30th, but waited for Franklin and Sumner, and then forced Lee beyond the Rapahannock, he would probably have been made general of the combined armies and McClellan formally relieved from command.

Halleck's joy over the supposed success of his general was of short duration. News of the disaster of August 30 travelled fast, and by the following night he knew the whole truth, and was utterly dismayed. "I beg of you," he telegraphed to McClellan, "to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out."³ Thirty-nine days had sufficed to demonstrate that he was not the great military leader so anxiously looked for; they had shown that he had all the faults of McClellan, and lacked some of his strong qualities. The despatches from Pope were alarming. In one he asked whether Washington was secure if his army should be destroyed; in another he disclosed his lack of confidence in the Potomac army, and its officers' lack of confidence in him.⁴ Pope's unpopularity was not confined to the officers, but extended to the men. Franklin's soldiers, in

Lee and Franklin Jackson, the Sixth Corps would have been in the thick of the fight. But McClellan was slow, and to his characteristic procrastination, as plainly evinced when his favorite Porter fought the losing battle of Gaines's Mill, must be ascribed his fault, if fault there was.

¹ O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 104; vol. xii. part iii. p. 821.

² Stanton's despatch, Aug. 30, *ibid.*, p. 766, Pope's despatch, p. 741; Warden, p. 457; McClellan's Own Story, p. 530; Cox's Reminiscences, MS.; Wash. *Eve. Star*, Aug. 30. The following is the heading of the account of the Wash. *Daily Nat. Int.* of Aug. 30: Brilliant Success of General Pope — The Enemy Circumvented — He is driven from Manassas — Pursued and Worst in a Second Battle.

³ Aug. 31, 10.07 P. M., O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 103.

⁴ Aug. 31, Sept. 1, *ibid.*, vol. xii. part ii. pp. 80, 83.

position on the Warrenton turnpike, mocked and taunted the troops leaving the field of Bull Run, jeered at the new route to Richmond, and made no secret of their glee at the downfall of McClellan's rival.¹ In order to "avoid great disaster," it was Pope's advice that the army be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington.² Halleck in his disquietude had already telegraphed to Burnside at Falmouth, "Embark your troops as rapidly as possible for Alexandria."³ McClellan did not "regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there," he said in a letter to his wife, "I will send your silver off."⁴ September 1 he went to Washington at the request of Halleck, who placed him in command of the defences of the capital and its garrisons. Towards evening of this day the advance of the Confederates occasioned the combat of Chantilly, which had no important result except that the killing of Generals Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stevens deepened the gloom on the Union side.⁵

September 2 was an anxious day in Washington. Early in the morning came a despatch from Pope which told a sad tale of the demoralization of the army and the excessive straggling from the regiments of the Potomac army. "Unless something can be done," he continued, "to restore tone to this army, it will melt away before you know it."⁶ The President knew the one remedy,⁷ and in spite of the bitter opposition and remonstrance he was certain to encounter, placed McClellan in command of all the troops for the defence of the capital.⁸ Halleck had already ordered Pope to bring his forces within or near the lines of the fortifications;

¹ Gen. Chas. F. Walcott, Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii p. 144.

² Sept. 1.

³ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 774.

⁴ 12.30 P. M., Aug. 31, Own Story, p. 532.

⁵ Cox's Reminiscences, MS.

⁶ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 797.

⁷ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 23.

⁸ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807 ; McClellan's Own Story, p. 566.

there his authority passed to McClellan. In view of the "great danger to Washington," the general-in-chief asked Dix at Fort Monroe to send as rapidly as possible to the capital as large a part of the remainder of Keyes's corps as could be spared, and urged Burnside to hasten forward his troops.¹ A number of gun-boats were ordered up the river, and anchored at different points in proximity to the city, and a war steamer was brought to the Navy Yard.² All the clerks and employés of the civil departments, and all employés in the public buildings were called to arms for the defence of the capital.³ The sale of spirituous liquors at retail within the District of Columbia was prohibited.⁴ Excitement and alarm held undisputed sway.⁵

McClellan, elated at being called to the rescue, went forward to meet his soldiers. Encountering Cox, he said, "Well, General, I am in command again." Warm congratulations ensued. The two rode on until they met the advancing column of the army, Pope and McDowell at its head. When it became known that McClellan had been placed in command, cheers upon cheers from the head to the rear of the column were given, "with wild delight."⁶ Inspired by the confidence of his men, he wrought with zeal. His talent for organization had full play, and in a few days he had his army ready for an active campaign. Lincoln's comment ran, "McClellan is working like a beaver. He seems to be aroused to doing something by the sort of snubbing he got last week."⁷

At the cabinet meeting of September 2 the opposition to McClellan broke forth, with Chase and Stanton so earnest

¹ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 798, 799.

² Wash. *Eve. Star*, Sept. 2, 3.

³ O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807.

⁴ *Nat. Int.*, Sept. 2.

⁵ Wash. *corr.*, Sept. 2, *N. Y. Herald*; Wash. *Eve. Star*, Sept. 3.

⁶ Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS. ; McClellan's *Own Story*, pp. 547, 567. Cox gives a graphic account of McClellan's apparently studied manner of responding to the cheers of his soldiers that "seemed to carry a little of personal good fellowship even to the humblest private soldier."

⁷ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 28.

that they fell to invective. Chase maintained that as a military commander he had been a failure, that his neglect to urge forward reinforcements to Pope proved him unworthy of trust, and "that giving command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels." "This, and more, I said," sets down Chase in his diary. All the members of the cabinet except Seward¹ and Blair "expressed a general concurrence." Lincoln was distressed and perplexed; "he would gladly resign his place;"² but he argued that under the existing circumstances, McClellan was the best man for the command — an argument to which subsequent events gave force. Chase replied that Hooker, Sumner, or Burnside could do the work required better than McClellan.³

The President again offered the command of the army in the field to Burnside, who again declined it, saying: I do not think that there is any one who can do as much with that army as McClellan, if matters can be so arranged as to remove your and the Secretary of War's objections to him.⁴ The intelligence came that Lee with his army was crossing the Potomac into Maryland. The Union troops must be sent in pursuit, and a commander for them must be designated. The President said to McClellan, "General, you will take command of the forces in the field."⁵ To Pope this word was sent: "The Armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report for orders to the Secretary of War:"⁶ thus ended his service as a general of the Civil War.⁷

¹ Seward was out of the city.

² Cf. Washington's regret that he had not resigned the office of President. — Jefferson's *Anas*, cited by McMaster, vol. ii. p. 112.

³ Warden, p. 459 *et seq.* Sidney Howard Gay, managing editor of the *N. Y. Tribune*, wrote A. S. Hill, its Washington correspondent: "What is the meaning of this appointment of a man as commander of the armies whom Mr. Lincoln has said over and over again is incompetent? Will Stanton resign? Will he be put out if he don't?" — A. S. Hill papers, MS.

⁴ C. W., part i. p. 650.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 451, 453, 470. This was probably as early as Sept. 5. See *O. R.*, vol. xix. part ii. p. 182; vol. xii. part iii. p. 812; Own Story, p. 567.

⁶ Sept. 5, *O. R.*, vol. xii. part iii. p. 813.

⁷ The sequences of Pope's Virginia campaign, other than those men-

tioned in the text, were the loss to the active army of the services of McDowell and Fitz John Porter as well as Pope, all of whom in happier circumstances might have been useful to the country. All had military ability and patriotism. The feeling in the army against Pope and McDowell was bitter; to some extent this was reflected in public sentiment. Pope's orders despatched him to the Northwest to watch the Indian tribes. McDowell, from whom Fortune's wavering wheel ever turned backward, was relieved from command. — Warden's Chase, pp. 462, 463; O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 197. The radical Republicans and friends of Pope demanded a victim. This they had in Fitz John Porter. He was tried before a general court-martial, which assembled Nov. 27, 1862, and was sentenced "to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States." The sentence was approved by the President. The most damaging evidence against Porter was his despatches to Burnside, who, carelessly but with goodness of heart, transmitted them to Halleck for the President's eyes. (See Burnside's testimony before the court-martial.) Porter, feeling that he had been wronged, appealed frequently for a review of his case. President Hayes in 1878 ordered a Board of Army Officers to examine the record of the court-martial and any new evidence. — O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 512. This board, at whose head was General Schofield, exonerated Porter. President Hayes submitted the matter to Congress, which took no action. President Arthur, May 4, 1882, by proclamation remitted so much of the sentence as had not been fully executed. — Ibid., p. 535. July 1, 1886, President Cleveland approved an act for the relief of Fitz John Porter. Aug. 5 he was commissioned as colonel of infantry in the U. S. Army to rank from May 14, 1861, but without back pay. — Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 692; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 12. The record of the proceedings of the court-martial and the Board of Army Officers is printed in Sen. Docs., No. 47, 1st Sess., 46th Cong. In an article "An Undeserved Stigma" (*N. A. Rev.*, Dec. 1882) General Grant espoused warmly Porter's cause, the more remarkable as when President he had decided against Porter. Excellent reviews of the case by Ropes and Col. Thos. L. Livermore may be found in vol. ii. of the Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass. See, also, Der Feldzug in Nord-Virginia in Aug., 1862, von Major F. Mangold, pp. 334, 335; contrariwise the Second Battle of Bull Run, J. D. Cox.

Although Pope testified strongly against Porter at the court-martial, he considered McClellan responsible for his lack of success. — O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 808. Oct. 20 he wrote Halleck, "The greatest criminal is McClellan." — Ibid., p. 821.

Two passages from Halleck's letter to Pope of Sept. 5 are worth citing: "The troops at present are under McClellan's orders, and it is evident that you cannot serve under him willingly. . . . The differences and ill-feeling among the generals are very embarrassing to the administration, and unless checked will ruin the country." — Ibid., p. 812.

CHAPTER XVIII

LET us take a look at Lee, as Longstreet has drawn his picture. Instead of the well-formed, dignified soldier, mounted at the head of his troops, and exhibiting in every movement the alertness and vigor of rich manhood, we have now before us the closet student, poring over his maps and papers, with an application so intense as sometimes to cause his thoughts to run no longer straight. Often on these occasions he would send for Longstreet and say that his ideas were working in a circle and that he needed help to find a tangent. He was now at Chantilly, in the midst of one of these perplexities. He had no intention of attacking the enemy in his fortifications about Washington, for he could not invest them and could not properly supply his army. He must either fall back to a more convenient base or invade Maryland. In that State, so allied in sympathy with his own, he even hoped for a rising in his favor, but at all events deemed it likely that he could "annoy and harass the enemy." He would strike alarm to Washington and Baltimore, and would enter Pennsylvania. Perhaps in the chances of war he might win a decisive battle and conquer a peace. His soldiers were ragged, and many of them were destitute of shoes. The army lacked "much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation." "Still," Lee wrote, "we cannot afford to be idle;" we shall encounter without fear the troops of McClellan and Pope, both of which we have beaten and both of which "are much weakened and demoralized." He decided to cross the Potomac. Nothing occasioned him uneasiness but "supplies of ammunition and subsistence." With this project in contemplation, he talked with Longstreet.

Perhaps the friendly collision with another mind would strengthen his determination. His lieutenant related how Worth's division had marched "around the city of Monterey on two days' rations of roasting-ears and green oranges," and that we could as safely trust ourselves to "the fields of Maryland laden with ripening corn and fruit."¹

September 3 Lee had put his troops in motion, and had reached Dranesville when he wrote Davis that he entertained the idea of invading Maryland. September 4, still marching on and now at Leesburg, his despatch to his President said, "I shall proceed to make the movement at once, unless you should signify your disapprobation;" but before this word could have reached Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac, its soldiers singing "Maryland, my Maryland," and had continued their rollicking march to Frederick City, which was reached on the sixth by the van led by Jackson. His riding through the streets gave an occasion to forge the story of Barbara Frietchie which Whittier wove into inspiring war verse. This poem was read in the home, in the school, and from the platform, and stirred Northern blood at the "barbarity of rebel warfare." It is a token of the intense emotion which clouds our judgment of the enemy in arms. Although Stonewall Jackson not long before was eager to raise the black flag, he was incapable of giving the order to fire at the window of a private house for the sole reason that there "the old flag met his sight;" and it is equally impossible that a remark of old Dame Barbara, "Spare your country's flag," could have brought "a blush of shame" over his face. Jackson was not of the cavalier order, but he had a religious and chivalrous respect for women. It is related, on seemingly good authority, that in this Frederick City, which was Union to the core, a woman, not Barbara Frietchie, waved a Union flag as Jackson's sol-

¹ See Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 158, 199; Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 663; Lee to Davis, Sept. 3, 4, 5, O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 590 *et seq.*

diers passed and that he paid no attention to it. One of his colonels tells the story that on their march to Harper's Ferry, as they went through Middletown, two pretty girls, ribbons of red, white, and blue streaming from their hair, waved with a merry defiance their small Union flags in the face of the general. "He bowed and raised his hat, and turning with his quiet smile to his staff, said: 'We evidently have no friends in this town.'"¹

In conformity with his intention in crossing the Potomac to give the people of Maryland "an opportunity of liberating themselves,"² Lee issued an address to them declaring that the South had "watched with deepest sympathy" their wrongs, and had "seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province." "To aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke" is the object of our invasion.³ He was soon convinced that if the people of Maryland were oppressed they kissed the rod of the oppressor. They gave no signs of rising.⁴ Jackson's experience was the epitome of the real feeling, which if it had formulated itself would have issued in an earnest prayer for the departure from their borders of the Confederate host. The most serious effect of their cold welcome was the difficulty in procuring subsistence. Lee proposed to pay for their supplies, but all that he had to pay with was Confederate currency, or certificates of indebtedness of the Confederate States, and these the farmers, millers, and drovers would not take for their wheat, their flour, and their cattle. The army which had defeated McClellan and Pope could not make the farmers thresh their wheat and the millers grind it, nor prevent the owners of cattle from driving them into Pennsylvania. The citizens of Frederick, caring not for the

¹ Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 618, 622; Boston *Herald*, Sept. 6, 1896; Life of Jackson, by his wife, p. 346; Whittier's Poetical Works (1888), vol. iii. p. 245; see *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov., 1902, 717.

² O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 593.

³ Sept. 8, *ibid.*, p. 601.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 596.

custom offered them by the officers and soldiers, closed their shops.¹

It was Lee's intention, and in this Davis agreed with him, to have the Confederate States propose peace to the Northern government and people on the condition of the recognition of their independence. Lincoln in declining this proposal would help the Democratic party in the coming fall elections, when a new House of Representatives was to be chosen; and if the invading army could maintain its position in the territory of the North, a clamor might arise against a further attempt to conquer the South.² He purposed to attack neither Washington nor Baltimore. His objective point was probably Harrisburg, and his purpose the destruction of the long bridge of the Pennsylvania Railroad across the Susquehanna River. Since he had already severed the communication by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the success of this undertaking would leave no land connection between the eastern and western States except the railroad line along the lakes. He would draw the Union forces away from the capital, so that, if he fought and overcame them, they would not have the intrenchments of Washington to fall back upon.³

At no time during the war were Confederate prospects so bright. Kirby Smith had defeated a Union force in Kentucky, had occupied Lexington, and was now threatening Louisville and Cincinnati, having pushed a detachment of his army within a few miles of Covington, one of the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati. Bragg with a large army had eluded Buell, and was marching northward toward Louisville in the hope that Kentucky would give her adhesion to the Confederacy. Cincinnati and Louisville were excited and alarmed.⁴ So impressed was Davis by the importance at this juncture of a union of statecraft with military strategy that he had started

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part II. p. 596 *et seq.*

² Davis to Lee, Sept. 7, Lee to Davis, Sept. 8, *ibid.*, pp. 598, 600.

³ Century War Book, vol. II. p. 605; Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 331.

⁴ Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*; *Cincinnati Commercial*, Sept. 1-11.

from Richmond to join Lee, expecting to sign his manifesto, offering peace from the head of the victorious army; but the general, unwilling to have him undergo the hardships of the journey and the risk of capture by the enemy, sent his aide-de-camp to warn him against continuing his progress.¹

Lee had now found out that he could not live upon the country, and decided that he must open a line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley so that he could procure sufficient supplies of flour. But Harper's Ferry commanded the valley, and was held by a Federal garrison, although, according to the principles laid down in the military books, this post should have been abandoned when the Confederate army crossed the Potomac. Lee had expected to see it abandoned, and McClellan had advised it,² but Halleck would not give it up. It was a lucky blunder, for Lee was forced on September 10 to divide his army, sending Jackson back into Virginia to capture Harper's Ferry, while he proceeded with Longstreet toward Hagerstown.

The feeling in the North approached consternation. That Lee should threaten Washington and Baltimore, then Harrisburg and Philadelphia, while Bragg threatened Louisville and Cincinnati, was a piling up of menace that shook the nerves of the coolest men. Those who were in a position to receive the fullest information seemed the most gravely anxious, for the inner councils of the nation were even more disturbed than the people. The number of the Confederates was grossly exaggerated, but their mobility and their leaders were compensation so great that their power as an invading army was still rated none too high. Taking into account that over 60,000³ veteran soldiers, led by Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, marched out of Frederick with spirits high and with confidence of victory, it may not at this day be affirmed that the alarm

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 602; Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 66. See Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 204, 284. Davis returned to Richmond.

² O. R., vol. xix. part i. pp. 43, 145.

³ But see Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, part ii. p. 337.

which spread over the North was greater than men in such peril ought to feel. In Washington the anxiety was not so much for the safety of the capital, which was well fortified and garrisoned, as for the danger to the cause. Stanton's uneasiness showed itself in the fear that communication with the North might be cut off. "The President said he had felt badly all day" (September 8).¹ Seward, an optimist by nature and by conviction, wrote to his wife: "It would seem as if a crisis in our affairs were at hand. It would be easy to predict a favorable result, but the old armies are fearfully reduced. The new regiments come in very slowly, and of course they will be quite unreliable at first."² When Lee left Frederick and made directly for Pennsylvania, the farmers on the border sent away their women and children, then their cattle, and armed themselves for the protection of their homes against cavalry raids.³ The despatches from Governor Curtin at Harrisburg manifest concern for that capital: he called out 50,000 militia for the defence of the State. The words which came from Philadelphia were such as utter the citizens of a wealthy city in time of panic.⁴ All sorts of suggestions of little or no value were telegraphed to Halleck, to Stanton, and to the President, who had already done all they could. The peril in which Maryland and Pennsylvania lay could for the moment be averted only by McClellan and his army.

McClellan started his troops from Washington September 5, he himself following two days later. The necessity of reorganizing his depleted army and of covering Baltimore and Washington, together with his own habitual caution and his uncertainty as to the enemy's movements, caused him to pro-

¹ Warden's Chase, pp. 464, 466.

² Sept. 10, Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 128.

³ *Nat. Intelligencer*, Sept. 11. Old residents of Keedysville, Md., on the edge of the battlefield of Antietam, have related to me like occurrences in their section, which was strongly Union.

⁴ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 230, 250, 268, 279. S. H. Gay wrote from New York City: "There is the deepest anxiety here, and a most ominous state of affairs." — A. S. Hill papers, MS.

ceed slowly. September 10 he ordered a general advance, and began to ask for reinforcements; the next day he repeated this request, specified what troops in particular he wanted, and argued that it would be well even to weaken the defences about Washington for the purpose of strengthening his army: he estimated the Confederate force at 120,000.¹ The President ordered Porter's corps to join him.² September 12 a portion of the Union right wing entered Frederick City amidst the joyful acclaim of its inhabitants. McClellan arrived a day later, and wrote of his "enthusiastic reception": "I was nearly overwhelmed and pulled to pieces. . . . As to flowers, — they came in crowds!"³ Fortune turned his way. There was brought to him an order of Lee,⁴ disclosing the division of the Confederate army and the exact scheme of their march — the whole plan of the able strategist opposed to him was revealed. The order, addressed to D. H. Hill and wrapped around three cigars, was found by Private Mitchell of the 27th Indiana on the ground which had been occupied by Hill's troops. When General John G. Walker received his copy of this order, it occurred to him that disaster might result from its loss, and he "pinned it securely in an inside pocket." Longstreet, with the same thought, took a more certain precaution; "he memorized the order and then chewed it up." The finder and his superior officers made no doubt of its importance: it was taken at once to the headquarters of the army, where the signature to it of Lee's adjutant was verified.⁵ McClellan's joy is shown in his despatch to the President written at noon of September 13: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost. . . . I think Lee has made a gross mistake,

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 234, 253, 254.

² Porter had been relieved from duty by direction of the President, but this order was suspended at the request of McClellan. — *Ibid.*, pp. 188, 189. The general court-martial which tried Porter did not convene until Nov. 27. — *Ibid.*, vol. xii. part ii. p. 507.

³ Own Story, p. 571.

⁴ Printed, O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 603.

⁵ Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 603, 607.

and that he will be severely punished for it. The army is in motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. . . . I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I can count on them as of old. . . . My respects to Mrs. Lincoln. Received most enthusiastically by the ladies.”¹ McClellan acted with energy, but not with the energy of the great Frederick or of Napoleon.² He marched his army forward, and the next day (September 14) won the battle of South Mountain. Jacob Dolson Cox, who seized an unexpected opportunity, made a brave assault in the morning, with his Kanawha division and carried the crest of Fox’s Gap. In the afternoon Reno’s corps, to which Cox belonged, and Hooker’s corps forced Turner’s Gap, securing a passage for the Union army over the South Mountain range to the field of Antietam. This victory restored the morale of the Union army, and gave heart to the President and the people of the North.

Meanwhile Franklin, on his way to relieve the garrison at Harper’s Ferry, had forced Crampton’s Gap. But it had been put beyond the power of generals of no more enterprise than McClellan and Franklin to save this post.³ The military blunder of Halleck in refusing to abandon Harper’s Ferry would have been an astonishing piece of good fortune had he thrown off for the occasion his habitual vacillation. As early as September 5 he suggested to Wool, who was stationed at Baltimore and had command of a department which embraced Harper’s Ferry, “the propriety of withdrawing all our forces in that vicinity to Maryland Heights,”⁴ on the Maryland side of the Potomac River; but Wool did

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 281. In his despatch to Halleck, 11 P. M., Sept. 13, McClellan wrote that Lee’s order came into his hands that evening, but it is unquestionable that he must have had it when he sent the telegram to the President cited in the text.

² See Ropes’s Civil War, part ii. p. 341 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

⁴ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 189.

not see fit to put this suggestion in shape of an order. Why Halleck himself did not issue such a command is not entirely clear. McClellan advised it as the next best thing to having the garrison reinforce his own army, and had it been done it is difficult to imagine how Lee with all his fertility of resource could have saved himself, for Franklin and the Harper's Ferry garrison would have fought Jackson while McClellan overwhelmed the other wing of the Confederate army. Perhaps the military jealousy of which Halleck had spoken in warning to Pope¹ had risen in his own breast, and as McClellan's star was now in the ascendant and his was declining, he would not order it because the suggestion came from his rival. Nothing could have been more unwise than this division of authority. The whole campaign should have been from the first in McClellan's hands.² Yet, as haggling between Halleck and McClellan seemed to be the necessary concomitant of their endeavors to co-operate, Halleck ought to have had the courage of his conviction. Wool was a man seventy-eight years old, who had been given a place on account of meritorious service in Mexico, but who seems to have been no better than a clog in these operations; and for the general-in-chief to have suggested to him a strategic move was a piece of misplaced responsibility hardly to be expected in military affairs. D. S. Miles, the commander at Harper's Ferry, placed the strange construction on his orders that they did not permit him to mass his whole force on Maryland Heights, but required him in his exigency to coop it up in the village. Jackson and other detachments of the Confederates encompassed Harper's Ferry by occupying all the hills around it, and the garrison fell without a struggle, the surrender including 12,500 men and much material of war.³

The despatches of Halleck, even after he became aware of

¹ See last note to chap. xvii.

² The Harper's Ferry garrison was not placed under McClellan's command until Sept. 12.

³ See O. R., vol. xix. parts i. and ii.; Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 612 *et seq.*; McClellan's Own Story, p. 549.

the finding of Lee's lost order, conveyed to McClellan poor and superfluous counsel. His fears for the safety of Washington, his anxious suggestions of caution showed blindness to McClellan's great fault, and no proper comprehension of the strategy needed in this campaign.¹ Compare this division of authority among Halleck, McClellan, and Wool, accompanied undoubtedly by pressure from the President and the Secretary of War, with the management on the other side, where a single head directed all movements. Lee was supreme. Longstreet objected to the division of the army when he was asked to command the detachment for the capture of Harper's Ferry. Lee simply ordered Jackson to make the move at first intended for Longstreet, but the arrangement was made in such manner that Longstreet did not feel aggrieved.² It may have been that aversion to having his movements hampered by his superior was a reason why Lee objected to Jefferson Davis joining his army.

A citizen friendly to the Confederate cause had been present when Lee's lost order was brought to McClellan; he got an inkling of its importance to the Union army, made his way through the lines, and gave the information to Stuart, who at once transmitted it to Lee.³ Having this knowledge before daylight of September 14, Lee, who was disappointed and concerned at the rapid advance of McClellan, left Hagerstown, retraced his steps, disputed without success, as we have seen, the passes of South Mountain,⁴ and took up a strong position behind Antietam Creek, around the village of Sharpsburg. In the lost order Jackson and the commanders of the different detachments acting with him for the capture of Harper's Ferry were asked to join the main body of the army after accomplishing their object. Lee awaited them with his

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 41, part ii. p. 289; C. W., part i. p. 451.

² Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 663; From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 201.

³ Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 345.

⁴ It was not Lee's main army that Franklin fought at Crampton's Gap, but some of the troops who had been sent to capture Harper's Ferry.

small force. His Maryland campaign so far was a failure. Circumstances had beaten him, and only a decisive victory could bring back that prestige which was his when he marched out of Frederick. It was no longer Philadelphia and Harrisburg that were in danger; it was the very army which had menaced them. McClellan, say military judges, should have pressed forward vigorously, fought Lee the afternoon of September 15 before Jackson came up, since with his superior force he ought to have crushed the Confederate army. Whether indeed he could have been ready may be questioned, but it seems clear that he ought to have attacked early in the morning of the 16th, when Jackson was still three miles away on the other side of the Potomac,¹ when John G. Walker's division was even farther off, and when McLaws, R. H. Anderson, and A. P. Hill, who had also assisted in the capture of Harper's Ferry, were in a position not to come up until the next day. Walker arrived during the morning of the 16th,² and reporting to Lee found him "calm, dignified, and even cheerful," as composed as if he had had a "well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back," confident that he could hold his own until he was joined by the other three divisions.³

McClellan and the main part of his army had left South Mountain September 15, and advanced to the field of Antietam, taking up their position on the opposite side of Antietam Creek from Lee. One is pleased with the glimpses he obtains of the Union general in these days. Cox tells about a reconnaissance made by McClellan, Burnside, and himself in the afternoon of the 15th, when, standing on a hill in the midst of a large group of officers, they attracted the fire of the enemy's artillery. "I noted," adds Cox, "the cool and

¹ The exact hour of Jackson's arrival is not stated, but at sunrise he was at Shepherdstown, between three and four miles from Sharpsburg, with the Potomac River to ford. — O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 1007.

² Ibid., p. 914.

³ John G. Walker, article *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 675.

business-like air with which McClellan made his examination under fire.”¹

He had certainly purposed to give battle on the 16th. At 7 A. M. he telegraphed to Halleck, “will attack as soon as situation of enemy is developed.”² Our general was a busy man that day, scheming, reconnoitring, changing the position of his troops. But in his desire to have everything in perfect readiness he was letting slip an advantage which fortune and his own ability had secured. He experienced apparently no trepidation at the thought of meeting face to face the antagonist who had out-maneuvred and defeated him on the Peninsula and had driven Pope from the plains of Manassas; but he had not Lee's faculty of grasping a situation, nor would he ever combine his many perceptions in a single judgment that would gain for him the end desired.

In the afternoon of the 16th McClellan commenced operations on his right by sending Hooker, who now commanded a corps, across Antietam creek. A skirmish resulted which lasted until dark, and that night Hooker's men lay so close to the Confederate left wing that the opposing pickets could hear each other's tread.

This advance of the Union troops had shown Lee where the battle would begin on the morrow. At daylight, September 17, Hooker made a vigorous onset. He encountered stern resistance, and there was stiff wrestling and awful carnage in that historic cornfield. Knowing that he was hard pressed, Joseph K. F. Mansfield's corps, who had crossed the creek the night before, on orders to support him, was hastening to his assistance. Mansfield soon met his death, and Hooker was wounded and borne from the field. “Had you not been wounded when you were,” wrote McClellan to him three days afterwards, “I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the rebel army, for I *know* that, with you at its head, your corps would have kept on

¹ Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 631.

² O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 307.

until it gained the main road.”¹ Hooker’s corps, badly cut up, slowly retreated from the cornfield. Mansfield’s corps pressed on, drove the Confederates before them, and part of one division effected a lodgment in the woods north of the Dunker church, which was situated on the high ground that was the key to the position of the enemy’s left wing; but the greater part of the corps was finally brought to a stand. These corps had fought separate battles which by nine o’clock were practically over.

Now Sumner came forward. With “ill-regulated ardor” he put in the division of Sedgwick, who advanced “in column with his flank absolutely unprotected.”² But Jackson, who had the advantage of numbers, hurled Early and Walker together with McLaws, who had just arrived from Harper’s Ferry, upon Sedgwick.³ “My God,” exclaims Sumner, “we must get out of this.”⁴ He attempts to avert the disaster, is unsuccessful, and gives the word to retreat. It is now perhaps ten o’clock. Hooker’s and Mansfield’s corps and Sedgwick’s division have been hurt, and are unable to resume the offensive, but reinforced by part of Franklin’s corps, which has just arrived from Crampton’s pass, are still strong for defence. Sedgwick himself has been wounded. These successful blows have cost the Confederates dear.

After Sedgwick had been repulsed, French’s division, afterwards assisted by Richardson’s division, both of Sumner’s corps, made an attack on Lee’s line to the right of his extreme left where the previous fighting had been done. This was a desperate encounter, especially the struggle in the sunken road which has since been known as Bloody Lane. Richardson fell, mortally wounded; but the enemy was driven before them and would have suffered a still greater defeat but for the opportune arrival from Harper’s Ferry of R. H. Anderson’s division. The fighting on this part of the field ended at about one.

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 219.

² Francis A. Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 106.

³ Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, p. 405.

⁴ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 106.

Burnside commanded the left of McClellan's line, which was formed by his old corps, the Ninth, under Cox, the successor of Reno, who had been killed at the battle of South Mountain. At about ten o'clock¹ Burnside received the order to carry the bridge across the Antietam, thereafter known as Burnside's bridge. Cox took charge of the operation, which was a difficult one in that he must fight his way across the creek. The creek ran in a deep and narrow valley, and the slope on the Confederate side, which was steep, was commanded by the enemy from rifle-pits and "breastworks made of rails and stones."² Rodman's division and Scammon's brigade were ordered to cross by a ford one third of a mile below the bridge. Cox at the bridge met with a stubborn resistance, but his work was stiff and persistent, for the Union right had fared badly, and orders came constantly from McClellan to push the assault. Finally, the troops made a last successful charge, carried the bridge, and at one o'clock planted the banner on the opposite bank. Rodman had crossed at the ford, and at the same time had approached the rear of the enemy's position. The heights had been won and were held. Ammunition and fresh troops were now needed, and it was three o'clock before all was again made ready. Then Cox advanced and drove the Confederates before him.³ Sharpsburg, the centre of Lee's position, was almost in his grasp, when up came A. P. Hill's division, which had marched that day from Harper's Ferry. These men were dressed in the blue uniforms which were part of their captured spoil, and until they began to fire, Cox's soldiers thought they were a Union force. If only Couch's division, which had been left at Maryland Heights to watch Jackson, had arrived at the

¹ McClellan's report of Oct. 15, 1862, and Burnside's of Sept. 30. This was a controverted point until cleared up by the publication of a supplemental volume of O. R. The order is dated 9.10 A. M. It then had to be transmitted two miles as the crow flies. — *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, April, 1898, p. 575; *O. R.*, vol. li. part i. p. 844; see Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 372, n. 2.

² Cox's report of Sept. 23.

³ "It was a brilliant success." — Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 374.

same time, as perhaps they might have done had everything been ordered with care, how different had been the result ! As it was, the advance of Cox was checked. He withdrew his troops in good order, but still held much of the ground he had gained by forcing the passage of the creek.

The battle of Antietam was over. Lee had had 55,000¹ available troops, McClellan 87,000.² McClellan used only about 60,000 in the battle ;³ Lee employed every man who reached the field of action,⁴ but since the concentration of his troops at Sharpsburg had required swift marches from more than one half of his army, the men whom he took into battle fell short of the number which the field returns gave as present for duty. The Union loss was 12,410 ; the Confederate, 11,172.⁵ While McClellan outnumbered Lee in the ratio of about three to two,⁶ the work of attack was his, and the position of the Confederates was strong for defence. Besides the breastworks spoken of there were "occasional ridges of limestone cropping out in such shape as to give partial cover

¹ I have arrived at this number from the fair and accurate collation and analysis of the Confederate field returns by Gen. J. D. Cox in his reviews of Allan's *Nor. Va.* and Fitzhugh Lee's *Lee*, his replies to Fitzhugh Lee and D. H. Hill, Jr. *The Nation*, Feb. 2, 1893, pp. 85, 86; Nov. 15, Dec. 20, 1894, pp. 369, 462; Jan. 24, 1895, p. 71. From General Cox's total I have deducted an estimate of the casualties at South Mountain.

General Lee's statement in his report of Aug. 19, 1863, "This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side" (*O. R.*, vol. xix. part i. p. 151), implies a loss of 20,000 men by straggling and by casualties from Frederick City to Antietam. See Ropes's estimate of the two forces, *Civil War*, part ii. pp. 376, 377, 382; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 266.

² McClellan's report of Aug. 4, 1863. — *O. R.*, vol. xix. part i. p. 67.

³ Lincoln's statement in cabinet meeting after his visit to the army, Oct. 1-5. — Warden's *Chase*, p. 500; Palfrey, pp. 69, 71; *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 603.

⁴ Taylor, *Four Years with Gen. Lee*, pp. 69, 73.

⁵ *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 603.

⁶ General Palfrey, after a careful and candid discussion, arrives at the conclusion that, counting the men actually engaged, the Federals did not outnumber the Confederates as much as in the proportion of 3 to 2. — *The Ant. and Fred.*, p. 71. That indeed would be an inference from my statements in the text.

to infantry lying under them." The Confederates had, moreover, the full benefit of interior lines.¹

Much controversy obtains whether Antietam was a Union or Confederate victory, and the result is variously characterized in technical terms. After an analysis of the evidence and the criticisms, it will, I think, appear to the non-professional student that McClellan was justified when on the morning of the next day he wrote to his wife that he had gained a success.² We read much, however, about his defective tactics. "It was," asserts General Francis A. Walker, "a day of isolated attacks and wasted efforts."³ In this opinion there is so general a consensus that to traverse it will be impossible. Perhaps McClellan would have severely defeated Lee had not his overestimate of the Confederate force⁴ forbade his using Franklin's corps to the best advantage and making any use whatever of Porter's corps, which he held rigidly as his reserve. But to one who is biassed by the feeling that Lee had by this time shown himself almost invincible, it will be natural to speak well of the general who overcame him in any way and on any terms. While Lee's strategy and in some measure his tactics have been censured by Longstreet,⁵ the layman will be prone to agree with Allan

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 235, 267.

² *Own Story*, p. 612.

³ *Second Army Corps*, p. 109. J. D. Cox speaks of the "series of partial reverses which resulted from the piecemeal and disjointed way in which McClellan's morning attacks had been made." — *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 658. Palfrey writes: "Of McClellan's conduct of this battle there is little to be said in the way of praise beyond the fact that he did fight it voluntarily without having it forced upon him." — *The Ant. and Fred.*, p. 119. Longstreet says "Gen. McClellan's plan of the battle was not strong, the handling and execution were less so." — *From Man. to App.*, p. 267. Allan's criticism is, McClellan's "execution was unequal and without coherence. . . . His divisions were separated and fought in a disjointed and desultory way, accomplishing nothing." — *A. N. V.*, p. 382; see Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 369.

⁴ He thought he was fighting 97,000. — *Report of Aug. 4, 1863, O. R.*, vol. xix. part i. p. 67.

⁵ *From Man. to App.*, pp. 220, 237, chap. xx.; *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 666.

that the conduct of the battle of Antietam itself "by Lee and his principal subordinates seems absolutely above criticism."¹

McClellan's first impulse was to renew the battle the next day,² but after "a careful and anxious survey of the condition" of his command he decided to rest his army and get the reinforcements which were arriving into position for an attack on the morrow.³ He has been blamed by military critics for not falling upon the Confederates at once, but as Lee "awaited without apprehension the renewal of the attack,"⁴ we may conclude that McClellan's caution redounded to the benefit of the Union cause.⁵ September 19 Lee withdrew from the field and crossed the Potomac into Virginia.⁶ The pursuit was neither vigorous nor effectual.

Military judges criticise McClellan's lack of celerity after he found Lee's lost order; he acted with energy, they say, but not with the utmost possible energy. The situation demanded uncommon diligence, the straining of every nerve, inasmuch as the destruction or capture of Lee's army in detachments was in sight. Lincoln and Seward, believing that more might have been accomplished, were not satisfied.⁷ In these judgments, however, there is, consciously or unconsciously, a reflection of what Frederick the Great or Napoleon in like case would have done. But against a Frederick, a Napoleon, or the Grant or Sherman of 1864, Lee's strategy would have been different: he would not have invaded Maryland nor divided his army. Instead therefore of emphasizing these criticisms, let us rather contrast the conquering

¹ P. 441. "Of General Lee's management of the battle there is nothing but praise to be said." — Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 377.

² Sept. 18. To Halleck, 8 A. M., O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 322.

³ Report of Oct. 15, *ibid.*, part i. p. 32.

⁴ Lee's report, *ibid.*, p. 151; Allan, p. 443.

⁵ Contrariwise, see *Life of Lee*, White, p. 224; Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 378.

⁶ "The prestige of victory remained naturally with McClellan." — Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 379.

⁷ Warden, p. 481; *Life of Seward*, vol. iii. pp. 132, 135.

host of the South as they marched through the streets of Frederick, full of pride and hope, and singing "The Girl I left behind me,"¹ with the "horde of disordered fugitives" fleeing before an army they had a fortnight earlier driven "to cover under its homeward ramparts;"² let us note the change of feeling at the North from depression before South Mountain to buoyancy after Antietam;³ let us reflect that a signal Confederate victory in Maryland might have caused the Northern voters at the approaching fall elections to declare for the peace that Jefferson Davis would offer them from the head of Lee's victorious army, and that without McClellan's victory the Emancipation Proclamation would have been postponed and might never have been issued!

Antietam "was the bloodiest single day of fighting of the war," writes Longstreet, and supports the statement with an array of figures.⁴ Such fighting in a border State like Maryland makes us realize the horror of civil conflict. On this battlefield friend fought friend, and even brother fought brother. At the ford near Burnside bridge a Northern colonel leading a charge of his regiment was killed by the Confederates under the command of his brother, the general of a division.⁵ We may say with King Henry VI., whom Shakespeare represents in a battle of the Wars of the Roses as standing by when a son, who has killed his father unawares, recognizes the face of the slain and bursts into grief,

"O piteous spectacle! O bloody times!
Whiles lions roar and battle for their dens,
Poor harmless lambs abide their enmity.
Weep, wretched man, I'll aid thee tear for tear;

¹ Longstreet, *From Man. to App.*, p. 205.

² Longstreet's expressions, *ibid.*, p. 283.

³ The whole literature of the period may be referred to. See especially files of the *N. Y. Tribune*, *Times*, *World*, *Herald*; *Chicago Tribune*; *Wash. Nat. Int.*

⁴ Longstreet, *From Man. to App.*, p. 239.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 262; see also D. H. Hill, *Century War Book*, vol. ii. p. 580.

And let our hearts and eyes, like civil war,
Be blind with tears, and break o'ercharged with grief."¹

The great historical significance of the battle of Antietam is that it furnished Lincoln the victory he was waiting for to issue his proclamation of emancipation. This, as we have seen, he had laid aside on July 22, until some military success should give support to the policy.² The working of his mind in the two months following that day is open to us. While he had come to a resolve, he showed the true executive quality, as well as the fair mind, in not regarding the policy of striking directly at slavery as absolutely and finally determined until it had been officially promulgated. From the cabinet meeting of July 22, when he announced tentatively his purpose, to that of September 22, when he told his advisers that he should issue an irrevocable decree, he endeavored, in his correspondence and formal interviews and private conversation, to get all the light possible to aid him in deciding when the proper moment had come to proclaim freedom to the slaves. To Conservatives he argued the radical side of the question. "I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed," he wrote Reverdy Johnson.³ "This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all and

¹ "A heavy case
When force to force is knit, and sword and glaive
In civil broils make kin and countrymen
Slaughter themselves in others, and their sides
With their own weapons gore!"

MARLOWE, *Edward II.*, act iv. sc. 4.

Illustrating this phase of the civil war, see the story of "An Unfinished Fight" in "Southern Soldier Stories," by George Cary Eggleston; "Tales of the Home Folks in Peace and War," J. C. Harris, p. 172; also, "A Horseman in the Sky," by Ambrose Bierce in "In the Midst of Life." Francis Lieber had one son in the Confederate army, another in the Union.—*Life and Letters*, p. 318.

One gets a good idea of the aftermath of battle in an article of O. W. Holmes in the *Atlantic* of Dec. 1862, "My Hunt after 'the Captain,'" being an account of his search for his son who was wounded at Antietam.

² *Ante.*

³ July 28, Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 215.

its enemies stake nothing," he said in a letter to August Belmont. "Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government and if they fail still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was . . . now is the time."¹ To Radicals he put forth the conservative view or laid stress on the necessity of proceeding with caution. "My paramount object . . . is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery," he wrote to Horace Greeley.² To the committee of clergymen from the public meeting in Chicago of Christians of all denominations who presented a memorial in favor of national emancipation, he said: "I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there?"³

There was pressure on the President to issue a proclamation of emancipation, and there was pressure against it. He talked with conservatives and radicals, listened to their arguments, reasoned with them, and left different impressions on different minds. Much of his talk was after his manner of thinking aloud where the stimulation of contact with sympathetic or captious men afforded him the opportunity to revolve his thoughts, and see the question on all sides. There was, indeed, much to be considered. His warrant was the war powers of the Constitution. There ought to be a reasonable probability that a proclamation would help the operations of our army in spite of the strong opposition among many officers of high rank to a war for the negro,⁴ that it would damage the Confederates by stirring up in the slaves their in-

¹ July 31, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 217.

² Aug. 22, *ante*.

³ Sept. 13, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 234; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 154; Chicago *Tribune*, Sept. 23.

⁴ See Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 83; Warden's Chase, p. 485.

herent desire for freedom, causing every one of them to be in secret a friend of the North, and that it might lead to the employment of the blacks as soldiers. Granted these considerations, Lincoln must satisfy himself that public opinion at the North would sustain him in the action. He could not doubt that the cavilling support of the radicals would for the moment turn to enthusiasm, and the zeal of these positive anti-slavery Republicans directed in the channel of raising men and money was an influence worth having. But was the sentiment of the plain people, the mass of steady Republicans and war Democrats, ripe for an edict of freedom?

Again, the possibility that the policy might alienate the border slave States which had clung to the Union was in Lincoln's mind a serious objection, "but the difficulty was as great not to act as to act."¹ On the other hand, emancipation would help us in Europe. England and France could not recognize the Southern Confederacy when the real issue between the sections was thus unmasked. Yet there was reason to anticipate that an avowed war against slavery would revive the opposition of the Democrats and give them a "club" to use against the administration; but the President did not regard this an objection of great moment, since party opposition at the North must in any event be expected.²

Turning the question over and over in his mind, he finally settled his doubts. He believed that a proclamation of freedom was a military necessity, and that the plain people of the North would see it as he did. As the days went on, he was confirmed in the conclusion which he had come to in July, and felt that public sentiment was growing in that direction.³

¹ Welles, *The Galaxy*, Dec., 1872, p. 847.

² *Ibid.*

³ Lincoln's almost unerring judgment of popular opinion did not fail him. Grimes wrote Chase from Iowa, July 29: "The people are far in advance of the administration and of Congress in their desire for a vigorous prosecution of the war. . . . The popular sentiment . . . is far more ardent and extreme than even I ever supposed. . . . We have too much at stake . . . to justify us in neglecting any methods to put the rebellion down known to civilized warfare." — Salter, p. 215. Chase wrote Butler, July 31:

Even in the dark hours following the second defeat of Bull Run and Lee's invasion of Maryland, he did not falter. "When the rebel army was at Frederick" [September 6-10], he afterwards said, "I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of emancipation. . . . I said nothing to any one, but I made the promise to myself and to my Maker."¹ Antietam was won. Lee had recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. Then was held that cabinet meeting of September 22, which is a point in the history of

"The truth is, there has been a great change in the public mind within a few weeks. The people are resolved not to give up the struggle for territorial integrity. . . . Whatever stands in the way of this determination must get out of the way. If State organizations, they must fall; if negro slavery, it must be abolished."—Schuckers, p. 378. John Sherman wrote Gen. Sherman from Ohio, Aug. 24: "I am prepared for one to meet the broad issue of universal emancipation."—Sherman Letters, p. 157. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote Motley, Aug. 29: "I feel no doubt in my own mind that the spirit of hostility to slavery as the cause of this war is speedily and certainly increasing. . . . I think a miscellaneous Boston audience would be more like to cheer any denunciation of slavery now than almost any other sentiment."—Motley's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 86. The Republican State Convention of Massachusetts, meeting Sept. 9, adopted with enthusiasm resolutions which nominated Sumner as senator to succeed himself and which called for the extermination of slavery.—Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 100; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 240.

¹ Chase's Diary, Warden, p. 481. The growth of Lincoln's religious feeling under the stress of perturbation and trouble is an interesting by-study. His religion was devoid of cant. When he made the remark to his cabinet cited in the text, he hesitated a little before he spoke of his promise to his Maker. When the Chicago clergymen told him, Sept. 13, that they and those whom they spoke for believed "these disasters to be tokens of Divine displeasure, calling for new and advanced action by the President in behalf of the country, such as would indicate national repentance for the sin of oppression," he replied with a tinge of sarcasm: "I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right."—Chicago *Tribune*, Sept. 23; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 234.

civilization. After some general talk, the President took the word and read from Artemus Ward's book a chapter, "High-Handed Outrage at Utica." He thought it very funny and enjoyed the reading of it greatly, while the members of the cabinet except Stanton laughed with him. Was ever so sublime a thing ushered in by the ridiculous? Lincoln fell into a grave tone and told of the working of his thoughts on the slavery question since the July meeting. "The rebel army is now driven out" of Maryland, he said, and I am going to fulfil the promise I made to myself and my God. "I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter; for that I have determined for myself."¹ He read then his proclamation of freedom: "On the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free." In the case of the loyal slave States he declared again for his policy of compensated emancipation, and colonization of the freed negroes,² and said that he should in due time recommend compensation also for the loss of their slaves to loyal citizens of the States in rebellion. All the members of the cabinet except Blair approved substantially the proclamation, and Blair's objection was on the ground of expediency, not of principle.³ On the morrow, September 23, this edict, which heralded a new epoch in the world's progress, was given to the country.⁴

¹ Chase's Diary, Warden, p. 481.

² How much Lincoln had this at heart is shown by his address on Colonization to a deputation of colored men, Aug. 14. — Works, vol. ii. p. 222.

³ Chase's Diary; Welles's Diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 160; Welles, *The Galaxy*, Dec., 1872, pp. 846, 847.

⁴ Besides authorities already cited, I will refer to Carpenter, *Six Months at the White House*, *passim*; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 66; Schurz, A. Lincoln, p. 78; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, p. 96 *et seq.*; Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i. p. 439; Julian, Boutwell, Welling, *Reminiscences*, *N. A. Rev.*, pp. 61, 124, 519; Julian, *Political Recollections*,

The next evening the President made a short speech to a party who serenaded him, in which he said: "What I did, I did after a very full deliberation and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. . . . It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it."¹ The immediate response of the country was apparently favorable.² "God bless Abraham Lincoln," the New York *Tribune* said, and it spoke for the radical and fervent Republicans.³ Many conservatives endorsed it because it came from the mind and pen of the President. But Lincoln himself, with his delicate touch on the pulse of public opinion, detected that there was a lack of heartiness in the response of the Northern people. In his "strictly private" letter to Hamlin, the Vice-President, he manifested his keen disappointment. "While I hope something from the proclamation," he wrote, "my expectations are not as sanguine as are those of some friends. The time for its effect southward has not come; but northward the effect should be instantaneous. It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished

p. 222; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 135; Letter of Joseph Medill to Colfax, Life of Colfax, Hollister, p. 186.

¹ Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 240.

² See, for example, N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 23; N. Y. *Tribune*, Chicago *Tribune*, Sept. 23, 24; N. Y. *Herald*, Sept. 24. When the North was threatened with invasion, a conference of governors of the loyal States was called at Altoona, Pa., but before they met, the emergency had passed away. They however took counsel together. Twelve of them went from Altoona to Washington, called on the President (Sept. 26), presented him an address which then or afterwards was signed by seventeen governors; in this, after assurances and one recommendation, they said, "We hail with heartfelt gratitude and encouraged hope the proclamation." The governors of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri dissented from the portion of the address that approved of the emancipation policy. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 165; McPherson, Hist. of the Great Rebellion, p. 232; Wash. *Star*, cited by *Nat. Int.*, Sept. 27; Wash. despatch to N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 27.

³ "'God bless Abraham Lincoln,' as Horace Greeley did n't say. It is curious how much a phrase will do. The town [New York] rung with that the other day. The Proclamation stunned the secesh here at first, but they are coming to." — S. H. Gay to Hill, Sept. 25, A. S. Hill papers, MS.

individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. . . . The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath ; but breath alone kills no rebels.”¹ Lincoln’s despondency is revealed also in his reply to an address by a pious Quaker woman, and in his “Meditation on the Divine Will,” in which his belief in a divine Providence mingled with his present disappointment to produce the doubt whether indeed God were on our side.²

The President’s policy, his administration of affairs, clouded by defeats in the field, were submitted to the judgment of the people at the ballot-box. In October and November, elections took place in the principal States, with the result that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, all of which except New Jersey³ had cast their electoral votes for Lincoln, declared against the party in power. A new House of Representatives was chosen, the Democrats making conspicuous gains in the States mentioned. The same ratio of gain extended to the other States would have given them the control of the next House, — a disaster from which the administration was saved by New England, Michigan, Iowa, California, and the border slave States.⁴

¹ Sept. 28, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 242 ; see, also, Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 135. The President would have been more exact had he said that government stocks were not active and had not advanced. The *New York Times* reported for the week ending Sept. 27, “a somewhat tame market for U. S. securities which have not responded to the extreme speculation in railway shares and bonds.” One factor in the advance of these was the large traffic returns. On the other hand, there was an impression in Wall Street that the Proclamation would have an adverse effect on Governments.

² Sept. 28, 30, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 243 ; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 342.

³ New Jersey cast 4 out of her 7 electoral votes for Lincoln.

⁴ Minnesota with two representatives, Kansas and Oregon each with one, also contributed to this result. Maine voted in September, Iowa in October, Massachusetts and Michigan in November.

Some of these States, however, did not elect their Congressmen until the following year, when the conservative reaction had spent itself. The elections came near being what the steadfast Republican journal, the *New York Times*, declared them to be: a "vote of want of confidence" in the President.¹ Since the elections followed so closely upon the Proclamation of Emancipation, it is little wonder the Democrats declared that the people protested against Lincoln's surrender to the radicals, which was their construction of the change of policy from a war for the Union to a war for the negro. Many writers have since agreed with them in this interpretation of the result. No one can doubt that it was a contributing force operating with these other influences: the corruption in the War Department before Stanton became Secretary, the suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, arbitrary arrests which had continued to be made by military orders under the authority of the Secretary of War, and the suspension, by the same power, of the writ of *habeas corpus*. But the dominant cause was the failure of our armies to accomplish decisive results in the field. Had McClellan captured or destroyed Lee's army after Antietam, had Buell cut up Bragg's army at Perryville when the tide of invasion into Kentucky turned,² the President would have received at the ballot-box a triumphant approval of his whole policy. While at first the victory at Antietam brought relief and satisfaction, further reflection on the part of the people as well as of those high in office made it evident that merely to stem an invasion into the North was making little progress towards crushing the Confederacy. The defeat of the administration party in these important States, which was occasioned by its former friends staying away from the polls, was a symptom of weariness of the war, a protest against the waste of so much life and money with so little result accomplished. This feeling showed itself in an extreme form in the open dissatisfaction,

¹ Nov. 7.

² Bragg was beaten at Perryville, Oct. 8, and retreated from Kentucky, *infra*.

which in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin broke out into positive violence, over the draft necessary under the August call for 300,000 militia.

The result in Ohio was affected by the arrest of Dr. Edson B. Olds for a speech in which it was alleged that he had used treasonable language and discouraged enlistments. To drag a man of seventy from his house at night without legal warrant, and take him summarily to Fort Lafayette, was a procedure likely to set to thinking voters who were bred to liberty, especially as in this case the victim was an intelligent man of high character, who had served his constituents three terms in the legislature and six years in Congress. A vacancy occurring while Olds suffered in prison, his neighbors and fellow citizens promptly chose him to represent them again in the legislature. The normal Democratic majority in New Jersey was made larger through the feeling aroused by the arrest, the year previous, and incarceration in Fort Lafayette of James W. Wall, a lawyer and writer of culture, who was prosecuted probably on account of his severe criticism of the administration which appeared in the editorial columns of the *New York Daily News*. The newly elected legislature sent him to the United States Senate to fill an unexpired term. The arrests made in 1862, under the authority of Stanton, amounted to a considerable number, and were futile for good; attended as they frequently were by the insolence of subordinate officers, they were pregnant with mischief in that they increased the majorities against the administration. Frequently they were suggested by local animosity or mistaken zeal, and the Secretary of War in putting these motives in the shape of formal orders displayed short-sighted judgment as well as the capriciousness of power. It must be reckoned as one of the results of the elections that he issued, November 22, an order which, after no more than a formal delay, effectuated the discharge from military custody of practically all of the political prisoners.

Allusion must be made to an explanation, then current to some extent among Republicans, which ascribed their defeat

to the fact that the Republicans were fighting the Confederates in the field while the Democrats stayed at home to vote.¹ It was not alleged as necessarily true that the Republican volunteers exceeded greatly the Democratic, but that the natural tendency of the soldiers was to vote as they fought and to sustain the administration in its conduct of the war. A comparison, however, of the returns of 1862 with those of 1860 and 1863 will make it plain that this had little to do with the result.²

Senator Grimes thought that the anti-slavery declaration of the President enabled the Republicans to win in Iowa. "We took the bull by the horns and made the proclamation an issue," he wrote to Chase. "I traversed the State for four weeks, speaking every day, and the more radical I was the more acceptable I was. The fact is, we carried the State by bringing up the radical element to the polls. The politicians are a vast distance behind the people in sentiment."³ Sumner, in making the canvass of Massachusetts, planted himself squarely on the President's edict of freedom, which he maintained to be a military necessity. A legislature was chosen which sent him back to the Senate by a vote of nearly five to one, and Andrew, the most outspoken of all the war governors in his anti-slavery views, was re-elected.⁴

¹ In 1862 only a few of the States authorized their soldiers to vote in camp.

² An example of the high character of candidates for political office is seen in Ohio, where the Union men nominated Backus, one of the counsel for the Oberlin-Wellington rescuers (see vol. ii. p. 363), for supreme judge (no governor being chosen this year, the candidate for this office stood at the head of the ticket), while the Democrats drew forth from a grateful retirement Rufus P. Ranney (*ibid.*, p. 380), and nominated and elected him against his will. Either of these men would have adorned the highest judicial bench of the country; either would make a heavy pecuniary sacrifice in becoming a member of the Supreme Court of his own State.

³ Life of Grimes, Salter, p. 218.

⁴ In his reply, May 19, to the Secretary of War on a demand for troops, Andrew had intimated that it would be difficult to furnish them on account of the manner in which the war was prosecuted, but let the President sustain General Hunter in his order freeing the slaves, and let the blacks be employed as soldiers, and "the roads will swarm, if need be, with multitudes

This result was remarkable in that the opposition contained elements of a high character, the moving force coming from the Bell-Everett supporters of 1860, and from conservative Republicans who took the name of the People's party, called for a vigorous prosecution of the war, and nominated for governor Charles Devens, a gallant general in active service.

The Democratic conventions of the great States which voted against the administration had been held before the issue of the proclamation, but the policy of emancipation was in the air and they denounced it in advance. A favorite catchword of the time, "the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was," incorporated into many platforms of the Democrats, expressed exactly the principle for which they demanded the support of the country. By the Constitution as it is, they meant that there ought to be no more violation of it in time of war than in time of peace, and that it ought not to be stretched to cover an arbitrary use of power. By the Union as it was they signified that after the suppression of the rebellion the States should be as they had been before, slavery should remain unimpaired, and the country should adhere to the policy solemnly declared by Congress in its resolution of July, 1861.¹

In most of the States the Republicans took the name of Union men. In New York and Illinois their conventions were held late enough to allow their cordial approval to be given to the proclamation. In New York this approval was emphasized by the nomination for governor of General Wadsworth, a radical on the slavery question and one of the military advisers of the President. The Democrats had named for governor Horatio Seymour, a gentleman of public experi-

whom New England would pour out to obey your call." — Schouler, *Mass. in the Civil War*, p. 333. "Who was it that demanded, before troops should be sent to defend the flag of the government, that that government should form a policy that pleased him?" asked Horatio Seymour, Oct. 22. "Who was it but the extreme radical Governor of the State of Massachusetts?" The intimation of Andrew was severely condemned by a resolution of the Democratic convention of Ohio.

¹ See vol. iii. p. 464.

ence, culture, sterling character, and moral purpose. He repelled indignantly an electioneering statement of the other side, that every vote for Wadsworth was one of loyalty, every vote for Seymour one of treason. "God knows I love my country," he said; "I would count my life as nothing, if I could but save the nation's life." In the speeches which gave the key-note to his campaign, he made but one allusion, a brief one, to the proclamation of emancipation, and did not impart to his words a tone of bitterness. Recognizing "that at this moment the destinies, the honor, and the glory of our country hang poised upon the conflict in the battle-field . . . we tender to this government no conditional support" to put down "this wicked and mighty rebellion." Speaking always in a respectful manner of the President, he condemned the course of the radical Republicans, the infractions of the Constitution, the mismanagement of affairs, but he was most severe when he denounced corruption in the departments, dishonesty in the award of government contracts. Read the Congressional investigations, he said, and "learn for yourselves if fraud does not reek at the National Capital." We have a right to require that the National affairs "be conducted not only by efficiency, but with honesty, economy, and integrity." Our aim is to preserve the Constitution as it is, to restore the Union as it was.¹

Seymour, who was the ablest Democrat to enter the political arena during the civil war, represented the best quality of the opposition, even as Lincoln stood for the highest purpose and most expedient methods in the prosecution of the war. Granted the necessity in a constitutional government of an opposition party even when the life of the nation is at stake, the leadership of it could not in this case have fallen into better hands. At the same time with his fearlessness in criticism Seymour's speeches were marked by patriotism, good temper, reverence for the constitution and the laws, and

¹ Speeches at Cooper Institute, New York, Oct. 13, Brooklyn Acad. of Music, Oct. 22, Public Record of H. Seymour (N. Y. 1868).

respect for the constituted authorities. What was still more noteworthy was the moderation he displayed in his victory.¹ Sturdy and thoughtful Democrats had been irritated indeed by a proclamation of the President two days after the edict of emancipation (September 24), which gave the authority of an executive decree to Stanton's arbitrary orders, created the new offences² of "discouraging enlistments" and "any disloyal practice," ordered that such offenders and those who afforded "aid and comfort to the rebels" should be "subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military commissions," and for persons arrested on these charges suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*.³ This proclamation applied to the whole country, and supplemented with the machinery instituted by the Secretary of War for its enforcement, was the assumption of authority exercised by an absolute monarch.⁴ On the part of the President of the United States it was a usurpation of power, for which the military necessity was not as cogent as for the edict of emancipation: indeed it is not surprising that it gave currency to an opinion that he intended "to suppress free discussion of political subjects."⁵ As it was not promulgated until after the Democrats had held their conventions, it is difficult to trace the effect it had on the elections, but it was probably not so potent a factor in the success of the opposition as the edict of freedom.⁶

¹ See his speech of Nov. 6. He was elected governor by a majority of 10,752.

² In this remark I have followed Benjamin R. Curtis in his pamphlet on Executive Power.

³ This was undoubtedly to set at rest questions which had been raised in different courts whether the Secretary of War had by delegated authority the right to suspend the writ. This proclamation is printed in Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 239.

⁴ Joel Parker, Professor in the Harvard Law School, asked the people of Massachusetts, "Do you not perceive that the President is not only a monarch, but that his is an absolute, irresponsible, uncontrollable government; a perfect military despotism?" — Boston *Courier*, Nov. 1.

⁵ Curtis's pamphlet.

⁶ My authorities for this account other than those already mentioned are

Benjamin R. Curtis as Supreme Judge had answered with common sense and justice the reasoning of Taney in the Dred Scott decision, which was a juridical manifestation of the arrogance of slavery's advocates.¹ He now published a pamphlet entitled "Executive Power,"² part of which was a strong argument to show that the President had no constitutional right to issue the edict of freedom. Of the later proclamation (that of September 24) he said in substance: The President has made himself a legislator, he has enacted penal laws governing the citizens of the United States, has erected tribunals and created offices to enforce his penal edicts upon citizens, he has superadded to his *rights* as commander the powers of a usurper: "and that is military despotism." He can use the authority, which he has assumed, to make himself the absolute master of our lives, our liberties, and our property, with power to delegate his mastership to such satraps as he may select or as may be imposed on his credulity or his fears.³ This pamphlet, owing to the high stand-

Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1862; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv.; War Department Archives, MS.; Report of Secretary of War, Dec. 2; Debate in Senate and House, 3d sess., 37th Cong., 1862-63; *Tribune Almanac*; O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 473, 489; Columbus (Ohio) *Crisis*, July 9, Aug. 20, Sept. 24, Oct. 22, 29, Nov. 12, 19; Boston *Advertiser* of Nov. 6, 7; Boston *Courier*, Nov. 6; N. Y. *World*, Oct. 17, Nov. 5, 6, 24, 25, 29; N. Y. *Times*, Nov. 7, *Tribune*, Nov. 6, 7, *Eve. Post*, Nov. 5, *Herald*, Oct. 16, Nov. 6; Chicago *Tribune*, Nov. 6; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i.; S. S. Cox, Three Decades; Marshall, American Bastile; Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, vols. i., ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. chap. i. Sumner to Bright, Oct. 28: "The old Democracy are rallying against the proclamation." — Pierce, vol. iv. p. 106. John Sherman to Gen. Sherman, Nov. 16: "The people were dissatisfied at the conduct and results of the war. . . . No doubt the wanton and unnecessary use of power to arrest without trial and the ill-timed proclamation contributed to the general result." — Sherman Letters, p. 167. On the arrest of Olds, see Columbus despatch to Cincinnati *Commercial*, Aug. 13, Lancaster (Ohio) *Eagle*, cited in Columbus *Crisis*, Aug. 20; O. R., iii. ii. 761, 765, 786.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 257.

² It appeared Oct. 18. Little, Brown & Co. were the publishers.

³ Pp. 23, 30. See, also, p. 16. This pamphlet is printed in the *Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis*, vol. ii. p. 306.

ing of its author, attracted the attention of the President, the Secretary of War, of jurists from Massachusetts to Wisconsin, and of thinking men in this country and England,¹ but it did not apparently have a profound and enduring effect on public opinion. That the country finally sustained the anti-slavery policy of the President, when enforced by military success, is a fact in accord with the natural development of Northern sentiment. That the protests against the arbitrary arrests lacked energy and persistence, that the infringements upon the bill of rights of the Constitution were not actively resisted, is explicable only by the confidence the people had in Abraham Lincoln; for, while there was at this time much distrust of his ability and firmness, his honesty was unquestioned. That he had assumed unwarranted powers might be true; but that he had done this with regret, that he was no Cæsar or Napoleon and sought no self-aggrandizement, that he had in his own loyal and unselfish nature a check to the excessive use of absolute power, was then almost as clear to his friends and opponents as it is now to the student of his character and acts. The Democrats might protest that we were no longer a free people, that we could not with safety criticise the acts of the President, yet criticism went on; and while some of the arrests were undoubted outrages, Democratic citizens submitted, not so much because they were overawed by force as because they knew that the ruler whom they called a despot was really "Honest old Abe." Indeed, there was a real majority of the people who were impatient too of the law's delay, and gave the President in the exercise of these extraordinary powers their faithful and earnest though unexpressed support. Men may have held the faith that the tyrant desired by Plato had appeared, — a tyrant who was tem-

¹ Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, vol. i. p. 350 *et seq.*; Theophilus Parsons, Professor in Harvard Law School, in Boston *Advertiser*, Oct. 24; Chief Justice Dixon in giving the unanimous opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1862, p. 514.

perate, quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; like the Athenian, they may have said, if some happy chance brings to our President a great general, God has done all that he can ever do for our State.¹

¹ If "some happy chance brings them [the tyrant and a great legislator] together . . . God has done all," etc. — *Laws*, book iv.

CHAPTER XIX

WHEN the President ordered Halleck to Washington, Grant succeeded him in command of all of the forces in West Tennessee and Mississippi, but it was on Buell and his Army of the Ohio that devolved the offensive movement which the government desired to have made in the West. Ever present in Lincoln's mind was the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee, whose sufferings and whose claims were constantly pressed upon his attention. To impracticable projects of invasion ¹ had succeeded a plan, not only feasible,² if the force were adequate, but one which promised great military as well as political advantage. Such was the proposed capture of Chattanooga, a railroad centre of consequence, the key to East Tennessee, a strategic position for offensive operations east and south, and almost as important for the West as Richmond for the East. This became the objective point of Buell's campaign. Alive to the advantages to be gained, the President and Secretary of War did not appreciate the obstacles and the force requisite for the movement. Their misapprehension arose probably from the idea that as the Confederates had abandoned Corinth, they would make no effort to save Chattanooga, although its situation within its mountain fastnesses invited them to strenuous exertion. Buell's offensive movement came to nothing. He had been put to a herculean undertaking and had been hampered by Halleck, who, while still in the West, had dictated to him a line of supply and communication which was against his own

¹ See p. 12, especially note 1.

² Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 385.

better judgment and proved very difficult to maintain.¹ In July complaints of his slowness came from Washington. After the cavalry raid of John H. Morgan through Kentucky had given rise in southern Ohio to fears of an invasion, which, owing to the low water in the Ohio River, would have been an easy undertaking, the administration became so dissatisfied with him that they asked Halleck to recommend some officer to take his place.² In the correspondence at this time Buell shows the courtesy, dignity, and ability of a soldier. "It is difficult to satisfy impatience," he said in one despatch, "and when it proceeds from anxiety, as I know it does in this case, I am not disposed to complain of it. My advance has not been rapid, but it could not be more rapid under the circumstances. I know I have not been idle nor indifferent."³ His words and his action draw us to him in the sympathy which is due the man who, with an eye single to his duty, suffers misconstruction and injustice from his superiors. A despatch of Halleck, which we may be sure did not originate with him but simply reduced to words the meaning of Lincoln and Stanton, discloses the straits into which our great democracy had come in the process of learning the lessons of war under the discipline of misfortune. To General Horatio G. Wright, for whom the government in its policy of dividing authority had created a new department which encroached on Buell's, he said: "The President and Secretary of War are greatly displeased with the slow movements of General Buell. Unless he does something very soon, I think he will be removed. Indeed it would have been done before now if I had not begged to give him a little more time. There must be more energy and activity in Kentucky and Tennessee, and the one who first does something brilliant will get the entire command. I therefore hope to hear very soon of some success in your

¹ See Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. pp. 385, 388.

² "I have replied that I know of no more capable officer than yourself to recommend." — Halleck to Buell, Washington, Aug. 12, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 314.

³ To Halleck, Aug. 6, *ibid.*, p. 266.

department. I can hardly describe to you the feeling of disappointment here in the want of activity in General Buell's large army. The Government seems determined to apply the guillotine to all unsuccessful generals. It seems rather hard to do this where the general is not in fault, but perhaps with us now, as in the French Revolution, some harsh measures are required."¹

Before Wright or Buell could do "something brilliant," they were thrown upon the defensive by an aggressive movement of the Confederates directed northward through Tennessee into Kentucky. Bragg and Kirby Smith, encouraged by the defeat of McClellan before Richmond and the inaction of Halleck's grand army,² were operating in concert in an effort to retrieve the Confederate losses in the West.³ Bragg, who was the chief, had the same idea about the effect of an invasion into Kentucky, that Lee entertained of the advance into Maryland. He thought that the people would rise in his favor, and accordingly took with him 20,000 stand of arms for the Kentucky recruits he expected to enlist. Kirby Smith left Knoxville, marched into Kentucky, defeated the Union force which opposed him,⁴ and occupied Lexington, the home of Henry Clay and the centre of the Blue-grass region, the garden of the State. "The loss of Lexington," telegraphed Governor Morton of Indiana to the Secretary of War, "is the loss of the heart of Kentucky and leaves the road open to the Ohio River."⁵ Smith's army threatened Cincinnati and Louisville, causing great alarm.⁶ In Cincinnati martial law was declared, liquor shops were closed, all business was ordered to be suspended, every man who could fight or work was commanded to assemble at his voting place for the purpose of drill or labor. The street cars ceased to run, and long lines of men were drilled in the streets, among them

¹ Aug. 25, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 421.

² See vol. iii. p. 628.

³ Ibid., p. 598.

⁴ Aug. 30.

⁵ Sept. 2, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 475.

⁶ These circumstances were alluded to in the previous chapter.

prominent citizens, ministers, and judges, many beyond the age of forty-five. A newspaper alleged to be disloyal was suppressed. Tod, the governor of Ohio, hastened to Cincinnati, and called out for military service all the loyal men of the river counties. Meanwhile Kirby Smith pushed a detachment within a few miles of the city. Consternation reigned. Bells were rung in the early morning to summon men to arms, and hundreds of laborers were put to work in the trenches. Women were asked to prepare lint and bandages for the approaching battle. The war has come home to us, was the thought of all. The alarm spread through the State. The call of the governor for all the armed Minutemen met with a prompt response, and thousands with double-barrelled shot-guns and squirrel-rifles, known henceforward as Squirrel-hunters, poured into the city. The friction between Louisville and Cincinnati over the question which was in the more imminent danger and which should receive the greater attention, became intense. Frantic appeals were made to the President and Halleck to stop the withdrawal from Louisville of troops which had been ordered to Cincinnati by General Wright. Fortunately the Confederates did not deem themselves strong enough to attack either city. Before Smith could venture on further offensive operations he must await the junction of Bragg; and much to Cincinnati's relief he ordered the threatening detachment to withdraw.¹

Bragg, having crossed the Tennessee River at Chattanooga, began, August 28, his march northward over Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland Mountains. Keeping to the east of Buell, he went through middle Tennessee unmolested, and on September 13 reached Glasgow in Kentucky. Buell, who had concentrated his army at Murfreesborough, followed. It now became a race between the two for Louisville, and Bragg, who had the shorter line of march, got ahead and placed

¹ The order is dated Sept. 11. The withdrawal became known to Lew. Wallace, the general commanding at Covington, the 12th — O. R., vol. xvi part ii. pp. 511, 812.

himself between Buell and the city. It is thought that if he had pressed on vigorously he might have captured it. Kirby Smith suggested a combined attack. "Louisville," he wrote, "is in my opinion the great point to be arrived at, and the destruction of the force now there can, I think, be accomplished without difficulty."¹ Buell, cut off from telegraph and railroad communication with the North, thought that the city was certainly in danger.² Robinson, the governor of the State, John J. Crittenden, and Senator Garrett Davis united in a telegram to Halleck. "The fate of Kentucky," they said, "is hanging in the balance, and the army of Buell is in imminent peril."³ But Bragg lingered. He threw away time in the capture of the Union garrison at Munfordville, a success that by no means compensated for the delay. Then, overawed perhaps by the magnitude of his enterprise, he lost heart and would not press forward. Buell came up in his rear. The two armies confronted each other, and, while each commander was willing to fight if he had the advantage of position, neither would risk attacking the other on his chosen ground. It was a contest in manœuvring. Buell feared that defeat would result in the fall of Louisville; Bragg, the serious crippling of his army. Both were short of supplies. Reduced to three days' rations, Bragg turned aside from the direct road north and marched to Bardstown. The way was left open for Buell; he moved rapidly to Louisville.

The Confederate campaign into Kentucky, like that into Maryland, had failed, and mainly for the same reason. Kentucky preferred the Union to the Southern Confederacy. Bragg had been informed by her senators and representatives in the Confederate Congress that a large majority of the people of the State sympathized with the South, and that the young men in a multitude would join his army.⁴ In this belief he issued a high-sounding proclamation. "Kentuck-

¹ Sept. 15, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 830; see, also, pp. 846, 850, 856, 859, 861.

² Sept. 14, *ibid.*, p. 516.

³ Sept. 19, *ibid.*, p. 529.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 771.

ians," he said, "I offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler."¹ Eleven days sufficed to dispel the illusion that he would be regarded as a liberator. September 25 he wrote from Bardstown to Richmond: "I regret to say we are sadly disappointed at the want of action by our friends in Kentucky. We have so far received no accession to this army. General Smith has secured about a brigade, — not half our losses by casualties of different kinds. We have 15,000 stand of arms² and no one to use them. Unless a change occurs soon, we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky to its cupidity. The love of ease and fear of pecuniary loss are the fruitful sources of this evil."³

September 25 Buell arrived in Louisville, insuring the safety of the city. So dissatisfied had been the administration with his slowness, to which they attributed largely the invasion of Kentucky and the threatened danger to Cincinnati and Louisville, so anxious had they been lest their nursing policy of this border slave State should be set at naught through military incompetence, that they determined on his removal from the head of the army. September 24 orders displacing him and giving the command to George H. Thomas were made out and sent to the army in charge of an aide-de-camp. Three days later, when the safety of Louisville was assured, the administration repented of the step, and Halleck telegraphed the aide not to deliver these orders; but this despatch and a subsequent one failed to reach him before the orders had been handed respectively to Buell and to Thomas. The circumstance is notable inasmuch as it gave

¹ Sept. 14, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 822.

² In his report of Oct. 12, he said: "With ample means to arm 20,000 men . . . we have not yet issued half the arms left us by casualties incident to the campaign." — *Ibid.*, part i. p. 1088.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 876. When Kirby Smith was in the mountains of Kentucky, he wrote that the people were universally hostile, but he had better expectations from the blue-grass region (pp. 776, 780). As he advanced northward, many of the inhabitants fled before him. Sept. 18 he wrote from Lexington: The hearts of the Kentuckians "are evidently with us, but their blue-grass and fat-grass are against us" (p. 846).

Thomas an opportunity to show his loyalty to his chief by asking respectfully that he be retained in command, and as it brought forth a vigorous protest from prominent Union citizens of Kentucky, asserting that "General Buell has in a very high degree the confidence of this State and of the army."¹ Halleck had already suspended the order of removal.²

Buell had gone to work reorganizing his force, intermixing with his veterans the raw soldiers who had assembled for the defence of Louisville. October 1 he left the city with about 58,000 men in pursuit of the enemy, whose available forces were not far from the same number. Bragg himself had proceeded to Lexington to confer with Kirby Smith. Issuing orders for the movement of their troops, the two generals went to Frankfort, the capital, to assist in the farce of inaugurating the Confederate provisional governor of Kentucky. Buell meanwhile hunted for their army. The roads in this part of the State were good, but there had been a drought for several weeks and the Union soldiers suffered from the dust, the prevailing heat, and the lack of water. The battle of Perryville (October 8) was in the beginning a fight on their part for the possession of some pools of water, which resulted in a hot engagement. Both generals claimed the day. Misfortune attended Buell or he might have obtained a signal victory.³ He did not receive word that his left wing was sustaining a severe attack until four o'clock in the afternoon, when the battle had been on several hours, and, although his headquarters were but two and a half miles distant, the sound of the musketry firing was broken by the uneven configuration of the ground and by the heavy wind, and did not reach him. He had not expected a general en-

¹ Signed by J. J. Crittenden, Garrett Davis, R. Mallory, G. W. Dunlap. Davis was United States senator; the other three were representatives from Kentucky. "The balance of advantage was on October 1 decidedly with the Federals." — Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 405.

² The correspondence will be found in O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 538 *et seq.*

³ See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 409.

gagement until the next morning, and, when the news of the fighting was finally brought to him, there was not left sufficient daylight for him to make the dispositions that might have prevented the action from being a disappointment to him and to the people of the North. The next day Bragg fell back, and soon afterwards took up his march southward. Buell's pursuit was not vigorous. He failed to overtake the Confederates and bring them to battle, but he drove them out of Kentucky.¹

"I congratulate you and all concerned in your recent battles and victories," telegraphed Lincoln, October 8, to Grant, referring to the repulse of the Confederates' attack on Corinth² (October 3, 4) in the Department of Tennessee, which was under the command of Grant. This was a diversion in favor of Bragg to prevent reinforcements from being sent to Buell.³ The fighting had been directed by W. S. Rosecrans, for neither duty nor any exigency had called Grant to Corinth. As Grant had not emerged from the cloud which had obscured him since Shiloh,⁴ this victory brought Rosecrans before the government and the public as the possible great general looked for.⁵

"The rapid march of your army from Louisville, and your victory at Perryville," telegraphed Halleck to Buell, "has

¹ My authorities for this account are the reports of Buell, Bragg, McCook, Rousseau, and Sheridan, the findings of the Buell commission and accompanying documents, O. R., vol. xvi. part i.; the Correspondence in part ii.; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi.; W. M. Polk, Life of Leonidas Polk, vol. ii.; Fry, The Army under Buell; J. D. Cox's review of the same, *The Nation*, Oct. 2, 1884; Cist, The Army of the Cumberland; Van Horne, The Army of the Cumberland; articles of Wheeler, Buell, and Gilbert, Century War Book, vol. iii.; Shaler, Kentucky; Moore, Reb. Rec., vol. v.; Pollard, Second Year of the War; Davis, Confederate Government.

² Corinth was in Mississippi. See vol. iii. p. 628.

³ Grant had already sent Buell two divisions, which reached him Sept. 1-12. — O. R., vol. xvi. part i. p. 37.

⁴ See vol. iii. p. 627.

⁵ O. R., vol. xvii. part i. p. 154 *et seq.*; Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. i. chap. xxix.; Grant to E. B. Washburne, Nov. 7, Grant letters edited by Wilson, p. 22.

given great satisfaction to the government.”¹ In the same despatch he was urged to drive the enemy from East Tennessee. The next day the injunction, which was evidently put in Lincoln’s own words, was more emphatic: “The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy’s resources; make it the heart of yours. Your army can live there if the enemy’s can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper, and levying contributions where necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable. Once between the enemy and Nashville there will be no serious difficulty in reopening your communications with that place. He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals.”²

The plan of living upon the country, although a favorite notion of the President, the Secretary of War, and the people of the North, was visionary. Lee could not do it in the rich country of Maryland, which before his invasion had been traversed by neither army. Bragg could not live in the blue-grass region of Kentucky when he had to concentrate his troops to confront Buell. “Why not . . . pursue the enemy into Mississippi, supporting your army on the country?” asked Halleck of Grant after the battle of Corinth. Grant, who never invented obstacles, promptly replied, “An army cannot subsist itself on the country except in forage;”³ and for good military reasons no system was desirable which should promote pillage in the smallest degree.⁴

¹ Oct. 18, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 623.

² Oct. 19, *ibid.*, p. 626. The internal evidence that the language is Lincoln’s is confirmed by the inclusion of this despatch, although signed by Halleck, in the Complete Works of Lincoln edited by Nicolay and Hay.

³ Oct. 8, O. R., vol. xvii. part i. p. 156.

⁴ On the pillage of Napoleon in his Italian campaign and its effect, see Lanfrey, tome i. pp. 83–85, 95, 96.

Buell was asked to live upon a country which had been supporting Confederate armies most of the summer and early autumn, in the face of a hostile force equal to his own. The thing was impossible, but the President had made up his mind that it ought to be tried. Therefore the common-sense, intelligent, and logical answer of Buell¹ to his despatch must have been unsatisfactory if not irritating, and was probably interpreted as an excuse for slowness, a subterfuge to avoid incurring a fair military risk. Yet this would not of itself have caused the removal of the general, for the despatches make it clear that his fate hung for some hours in the balance. The additional influence necessary to turn the scale was furnished by Oliver P. Morton, governor of Indiana.

Morton was the ablest and most energetic of the war governors of the Western States. Since the national administration had been from the first dependent on the State machinery for furnishing troops and to some extent for their equipment, the governors of the Northern States were larger factors in the conduct of the war than is easily made to appear in a history where the aim is to secure unity in the narration of crowded events. Owing to the location of his State and the bitterness of the Democratic opposition, no governor had so many obstacles to surmount, and no one threw himself into the contest with more vigor and pertinacity. Wishing to see displayed in military affairs the same force which he put into the administration of his State, he made no secret of his contempt for the generalship of Buell, whom he even charged in his communications with Washington with being "a rebel sympathizer." Morton was personally incorrupt, but selected his coadjutors from the vulgar and the shifty, making his test of fitness for civil and military office personal devotion and unscrupulous obedience to himself rather than honesty and high character. He and Buell became enemies, and he held

¹ Oct. 22, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 636; see Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 413.

it a duty to his country as well as an offering to his self-interest to crush the man whom he could not use.¹

October 21 Governor Morton telegraphed the President: "Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee. . . . The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small portion of ours. Sufficient time was thus gained by the enemy to enable them to escape. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction. In the Northwest distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of the people."²

Morton was backed by Governors Tod and Yates,³ whom Buell had offended by his lack of tact. The general was a strict disciplinarian, and lacked popularity with his soldiers, who were volunteers largely from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. There was an interaction of opinion between the soldiers in the field and the people at home, so that the private letters written from the army and the editorials in the influential newspapers of the West were at one in their criticisms of him. All these manifestations of public opinion could not be disregarded by Lincoln. He craved popular support, and knew that the war could not go on long without it. Andrew Johnson, military governor of Tennessee, whose sturdy patriotism and brutal energy gave him influence with the President, was earnest for the displacement of Buell, while Stanton had been urging it for two months. The general himself had with magnanimity written that if it were deemed best to change the command of the army, now was a convenient time to do it.⁴ It is little wonder, then, that the President gave the word for his removal.⁵ Rosecrans was placed in command

¹ J. D. Cox on Buell, *The Nation*, Oct. 2, 1864; *The Army under Buell*, Fry; *Warden's Chase*, pp. 496, 498; *Appleton's Cyclopædia of American Biography*.

² O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 634.

³ Of Ohio and Illinois.

⁴ Oct. 16.

⁵ The orders were issued Oct. 24. See the correspondence, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. ; also proceedings in the Buell commission, part i ; Hollister, *Life of*

of the force, which now becomes known as the Army of the Cumberland.

The action of Rosecrans was a tribute to Buell's sagacity. Halleck urged him "to take and hold East Tennessee."¹ It was impossible. He concentrated his troops at Nashville, a movement which the General-in-Chief had warned Buell not to make.² In thirty-five days from his assumption of command, the government became impatient at his delay. December 4 Halleck telegraphed him, "If you remain one more week at Nashville, I cannot prevent your removal."³ Rosecrans replied immediately: I am trying to do "my whole duty. . . . To threats of removal or the like . . . I am insensible."⁴ He did not move from Nashville for twenty-two days, not until his preparations were complete, and he was not displaced. There is no reason whatever to believe that in the substitution of Rosecrans for Buell, aught was gained toward the capture of Chattanooga or the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee.

The scene changes to the banks of the Potomac, the leading actor is McClellan, the action is much the same: the general did not take the aggressive promptly enough to satisfy the President and the people of the North. Among radical spirits prevailed distrust of the future, which in a private letter of Sydney Howard Gay, the managing editor of the New York *Tribune*, finds apt expression. "Smalley,"⁵ he wrote, "has come back,⁶ and his notion is that it is to be quiet along the Potomac for some time to come. George [McClellan], whom Providence helps according to his nature, has got himself on one side of a ditch [the Potomac River], which Provi-

Colfax, p. 199 ; J. D. Cox and Fry, hitherto cited. The injustice to Buell did not end with his removal. See remarks of Cox and Fry on the Buell commission and Buell's subsequent career. "I think Buell had genius enough for the highest commands." — Grant, J. R. Young, *Around the World with Gen. Grant*, vol. ii. p. 289.

¹ Oct. 24, O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. p. 640.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xx. part ii. p. 118.

⁵ George W.

² *Ibid.*, p. 638.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶ From the army.

dence had already made for him, with the enemy on the other, and has no idea of moving. Wooden-head [Halleck] at Washington will never think of sending a force through the mountains to attack Lee in the rear, so the two armies will watch each other for nobody knows how many weeks, and we shall have the poetry of war with pickets drinking from the same stream, holding friendly converse and sending newspapers across by various ingenious contrivances." ¹ October 1 Lincoln went to see McClellan, remained with the army three days, and as a result of the conferences and observations of his visit, issued through Halleck, after his return to Washington, the following order: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible." ²

While giving his army the rest it needed, McClellan had begun the work of reorganization and the drilling of the new recruits. His native aptitude in matters of detail now commenced to spy out defects in equipment and to remedy them, to send complaints to Washington, and to clamor for shoes, blankets, clothing, and camp equipage. The correspondence between the army and Washington is unpleasant reading. It goes to the extent of mutual recrimination between Halleck

¹ Sept. 25, to A. S. Hill, Hill papers, MS. On the disposition of pickets to fraternize, see Walker, 2d Army corps, p. 127; N. P. Hallowell, Memorial Day address, May 30, 1896, pamphlet; also Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, Comm. iii. cap. xix. As to Chase's dissatisfaction, see Warden, pp. 484, 485.

² Oct. 6, O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 10. McClellan at first decided to adopt the line of the Shenandoah. This was what Lee desired him to do. Oct. 22 he changed his plan to moving on the interior line, and began the movement Oct. 26. — Ibid., p. 11; part ii. pp. 464, 626.

and McClellan. One is surprised that this exchange of acrimonious despatches, this working at cross purposes, should have continued when the two were less than a day's journey apart and both had efficient subordinates, Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, and Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac. The prime cause of the disagreement was McClellan's procrastination. An energetic general would have made the best of his deficiencies, and, reflecting that the Confederates were worse off in every respect, would have moved boldly forward.¹ "The men cannot march without shoes"² seems to be the summing up of McClellan's reasons for delay. Making due allowance for the higher standard of comfort which ought to have obtained and did obtain among Union soldiers, the contrast between the Army of the Potomac refusing shoes because the sizes were too large³ and the plaintive utterance of Lee to Davis, "The number of barefooted men is daily increasing, and it pains me to see them limping over the rocky roads,"⁴ is significant of the difference between the two commanders, — the one ready to undertake any operation with insufficient means, the other aiming at an "ideal completeness of preparation."

The impatience of the country at the army's inaction was becoming intense. To prevent the people of the North from growing weary of the contest, to convince Europe that there was a prospect of the end of the war, and to guard against an interference of France and England, who were eager to get cotton, Lincoln felt that he had great need of victories in the field. This yearning, tempered by a common-sense view of means and chances, bursts out in a letter to McClellan which was "in no sense an order," and which cannot in fairness be compared to "the meddling interference" of the Vienna Aulic Council in the Napoleonic Wars.⁵

¹ See Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 436.

² McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 11, O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 633.

⁵ See Sloane's *Napoleon*, vol. i. pp. 263, 266; vol. ii. pp. 105, 236.

"MY DEAR SIR,— You remember my speaking to you," he wrote, "of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? . . . Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. . . . Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. . . . If he should . . . move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him; fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say 'try;' if we never try we shall never succeed. . . . We should not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond."¹

McClellan complained that he could not advance because he was short of horses for his cavalry; then disease attacked them, and those which remained sound were broken down by fatigue. The much-enduring Lincoln thought of Stuart's cavalry raid around the Union army,² and the ineffectual pursuit by the Federal troopers, and, irritated because he believed that McClellan conjured up difficulties, sent this sharp inquiry: "I have just read your despatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what

¹ Oct. 13, O. R., vol. xix. part 1. p. 13.

² Oct. 9-12. Especially discreditable to McClellan because the raid was made on Union territory. "It is disgraceful that Stuart's cavalry are this morning in possession of Chambersburg." — Chase, Oct. 11, Schuckers, p. 382.

the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"¹ While the correspondence on the part of the general remains respectful, the acerbity of the President does not abate, and makes it evident that if the army had not then commenced the advance he would have borne no longer with McClellan.²

October 26 the army, 116,000 strong, began to cross the Potomac, and six days later the last division was over. The Confederates fell back. Longstreet's corps, accompanied by Lee, marched to Culpeper Court-House, while Jackson remained in the Shenandoah valley.³ November 7 the Union army was massed near Warrenton. Lincoln had determined that if McClellan permitted Lee to cross the Blue Ridge and take position between Richmond and the Army of the Potomac, he would remove him from command.⁴ When he heard that Lee had accomplished this movement, he relieved McClellan and appointed Burnside the general of the army.⁵

It is not surprising that McClellan was relieved, but it is no less true that his removal was a mistake. Had there been a general of better ability to take his place, the President's action could be justified.⁶ Chase, fertile in military suggestions, had at different times proposed Hooker, Sumner, Burnside, and Sherman for the command, any one of whom in his opinion would do the work better than McClellan.⁷ Age and infirmity, if no other reason, put Sumner out of the question.⁸

¹ O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 485.

² See despatch of Oct. 27, *ibid.*, p. 497.

³ Longstreet and Jackson had been made lieutenant-generals, and their commands called respectively the 1st and 2d corps.

⁴ John Hay's *Diary*, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 188.

⁵ This order is dated Nov. 5. It reached Burnside and McClellan two days later. — O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 545; McClellan's *Own Story*, p. 660.

⁶ "McClellan ought not to have been removed unless the Government were prepared to put in his place some officer whom they knew to be at least his equal in military capacity. This assuredly was not the case at this moment." — Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 442.

⁷ Warden, pp. 460, 492.

⁸ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 130. Grant said, "A successful general needs health and youth and energy. I should not like to put a general

Had Sherman been the Sherman of 1864, his fitness would have indicated him for the place, but now it were better for him to remain in the West rather than to be elevated to a position on which so much depended and from which so much was expected. Burnside and Hooker were tried, and the army met with two crushing defeats such as it would never have suffered under its loved commander. It is worthy of note that Grant was not suggested.

We have no right to judge the President by our knowledge of the event, but even on turning back to the time itself, we may easily see that the substitution of Burnside for McClellan can in no wise be defended. Burnside had given no proof of his fitness, had refused the place twice, and had told the President and Secretary of War over and over again that he was not competent to command so large an army, and that McClellan was the best general for the position.¹ His removal was indeed ill-timed. He had shown at Antietam that he could take the offensive and check the almost invincible Lee; since crossing the Potomac he had made a swift march and was troubling his adversary;² he now had his army equipped and well in hand; and he retained in the fullest degree the love and devotion of his soldiers. With the frankness which distinguishes Lincoln, he seemed to admit nineteen days after he had signed the order for the removal of McClellan that he had made a mistake. "I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan," he wrote Carl Schurz; "but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add that I have seen little since to relieve those fears."³

in the field over fifty." — J. R. Young, *Around the World with Gen. Grant*, vol. ii. p. 353. Sumner was sixty-five.

¹ C. W., part i. p. 650.

² "The march from the Potomac at Berlin to Warrenton . . . was a magnificent spectacle of celerity and skill." — Report of Rufus Ingalls, O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 96. McClellan "is also moving more rapidly than usual, and it looks like a real advance." — Lee to Davis, Nov. 6, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 698. But see Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 446.

³ Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 258.

I shall not take issue with those who aver that McClellan would never have brought the war to a close. It was not Fabius¹ but Scipio who overcame Hannibal, and Grant was needed to crush Lee. "Few men," writes General Cox, "could excel McClellan in strictly defensive operations. . . . He was . . . often compared to Marshal Daun, whose fair ability but studiously defensive policy was so in contrast with the daring strategy of the great Frederick. The comparison was a fair one. The trouble was that we had need of a Frederick."² It may be added that the other side had the Frederick, and until we had developed an aggressive general it were well to hold fast to our Daun.³

In a democracy it is probably inevitable that politics should be brought into military affairs. Public opinion of McClellan and Buell turned therefore on their attitude towards slavery. These generals were conservatives, and their friends were among the conservative Republicans and the Democrats. When a man was heard denouncing them, he was sure to be a radical. Of course the radicals would have welcomed signal military success at the hands of McClellan and Buell,⁴ but as this success was not forthcoming they persistently minimized their achievements and the difficulties that stood in

¹ But Ennius wrote: "Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem."

² Reminiscences, MS. Carlyle thus speaks of Daun: "A man that for caution and slowness could make no use of his victory." "The angry Vienna people [said to Daun] 'you loitered and haggled in your usual way.'" "A man slow to resolve and seeking his luck in leisure."

³ "Let military critics or political enemies say what they will, he who could so move upon the hearts of a great army as the wind sways long rows of standing corn, was no ordinary man; nor was he who took such heavy toll of Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee an ordinary soldier." — Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 138. "There are strong grounds for believing that McClellan was the best commander the Army of the Potomac ever had. . . . While the Confederacy was young and fresh and rich, and its armies were numerous, he fought a good, wary, damaging, respectable fight against it." — Palfrey, p. 135.

⁴ Joseph Medill, editor of the *Chicago Tribune* and a representative radical of the West, wrote A. S. Hill, Sept. 20: "McClellan's star is in the ascendant. Let him go ahead. I am willing to accept *success* at the hands of any general." — Hill papers, MS.

their way. While McClellan believed that the war would result in the destruction of slavery, he thought the President's proclamation premature,¹ and his order calling the attention of his army to it shows only a grudging compliance with the great edict.² Lincoln was too wise to rate a man's military talent by his political opinions, and he was sincere when on the day of McClellan's displacement he wrote in a private letter, "in considering military merit, the world has abundant evidence that I disregard politics."³

Expressions of hostility to the administration were common at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, and these at times assumed the color of treason. Officers and citizens assured McClellan that the devotion of the army would enable him to dominate the situation. While he was too true a patriot to do anything that was questionable, he was nevertheless so influenced by the conviction that the government had not shown him the gratitude and consideration which was his due that he did not rebuke these suggestions as a general subject to the civil power ought to have done. His enemies, in their pressure on the President for his removal, undoubtedly made the most of the reports of this factious hostility. The opposition of the radicals was intensified by the hold he had on the Democrats of the country. Some of the Democratic conventions had expressed by resolution their trust in him,⁴ and he began to be spoken of as their candidate for the presidency. There is no evidence that he maintained other than a passive attitude toward these political advances. His famous letter from Harrison's Landing was no partisan manifesto: indeed, until after his removal it had been seen only by the President and a few intimates of the White House. Its contents had not been imparted to his political

¹ J. D. Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS.

² O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 395.

³ *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 252; see, also, his letter to Schurz, p. 258.

⁴ *Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1862, pp. 557, 564, 565; Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 17, 1862, *British Blue Book*.

friends.¹ He loved a soldier's life, and cared more for military distinction than any other; he felt grieved at his removal.

We part with McClellan the soldier with regret. He was a gentleman of high character. No orgies disgraced his headquarters.² If his promotion had not been so rapid, less would have been expected of him, and he would perhaps have been able to fill the measure of anticipation.³

With unfeigned grief, with sinking hearts, with expressions of love and devotion, the officers and soldiers of the army bade farewell to McClellan. Burnside accepted the command with great reluctance. Had he simply been asked to take it, he would have refused; but the promotion coming in the shape of an order, he deemed it his duty to obey.⁴ Would the President thus have forced on any general a command which he had declared repeatedly that he was incompetent to wield, had it not been for a weighty precedent significant of the modesty of the American soldier? "I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with," declared Washington to the Congress that had made him commander-in-chief of the American army. The parallel can go no further. Whether unconsciously or not we measure Burnside's first steps by his disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg, it

¹ McClellan's Own Story, p. 489. The note by the editor is supported by the fact that this letter is not mentioned in the contemporary literature.

² Palfrey, p. 134.

³ Grant after his presidency thus expressed himself of McClellan: "I have entire confidence in McClellan's loyalty and patriotism. But the test which was applied to him would be terrible to any man, being made a major-general at the beginning of the war. It has always seemed to me that the critics of McClellan do not consider this vast and cruel responsibility—the war, a new thing to all of us, the army new, everything to do from the outset, with a restless people and Congress. McClellan was a young man when this devolved upon him, and if he did not succeed, it was because the conditions of success were so trying. If McClellan had gone into the war as Sherman, Thomas, or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high distinction as any of us."—J. R. Young, *Around the World with Gen. Grant*, vol. II. p. 216.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxi. p. 101.

seems that incompetence attends his every movement. The reason of the change of commanders demanded that he should take the offensive immediately. On this point he and the President were at one, although he did not believe in the plan exposed by Lincoln in his letter to McClellan of October 13,¹ but desired to advance on Richmond by the way of Fredericksburg. The President unwillingly relinquished his design, but in the end gave his assent to Burnside's plan.

A misunderstanding occurred between Burnside on one side, and Halleck and Meigs on the other, in reference to the celerity with which the army could be furnished with pontoons to effect their crossing of the Rappahannock River. The delay that ensued in the despatching of the pontoon trains, maintains the general, prevented his seizing the heights above Fredericksburg before their occupation by the enemy, and led to his defeat. Considering the lives and money at stake in large military operations, any one who had not discovered from previous study how costly it is for an industrial nation to learn the efficient management of war would be amazed, in reading the correspondence, reports, and testimony in this case, to note the lack of precision, the division of labor and responsibility, and the shifting of blame from one officer to another. It is repeatedly asserted that the failure of the campaign was due to delay in the arrival at the river of the pontoon trains. The truth is, that had everything in this respect worked as Burnside expected, he would not indeed have gone down at Fredericksburg, but would have had his columns shattered at the North Anna River, where Lee intended to retire had the Union army gained possession of the heights above Fredericksburg. The difference of capacity between Burnside and Lee, the determination of the Union general to attack the Confederates in any event, making an opportunity if the favorable one did not occur, allowed of no other result than defeat.

Some days were spent in marching. By the last week of November, Burnside with his army, 113,000 strong, was on the

¹ *Vide ante*, p. 187.


north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, and his pontoons had arrived. Lee was with Longstreet at Fredericksburg, Jackson being within easy distance. Lee had under his command 78,000 men. There was the usual manœuvring, in which Lee anticipated every move of his adversary with preparations to check it. The chance of a hoped-for surprise vanished; but Burnside, who had determined to fight, infused into his projects such impetuosity that the President, on visiting the army, was impelled to say a word of caution to him and to suggest a safer plan.¹ Lincoln's plan was rejected by both Halleck and Burnside, for the reason that it involved "too much waste of time,"² and the commander was left to his own devices, although, as the critical moment approached, he grew anxious and wished to submit to Washington for approval a detailed statement of his design.³ He proposed to cross the river and strike at the enemy in his chosen, strong position. No movement that was open to him could have given Lee greater satisfaction.

At Burnside's request the army had been divided into the Right, Centre, and Left grand divisions, under the command respectively of Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. December 11, in the teeth of opposition, the bridges were thrown over the river, and the next day Sumner and Franklin crossed, Hooker remaining on the north bank to give his support where it would most be needed. The pictures of Burnside on the evening of December 12 are those of a general bewildered in the undertaking of a larger enterprise than he had the ability and nerve to carry through. It is impossible to discover that he had a well-defined plan of operation. It is now pretty well agreed that the only chance of success lay in an attack in force by Franklin's grand division on Jackson's corps, which formed Lee's right. Jackson had a strong though by no means impregnable position. According to Dabney, he had

¹ Nov. 27, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 259.

² Ibid.

³ O. R., vol. xxi. p. 64.



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG
(From Atlas accompanying Official Records)

no intrenchments in his front, since he had occupied the ground only during the night and early morning preceding the battle.¹ Franklin and General William F. Smith² relate that about five o'clock in the afternoon of December 12 Burnside visited the left of his army and had a conference with them and John F. Reynolds.³ Franklin, fortified by a previous discussion in which Smith and Reynolds had agreed with him, urged Burnside to let him attack the enemy's right with a column of at least 30,000 at daylight the next day; he further recommended that to make the necessary dispositions and to get the aid needed from Hooker, the orders should be issued as early as possible. Burnside neither approved nor disapproved Franklin's suggestion, but promised him his directions before midnight. Franklin passed the night in "sleepless anxiety," waiting for the order from his general, which came at about seven in the morning,⁴ and was interpreted by him to direct that he should make an armed reconnaissance with one division, while Burnside's real meaning was that he should attack the enemy with one division well supported. The order was indeed ambiguous, and especially so if taken in connection with the conversation of the evening before. Franklin sent Meade's division to the attack. It gained the crest of the hill, but not being strongly enough supported, although several other divisions had been sent into action, was driven back. It is thought that if the onset had been made with a large force Lee's right would have been turned.

On Burnside's right was lost forever his reputation as a general. He determined "to seize" Marye's Heights — a hill, at the bottom of which was a stone wall, "strengthened by a trench" and "heavily lined with the enemy's infantry," while the crest "was crowned with batteries."⁵ Where

¹ Life of Jackson, p. 604.

² The commander of the Sixth Corps in Franklin's grand division.

³ The commander of the First Corps in Franklin's grand division.

⁴ Dec. 13. See Ropes's discussion of this order, Civil War, part ii. p. 460.

⁵ Humphrey's report.

there were not cannon in earthworks, there were rifle-pits filled with sharpshooters. Couch and Hancock had told Burnside that the heights were fortified and that it would be difficult to take them. This caused him irritation, but did not induce caution.¹ The day before the battle Couch sent Francis A. Walker of his staff to the commander, to tell him that the enemy would make a stand upon the hills in the rear of the town, "that a deep trench or canal ran around Fredericksburg, which would prove a serious obstacle to the passage of troops debouching from the town to assault the works on the hills behind." Nervousness and obstinacy caused Burnside, "the sweetest, kindest, most true-hearted of men, loving and lovable," to reply with asperity that "he himself had occupied Fredericksburg with the Ninth Corps the August before" — he knew the ground and Couch was mistaken.²

The order to be ready came in the early morning;³ the word of attack was received before noon. The Union soldiers advanced over the plain between the town and the stone wall, ground which Longstreet's superintendent of artillery said, "we cover so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."⁴ The canal interfered with their deployment, and the fire was therefore the more destructive. But generals and soldiers had their orders, and forward they went. No higher courage could be shown. Intelligent as brave, they felt their effort hopeless, yet did their very best to carry the stone wall. Hancock led a charge of 5000, and lost two out of every five of his veterans, of whom 156 were commissioned officers, "able and tried commanders."⁵ "Six times did the enemy," wrote Lee, "notwithstanding the havoc caused by our batteries, press on with great determination to within 100 yards of the foot of the hill, but here, encountering the deadly fire

¹ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 108.

² Walker, Second Army Corps, pp. 137, 155.

³ Dec. 13.

⁴ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 79.

⁵ Hancock's report.

of our infantry, his columns were broken.”¹ “Oh, great God!” cried Couch, “see how our men, our poor fellows, are falling.” “It is only murder now.”² “Fighting Joe Hooker,” who until that day had never seen fighting enough, felt that he could make no more impression upon the Confederate works than upon “the side of a mountain of rock.” Putting spurs to his horse, he rode across the river and begged Burnside to desist from further attack. The commander was obstinate, and declared that the work of assault must go on.³ Humphreys, “the knight without reproach or fear,”⁴ then led a bayonet charge of 4500 troops who had never been in battle before. “The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column.” In brief time over a thousand men were killed and wounded. “The column turned.” The regiments retired slowly, and in good order, many of the soldiers “singing and hurrahing.”⁵

This ended the battle. The Confederate loss was 5377; the Union 12,653, of the flower of the army. The next day Burnside was wild with grief. “Oh, those men! those men over there!” he said, pointing across the river where lay the dead and wounded, “I am thinking of them all the time.”⁶ This anguish combined with his debility from loss of sleep to drive him to a desperate plan. He thought of putting himself at the head of his old corps, the Ninth, and leading them in person in an assault on the Confederates behind the stone wall. Sumner advised him against such an attack, as did Franklin and several corps and division commanders. He gave it up. On the night of December 15, his movement

¹ Lee's report. I do not cite the concluding clause, as the statement is disputed by Federal writers.

² Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 113; Second Army Corps, p. 175.

³ C. W., part i. p. 668.

⁴ Walker's Hancock, p. 68.

⁵ Humphrey's report. When matters on his right were going so badly, Burnside sent this word: “Tell General Franklin that I wish him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force.” This was not done. See the discussion of this incident by Palfrey, p. 174.

⁶ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 138.

concealed by a violent storm of wind and rain, he successfully withdrew his army to the north side of the river.

Lee was not aware of the magnitude of his victory. Expecting that the Federals would renew the attack, he did not follow up his advantage. Pollard writes that the Southern public anticipated that their shattered foe, who was cut off from escape by the river in his rear, would be annihilated.¹ The feeling in regard to Lee might have found expression in the words of Barcas, a Carthaginian, after the battle of Cannæ: "You know, Hannibal, how to gain a victory, but not how to use it."

Burnside's loss in killed, wounded, and missing was heavy, but it was as nothing compared with the loss in the army's morale. Officers and soldiers, feeling that they had been put to a useless sacrifice, had lost confidence in their commander. At a review of the Second Corps he was received with such coldness that Sumner asked Couch² to call upon the men for cheers. Couch and the division commanders rode along the lines and waved their caps or swords, but did not elicit a single encouraging response. Some soldiers even gave vent to derisive cries. Had McClellan appeared before them to take command once more, the air would have rung with joyful shouts.³ The Democrats and some of the Republicans clamored for his restoration to the head of the army,⁴ but Lincoln could not of course entertain seriously the proposal. Burnside remained its general, and the President sent to its officers and soldiers the best measure possible of congratulation. But the demoralization of the army was complete. Officers resigned and great numbers of men deserted.

¹ The Second Year of the War, p. 195. The weight of military authority is against the soundness of such an anticipation. Longstreet, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 83; Allan, p. 513; Dabney, p. 628.

² Now commander of the Second Corps.

³ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 198.

⁴ Welles, *Diary, Nicolay and Hay*, vol. vi. p. 267; W. P. Cutler's *Diary*, entry Dec. 18; *Boston Courier*, Dec. 23; *N. Y. Herald*, Jan. 10, 1863; see, also, Wright's speech in the House, Jan. 30, 1863, *Globe Appendix*, p. 76.

Although Burnside was weighed down with distress, the magnanimous nature of the man would not let go unchallenged the report gaining currency that he had been forced to the attack by orders of the President. The President, the Secretary of War, the General-in-Chief gave me no orders; the whole management was left in my hands; I am entirely responsible for the failure, he wrote in his first account of the battle.¹ This was exactly true, but the laying bare of the whole correspondence has been necessary to convince many that this despatch in which he assumed the whole blame was not dictated to him from Washington.

Lincoln was much depressed at the disaster, the responsibility of which he must share with his general, since he had placed him in command. In the early part of December, Halleck had conceived that the paramount anxiety of the President for a victory was the necessity of counteracting the sentiment in Great Britain which favored joining France in an intervention in our contest.² It was, indeed, true that the fear of foreign complications contributed to the solicitude born of the consciousness that he was losing rapidly his hold on the people of the North, which he then knew, as we all now know, was the requisite of success. "I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since,"³ he said, September 22, the day on which he submitted his proclamation of emancipation to his cabinet. Since then he had suffered defeat at the ballot-box and in the field; and the defeat in battle was aggravated in the popular estimation by his mistaken change of commanders, on which no more severe comment could be made than Burnside's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War which was speedily given to the public.⁴

¹ Dec. 17, O. R., vol. xxi. p. 67.

² Ibid., vol. xx. part ii. p. 123.

³ Warden's Chase, p. 482.

⁴ Burnside's testimony (as to the nature of it, see p. 189) was taken Dec. 19, and published in the N. Y. *Tribune* Dec. 24. See Boston *Courier*, Dec. 25; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. i. p. 343.

The hopes of the Confederacy were high. The correspondent of the London *Times* wrote from Lee's headquarters: December 13 will be "a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic."¹ Some such thought occurred to the people of the North when they came to know the story of the battle of Fredericksburg. Grief, as great as any told in epic, in drama, or in novel, wrung their hearts at the useless sacrifice of so many noble souls. Gloom followed. "This is a day of darkness and peril to the country. . . . Under McClellan nothing was accomplished; now Burnside fails on the first trial;"² an elastic and stout-hearted people has been brought to the brink of despondency; the North has lost heart and hope; we do not absolutely despair of the Republic;³ such are the reflections of public opinion we meet with in the chronicles of the time. The feeling of those in the inner councils of the nation was undoubtedly expressed by Meigs. "Every day's consumption of your army," he wrote Burnside, "is an immense destruction of the natural and monetary resources of the country. The country begins to feel the effect of this exhaustion, and I begin to apprehend a catastrophe. . . . I begin to doubt the possibility of maintaining the contest beyond this winter unless the popular heart is encouraged by victory on the Rappahannock. . . . As day after day has gone, my heart has sunk, and I see greater peril to our nationality in the present condition of affairs than I have seen at any time during the struggle."⁴

¹ Issue of Jan. 13, 1863.

² W. P. Cutler, M. C. from Ohio, in his diary entry of Dec. 16, *Biographical Sketch*, p. 296.

³ *N. Y. World*, Dec. 24; *N. Y. Tribune*, Dec. 26; *Boston Courier*, Dec. 29. Joseph Medill, editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, while penning or dictating hopeful leaders in his journal, thus wrote privately to Colfax: "Our people all have the 'blues.' The feeling of utter hopelessness is stronger than at any time since the war began. The terrible bloody defeat of our brave army at Fredericksburg leaves us almost without hope."—Hollister's *Colfax*, p. 203.

⁴ Dec. 30, *O. R.*, vol. xxi. p. 916.

Burnside's energy took an almost frenzied turn. In spite of the disaffection in his army, which extended from the highest generals to the privates, he decided to cross the river a few miles below Fredericksburg and again attack the Confederates. He had already commenced operations when the President, to whom had been brought home vividly the feeling in the army towards its commander, sent him this despatch: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know."¹ He suspended the orders for the advance and went immediately to Washington. The knowledge that we have of his conferences with the President, the Secretary of War, and the General-in-Chief show us Burnside perturbed, Stanton and Halleck lacking judgment and decision and unequal to the responsibility that should have been theirs, and Lincoln in a state of painful perplexity which seemed to reach, on New Year's Day, 1863, a culmination. Burnside told the President that Stanton and Halleck "had not the confidence of the officers and soldiers," nor, in his belief, of the country at large. He intimated strongly that they ought to be removed, while he himself "ought to retire to private life." The President, harassed by doubts, wrote to Halleck with pardonable irritation, saying, in effect, Do come to some decision in regard to General Burnside's plan of advance. "Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this." This resulted in an offer of resignation of his place by the General-in-Chief and the withdrawal of the letter by the President "because considered harsh by General Halleck."²

No determination was reached. Burnside returned to the army, where, in spite of the almost unanimous opposition of his general officers, he resolved upon another crossing of the river, and wrote the President to this effect, enclosing his resignation in case the movement were disapproved.³ Lincoln gave a qualified consent, adding an injunction different

¹ O. R., vol. xxi. p. 900.

² Ibid., p. 940 *et seq.*

³ Jan. 5, 1863, *ibid.*, p. 944.

from that he had been accustomed to send McClellan: "Be cautious and do not understand that the government or country is driving you." He said further, "I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac."¹ Burnside prepared for an advance. Franklin said that success was impossible. Hooker, as free and emphatic in the criticism of his present commander as he had been of McClellan, declared that the projected movement was absurd, and the chances of failure nineteen to one. Officers and privates generally agreed with Franklin and Hooker. It was fortunate that the elements interfered in their favor. A severe storm occurred, and rain fell without ceasing. Burnside, tormented by lack of sleep, still persisted with desperate energy. The orders to march were given, but the deep mud made it impossible to move the artillery, the pontoons, the ammunition and supply wagons. The Confederates on the other side of the river bantered the Union pickets, asking if they should not come over and help build the bridges. The movement known in the annals of the army as the "mud campaign" was perforce abandoned, yet Burnside was still stubborn and his excitement did not abate. He prepared an order removing Hooker, Franklin, and many other officers of the army.² He went to see the President, and asked for the approval of this order or the acceptance of his resignation as major-general. The President took time for reflection, and concluded to relieve Burnside and place Hooker in command of the Army of the Potomac.³

¹ Jan. 8, 1863, O. R., vol. xxi. p. 954.

² General Order No. 8, Jan. 23, *ibid.*, p. 998.

³ The same order relieved Sumner at his own request; and also Franklin. It was one of the unfortunate results of Fredericksburg that Franklin, who had undoubted military talent, was lost to the service. The Committee on the Conduct of the War injured him in the public estimation by reporting that if he had attacked the enemy in sufficient force, "the plan of General Burnside would have been completely successful." — C. W., part i. p. 67. But see Palfrey, pp. 174–182. "The press has now killed McClellan, Buell, Fitz John Porter, Sumner, Franklin, and Burnside. Add my name and I am not ashamed of the association. If the press can govern the country,

The disaster of Fredericksburg caused a cabinet crisis, as it is described by the contemporary authorities, with deference to English political phraseology. But the procedure when a calamity of state seems to call for radical action shows the difference between the English and the American constitutions. Lincoln was the head of the administration, the commander-in-chief of the armies, and if any one other than Burnside was responsible for the defeat on the Rappahannock, it was he. So declared the Democrats without reserve. The Republicans too, in private conversation and confidential letters, expressed the same conviction, although in public they were cautious and reticent. Suppose English conditions to have obtained and Lincoln to have been prime minister. Congress would probably have voted a want of confidence in him and his ministry; his resignation or an appeal to the country would have followed. But as Lincoln said September 22 and might still have said: "I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more" of the confidence of the people than I have; "and however this may be, there is no way

let them fight the battles."—Gen. Sherman to his brother, Feb., 1863, Sherman Letters, p. 189. He had written, Jan. 17, "I hope the politicians will not interfere with Halleck. You [the politicians] have driven off McClellan, and is Burnside any better? Buell is displaced. Is Rosecrans any faster? His victory at Murfreesboro [Stone's River] is dearly bought."—*Ibid.*, p. 182.

My authorities for this account are the Union and Confederate correspondence, O. R., vol. xxi.; reports of Halleck, Burnside, Sumner, Hooker, Franklin, Couch, Hancock, Butterfield, Humphreys, Reynolds, Meade, Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, *ibid.*; testimony of Halleck, Burnside, Sumner, Hooker, Meigs, Franklin, Meade, Reynolds, Parke, Newton, Cochrane, C. W., part i.; Ropes's Civil War, part ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi.; Palfrey, Antietam and Fredericksburg; Allan, Army of Nor. Va.; Walker, Second Army Corps, Life of Hancock; Long, Life of Lee; Mrs. Jackson, Life of Jackson; Dabney, Life of Jackson; Taylor, Four Years with Gen. Lee; articles of Longstreet, Couch, W. F. Smith, McLaws, Century War Book, vol. iii.; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Franklin, Reply to Committee on Conduct of the War; Moore, Reb. Rec., vol. x.; Swinton, Army of the Potomac; Letter of London *Times* correspondent from Lee's Headquarters, Dec. 12, 13, 1862; N. Y. *Tribune*, Dec. 16, 17, *World*, 17, 18, *Times*, 17, *Herald*, 17, 18; Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 17, 18; Boston Eve. *Transcript*, Dec. 17, 18, *Advertiser*, Dec. 18, 1862.

in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." In view of this constitutional limitation a caucus of Republican senators, assuming to speak for a majority of their party and of the nation, reverted unconsciously to earlier English precedents, and gave as a formal opinion that the failure of a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war was due to the fact that the President was badly advised by his cabinet ministers. Most of these senators thought that the clog to the administration was Seward, and at their first meeting they passed, although not by a unanimous vote, a resolution declaring that the welfare of the country required his withdrawal from the cabinet. Later, in order to obtain practical unanimity, this resolution was reconsidered and a substitute adopted which asked such changes to be made among the President's constitutional advisers as would secure "in the present crisis of public affairs" better results in the war waged "to suppress a causeless and atrocious rebellion." The radical senators, a prey to long-continued irritation at Seward's conservatism of the last two years and especially embittered at a confidential letter of his to Adams,¹ recently published, saw in the resolution nothing more than a demand for his dismissal, while the conservatives probably hoped that a reconstruction of the cabinet might result also in the retirement of one or both of the representative radical members, Chase and Stanton. From his friend Senator Preston King of New York, Seward heard of the action of the senatorial caucus and immediately sent his resignation to the President.

December 19² a committee of nine senators appointed by the

¹ "It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war—the former by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the federal Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate, way of saving the Union."—Letter of July 5, Message and Dip. Corr., p. 124.

² I follow the date given by Nicolay and Hay. The Washington corre-

caucus waited upon Lincoln, presented their formal conclusions, and urged that a change be made in the department of State. The pith of the interview was given in the report he made of it the same day to his cabinet. "While they seemed to believe in my honesty," he said, "they also appeared to think that when I had in me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived."¹ At this conference with his cabinet advisers, he asked them to meet him again in the evening, and having made a similar appointment with the committee of senators, the two parties came together with equal surprise. Seward of course was not of the company, and one of the senators was absent.² A frank interchange of views took place. Feeling that the fate of the nation was perhaps at stake, the senators were open in their criticism of the cabinet and forcible in their attack upon Seward. The cabinet ministers made an energetic defence. The President acted as moderator, but, knowing that the maxim, the king can do no wrong, had no place in American politics, he understood that the prosecutors were indirectly finding fault with himself. The conference was stormy and lasted long. Finally Lincoln said: "Do you, gentlemen, still think Seward ought to be excused?" Sumner, Trumbull, Grimes, and Pomeroy said "Yes." Collamer, Fessenden, and Howard would not vote, and Harris [of New York] said "No."³

The most important result of the meeting was that it induced Secretary Chase to resign his portfolio the next day.⁴ In conversation, in private correspondence, in the confidences to his diary, he had dealt censure unrestrained to the President's conduct of the war. At this conference he was therefore between two fires. To be consistent with his

spondent of the N. Y. *Tribune* wrote that this interview took place the evening of the 18th, but the difference is not material.

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 265; see, also, Joseph Medill to Colfax, *Life of Colfax*, Hollister, p. 200.

² Wade.

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 266.

⁴ Dec. 20.

hostile animadversions, which were undoubtedly well known to the senators, he should join in the attack; duty and honor in the execution of his office commanded him to take part in the defence. His position was embarrassing and untenable. The reflection of a night pointed to resignation as the only way out of the difficulty, and in the morning he placed the letter imparting his decision in the President's hands. Lincoln was pleased that his political shrewdness had effected, as a consequence of the resignation of the conservative chief, that of the head of the radicals. Believing, as he afterwards expressed it, "If I had yielded to that storm and dismissed Seward, the thing would all have slumped over one way, and we should have been left with a scanty handful of supporters," he saw that the resignation of Chase enabled him to win the game, and said to Senator Harris, "Now I can ride; I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag."¹ He immediately sent this word, "Secretary of the Treasury, please do not go out of town," and later in the day sent two identical letters: "Hon. William H. Seward and Hon. Salmon P. Chase: Gentlemen: You have . . . tendered me your resignations. . . . I am apprised of the circumstances which may render the course personally desirable to each of you; but, after most anxious consideration, my deliberate judgment is, that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your departments respectively."² The next day Seward cheerfully resumed his office, and two days later Chase reluctantly returned to his post. The cabinet crisis was over. Its members remained the same.³

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 271; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 148.

² Dec. 20, Warden's Chase, p. 508; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 268.

³ Smith, Secretary of the Interior, resigned about this time, but his resignation was in no way a result of the action of the senators.

My authorities for this account are Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. chap. xii.; Warden's Chase; Schuckers's Chase; Life of Seward, vol. iii.; Lothrop's Seward; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv.; Wash. corr. N. Y. *Tribune*, Dec. 20, 21, 23, Jan. 9, 1863, editorials of Dec. 22, 23; N. Y. *Eve. Post*, Dec. 22; Wash. corr. N. Y. *Times*, Dec. 20, editorials of Dec. 22, 23; N. Y. *World*, Dec.

Lincoln had displayed rare political sagacity in insisting on retaining in the service of the State the men who could best serve it notwithstanding the rude jostling of the cabinet and the opinion of Congress that the essential concord in judgment and action did not prevail among its members.¹ His judgment that "the public interest does not admit" of the retirement of the secretaries of State and of the Treasury is confirmed by a study of the writings of the time in the light of succeeding events. In the misfortune and dejection which had fallen upon the country no voice could be slighted that would be raised for the continued prosecution of the war; and since Seward and Chase represented the diverse opinions of two large classes of men who were at least in concord on the one all-important policy, it was desirable that they should remain in the cabinet. The loss of either or both of them would have been a subtraction from the popular support of the administration that could in no other way be made good.

There were, too, other reasons why the President did not wish to part with his secretaries of State and of the Treasury. Since April, 1861, Seward had rendered a loyal support; he had sunk his ambition for the presidency; he had come to appreciate the ability of Lincoln and to acknowledge in him the head of the government in reality as in name. He had been an efficient minister. Even allowing for all the circumstances, that slavery in the Confederacy was a stumbling-block in the way of its recognition by England and France, and that the influence of Lincoln, Sumner, and Adams in foreign relations was of great weight, much credit is still due the Secretary of State, that affairs were so managed that there was no interference from Europe in our struggle.

Chase, on the other hand, was supreme in his own department, and wrote the part of the President's message of December 1, 1862, which related to the finances.² Lincoln

22, 23, 27, *Herald*, Dec. 21, 22; *Boston Courier*, Dec. 22, 23; *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 24, 25.

¹ Letter of Chase of Dec. 20, *Warden*, p. 510.

² *Warden*, p. 507.

had no business training, and like many lawyers had little or no conception of the resources of revenue and of the outlay of money which the country could sustain. The confidence of Chase to his diary of September 12 is an exaggeration, as in his criticisms of the President he usually falls into extravagance, but with that qualification it may be read as evidence of the trials of Chase and of the lack of business capacity of Lincoln. "Expenses are enormous," he wrote, "increasing instead of diminishing; and the ill successes in the field have so affected government stocks that it is impossible to obtain money except on temporary deposit. . . . It is a bad state of things; but neither the President, his counsellors, nor his commanding general seem to care. They rush on from expense to expense and from defeat to defeat, heedless of the abyss of bankruptcy and ruin which yawns before us. May God open the eyes of those who control us, before it is too late." ¹ There is no evidence that Lincoln tried to grasp the principles of finance. He had no taste for the subject, and being obliged to master, as a layman may, the art of war and the art of diplomacy, he was wise to attempt no more. While he did not know finance, he knew men and selected and retained as his Secretary of the Treasury one whose inflexible honesty and assimilating mind entitle him to the popular reputation he has obtained as a strong finance minister. That the war had gone on for nearly two years with an immense expenditure of money, and that the government could still buy all it needed of food and munitions of war and could pay its soldiers, was due primarily to the patriotism and devotion of the people of the North; but honor should also be given to the manager of the country's finances.

¹ Warden, p. 470. Adams S. Hill, Wash. corr. of N. Y. *Tribune*, wrote about this time to S. H. Gay: "Gen. Wadsworth [one of the military advisers of the President] says that in all the councils of war which he attended he never heard a word of economy, never from President, Secretary of War, Chief of Ordnance, or Gen. Meigs. Millions of money were to them as to ordinary men star distances, whether two or three hundred billions of miles, what difference?" — A. S. Hill papers, MS.

The Secretary of the Treasury was probably not a pleasant man at the council board. He and the President were so essentially different that sympathetic relations between them were impossible. Handsome, imposing, and careful in dress, Chase had the manners of a Chesterfield. A graduate of Dartmouth, he had a college man's knowledge of Latin and Greek and the reverence of an educated lawyer for the classics. At the age of twenty-three,¹ while he was living in Cincinnati, he came forward as a lecturer before the Cincinnati Lyceum and as an essayist contributing to the *North American Review*. He had a comprehensive intelligence, and even in his busy life as member of the cabinet, found his recreation in the reading of good literature in English and French; he cared neither for cards nor for the theatre. A serious, thoughtful man in every walk of life, he brought to the business of his department a well thought-out method.

Lincoln, ungainly in appearance and movement, gave no thought to the graces of life, and lacked the accomplishments of a gentleman, as no one knew better than himself.² He had no system in the disposition of his time and in the preparation of his work. During his term of office he confined his reading of books mainly to military treatises and to works which guided him in the solution of questions of constitutional and international law, although he occasionally snatched an hour to devote to his beloved Shakespeare, and displayed in his state papers an undiminished acquaintance with the Bible. He found recreation in the theatre, has left on record his pleasure at Hackett's presentation of Falstaff,³ and, as Hamlet had a peculiar charm for him, he doubtless experienced an unusual delight when he witnessed Edwin Booth's rare impersonation of the rôle. Possessed of a keen sense of humor, he was a master of the story-telling art, and must at times

¹ In 1831.

² See his speech in 1858, vol. ii. p. 312. The expressions in his letter to Hackett the actor quoted by Hay in his article in the *Century Magazine* for Nov., 1890, are pathetic.

³ Letter to Hackett, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 392.

have grated on the serious disposition of his finance minister, who had no appreciation of humor and was a poor judge of men.

In going through Chase's private correspondence one is astonished to find him in friendly communication with so many cheap persons,¹ mainly, it is true, political followers, on whose help he counted in attaining the much-desired presidency. This ambition, or rather the unseemly manifestations of it, became the greatest drawback to his usefulness. His opinion of Lincoln's parts was not high, and could hardly have remained unperceived by the President, who in return made no attempt to conceal his judgment that Chase was a very able man.

At this time the Secretary was by no means alone in his judgment of the President. In many senators and representatives existed a distrust of his ability and force of character which had been induced in those who met him frequently, by his lack of dignity, his grotesque manner and expression, and his jocoseness when others were depressed, all viewed in the damning light of military failure.² While his popularity

¹ Warden, p. 521, speaks of the many "knaves or fools in whom [Chase] confided."

² Richard H. Dana, on an official visit to Washington, wrote Thornton K. Lothrop, Feb. 23, 1863: "As for the country, I see no hope but in the army. Victory alone can help us. The lack of respect for the President in all parties is unconcealed."—Adams's Dana, vol. ii. p. 271. He wrote Charles Francis Adams, March 9, 1863: "As to the politics of Washington, the most striking thing is the absence of personal loyalty to the President. It does not exist. He has no admirers, no enthusiastic supporters, none to bet on his head. If a Republican convention were to be held to-morrow, he would not get the vote of a State. He does not act, or talk, or feel like the ruler of a great empire in a great crisis. This is felt by all, and has got down through all the layers of society. It has a disastrous effect on all departments and classes of officials, as well as on the public. He seems to me to be fonder of details than of principles, of tithing the mint, anise, and cummin of patronage, and personal questions, than of the weightier matters of empire. He likes rather to talk and tell stories with all sorts of persons who come to him for all sorts of purposes than to give his mind to the noble and manly duties of his great post. It is not difficult to detect that this is the feeling of his cabinet. He has a kind of shrewdness and common sense, mother wit, and slipshod, low-levelled honesty, that made him a good

was waning, he was stronger with the country than with the men at Washington. The people did not come in personal contact with him, and estimated him by his formal state papers and his acts. Posterity, that has seen his ultimate success, bends to the same judgment and looks with open admiration on the patience and determination with which he bore his burden during this gloomy winter. The hand that draws the grotesque trait of Lincoln may disappoint the hero-worshipper, but the truth of the story requires this touch which helps to explain the words of disparagement that showered upon him, and serves as a justification for those who could not in the winter of 1862-63 see with the eyes of to-day. Had his other qualities been enhanced by Washington's dignity of manner, not so many had been deceived; but as it was we cannot wonder that his contemporaries failed to appreciate his greatness. Since his early environment in fostering his essential capabilities had not bestowed on him the external characteristics usually attributed to transcendent leaders of men, it was not suspected that in him had developed a germ of extraordinary mental power.

Seward, with his amiable and genial manners, was, I believe, a most agreeable man in council. Fertile in suggestion, he must, in spite of his personal failings, have been especially acceptable to Lincoln, whose slow-working mind was undoubtedly often assisted to a decision by the various expedients which his Secretary of State put before him. It is frequently easier for an executive to choose one out of several courses than to invent a policy. The members of the cabinet who filled the public eye were Seward, Chase, and Stanton, and they exact a like attention from the historian. It was either on Seward or on Stanton that the President leaned the most; and the weight of evidence, confirmed by the cir-

Western jury lawyer. But he is an unutterable calamity to us where he is. Only the army can save us. Congress is not a council of state. It is a mere district representation of men of district reputations. It has passed some good laws to enable the President to do the work, but the nation does not look up to it for counsel or lead." — *Adams's Dana*, vol. ii. p. 264.

cumstance of his urbanity, points to the Secretary of State as the favorite counsellor.¹

It will be remembered that the President's proclamation of emancipation of September 22, 1862, was in the form of a warning; it was a declaration that the slaves in States or parts of States whose people were still in rebellion, January 1, 1863, against the federal government should be free. The new year had come, and his purpose had been proclaimed one hundred days before. It remained for him to carry out the design that he had gravely announced. While the form and the words of the preliminary proclamation seemed to expect that the Confederates or some of them might lay down their arms to avoid incurring the threatened penalty, no such illusion was really entertained. It had become well understood that the States of the Southern Confederacy were earnest in their desire to secure their independence, and that their people were united in this aim. If therefore the proclamation had any effect at all on the Southern people, it made them more determined in their resistance by giving force to the argument that the war of the North was a crusade against their social institutions.

The President regarded the proclamation "as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing [the] rebellion," and notwithstanding the defeat of his party at the ballot-box and the defeat of his principal army in the field in the interim of the hundred days, he fulfilled his promise and promulgated, January 1, 1863, the complement of his preliminary edict. "I do order and declare," it ran, "that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States [a list of these is given in the preceding paragraph] are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons."

To obviate an objection that had been made by the Demo-

¹ See F. Bancroft, *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, vol. vi. p. 722.

crats and to allay the not unreasonable dread that the blacks, incited by the proclamation, would rise against their masters and perpetrate the horrors of a servile revolt, this paragraph was added: "And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that in all cases, when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages."

In the next paragraph the President declared that the liberated slaves would be accepted as soldiers to garrison forts, positions, stations, and concluded with an invocation suggested by Chase: "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution [upon military necessity], I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God."¹

There was, as every one knows, no authority for the proclamation in the letter of the Constitution, nor was there any statute which warranted it. It imports much to see how Lincoln, who had the American reverence for the Constitution and the Anglo-Saxon veneration for law, justified this departure from the letter of the organic act and from sacred precedent. "I am naturally anti-slavery," he wrote. "If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. . . . I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation—of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures

¹ The three words in brackets are Lincoln's, the rest Chase's. See Warden's Chase, p. 513; on the making of the proclamation, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. pp. 405-430.

otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground. . . . I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together. . . . When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter.”¹

With opponents who maintained that the emancipation proclamation was unconstitutional, he argued: “I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said — if so much — is that slaves are property. Is there — has there ever been — any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us, or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies’ property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel.”²

The event manifested the wisdom of Lincoln’s policy. The proclamation did not incite servile insurrection, although it completed the process, which the war had commenced, of making every slave in the South the friend of the North.

¹ Letter of April 4, 1864, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 508; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 430.

² Letter of Aug. 26, 1863, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 397.

Every negro knew that if he got within the lines of the Federal armies, the aspiration of his life would be realized; he would become a free man. Before the close of the year there were in the United States military service 100,000 former slaves, "about one-half of which number actually [bore] arms in the ranks."¹ Without the policy of emancipation, these negroes would probably have remained at the South raising food for the able-bodied white men, all of whom were forced into the Confederate army by the rigorous conscription. The proclamation, making clear as it did the real issue of the war, was of incontestable value in turning English sentiment into the right channel. It already had the approval of the House of Representatives,² and, when enforced by victories in the field, received the support of the majority of the Northern people.

It does not appear that the preliminary proclamation could have been better timed. The trend of public sentiment makes it evident that it was issued soon enough, and that the President showed discretion in annulling the acts of Frémont, Cameron, and Hunter; and since it was conceded that the edict ought not to be promulgated except after a victory, there would have been danger in delay beyond September, 1862, for no military success as important in its results as Antietam was obtained until July 3, 1863, when Meade defeated Lee at Gettysburg.

In addition to military emancipation, the policy of the President comprised the giving of freedom to the slaves gradually in a way strictly legal, the compensation of the owners by the federal government and the colonization of the liberated negroes. In his annual message to Congress of December 1, 1862, taking as his text, "Without slavery the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue," he made an argument in advocacy of his policy, which, in his grasp of the subject, as tested by suc-

¹ Lincoln, Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1863

² Dec. 15, 1862, by a vote of 78 : 51.

ceeding events, marks him as one of the great statesmen of the world. He pleaded for gradual emancipation, appointing January 1, 1900, as the time when it should be completed, to spare "both races from the evils of sudden derangement." It is matter for regret that fortune had not at this time favored Lincoln with signal military victories to give to his words the strength that enforced the declarations of Cæsar and Napoleon. Owing to distrust in him and his waning popularity, his recommendations in this message were not considered by Congress, nor had they, so far as I have been able to ascertain, any notable influence on public sentiment.¹

Congress, however, made an attempt to fulfil the pledge which it had given at the previous session on the prompting of the President.² The result of the election in Missouri³ showed that the people of that State were in favor of getting rid of slavery.⁴ In conformity with that sentiment, there was reported, January 6, from the select committee on emancipation to the House of Representatives a bill to apply \$10,000,000 in bonds for the purpose of compensating the loyal owners of slaves in Missouri, if her legislature should provide for immediate emancipation. After a brief debate, the bill under the operation of the previous question passed the same day. It went to the Senate; and Henderson, who had charge of the measure, introduced a substitute for the House bill, which in its turn was amended, and occasioned a long and intelligent debate, that consumed a portion of many days for nearly a month. The bill, as it passed the Senate,

¹ An attempt at colonization on a very small scale was made by the President under the authority of legislation of April and July, 1862. Nicolay and Hay give an interesting account of it, largely from MS. sources, in vol. vi. chap. xvii. The experiment was tried in the year 1863 and resulted in failure. N. and H. write at the close of the chapter: "No further effort was made by the President." See, also, Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 66.

² See vol. iii. pp. 631, 635; *ante*, p. 70.

³ In Nov., 1862.

⁴ Noell in the House, *Globe*, p. 207; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1862, p. 595.

gave ten millions for gradual emancipation, or twenty millions if the act of Missouri should provide for the manumission of all slaves by July 4, 1865.¹ The measure in this shape went back to the House. An important change in the wording of the bill enabled any one member to send it to the committee of the whole, the "grave of any disputed measure;"² it prevented a motion of non-concurrence and the reference of the matter to a committee of conference, and lost to the majority of the House the control of the bill. It became necessary to recommit the Senate measure, and to report to the committee of the whole a new bill, for the consideration of which the rules of the House allowed only one hour. This time the Democrats, aided by a Unionist from Missouri, used up in filibustering.³ Later, an endeavor was made to get the bill considered by a suspension of the rules, but the necessary two-thirds of the House could not be obtained.

The Republican historians are within the bounds of truth when they assert that compensated emancipation for Missouri failed on account of the strenuous opposition of the Democrats. The same explanation will apply to the case of Maryland;⁴ and the failure of the measures for the relief of these States shows why no effort was made to proceed with the West Virginia bill, or to take up the question of compensating the loyal slave owners of Kentucky and Tennessee.⁵ Yet it is doubtful whether it is the whole truth to impute the defeat of this policy exclusively to the Democrats. Granted their opposition as a necessary factor, this might have been over-

¹ *Globe*, pp. 302, 351, 586, 611, 666, 762, 776, 897; *Senate Journal*.

² Letter of Albert S. White, representative from Indiana, who had charge of the bill, to *Nat. Intelligencer*, March 12.

³ *Ibid.* The Unionist was Hall. The Democrats were Vallandigham, Pendleton, Cox of Ohio, Norton of Missouri.

⁴ "The story of the Missouri bill (after it was returned from the Senate) is the story of the Maryland bill. It was filibustered out of Congress."—Letter of Albert S. White.

⁵ See Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i. p. 446; Greeley, *The American Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 261.

come had the leading Republicans of the Senate and the House manifested zeal for the Missouri bill, had the far reaching and generous policy involved in that measure lain as close to their hearts as it did to the President's. They voted for it, but they did not, to secure its passage, use the extraordinary care and exertions which they employed at this session in enacting other important bills.¹

At this distance it seems surprising that Democrats and border State Union men should have combated a policy which was apparently in the interest of slave owners, but their opposition came from the belief that it was impossible for the North to conquer the South. The alternative was separation of the sections, with strong guarantees for slavery in the border States which remained with the North. The remark which it is said Lincoln made to Crittenden, "You Southern men will soon reach the point where bonds will be a more valuable possession than bondsmen,"² was far from a self-evident proposition in February, 1863; in truth the reverse was the estimate of the Democrats. At this distance, too, the lukewarmness of the radical Republicans, which they might have expressed by this question, Why compensate for a wrong? may be pressed too far. The sincere support of the measure by Sumner, the genuine regret of Grimes at its failure, although he did not vote for the Senate bill compensating Missouri,³ will serve to invalidate a judgment that might

¹ The principal authority for this account is the *Congressional Globe*, but the controversy afterwards between A. S. White, and the *Nat. Intelligencer* throws light on the proceedings. See *Nat. Int.*, March 10, 12; see, also, *St. Louis Democrat* [Republican journal] cited *ibid.*, March 10, 17; *Boston Advertiser*, March 6.

² Blaine, vol. i. p. 448.

³ *Globe*, p. 902; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 116. Grimes wrote in a private letter, March 27: "I regret as much as you can the failure of Congress to provide means to assist the States of Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware to secure emancipation. . . . Just such bills would have been a sort of culmination and rounding off of the acts of the late Congress that would have reflected glory upon it and upon the country." — *Life of Grimes*, Salter, p. 235.

seem to be confirmed by the rapid progress of opinion on the true policy of dealing with slavery.¹

A gleam from the West lightened the intense gloom following the disaster at Fredericksburg. Influenced undoubtedly by the President's anxiety for a victory, and deeming the conditions auspicious, Rosecrans moved out of Nashville the day after Christmas with the purpose of attacking the Confederates. Skirmishing for a number of days as he marched forward, he took up a position within three miles of Murfreesborough, Tenn., where Bragg's army had gone into winter quarters. On the last day of the year he determined to make the attack; but Bragg had resolved to take the offensive at the same time, and obtained the advantage of the initial onset. The bloody battle of Stone's River² ensued. The forces were equal.³ The Confederates gained the victory, but Rosecrans stubbornly maintained his ground. January 2, 1863, Bragg attacked the Union army and met with repulse. On the night of the next day, his troops being somewhat demoralized, he retreated from Murfreesborough. This gave Rosecrans a chance, of which he at once availed himself, to claim the victory in the campaign. The President telegraphed him, "God bless you." Halleck called it one of the most brilliant successes of the war. Throughout the North it was proclaimed a victory. At last, ran the sentiment of the people, our great general has appeared. The loss on both

¹ In his controversy with the *Nat. Intelligencer*, White wrote, "The best evidence of the purposes and intentions of a party is its recorded votes." According to this gauge the Republicans appear well. The vote on the Missouri bill in the House was: Yeas, Republicans 65, Democrats 1, Unionists 7, total 73; Nays, Republicans 8, Democrats 27, Unionists 11, total 46. The leading Republicans of the House voted for the bill. The vote in the Senate on its bill was: Yeas, Republicans, 21, Unionists 2, total 23; Nays, Republicans 5, Democrats 8, Unionists 5, total 18. Of the prominent Republicans, Grimes and Fessenden voted against the bill. The objection of Grimes was one of detail, not of principle, and the same is doubtless true in regard to Fessenden.

² Or Murfreesborough.

³ About 40,000 on each side. But see Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii. p. 424.

sides was very heavy.¹ Both armies were so crippled that a long time was required to repair the damage. Although the casualties of Rosecrans were greater in number, so much larger were the resources of the North that in this respect the balance was against the Confederates, who sustained moreover the loss in morale.

If the student confines himself to the literature of this campaign alone, he will feel that the extensive claims of a signal victory by the President and the people of the North were a clutching at straws; but if he looks ahead he will see that they were wiser than they knew, for he will comprehend that to hold Tennessee Bragg needed a decisive success, that his failure and the serious crippling of his army opened the way the following summer to the Union advance to Chattanooga. The campaigns of Perryville and Stone's River were moreover a favorable augury to the cause of the North, inasmuch as they showed that in the Army of the West an education of generals was going on, that native military talent was in the process of development. George H. Thomas, a Virginian of the same good stuff as Washington and Robert E. Lee, served as second in command to Buell and to Rosecrans, and joined to ability in his profession and a scrupulous loyalty to his superiors a conviction of the justice of the cause he had, contrary to the example of his State, espoused. Although at first he had not unreasonably believed that injustice had been done him because he was not made commander of the Army of the Cumberland when Buell was displaced, he gave a magnanimous and efficient support to Rosecrans, who could say of him that he was as wise in council as he was brave in battle. Philip H. Sheridan had distinguished himself at Perryville, and now did gallant work at the battle of Stone's River.²

¹ Union loss, 13,249; Confederate, 10,266.

² O. R., vol. xx. parts i., ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi.; Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War*; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*; Van Horne, *Hist. of the same*; Ropes's *Civil War*, part ii.; *Century War Book*, vol. iii.; *Diary of W. P. Cutler*; *Warden's Chase*, p. 516. For the correspondence between

The immediate results of this campaign were not sufficient to lift Congress and the country for more than a brief period out of the dejection into which they had fallen. Even the constrained rejoicing was brought to an end by the news that the expedition for the capture of Vicksburg, from which much had been hoped, had failed.¹ The feeling of the radical members of Congress, although it was mainly their policy that was in the ascendant, is without doubt well exhibited by the confidences to his diary of William P. Cutler, a representative from southern Ohio: "Rosecrans's dearly bought victory [Stone's River] fails to give relief or inspire confidence. The failure at Vicksburg casts a deeper gloom over affairs. The feeling prevails that Lincoln allows the policy of the war to be dictated by Seward, Weed, and the border State men. . . . To human vision all is dark, and it would almost seem that God works for the rebels and keeps alive their cause. Our Potomac army is so far a failure, and seems to be demoralized by the political influences that have been brought to bear upon it. . . . All is confusion and doubt. . . . How striking the want of a leader! The nation is without a head. . . . All faith and confidence in everybody seems to give way. . . . The earnest men are brought to a dead-lock by the President. The President is tripped up by his generals, who, for the most part, seem to have no heart in their work. . . . God alone can guide us through the terrible time of doubt, uncertainty, treachery, imbecility, and infidelity. . . . The people are bewildered and in a fog."²

Thomas and Halleck at the time of Buell's removal, see O. R., vol. xvi. part ii. pp. 657, 663.

¹ The first intimation of this seems to have reached Washington through Confederate sources, Jan. 7. — O. R., vol. xvii. part ii. p. 542. John Sherman wrote his brother, Jan. 2: "We are watching with the most eager interest the progress of your expedition. We all hope its success will brighten the gloom cast by operations here." The General wrote the Senator, Jan. 6: "You will have heard of our attack on Vicksburg and failure to succeed. The place is too strong, and without the co-operation of a large army coming from the interior it is impracticable." — Sherman Letters, pp. 177, 179.

² Entries of Jan. 17, 26, 27, Feb. 2, pp. 297, 300, 302. John Sherman wrote his brother, Jan. 27: "Military affairs look dark here in the Army of

Sumner, although he appreciated the peril, had not lost heart.¹ "These are dark hours," he wrote to Lieber. "There are senators full of despair, — not I. . . . But I fear that our army is everywhere in a bad way. I see no central inspiration or command; no concentration, no combination which promises a Jena."² Greeley in his journal advocated the mediation of a European power between the North and the South, and to further this end he wrote to Vallandigham, the most extreme of the Democratic leaders in Congress, and held private interviews and opened a correspondence with Mercier, the French minister, setting forth that the people would welcome a foreign mediation which terminated the war. I mean to carry out this policy, he said to Raymond, and bring the war to a close. "You'll see that I'll drive Lincoln into it."³ An offer of mediation between the two sections from Louis Napoleon, the Emperor of the French, was communicated, February 3, to the Secretary of State. It was declined at once by the President, the offer and response being published at the same time.⁴ Despite the rumors that had in some manner prepared the public mind for this step, the actual fact that a

the Potomac. Burnside is relieved and Hooker is in command. The entire army seems demoralized." — Sherman Letters, p. 187. The feeling in the Northwest is illustrated by a letter of Joseph Medill to Colfax: "The public discontent waxes greater daily. Failure of the army, weight of taxes, depreciation of money, want of cotton — which affects every family — increasing national debt, deaths in the army, no prospect of success, the continued closure of the Mississippi, exorbitant charges of transportation companies for carrying the farmers' products eastward — all combine to produce the existing state of despondency and desperation. By a common instinct everybody feels that the war is drawing towards a disastrous and disgraceful termination. Money cannot be supplied much longer to a beaten, demoralized, homesick army. Sometimes I think nothing is left now but 'to fight for a boundary.'" — Hollister's Colfax, p. 203.

¹ See Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 113.

² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³ H. J. Raymond's diary, entries Jan. 25, 26, Feb. 12, *Scribner's Monthly*, March, 1880, pp. 705, 706, 708; *N. Y. Tribune*, Dec. 27, 1862, Jan. 9, 14, Feb. 13; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 83; *Life of Vallandigham* by his brother, p. 223.

⁴ Printed in the newspapers, Feb. 12, 13.

powerful nation impelled by motives of material interest was eager to interfere in the struggle startled the people and deepened the gloom.¹

"The President tells me," wrote Sumner to Lieber, "that he now fears 'the fire in the rear'—meaning the Democracy, especially at the Northwest—more than our military chances."² Governor Morton of Indiana had telegraphed the Secretary of War: "I am advised that it is contemplated when the Legislature meets in this State to pass a joint resolution acknowledging the Southern Confederacy, and urging the States of the Northwest to dissolve all constitutional relations with the New England States. The same thing is on foot in Illinois."³ The legislatures of these States were Democratic, having been chosen the previous autumn as a result of the conservative reaction. Morton's alarming apprehensions came far from being realized, but his legislature quarrelled with him and refused its support to his energetic measures for carrying on the war. The Republican members took his part, and the wrangle became so bitter that finally the legislature adjourned without making the necessary appropriations for the maintenance of the State government during the ensuing two years. In Illinois, resolutions praying for an armistice, and recommending a convention of all the States to agree upon some adjustment of the trouble between them, passed the House, but failed by a few votes to obtain con-

¹ Although I have brought the facts in juxtaposition, I know of no evidence which indicates that Greeley's intercourse with Mercier had any effect towards inducing this offer of mediation from France.

² Jan. 17, Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 114.

³ Jan. 3, O. R., vol. xx. part ii. p. 297. See Morton's despatch of Jan. 2, p. 294. The information which he gave Stanton by letter, not daring to trust the telegraph, was: "It has been discovered within the past two weeks that the treasonable political secret organization having for its object the withdrawal of the Northwestern States from the Union, which exists in every part of this State, has obtained a foothold in the military camps in this city. The testimony of a number of soldiers has been taken, showing up the whole matter clearly and conclusively. Some important arrests have been made, and investigation is still going on."—MS. War Department Archives.

sideration in the Senate. This legislature likewise fell out with its Republican governor.¹

The term "Copperhead," which originated in the autumn of 1862, is now used freely. It was an opprobrious epithet applied by Union men to those who adhered rigidly to the Democratic organization, strenuously opposed all the distinctive and vigorous war measures of the administration and of Congress, and deeming it impossible to conquer the South were therefore earnest advocates of peace. It might not be accurate to say that all who voted the Democratic ticket in 1863 were, in the parlance of the day, "Copperheads," but such an inclusion would be more correct than to limit the term to those who really wished for the military success of the South and organized or joined the secret order of the Knights of the Golden Circle. In the Western States, at all events, the words "Democrat" and "Copperhead" became, after the middle of January, practically synonymous, and the cognomen applied as a reproach was assumed with pride.²

¹ Indiana in the War of the Rebellion. Official report of W. H. H. Terrell, Adj. Gen., p. 240 *et seq.*; *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 14, 15, 22; *N. Y. Tribune*, Jan. 10, Feb. 14, 17; *N. Y. Times*, Feb. 13; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1863, pp. 510, 529; Life of O. P. Morton by Indianapolis *Journal*, chap. viii. "Illinois is not alone in harboring a party that makes treason its watchword. While the echoes of the traitorous speeches that signalized the opening of the session of the Legislature at Springfield are still ringing in our ears, we have from Indiana the unwelcome news that the would-be rebels at Indianapolis are confederated with those of Illinois." "The Copperheads of the Legislature have undertaken to carry things with a high hand in the interest of the rebels . . . but it is beyond their strength to wrench Illinois from her Union moorings and annex the State to the dominions of Jeff Davis"—*Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 14, 22.

² I have made and had made a considerable search for the first use of the term "Copperhead." The earliest that I have found it employed is in the Cincinnati *Commercial* of Oct. 1, 1862, in an article entitled "Comfort for 'Copperheads.'" The writer charges the *Gazette* (a rival Republican journal) with a course which is "driving the fighting Democrats into the ranks of the Vallandigham party." In the *Commercial* when used afterwards, Copperhead is printed without the quotation marks. It occurs several times in October, November, and December, 1862. The curious may also find several illustrative uses of the word in the *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 22; *N. Y. Tribune*, Jan. 12, Feb. 11; *N. Y. Times*, Feb. 13.

The Western partisans also gloried in the name "Butternut." "The War Democrats," in contradistinction from those who favored peace, acted at elections in the main with the Republicans, voting the Union ticket, as it was called in most of the States. It may safely be said that the men who adhered with fidelity and enthusiasm to the Democratic organization and name, found their notions represented by either Horatio Seymour, of New York, or Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, both of whom had the peculiar ability which establishes political leadership. The tendency of the Eastern Democrats was to gravitate to Seymour, that of the Western Democrats to the more extreme views of Vallandigham. After the fall elections Seward wrote, "Party spirit has resumed its sway over the people."¹ This is indicated by a contrast of the inaugural message of Seymour as governor of New York, January 7, 1863, with the speeches he made during the canvass. His inaugural displayed less moderation and no magnanimity. He was trenchant in criticism, but did not seem to appreciate the difficulties under which the government labored, nor to understand that the utmost forbearance was required of one in his high position. Nevertheless the course which he laid out was in the main the right one for the opposition, and, while his message was exasperating to the Republicans, there is little in it that ought to receive condemnation at the judgment bar of history.²

Robert C. Winthrop in Boston, Nov. 2, 1864, spoke as if he were not ashamed of the name. "Abandon the Constitution," he said, "and the Ship of State is left tossing upon a shoreless sea, without rudder or compass, liable at any moment to be dashed to pieces on the rocks. And though I have no heart for pleasantry on such a topic, let me add that if in such a case the good old ship shall escape such a catastrophe and be rescued from final wreck, it will be only because she will have been treated in advance to a thorough sheathing of *copper* from stem to stern."

Harold Frederic wrote a graphic story entitled "The Copperhead," in which the hero is a striking character.

¹ Nov. 15, 1862, *Life of Seward*, vol. iii. p. 143.

² The message is printed in the *Public Record of H. Seymour* (1868), p. 88. The Indiana legislature declined to receive Governor Morton's message, but passed a joint resolution thanking Governor Seymour "for the able

Far otherwise is it with the speech of Vallandigham, January 14, in the House of Representatives. "I learned my judgment from Chatham," he said: "'My lords, you cannot conquer America.' And you have not conquered the South. You never will. . . . The war for the Union is, in your hands, a most bloody and costly failure. The President confessed it on the 22d of September. . . . War for the Union was abandoned; war for the negro openly begun, and with stronger battalions than before. With what success? Let the dead at Fredericksburg and Vicksburg answer. And now, sir, can this war continue? Whence the money to carry it on? Where the men? Can you borrow? From whom? Can you tax more? Will the people bear it? . . . Will men enlist now at any price? Ah, sir, it is easier to die at home. I beg pardon; but I trust I am not 'discouraging enlistments.' If I am, then first arrest Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck, and some of your other generals; and I will retract; yes, I will recant. But can you draft again? Ask New England, New York. Ask Massachusetts. . . . Ask not Ohio — the Northwest. She thought you were in earnest, and gave you all, all — more than you demanded. Sir, in blood she has atoned for her credulity, and now there is mourning in every house, and distress and sadness in every heart. Shall she give you any more? But ought this war to continue? I answer, no — not a day, not an hour. What then? Shall we separate? Again, I answer, no, no, no! What then? . . . Stop fighting. Make an armistice." Accept at once friendly foreign mediation,¹ "the kindly offer of an impartial power to stand as a daysman between

and patriotic defence of the Constitution, the laws and liberties of the American citizen."

The feeling of the Democrats is well described by August Belmont, himself a Democrat who had confidential relations with the New York leaders, in his letters of Nov. 25, 1862, to Lionel de Rothschild, London, and of Dec. 6, 1862, to E. G. W. Butler, New Orleans. — Letters privately printed, pp. 73, 75.

¹ Although the communication from the Emperor of the French had not yet been received, rumors were now rife that he would offer mediation.

the contending parties in this most bloody and exhausting strife. . . . If, to-day, we secure peace and begin the work of reunion, we shall yet escape; if not, I see nothing before us but universal political and social revolution, anarchy, and bloodshed, compared with which the Reign of Terror in France was a merciful visitation.”¹

Under a constitutional government, where speech and the press are free, we must grant the necessity of an opposition in time of war, even when the Ship of State is in distress. It is not difficult to define a correct policy for the Democrats during the civil conflict, when, as was conceded by every one, the republic was in great danger. In Congress they should have co-operated to the full extent of their power with the dominant party, in its effort to raise men and money to carry on the war; and in any opposition they ought to have taken the tone, not of party objection, but of friendly criticism, with the end in view of perfecting rather than defeating the necessary bills. While in the session of this Congress which ended March 4, 1863, they failed to rise to this height, they did not, on the other hand, pursue a policy of obstruction that would be troublesome if not pernicious. It is doubtful whether, under the able and despotic parliamentary leadership of the majority in the House by Thaddeus Stevens, they could by obstructive tactics have prevented the passage at this session of the two bills which gave the President control of the sword and the purse of the nation; but a serious attempt in that direction, with all that it involved, would have thrown the country into convulsions.² There must therefore be set down

¹ *Globe* Appendix, pp. 55, 59, 60. The opinion of Republicans is well expressed by Cutler in his diary: “We had in the House a full exhibition of treason in Vallandigham’s speech, in which he counselled peace and submission to the rebels.” Jan. 17, p. 297.

² The Democrats had able men in the House. Vallandigham, George H. Pendleton, and Samuel S. Cox, of Ohio, and Daniel W. Voorhees, of Indiana, were ready debaters, possessing likewise the quality of leadership. The Democrats were not strong enough in the Senate (having 8 to the Republicans 31 and Unionists 10) to venture on obstruction, had they been so disposed.

to the credit of the Democrats in Congress a measure of patriotism that almost always exists in an Anglo-Saxon minority sufficient to preserve the commonwealth from destruction.

More severe criticism than is due for any positive action in the House or the Senate must be meted out to the leaders of the party for their speeches in and out of the legislative halls, and to the influential Democratic newspapers in their effort to form and guide a public sentiment which should dictate the policy of the government. One fact they ignored, that peace was impossible unless the Southern Confederacy were acknowledged and a boundary line agreed upon between what then would be two distinct nations. They pretended to a belief, for which there was absolutely no foundation, that if fighting ceased and a convention of the States were called, the Union might be restored.¹ Hence proceeded their opposition to the emancipation policy of the President as being an obstacle to the two sections coming together. But men who loved their country better than their party ought to have perceived, for it was palpable at the time, that the Southern States had not the vaguest notion of consenting on even the most favorable conditions to the Union as it was, and that the President had been brought to his decree against slavery by the logic of events. Apologists for slavery as the Democrats had been for so many years on the ground that it was a necessary evil, they could not give hearty support to emancipation, but, influenced by the consideration that slavery was morally wrong, they could with patriotism and consistency adopt the position of Henderson, the Unionist senator from Missouri, that the proclamation was a military order, and, having been made, should be executed.² Without the pursuit of an impossible attainment, without a factious opposition

¹ " 'Ay crowd to council citizens,' Turnus cries,
'and sit praising peace

While they rush armed on empire.' " — The *Æneid*, book xi.

² *Globe*, p. 356.

to the acts of the President and Congress, there remained scope for a healthy opposition which would not have left the name Copperhead-Democrat a reproach for so many years; in truth, the Democrats might have deserved well of the muse of history. Indeed they did well in advocating economy and integrity in the disposition of the public money, and they might have gone further and applauded Chase in his efforts to secure the one and Stanton in his determination to have the other. Their criticisms of the Executive for suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, for arbitrary arrests, for the abridgment of the freedom of speech and of writing, were justly taken, and undoubtedly had an influence for the good on the legislation at this session. Had they concentrated their opposition on these points, their arguments would have carried greater force, and would have attracted men who were disturbed at the infractions of personal liberty, but who were repelled by the other parts of the Democratic programme.

In consideration of our own practice, the decision of our courts, the opinions of our statesmen and jurists, and English precedents for two centuries, it may be affirmed that the right of suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* was vested by the Constitution in Congress and not in the executive.¹ The President, in assuming that authority and applying the suspension to States beyond the sphere of hostile operations, arrogated power which became necessary to support the policy of arbitrary arrests so diligently pursued by Seward at first and afterwards by Stanton. Such pretensions that revolt the spirit born to freedom may be oppugned by arguments drawn from the storehouse of British and American liberty. The defence made was that these things were done under the pressure of necessity. Our own precedents were set aside because our State now stood in its greatest

¹ See vol. iii. p. 439, note 1; James A. Garfield's argument in the Milligan case, Works, vol. i. p. 158 *et seq.*; contrariwise, Lieber to Sumner. Jan. 8, 1865, Life and Letters, p. 328.

peril since the adoption of the Constitution. Still, in England during the years of the war against the revolutionary government of France, when discontent at home and the sympathy of a band of reformers with the Democratic sentiment across the channel scared the statesmen and the bulk of the upper and middle classes, who were agitated by the terrors of the French Revolution, into a belief that the Constitution and the throne were in danger, neither the King nor the ministry claimed the right to suspend the *habeas corpus* act. It was done by Parliament, which limited in each of the acts passed the suspension to less than one year. When this time expired the ministry were obliged to bring in a new bill which was open to debate in both houses. Summing up the months covered by different measures, Parliament granted the withdrawal of the privilege for only five out of the nine years of the war. Besides, men, though arbitrarily detained, were arrested according to law. Acts were passed to suit the exigency of the time, and many of the suspects were brought to trial before a jury in the civil courts. From April to December, 1798, — the period, as it appears, of the largest number of arrests, — seventy or eighty persons had been apprehended but not brought to trial. At the time of the earnest discussion of such violations of personal liberty¹ in the House of Commons in December, only a few still remained in prison; and the place of their confinement had become known as the Bastille. From May, 1799, to February, 1800, but three men had been arrested; yet it was a subject of indignant remonstrance by two lords in a session of their body that twenty-nine persons were still immured in jail without being brought to trial. In our own country during the civil war the number of arrests of political prisoners must be counted by thousands.² In England lists of the prisoners had

¹ Charles James Fox wrote, March 9, 1798: "What an engine of oppression this power of imprisonment is." — Fox's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 277.

² Bad as is our record in this particular, it has been exaggerated. In his article on Habeas Corpus in Lalor's Cyclopædia, Alexander Johnston wrote: "The records of the provost-marshal's office in Washington show 38,000

been called for and sent to both houses of Parliament. By the act of March 3, 1863, the Secretary of State and the

military prisoners reported there during the rebellion." The context shows that political prisoners are meant. Col. F. C. Ainsworth, Chief, Record and Pension Office, War Department, very kindly made at my request a thorough search of the records, and the result is given in his letter to me of June 1, 1897: "A Commissary-General of Prisoners was appointed to date from October 7, 1861, and the records of his office, which cover the period from February, 1862, until the close of the war, contain the names of 13,535 citizens who were arrested and confined in various military prisons during the war. After a protracted and exhaustive examination of these records it has been found impossible to determine with even approximate accuracy how many of these prisoners were charged with any particular class of offences. The records are very incomplete, and in many instances do not show the charges on which arrests were made. In addition to this many prisoners were confined in two or more different prisons, the records of which do not agree as to the causes of the arrests. Some of the charges recorded are as follows: 'Treason, disloyalty, inciting or participating in riot, aiding and abetting rebels, defrauding government, stealing government property, robbing U. S. mail, blockade running, smuggling, spy, enticing soldiers to desert, aiding and harboring deserters, defrauding recruits of bounty, horse-stealing.' For the reasons stated above, however, it is impossible to ascertain how many arrests were made on any one of these charges.

"It is certain that a considerable number of arrests of civilians in addition to those reported to the Commissary-General of Prisoners were made during the war, because it is known that prisoners of this class were confined by military authority in State prisons and penitentiaries, the records of which are not on file in this department, and nothing has been found to show that prisoners of this class were reported to the Commissary-General of Prisoners. It is also probable that the records of that officer do not contain the names of many persons who were arrested by order of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Navy.

"I have given the subject of your inquiry much attention, and several of the most experienced clerks in the office have made an examination of all records likely to throw light upon the subject, but I regret to say that the result of the investigation is far from being satisfactory. I am convinced, however, that it is impossible to compile a statement with regard to this subject that will be of more value to you than that given above.

"In reply to your inquiry as to the accuracy of the statement made by Mr. Alexander Johnston, in Lalor's Cyclopædia, to the effect that 38,000 prisoners were reported to the Provost-Marshal-General during the Rebellion, I beg to say that a thorough search of the records has been made for the purpose of determining if possible the authority upon which this statement was based, but nothing whatever relative to the subject has been found. I am satisfied that this statement was based upon an 'estimate' that may have

Secretary of War were required to furnish lists of "State or political prisoners" to the judges of the United States Courts, but no lists, so far as I have been able to ascertain, were ever furnished; and in truth the relish for autocratic government had so developed that in September of this year Chase was surprised that the provisions of this act were unfamiliar to the President and to all the members of the cabinet except himself.¹

In both countries those opposed to the government called the state of things a "reign of terror;" in both cases the phrase was a misnomer; in neither country up to the present time have the great principles of liberty been invalidated by the exercise in its crisis of those extraordinary powers. In Great Britain the government displayed method in its rigor. It instituted prosecutions in Scotland, where, the rule being different from that in England, the courts had "unrestricted power to visit sedition with the penalty of transportation" and cruel punishments were inflicted for insignificant offences. The special acts of Parliament were more comprehensive and severe than those of Congress, and they led in England to prosecutions which were unreasonable and unjust.² In the

been made by Johnston, or by some one for him, and was really nothing but a guess."

I dislike to take up space in showing the processes by which I arrive at a statement, but this subject is open to misconception and has been full of difficulty. Mr. Ainsworth's careful and scientific report was the end of my investigation. As authorities before I reached this point at which I was delivered from the maze, I will mention: Vallandigham in his speech in the House of Feb. 23, 1863, declared that at one time there had been confined for "treasonable practices" 640 prisoners at Camp Chase, Ohio. The assistant provost-marshal-general of Illinois stated in his report of Aug. 9, 1865, that the number of arrests exclusive of deserters, from the date of the organization of his office to May 31, 1865, was 443. In regard to the number of arrests and lists of persons confined at Forts Lafayette and Warren and other places furnished by the military commandants, see O. R., series ii. vol. ii., "Treatment of Suspected and Disloyal Persons North and South," pp. 102, 113, 154, 165, 202, 271; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1863, p. 484; also American Bastille, Marshall, and Hist. of the Secret Service, Baker, *passim*.

¹ Chase's diary, MS., loaned me by the kindness of Professor A. B. Hart.

² Fox wrote in a private letter of April 12, 1795: "The bills of this year

comparison one is struck with the more careful observance of the forms of law in the older country. Most of the harshness was committed in a regular manner which was rendered easier by the subservience of Parliament to the king and the ministry, the stricter execution of the laws in the Great Britain of 1793–1802 than in the United States of 1861–65, and the greater devotion of the bench to the government. In Scotland this subordination amounted to servility: indeed one judge instructed the jury in a charge that bestowed upon him the nickname of Jeffreys. With us there were no individual cases of so extreme hardship as in Scotland. Four able and educated men were sentenced to fourteen years' transportation to Botany Bay¹ because they had advocated parliamentary reform and universal suffrage. It falls not to me to tell a tale of suffering on board the hulks, of the lives of aspiring men crushed by the cruelty of the law, nor have I to mention a monument like the Martyrs' Memorial on Calton Hill in Edinburgh; but, on account of the wholesale violations of personal liberty by our government, it well may be that the mass of suffering in our land was even greater.²

appear to me to be a finishing stroke to everything like a spirit of liberty." In 1800 in a letter to Gray he spoke of the country as being "both corrupted and subdued." — Correspondence, vol. iii. pp. 105, 307; Trevelyan's *American Revolution*, part i. p. 251.

¹ A fifth, a clergyman, was sentenced for seven years.

² My authorities for this discussion of affairs in Great Britain are the different statutes suspending the *habeas corpus* act, beginning with 34 Geo. 3, ch. 54; the Treasonable Attempts act, the Seditious Meetings act; the different debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords on the suspension of the *habeas corpus*, Parl. Hist., especially Pitt, Fox, and Courtenay, May, 1794, Courtenay and Tierney, Dec. 1798, Sheridan, Lord Eldon, Hobhouse and Canning, Lords King and Holland, Feb. 1800; Journals of the House of Lords and House of Commons; Buckle, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i. p. 348 *et seq.*; May, *Constitutional Hist. of Eng.*, vol. ii. p. 134 *et seq.*; Twiss's *Life of Lord Eldon*, vol. i.; Campbell's *Lives of the Chancellors*, vol. vi.; Fox's *Correspondence*, vol. iii.; The Story of the English Jacobins, Smith; Adolphus, *Hist. of George III.*, vols. vi. and vii.; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vols. iv., v., vi.; Green, *Hist. of Eng.*, vol. iv.; S. R. Gardiner, article "England," *Enc. Brit.*, vol. viii. p. 361; *Life of Cartwright*, vol. i.; Bradlaugh, *Impeachment of the House of Brunswick*; *Life of Francis Place*, Graham Wallas.

For my purpose I have not deemed it necessary to run the parallel to the

After careful consideration of our own case, I do not hesitate to condemn the arbitrary arrests and the arbitrary interference with the freedom of the press in States which were not the theatre of the war and where the courts were open. I do not omit to take into account that, bad as was Vallandigham's speech in the House, even worse was much of the writing in the Democratic newspapers; that the "Copperhead" talk on the street, in the public conveyances, and in the hotels was still more bitter and vituperative; that the virulence was on the increase, and that constant complaints of "the utterance of treasonable sentiments" were made by patriotic men to the authorities. Nevertheless I am convinced that all of this extrajudicial procedure was inexpedient, unnecessary, and wrong; that the offenders should have been prosecuted according to law, or, if their offences were not indictable, permitted to go free.¹ "Abraham Lincoln," writes James Bryce, "wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell."² My reading of English history and comparative study of our own have led me to the same conclusion, although it must be added that the power which Cromwell exercised far transcended that which was assumed by Lincoln, who governed with less infraction of the Constitution of his country than did the Protector of the Commonwealth.³ Moreover, there was in Lincoln's nature so much of kindness and mercy that he mitigated the harshness perpetrated by Seward and by Stanton. The pervasion of his individual influence, his respect for the Constitution and the law which history and tradition ascribe to him, the greatness of his character and work have prevented the generation that has grown up since the civil conflict from appreciating the enormity of

violations of personal liberty in England in a time of peace. For the repressive measures of 1817, and the "Six Acts" of 1819, see *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, May, vol. ii. p. 183 *et seq.*; *Life of Place*, Wallas, p. 120.

¹ See vol. iii. p. 555; *ante*, p. 165.

² *American Commonwealth*, vol. i. p. 61.

³ It may be interesting to consult Gardiner's *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, vol. ii. chap. xxvi., pp. 244, 247, 253, 278 *et seq.*, 315.

the acts done under his authority by the direction of the Secretaries of State and of War. While I have not lighted upon an instance in which the President himself directed an arrest, he permitted them all; he stands responsible for the casting into prison of citizens of the United States on orders as arbitrary as the *lettres-de-cachet* of Louis XIV., instead of their apprehension, as in Great Britain in her crisis, on legal warrants.¹

The infractions of the Constitution caused concern to many Republicans, and were the subject of earnest debates at this session of the Senate. More notable was the special message to the Pennsylvania legislature of Curtin, one of the great "war governors," attached to Lincoln, and from the first a zealous supporter of the emancipation proclamation. In this message he protested by indirection, though with entire plainness, against the arbitrary acts of the government, and suggested that there was no need of infringing upon the

¹ Through the kindness of Thornton K. Lothrop, I have seen the originals of several orders for the arrest of persons and their commitment to Fort Warren or Fort Lafayette which were sent from the State and War Departments at Washington to the United States authorities in Boston. The following are examples: [Telegram] "Wash., Sept. 14, 1861. United States Marshal: Arrest Leonard Sturtevant and send him to Fort Lafayette, N. Y., and deliver him into custody of Col. Martin Burke. Wm. H. Seward"; [Telegram] "War Dept., Wash., Oct. 19, 1861. Richard H. Dana, Jr., U. S. Dist. Atty.: Send Wm. Pierce to Fort Lafayette. F. W. Seward"; [Telegram] "Wash., Sept. 2, 1864. United States Marshal: John M. Watson is in Boston, Number 2 Oliver Place. He will to-day or to-night receive goods from Lawrence, New York, probably nautical instruments, care of Winsor & Son, also clothes and letters from St. Denis Hotel. Watch him, look out for the clothes and letters, and seize them and arrest him when it is the right time. When arrested don't let him see or communicate with any one, but bring him immediately to Washington. The letters and goods should be had by all means. E. M. Stanton." Similar orders are printed in Marshall's *American Bastille*, and in O. R., series ii. vol. ii.

As to Great Britain see 34 Geo. 3, ch. 54, and the statutes continuing the suspension of the *habeas corpus* act. After a careful reading of the debates in Parliament, I believe that the restrictions in these statutes were observed by the government; but see Hobbhouse in House of Commons, Feb. 19, and Sheridan, Dec. 11, 1800.

Constitution.¹ Moved by this sentiment among Republicans, by the wholesome criticism of the Democrats, and the verdict of the ballot-box in the autumn of 1862, Congress passed an act which, although belated one year, is worthy of approbation. It authorized the President "during the present rebellion, . . . whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it," to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof. It directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War to furnish to the judges of the United States circuit and district courts lists of political prisoners now or hereafter confined within their jurisdiction, and made it the duty of the judge to discharge, after they had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States government, those prisoners against whom the grand jury in his jurisdiction at its regular session found no indictment. If the lists were not furnished within twenty days from the time of the arrest, and if no indictment were found, relief was provided for any citizen who suffered from the arbitrary action of the authorities.² Had this statute been strictly observed, no lasting hardship, nothing but transient injustice, would henceforward have been done.

I have said that Congress gave the President the control of the sword and the purse of the nation. Owing to the discouragement at the defeats in the field, the feeling of weariness at the duration of the war, and the improved state of business, which opened many avenues of lucrative employment, volunteering had practically ceased. To fill the armies some measure of compulsion was necessary, for the efforts at drafting by the States had not proved satisfactory. The

¹ This message of Feb. 12 is printed in the *Phila. Inquirer*, Feb. 13. The governor ended it thus: "I recommend the passage of a joint resolution earnestly requesting that Congress shall forthwith pass laws defining and punishing offences of the class above referred to, and providing for the fair and speedy trial, by an impartial jury, of persons charged with such offences in the loyal and undisturbed States, so that the guilty may justly suffer and the innocent be relieved." See *N. Y. World*, Feb. 14.

² Approved March 3; *ante*, p. 231.

Conscription Act,¹ now passed, operated directly on the people of the nation instead of through the medium of the States, which had previously been the machinery for raising troops. The country was divided into enrolment districts, corresponding in general to the congressional districts of the different States, each of which was in charge of a provost-marshal. At the head of these officers was a provost-marshal-general, whose office at Washington formed a separate bureau of the War Department. All persons subject to military duty² were to be enrolled, and provision was made for drafting men for the military service when necessary. Any person drafted could furnish a substitute or pay three hundred dollars to the government as an exemption.

The financial legislation was alike drastic. One year previously the country had started on the road of irredeemable legal-tender paper: there was now no turning back. The maw of our voracious treasury again needed filling. Spaulding,³ who spoke for the Committee of Ways and Means, said in the House: "Currency has been scarce all the time for the last eight months, and is now very difficult to be obtained in sufficient quantity to meet the business wants of the country. . . . Legal-tender notes are not plenty among the people, who are required to pay your taxes; they are continually asking for more. Why, then, should we be alarmed at a further issue of legal-tender notes? So long as they are wanted by the business of the country, demanded by the soldiers for their pay, begged for by all the needy creditors of the government, surely Congress ought not to hesitate in an exigency like the present. It is no time now to depress business operations, or hold back the pay due to honest creditors of the government. It is much better to stimulate, make

¹ Approved March 3.

² These were "all able-bodied male citizens of the United States" and foreigners intending to become citizens "between the ages of twenty and forty-five years." Sec. 2 of the act, which is chap. lxxv., provided for exemptions. Sec. 3 made a classification favorable to married men.

³ See vol. iii. p. 562.

money plenty, make it easy for people to pay their taxes, and easy for government to make loans.”¹

The difficulties were so great that there was confusion in the councils of the nation. The President, in approving, January 17, the joint resolution which authorized, or in fact under the existing circumstances directed, the Secretary of the Treasury to issue at once \$100,000,000 United States legal-tender notes for the prompt discharge of the arrears of pay due the soldiers and sailors, said in words which sound as if they had come from Chase: “I think it my duty to express my sincere regret that it has been found necessary to authorize so large an additional issue of United States notes, when this circulation and that of the suspended banks together have become already so redundant as to increase prices beyond real values, thereby augmenting the cost of living, to the injury of labor, and the cost of supplies, to the injury of the whole country.”²

Spaulding explained to the House that in the next eighteen months there must be borrowed \$1,000,000,000. The expenses of the government were \$2,500,000 a day, Sundays included. The receipts from customs, taxes, and other sources would not exceed \$600,000, leaving the balance, a daily outgo of \$1,900,000, to be obtained by borrowing of some kind.³ Congress, in what is known as the nine hundred million dollar loan act, authorized more bonds, more Treasury notes, bearing interest, which might be made a legal tender for their face value, more non-interest bearing United States legal tender notes, and a large amount of fractional currency to take the place of the imperfect substitutes issued in lieu of silver change, as silver had long since disappeared from circulation. It gave large discretionary powers to the Secretary of the Treasury. Before the constitutional meeting of the next

¹ Jan. 12, *Hist. of Legal-Tender Paper Money*, Spaulding, pp. 175, 176.

² Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 300.

³ Spaulding, p. 174; see, also, letter of Chase to Fessenden, Jan. 7, *Globe*, p. 270.

Congress, he might issue of the different forms of paper obligations authorized a total of \$900,000,000.¹

Congress, in pursuance of the recommendations of the President and Secretary of the Treasury, also passed at this session an act creating National Banks, which was the nucleus of our present system.²

¹ Chap. lxxiii., An Act to provide Ways and Means for the support of the Government.

² Approved Feb. 25. The course of the legislation constituting national banks is well seen in Dunbar's Laws of the U. S. on Currency, Finance, and Banking, pp. 171, 178. In the Theory and History of Banking (p. 134), Dunbar writes: "An act for the purpose was passed in Feb., 1863 (12 Statutes at Large, 665), but in many points of detail this proved to be so unsatisfactory and incomplete that only 134 banks were organized under it in the next nine months, and the number had risen to less than 450 in sixteen months. A revised act, making important changes, was therefore passed in June, 1864 (13 Statutes at Large, 99), and ample provision having been made under which banks chartered by the States could be reorganized as national banks, the extension of the new system went on rapidly. Its adoption was further stimulated by an act laying a tax of ten per cent. on all notes of State banks paid out by any bank after July 1, 1866 (13 *ibid.* 484). The certainty of the practical exclusion of all State banks from the field of circulation caused the speedy reorganization of the greater part of them as national banks; and thus the national system, numbering 1,634 banks on July 1, 1866, at once assumed the pre-eminence which it has easily maintained."

Spaulding (p. 187) writes: "No National Bank currency was issued until about the first of January, 1864. After that time it was gradually issued. On the first of July, 1864, the sum of \$25,825,695 had been issued; and on the 22d of April, 1865, shortly after the surrender of Gen. Lee, the whole amount of National Bank circulation issued to that time was only \$146,927,975. It will therefore be seen that comparatively little direct aid was realized from this currency until *after* the close of the war. All the channels of circulation were well filled up with the greenback notes, compound interest notes, and certificates of indebtedness, to the amount of over \$700,000,000, before the National Bank act got fairly into operation." I have not verified exactly these figures which Spaulding has used, but, from amounts given at other dates in the reports of the comptrollers of the currency, I have no doubt that they are correct. His deductions, which are the important matter, are undeniable.

Another act of importance at this session was the admittance of West Virginia into the Union "on an equal footing with the original States." This new State was carved out of Virginia, and was required to adopt a plan for the gradual abolishment of slavery. This condition being complied with, West Virginia became a State sixty days after April 20, by a proclamation

It is easier to criticise the legislative body of a democracy than to praise it. Especially is this true in a country as large as our own, with interests apparently so diverse; for even in 1863, although the West and the East were knit in devotion to the common purpose of the war, the variance between the sections at times cropped out. The policy of give and take in compromise, the essence of legislation, prevented Congress at this session¹ from satisfying any ideal, yet as a whole the work of the Republican majority deserves the highest commendation. They realized that only by victories in the field could the clouds of trouble and gloom be dispersed, and that they must show the country an agreement among themselves upon such measures as was their due contribution to military success. Their distrust of the President's ministers did not cease with the termination of the so-called cabinet crisis of December.² Thaddeus Stevens at one time thought of moving in a caucus of the Republicans of the House a resolution of want of confidence in the cabinet.³ The radicals were not reconciled to the retention of Seward, and continued their efforts to have him removed, although they did not allow the President's firm resolve to keep him to prevent them from voting the administration ample powers. All the Republicans in Congress were of the mind of John Sherman, who may be classed with those inclining to moderation. "I cannot respect some of the constituted authorities," he wrote his brother, the general, "yet I will cordially support and aid them while they are authorized to administer the government."⁴ Military success could be obtained only by

of the President in pursuance of the act of Congress. As to the constitutionality of this act, see the opinions of six members of his cabinet and Lincoln's own opinion, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 300 *et seq.* This measure is discussed in an interesting way by Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. i. p. 466.

¹ The session expired March 4.

² *Ante*, p. 203.

³ Diary of W. P. Cutler, entry Jan. 27.

⁴ Jan. 27, The Sherman Letters, p. 187.

giving the President extraordinary powers, and both senators and representatives perceived the inevitable and submitted to it.¹

The country's response to the work of Congress was heard in enthusiastic "war" or "Union" meetings held in many cities and towns in divers States. Those in New York were characteristic. Noted and popular Democrats addressed a "magnificent uprising of the people" at Cooper Institute. "Loyal National Leagues" or "Union Leagues" were formed, of which the test for membership was a brief emphatic pledge that was subscribed to by many thousands. These leagues held one large meeting at the Academy of Music, another at Cooper Institute, and still another to celebrate the anniversary of the firing on Fort Sumter. To this period belong the organization and the furthering of the Union League Clubs

¹ That this was also the case with other leaders of public opinion is shown by a private letter of Joseph Medill from Chicago to A. S. Hill, dated March 20: "Our view is, that we ought to do all we can to strengthen the hands of the administration until the crisis is past. . . . An awful responsibility rests upon our party. If it carries the war to a successful close, the people will continue it in power. If it fails, all is lost, Union, party, cause, freedom, and abolition of slavery. Hence we sustain Chase and his National Bank scheme, Stanton and his impulsiveness, Welles and his senility, and Lincoln and his slowness. Let us first get the ship out of the breakers; then court-martial the officers if they deserve it." — A. S. Hill papers, MS.

John Sherman's letter of March 20 to his brother as a summary of his work and opinion is interesting. "I opposed arbitrary arrests, general confiscation, the destruction of State lines and other extreme measures, and thereby have lost the confidence of some of my old friends. On the other hand, I have taken my full share in framing and supporting other great measures that have proved a success, and think I may fairly claim credit for many of the most valuable features of our financial system, which has been wonderfully sustained under enormous expenditure. I can also claim the paternity of the Bank Law yet to be tested by experience, and for the main features of the Conscription Law. This latter law is vital to our success, and although it was adopted with fear and trembling and only after all other expedients failed, yet I am confident it will be enforced with the general acquiescence of the people, and that through it we see the road to peace. But, after all, Congress cannot help us out of our difficulties. It may by its acts and omissions prolong the war, but there is no solution to it except through the military forces." — Sherman Letters, p. 195.

of Philadelphia and New York, and the Union Club of Boston, the object of their formation being distinctly patriotic.¹ There prevailed a feeling of comparative cheerfulness due to the energy with which Congress had buckled to the task of rescuing the country from the depression that followed Fredericksburg, to the excellent reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, and to the known confidence of the President and his cabinet in ultimate success.

When Congress assembled, the finances were at a low ebb. Many of the soldiers had not been paid for five months, and to all of them the paymaster was at least three months in arrears,² so that by January 7, 1863, the amount due the army and navy had probably reached the sum of sixty millions.³ The bonds of the government were not selling. Now all was changed. The Secretary of the Treasury had devised a plan of offering the five-twenty bonds⁴ to popular subscription through the employment of a competent and energetic general agent, who, by a system of sub-agencies, wide advertising, and

¹ The Union League Club of Philadelphia was organized December, 1862, and occupied the "League House," 1118 Chestnut Street, Feb. 23, 1863; the Union League Club of New York was organized Feb. 6, 1863; its club-house, No. 26 E. 17th Street, was opened May 12. The formal inception of the Union Club, Boston, was Feb. 4. "We want," said one of its founders, "a place where gentlemen may pass an evening without hearing copper-head talk." The club-house, No. 8 Park Street, was occupied Oct. 15. See *Hist. of the Union League of Philadelphia*, Lathrop; *A Brief Sketch of the Hist. of the Union Club, Boston*, Thorndike; *N. Y. Eve. Post*, May 16, 1863; *Boston Herald*, Jan. 8, 1899.

² "The troops have been paid with punctuality whenever funds were furnished for the purpose, nearly all having been paid to June 30, 1862, and many to Aug. 31." — Report of acting Paymaster-General U. S. Army; see, also, report of Secretary of War, Dec. 2, 1862. General Rosecrans wrote to Stanton from Nashville, Nov. 23, 1862: "Maj. Larned informs me that he needs \$1,000,000 to complete payment to this corps to Aug. 31. Many have been led by lack of pay to temporarily desert, to look after their families. They are poor men and much in need of money. Officers are without the means of subsistence. . . . Many regiments have received no pay for six months." — *O. R.*, vol. xx. part ii. p. 91.

³ Letter of Chase to Fessenden, chairman of Senate committee on finance, *Globe*, p. 270.

⁴ Authorized by the Act of Feb. 25, 1862, see vol. iii. pp. 563, 572.

other business methods, appealed to the mingled motives of patriotism and self-interest and induced the people to lend large amounts of money to the government. An impetus was given to this process by the general character of the financial legislation of Congress, and in particular by the clause in the nine hundred million dollar loan act which limited to July 1st the privilege of exchanging legal-tender notes for five-twenty bonds. Immediately after the adjournment of Congress the confidence of the people began to show itself by the purchase of these securities. By the end of March Chase told Sumner that he was contented with the condition of the finances,¹ and ere three months more had passed by, he could see that his popular loan was an assured success. The subscriptions averaged over three million dollars a day.² The Germans were likewise buying our bonds. April 26, Sumner wrote to the Duchess of Argyll: "The Secretary of War told me yesterday that our rolls showed eight hundred thousand men under arms, — all of them paid to February 28, better clothed and better fed than any soldiers ever before. . . . Besides our army, we have a credit which is adequate to all our needs; and we have powder and saltpetre sufficient for three years even if our ports should be closed, and five hundred thousand unused muskets in our arsenals, and the best armorers of the world producing them at the rate of fifty thousand a month."³ Again he wrote to John Bright: "The Democracy is falling into line with the government and insisting upon the most strenuous support of the war."⁴ In view of succeeding events this last is too strong for a historical statement, but it is undeniable that during the months of March and April there was a lull in the bitter opposition of the Democrats to the administration.⁵

¹ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 130.

² Belmont to Lord Rokeby, May 7, Letters privately printed, p. 85.

³ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 137.

⁴ March 30, *ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵ The "feeling for a vigorous prosecution of the war [is] stronger than ever, and [there is] a complete unanimity of feeling against foreign interven-

Yet all was not bright. The iron-clad fleet, which had been carefully and expensively fitted out, failed to reduce Fort Sumter to ruins and to take the city of Charleston, — a result confidently expected by the naval officers engaged, the department in Washington, and the people at large.¹ The tidings which came from another movement against Vicksburg, under the personal command of Grant, are spoken of as “bad news.”² “But,” Sumner wrote to Bright, “we are not disheartened. These are the vicissitudes of war. . . . Our only present anxiety comes from England. If England were really ‘neutral,’ our confidence would be complete.”³ The intelligence came that more cruisers for the Confederates were being built in British ports with the design of preying upon our mercantile marine. This news, together with the frequent reports of the capture and burning of our vessels by the *Alabama*, whose escape through the negligence, or as most people then believed through the unfriendly animus, of the British government, made the links of “England and our blazing ships”⁴ complete, and caused emotions of sorrow, anger, and bitterness which long endured.⁵

tion and any peace except upon the *basis of a reconstruction of the Union*. The violent language of Jefferson Davis and his organs has produced quite a reaction at the North, and has silenced entirely the few *peace-at-any-price* men who had sprung up after the elections of last November.” — Belmont to Lionel de Rothschild, April 3, Letters, p. 77. See, also, Belmont to Rokeby, May 7, *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹ The attack was made April 7.

² Sumner to Bright, April 7, Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 131.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The heading of an article in *N. Y. Times*, March 7.

⁵ Bryant wrote to Bigelow, Dec. 3, 1862: “The English have lost more ground in public opinion in America within the past year and a half than they can redeem in a century.” — *Life of Bryant*, Godwin, vol. ii. p. 183. August Belmont wrote Lord Rokeby, May 7: “The fitting out of armed war vessels like the *Alabama* and *Florida* . . . in your ports in open violation of the Queen's proclamation and the foreign enlistment act have produced a most painful feeling here.” — Letters privately printed, p. 83.

My authorities for this account other than those mentioned are: *N. Y. Tribune*, March 7, 10, 16, 21, April 13; *N. Y. World*, March 16; see, especially, articles in the *Boston Advertiser* of March 19, and the *Phila.*

We now come to the most celebrated case of arbitrary arrests during the war. Vallandigham is not an attractive character. Had his vehement opposition to the war been the bursting out of a soul which could not contain itself in view of the growing militant spirit of the people, of the corrupt and arbitrary methods of many in power, our sympathy might in a measure be drawn to him, as it goes out to many who in history have stood up for the rights of the minority. But his efforts were not spontaneous; indeed, if the traditions be true, he was cold, calculating, selfish, ambitious, vindictive. He lacked generous impulses. He accepted favors of pecuniary and other character, and when the chance came to return them which a gentleman of ordinary sense of gratitude would eagerly have embraced, he turned the cold shoulder. In any leader of men it is difficult to say how much is self-seeking, how much is patriotism; but there is reason to believe that in Vallandigham's mind the advancement of self dominated all other motives. His speeches and his action lend themselves to such a construction. In the first part of 1863 Horatio Seymour was the leader of the democracy. Had Vallandigham been content to follow, he would have taken the same line, acting in union with his colleagues in Congress, Pendleton and Cox, whose course approached the ideal of an opposition that I have set forth. But in that there was no leadership. By a violent and sensational antagonism, by making himself the exponent of the extreme Democrats of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, he might draw the party to him, he might become the chief of the Copperheads of the West. Such was his course, such the result. He was a man of parts, an attractive and bright public speaker. If it be true that he lacked sincerity, he imposed upon his fellow-citizens by the intensity of his utterances, the earnestness of

Inquirer, June 24; *Chicago Tribune*, May 16; Moore's *Reb. Rec.*, vol. vi. Diary, pp. 45, 48, 59, 62; Pierce's *Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 129 *et seq.*; *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1863, part i.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii.; the *Atlantic Coast*, Ammen; *The Mississippi*, Greene; Schuckers's *Chase*; *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury*, Dec. 10, 1863.

his manner. He has been compared to Charles James Fox. In the opposition of the Englishman to the war against the thirteen colonies, the likeness fails for obvious reasons, but a comparison is pertinent between Vallandigham opposing Lincoln and Fox opposing Pitt in the war with revolutionary France.¹ In every respect save in personal morals, Fox is nobler than Vallandigham. The Englishman had a warm heart, dearly loved his country, and was capable of making sacrifices for it;² the American placed self first and country afterwards. One of the cleverest and most widely read sketches that grew out of the war was that written by Edward Everett Hale, whose conception was vitalized by the career of the Ohio Copperhead: "The Man without a Country"³ struck the chord that recalled to the minds of the majority Vallandigham. When he was banished and on his way to the South, passing from the lines of one army to those of the other, a guard was needed to protect him from the fury of the Union soldiers, but no sentinels paced before his door as he slept in the domain of the Southern Confederacy.⁴

Better had it been to leave his punishment to public opinion. But Burnside, smarting under his defeat at Fredericksburg and the criticisms to which he was subject, had been assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati; and when he came in contact with the Copperheads of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, he began literally to breathe out threatenings. April 13 he issued his famous General Order No. 38, in which, after denouncing the penalty of death for certain overt acts in aid of the Confed-

¹ How it appeared to a contemporary is shown by Lord Sheffield's words of Jan. 23, 1793, to Gibbon: "Charles [Fox] seemed disposed to support the enemies of the country, against the country, as he and his Party did the last war." — *Private Letters of Gibbon*, vol. ii. p. 364.

² See, for example, Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*, part i., *passim*, especially p. 246.

³ Published in the *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1863. In thirteen years half a million copies of it were printed. See *The Man without a Country and its History*, Boston (1897).

⁴ *Life of Vallandigham* by his brother, pp. 298, 300.

erates, he said: "The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed. . . . It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department."¹ Vallandigham, who had long been obnoxious to the Union men of Ohio, was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor, and was continually making speeches which were undoubtedly a source of irritation to Burnside. May 1 a Democratic mass-meeting took place at Mount Vernon. There was a large procession of citizens in wagons. Hickory poles, an emblem of the party since Jackson's time, were used to bear the American flags, and the conventional thirty-four young women rode in a decorated wagon to represent the thirty-four States of the whole Union. What was new in such a Democratic assemblage was the large number of butternut badges and of pins that were made of the heads cut out of old copper cents, and were worn with pride. Vallandigham was the chief speaker, and aroused much enthusiasm from the many thousands who had gathered there from all parts of Knox County. Two of Burnside's captains in citizen's clothes were taking notes, which are the only reports of the speech, and are of little value as historical evidence, for detached sentences and isolated remarks fail to give the tenor of a discourse; but it was undoubtedly harsh and violent, and went as near giving "aid and comfort to the rebellion" as any talk could that proceeded from a good lawyer who knew the law. The captains' reports, however, were sufficient to convince Burnside that his General Order No. 38 had been grossly violated. Without consulting his subordinates or an attorney, he ordered his aide-de-camp to go to Dayton and arrest Vallandigham. The aide with a company of soldiers took a special train, and reached his house at half-past two in the morning.² They thundered at the doors, awaked the inmates, and, telling their errand, were refused admittance. They broke into the house, seized Vallandigham in his bed-chamber, and took him quickly

¹ O. R., vol. xxiii. part ii. p. 237.

² May 5.

to Cincinnati, where he was incarcerated in a military prison. May 6 he was brought before a military commission for trial. He denied the jurisdiction of the commission and refused to plead, but the trial went on. It lasted two days. There were two witnesses for the prosecution, the captains, and one for the defence, S. S. Cox, one of the speakers at the Mount Vernon meeting. There were no arguments, but Vallandigham made a protest. His attorney made application to the judge of the United States Circuit Court for a writ of *habeas corpus*, which was refused. May 16 the Commission found him guilty of "publicly expressing in violation of General Orders No. 38 . . . sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." The Commission sentenced him to close confinement during the continuance of the war. General Burnside approved the sentence, and designated Fort Warren as the prison. The President commuted it to banishment, and directed that he be sent beyond our military lines to the Southern Confederacy.

From the beginning to the end of these proceedings law and justice were set at naught. The offence for which Vallandigham was tried was the violation of an order of a major-general. The only possible authority for this order was the proclamation of the President of September 24, 1862, itself of doubtful constitutionality.¹ This proclamation was superseded by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, inasmuch as a later and joint act of Congress and the President in undoubted accordance with the Constitution² must abrogate an earlier decree of the President alone.

The right of General Burnside even to make the arrest may be questioned. The majority of the United States Supreme Court in the Milligan case maintained that the suspension of

¹ See p. 170.

² Opinion of Chief Justice Chase in the Milligan case, 4 Wallace, 133.

the writ of *habeas corpus* did not authorize the arrest of any one.¹ Conceding, however, this right, as it had hitherto been freely and recklessly exercised, the procedure should have been subject to the Acts of Congress of March 3, 1863, and July 17, 1862. The Secretary of War should have reported the arrest of Vallandigham to the United States judge of that jurisdiction, and if the grand jury found no indictment against him for giving "aid and comfort to the rebellion" or for any other offence, it became the duty of the judge to discharge the prisoner. The argument that southern Ohio was the theatre of war and therefore under martial law because Cincinnati and other parts of the State had been threatened in the autumn of 1862, cannot be maintained. The only safe rule is as old as the Parliament of Edward III.: "When the King's courts are open, it is a time of peace in judgment of law."² The United States courts were regularly open in the Southern District of Ohio. But, it is urged, a jury would not convict the prisoner. As the President said in illustration of this and in defence of his action: "A jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor."³ To dispense with "the sworn twelve" because they will not find a person guilty, would obviously be subversive of personal liberty. The government of England during her war with revolutionary France tried men regularly for sedition and for treason, and while most of them were acquitted amid the shouts and cheers of the London mob the ministry never made a proposition to declare the country under martial law and try the accused by a military tribunal. Happily for us we have a Supreme Court which reviews proceedings and has laid down principles too clear for dispute, that should have guided the President, his

¹ This case was decided December, 1866. The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Davis. On this question the court divided 5 to 4. See Garfield's argument, Works, vol. i. p. 143.

² Cited in the opinion of the court in the Milligan case, 4 Wallace, 128.

³ Letter to Erastus Corning and others, June 12, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 347.

Secretaries, and his generals during the civil conflict. The judges were unanimous in declaring that the military commission which tried Milligan was illegal. By a parity of reasoning it follows unquestionably that the military commission which tried and sentenced Vallandigham had not a vestige of legal standing. The commutation of the President was likewise vitiated in law.

The connection of Lincoln with this case is of interest. "In my own discretion," he wrote, "I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. . . . It gave me pain when I learned that he had been arrested (that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him)." ¹ But when the arrest was reported by Burnside, he sent a quasi-approval of it through a despatch of the Secretary of War; ² and later wrote: "All the cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but being done, all were for seeing you through with it." ³ There can be no question that from the legal point of view the President should have rescinded the sentence and released Vallandigham. He chose, however, to assume the responsibility of the arrest, and in his letter to the Albany and Ohio committees he made the strongest argument in its support of which the case admitted. To Erastus Corning of the Albany committee he said: "I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution and as indispensable to the public safety. . . . I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many. . . . Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by

¹ Letter to Erastus Corning and others, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 351.

² O. R., vol. xxiii. part ii. p. 316.

³ To Burnside, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 342.

getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting and then working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause for a wicked administration and contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert." ¹

While the Republicans of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, meeting one extreme opinion with another, generally approved of the arrest, trial, and sentence of Vallandigham, many of them, indeed, believing that the sentence was not severe enough and that he deserved hanging, still a large portion of the Republican press of the East condemned his arrest and the tribunal before which he was arraigned. Yet when the President commuted the sentence to banishment to the Southern Confederacy, which was regarded by the people as a huge joke, the proceeding found a greater degree of favor; and when he wrote the two letters in defence of it, ² he carried pretty nearly his whole party with him. While he was adroit and sincere in his reasoning, and went as far towards proving a bad case as the nature of things will permit, he did not take the view of the broad statesman we may note in his papers on compensation to the border States and on the emancipation of the slaves. He employed rather the arguments of the clever attorney and politician eager to seize the weak points of his adversary and bring out in shining contrast the strong features of his own case. We may wish, indeed, that the occasion which prompted these letters had not arisen, yet their tone demonstrated that the great principles of liberty would suffer no permanent harm while Abraham Lincoln was in the presidential chair. The mischief of the procedure lay in the precedent, even as his intimate friend and appointee, Justice David Davis, expressed it in the opinion of the court in the *Milligan* case: "Wicked men ambitious of power," he said, "with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln, and if

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 347 *et seq.*

² The letter to the Ohio committee is printed, *ibid.*, p. 360.

this right is conceded [that of a commander in a time of war to declare martial law within the lines of his military district and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of *his will*] and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”¹

The arrest and punishment of Vallandigham were not only contrary to the Constitution and statute, but were likewise bad policy. The Democratic press again became bitter in their criticism of the administration. Many public meetings were held condemning the “outrage.” Most of these were marked by propriety, but the one held in New York City, where blatant demagogues roused the feelings of the basest element, was, in view of what occurred later, an admonition of the care that should be taken by the constituted authorities to observe strictly the letter of the law.

Had it not been for his arrest, Vallandigham would have been obliged to make a contest for the Democratic nomination for governor; now it came to him spontaneously and with almost the unanimous voice of an earnest and enthusiastic convention.² After remaining awhile in the Southern States, he went by the way of Bermuda to Canada, whence he spoke as a martyr to his fellow-Democrats with a voice of greater power than if he had been able to declaim from the stump in every county of Ohio. It was a serious thing that such a man should become the candidate of a still powerful party in one of the most important States; indeed the hearty response to his nomination made it seem at first more than possible that he might be elected. True, he met with defeat by an overwhelming majority; but it was the victories of Meade and Grant that accomplished his overthrow, and they would have been potent in taking the sting from his words had he been roaming at will over his own State.³

¹ 4 Wallace, 125.

² The convention assembled at Columbus June 11.

³ My authorities for this account other than those mentioned are: Life of C. L. Vallandigham by his brother; Trial of C. L. Vallandigham by a Military Commission, Cincinnati (1863); J. D. Cox, Reminiscences, MS;

By the President's approval of the arrest of Vallandigham Burnside was induced to further acts of folly. He issued an order announcing that "the publication or circulation of books containing sentiments of a disloyal tendency comes clearly within reach of General Orders No. 38, and those who offend in this manner will be dealt with accordingly."¹ June 1 he promulgated General Order No. 84. The circulation of the *New York World*, it said, "is calculated to exert a pernicious and treasonable influence, and is therefore prohibited in this department. . . . On account of the repeated expression of disloyal and incendiary sentiments, the publication of the newspaper known as the *Chicago Times* is hereby suppressed."² Strange pronunciamientos were these to apply to the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, where there was no war, where the courts were open, where the people were living under the American Constitution and English law. Fortunately men bred in liberty do not easily forget their lessons.

June 3, at three o'clock in the morning vedettes galloped

Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1863; The *Quarterly Review*, January, 1897, p. 215; *N. Y. Times*, May 8, 19, 20, June 13, 15; *Tribune*, May 15, 18, 22, June 13; *World*, May 6, 19, 25, June 12; *Herald*, May 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, June 11, 13; *Eve. Post*, May 14, 19, 21, June 15; *Columbus Crisis*, May 13, 20, 27, June 3, 17, Letter from Mt. Vernon, May 2; *Chicago Tribune*, May 6, 19, June 13, Agate's letter to *Cincinnati Gazette*, June 11; *Nat. Intelligencer*, May 27, June 16, 20; *Boston Advertiser*, May 19, 20, 22, June 13, 16; *Boston Courier*, May 7, 19, June 12, 13; *Cincinnati Commercial*, May 6, 8, 15, 19, 22, 26, June 1.

¹ June 2, O. R., vol. xxiii. part ii. p. 382.

² *Ibid.*, p. 381. I add a contemporaneous opinion on the *Chicago Times*, and one written after the close of the war: "Upwards of eighteen months that sheet had poured forth one continuous flood of disloyal and incendiary sentiments. It had gone beyond any print, North or South, in its opposition to the war and in its devotion to the interests of the rebellion." — *Chicago Tribune*, June 5. "Chief among these instigators of insurrection and treason, the foul and damnable reservoir which supplied the lesser sewers with political filth, falsehood, and treason, has been the *Chicago Times*, — a newspaper which would not have needed to change its course an atom if its place of publication had been Richmond or Charleston instead of Chicago." — Report of Acting Asst. Provost-Marshal-General of Illinois, Aug. 9, 1865.

up to the Chicago *Times* office in Chicago. An hour later two companies of infantry arrived from Camp Douglas, took possession of the office, stopped the press, destroyed the newspapers which had been printed, placed a guard over the establishment, and patrolled the entire block during the remainder of the night. At noon a meeting of prominent citizens of both parties was held in the room of the Circuit Court. The mayor presided. By a unanimous vote the President was requested to rescind the order of General Burnside suppressing the Chicago *Times*. To the telegram to Washington which imparted this action Senator Trumbull and Representative Arnold¹ added: "We respectfully ask for the above the serious and prompt consideration of the President."² The legislature was in session at Springfield, and the House of Representatives denounced by resolution the Burnside order. In the evening, in Court House Square, Chicago, "twenty thousand loyal citizens," half of whom were Republicans, assembled to hear speeches condemning the arbitrary act of the general, and resolved that the freedom of speech and of the press must not be infringed and that the military power must remain subordinate to the civil authority. The next day (June 4) the President rescinded the part of Burnside's order which suppressed the Chicago *Times*,³ and the Secretary of War directed the general to make no more arrests of civilians and suppress no more newspapers without conferring first with the War Department.⁴

Nothing can be a more striking condemnation of the President's course towards Vallandigham than his own action in the case of the Chicago *Times*. Even in this he deserves no credit for the initiative in right doing; for he simply responded to the outburst of sentiment in Chicago,⁵ which was beginning to spread over the whole North. Nevertheless, in

¹ Of Chicago.

² O. R., vol. xxiii. part ii. p. 385.

³ Ibid., p. 386. The general also revoked his order concerning the N. Y. *World*.

⁴ J. D. Cox's *Reminiscences*, MS.

⁵ See Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 525.

this censure of Lincoln it is well to remember that, overweighted by the heavy misfortunes of the last year, he came to the consideration of the Vollandigham case oppressed with anxiety at the terrible defeat of the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville.¹

¹ My authorities other than those mentioned are: *N. Y. Tribune*, June 6; *Times*, June 12, 13; *Columbus Crisis*, June 10; *Chicago Tribune*, June 4, 5; *Boston Advertiser*, June 6, 12.

CHAPTER XX

THE appointment of Hooker to the command of the Army of the Potomac was the President's own,¹ although it was plainly prompted by the sentiment of the rank and file and of the country which had been formed by the general's record as an excellent and dashing corps commander. But Halleck was opposed to it,² and a few of the higher officers of the Potomac army who had grown up with it felt that Lincoln had made an unwise choice. Curiously enough, Chase, who was the persistent friend of Hooker and had more than once urged that he be given the command in the place of McClellan, conceived an inkling of defects that might come to the surface if he held the supreme responsibility. When he lay in Washington recovering from his wound received at Antietam, Chase visited him, and the two conversed freely. The general had "less breadth of intellect" than the Secretary had expected. His surgeon and devoted friend gave to Chase this estimate of him: "Brave, energetic, full of life, skilful on the field, not comprehensive enough, perhaps, for the plan and conduct of a great campaign."³

The appointment of Hooker, although a natural choice, was none the less a mistake. The day after it was made the President wrote him a remarkable letter. "There are some things in regard to which," he said, "I am not quite satisfied with you. . . . I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a

¹ O. R., vol. xxi. p. 1009.

² C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 175.

³ Warden, *Life of Chase*, p. 488.

great wrong to the country and to a meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. . . . Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success and I will risk the dictatorship. . . . I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. . . . Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.”¹

When Hooker took command, the Army of the Potomac had through continued defeats become “quite disheartened and almost sulky.”² The number of absentees was enormous, and desertions were frequent. “So anxious were parents, wives, brothers, and sisters to relieve their kindred that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen clothing to assist them in escaping from the service.”³ The general went to work energetically to correct these evils. His eminent talent for organization was felt throughout the army. “I have never known men to change from a condition of the lowest depression to that of a healthy fighting state in so short a time,” wrote General Couch, one of his severest critics after Chancellorsville.⁴ A feeling of confidence grew up in the camp, while the labor of the general and its results were understood by the country. The people of the North took hope again, and their temper was buoyant as they looked forward to success.

Early in April Hooker considered his army in condition to take the offensive. He was hastened in his determination by the knowledge that the term of service of 23,000 nine months’

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 306.

² Couch, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 154.

³ Hooker's testimony, C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 112.

⁴ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 119.

and two years' men would soon expire.¹ Encamped on the north bank of the Rappahannock River, he had 130,000 troops to oppose Lee's 60,000, who were at Fredericksburg: the Army of Northern Virginia had been weakened by the detachment of Longstreet and part of his corps. Hooker ordered his cavalry to advance towards Richmond for the purpose of severing the communications of the Confederates, but owing to heavy rains and high water in the river, these troops were delayed and were of no assistance to him in his operations. He was not able to wait for them to perform their part. April 27 three corps were put in motion; they crossed the Rappahannock thirty miles above Fredericksburg, then forded the Rapidan and marched to Chancellorsville on the south side of these rivers. To mask the main movement, General John Sedgwick with his corps forced the passage of the Rappahannock a short distance below Fredericksburg. Meanwhile the Second Corps under Couch had crossed the river at the United States ford and had reached Chancellorsville. There on the night of April 30 four corps were assembled with General Hooker in person in command. "It had been," writes Couch, "a brilliantly conceived and executed movement. . . . All of the army lying there that night were in exuberant spirits at the success of their general in getting 'on the other side' without fighting for a position. As I rode into Chancellorsville that night, the general hilarity pervading the camps was particularly noticeable; the soldiers, while chopping wood and lighting fires, were singing merry songs and indulging in peppery camp jokes."² Hooker was full of confidence which displayed itself in a boastful order. "The operations of the last three days," he declared, "have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."³ That "with

¹ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 243. But see Hooker's testimony, C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 113.

² Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 157.

³ O. R., vol. xxv. part i. p. 171.



twice the weight of arm and as keen a blade,"¹ and in spite of the splendid initiative, the Army of the Potomac met with disaster, is easily understood. Hooker was completely outgeneralled by Lee. The Confederate commander had the perfect co-operation of Jackson, while the shortcomings of the Union general were aggravated by the carelessness of Howard, the commander of the Eleventh Corps.

Lee had early information of all of Hooker's movements, and by the afternoon of April 30 divined that his object was to turn the Confederate left. He ordered an advance to meet the Union troops who had taken position at Chancellorsville. When they pushed forward from the Wilderness, May 1, the enemy, instead of flying ingloriously, resisted and took the offensive. Hooker lost nerve and issued an order to his men to fall back. He had better left the movement to his corps and division commanders, who were at one in the opinion that they should make a vigorous attempt to hold the ground in the open country which they had gained. "My God," exclaimed Meade, "if we can't hold the top of a hill, we certainly cannot hold the bottom of it."² Hooker's own explanation of his decision to retreat is unsatisfactory. To abandon the offensive and take up a line of defence, when he had two men to his opponents' one and knew it, was certainly a glaring fault of generalship. Couch heard the reason of it from his own lips, and "retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man."³ All but one of the military writers with whom I am acquainted agree that the retrograde movement was unnecessary, that it was the abandonment of the prime object of the campaign, and demoralizing to officers and soldiers.⁴ This note of

¹ T. A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, p. 5.

² Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*, p. 224.

³ *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 161; Hooker's testimony, C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 125. For Hooker's explanation of the retrograde movement, see his despatches to Butterfield, May 1, O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. pp. 326, 328.

⁴ The exception is Hamlin. See the *Battle of Chancellorsville*, p. 10.

despair must have run through rank and file: "It is no use. No matter who is given us, we can't whip Bobby Lee."

Hooker's position of defence was in the Wilderness, a tangled forest, an almost impenetrable thicket of dwarf oak and shrubbery.¹ He deemed it a strong one, and so did Lee, who considered that a direct attack upon the Union army, which Hooker was hoping for, "would be attended with great difficulty and loss."² On the night of May 1 Lee and Stonewall Jackson might have been seen seated on two old cracker-boxes taking counsel together. The result of the deliberation evinced their supreme contempt for the generalship of their opponent, for, in the presence of superior numbers, they decided to divide their own forces. Early on the morning of May 2 Jackson, "the great flanker," with thirty thousand men started on a march which took him half-way around the Union army, his design being to attack its right, which was held by Howard and his Eleventh Corps. Hooker was up betimes, making an inspection of his lines, which resulted in a joint order to Howard and Slocum,³ written at 9.30 A. M., warning them to be prepared against a flank attack of the enemy.⁴ Jackson's column, marching along, was plainly seen by our men.⁵ The movement might be interpreted in two ways, — either that the Confederates were on the retreat southward, or that they were on their way to attack our right. Frequent reports of the progress of Jackson's column came to Hooker and to Howard, but they could see it in one light only, — that the enemy was retiring before the superior force which threatened him. At noon Sickles, who had brought

¹ Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 668.

² Hooker to Butterfield, May 1, Lee to Davis, May 2, Lee's report, O. R., vol. xxv. part i. pp. 797, 798; part ii. pp. 328, 765.

³ Commanding the 12th Corps.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 360.

⁵ "This continuous column was observed for three hours." — Sickles, *ibid.*, part i. p. 386. "In the course of the forenoon I was informed that large columns of the enemy could be seen from General Devens's headquarters . . . at a distance of about two miles or over. I observed them plainly as they moved on." — Schurz, p. 652.

his corps across the river the previous day, received orders to harass the movement; he captured some prisoners whose tale indicated that Jackson was bent on fight, not on retreat. This certainly should have been strongly suspected from a study of the characters and past generalship of Jackson and Lee. Still Hooker would not be convinced. At 4.10 P. M. he sent word to Sedgwick: "We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them."¹ It was equally impossible to make Howard see the truth. Carl Schurz, who commanded a division in his corps, urged upon him that the facts pointed unmistakably to an attack from the west upon their right and rear, and advised earnestly that they execute a change of front in order to be ready for it. But Howard would issue no such command, although Schurz on his own responsibility did change in accordance with his judgment the position of two of his regiments. The Eleventh Corps had been further weakened by the detachment on an order from headquarters of a brigade to the support of Sickles.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, after a march of fifteen miles, Jackson reached the place for which he had set out. He was west of the Union army, on the side of it directly opposite the position occupied by General Lee. Losing no time in forming his troops in battle array, he was ready soon after five and gave the order to advance.

The Eleventh Corps lay quietly in position, unsuspecting danger. The opinion at headquarters and of their own commander controlled the other officers, with a few exceptions, and pervaded also the soldiers. Some of the men were getting supper ready, others were eating or resting, some were playing cards. The warning came from the wild rush of deer and rabbits driven from their lairs by the quick march of the Confederates through the Wilderness. Twenty-six thousand²

¹ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 363.

² As I have computed it, the number of infantry. The artillery and cavalry must have made his force nearly if not quite 30,000.

of Jackson's men, "the best infantry in existence, as tough, hardy, and full of spirit as they are ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-looking,"¹ surprised less than half their number. The officers and men of the Eleventh Corps in the main did well. But, asks Colonel Dodge, "what can be expected of new troops, taken by surprise and attacked in front, flank, and rear at once?"² After a brief resistance they ran.

It was a dearly bought victory for the Confederates. Jackson, busy in the endeavor to re-form his troops who had fallen into confusion from the charge through the thick and tangled wood, and eager to discover the intentions of Hooker, rode with his escort forward beyond his line of battle. Fired upon by the Federal troops, they turned about, and as they rode back in the obscurity of the night, were mistaken for Union horsemen and shot at by their own soldiers, Jackson receiving a mortal wound. The disability of the general undoubtedly prevented his victory from being more complete. Sickles was in jeopardy, but the night was clear and the moon nearly full, and he fought his way back, reoccupying his breastworks.

Hooker, despondent at the rout of the Eleventh Corps, was in mind and nerve unfit for the exercise of his great responsibility. The story of Sunday the 3d of May is that of an incompetent commander in a state of nervous collapse confronted by an able and alert general. Early in the morning Jackson's corps, yelling fiercely and crying "Remember Jackson," made the attack, seconded by the troops under Lee's immediate command. The Union soldiers resisted bravely. The efforts of officers and men were praiseworthy, but there was no head, and nothing was effective that emanated from headquarters. Thirty to thirty-five thousand fresh troops, near at hand and eager to fight, were not called into action.³ The parting injunction of Lincoln to Hooker on

¹ T. A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, p. 92.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³ Reynolds's corps, which crossed the river May 2, a portion of the 5th Corps, and Barlow's brigade of the 11th Corps make up this number.

his visit to the Army of the Potomac in April,¹ "In your next battle *put in all your men*,"² had gone unheeded.

Shortly after nine o'clock in the morning Hooker was knocked down and rendered senseless by a cannon ball striking a pillar of the veranda of Chancellor House, against which he was leaning; but at that time the battle was practically lost. "By 10 A. M." said Lee in his report, "we were in full possession of the field."³

On the evening of May 2, after the rout of Howard, Hooker sent word to Sedgwick to march toward Chancellorsville and be "in our vicinity at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee," the despatch continued, "and between us we will use him up."⁴ The commander had given Sedgwick an impossible undertaking. He was three miles below Fredericksburg on the south side of the river, and between him and Lee lay Early, with over 9000 men occupying places strongly fortified. He received the order at eleven at night, moved promptly, skirmishing as he advanced, and at daylight was in possession of Fredericksburg. To gain the road desired, he must take Marye's Heights, whence the Confederates the previous December had overwhelmed with slaughter Burnside's troops. Two storming columns were formed, flanked by the line of battle, and, advancing on the double quick under a destructive fire, carried the works on the heights, capturing guns and many prisoners.⁵ Sedgwick then marched towards Hooker; but ere this Hooker's battle of May 3 was over, with the result that he had been driven back from his position at Chancellorsville. Lee learned with much regret of the capture of Fredericksburg and Marye's Heights, and sent a

¹ The President reached Falmouth April 5, and remained there until the 10th. — *Nat. Intelligencer*.

² Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 120.

³ O. R., vol. xxv. part i. p. 800.

⁴ *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 365.

⁵ Marye's Heights was not occupied by so large a force nor so stubbornly defended as when Burnside met there his crushing defeat.

portion of his force to meet Sedgwick's corps. They joined battle at Salem Church, and the Confederates got the better of it. The next day, May 4, leaving Jackson's corps to hold Hooker in check, Lee late in the afternoon fell with 25,000 men upon Sedgwick's 20,000, who resisted the attack until nightfall. Sedgwick, considering that he was hemmed in by the enemy, took advantage of the permission contained in one of the conflicting despatches that crossed between him and his commander, and withdrew that night to the north bank of the Rappahannock. All that day Hooker had done nothing to relieve Sedgwick, although only 22,000 Confederates confronted his 80,000. After a council of war he decided to recross the river, and by the morning of May 6 this movement was accomplished safely and without molestation. The loss of the Union army in the Chancellorsville campaign was 17,287; that of the Confederates, 12,463.¹

While Jackson lay suffering from his wounds, pneumonia set in, and eight days after his signal victory over Howard, he died. The Confederates had better lost the battle than

¹ My authorities for this account are the reports of Lee, Stuart, Halleck, Warren, Couch, Sickles, Meade, Sedgwick, Howard, Schurz, Devens, O. R., vol. xxv. part i.; the Union and Confederate correspondence, *ibid.*, part ii.; T. A. Dodge's Chancellorsville; A. C. Hamlin's *ibid.*; Doubleday's *ibid.*; testimonies of Hooker, Butterfield, Warren, Sickles, Hancock, Devens, C. W., 1865, vol. i.; articles of Couch, Howard, Smith, Jackson, Colston, Benjamin, Hooker's comments on Chancellorsville, Century War Book, vol. iii.; Dabney's Jackson; Life of Jackson by his wife; Fitzhugh Lee's Lee; Taylor's *ibid.*; Long's *ibid.*; Hist. of the 2d Army Corps, Walker; Walker's Hancock; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. chap. iv.; Swinton, Army of the Potomac.

The report gained currency that Hooker's mental collapse was due to intoxication. This is gainsaid by the testimony of Pleasanton, C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 31; by Couch in his article, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 170. "The story is positively contradicted by all of the officers who were with Hooker during the battle." — Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 108 note. I have heard the same denial from two officers. The truth seems to be that Hooker was accustomed to drink a large amount of whiskey daily without being prevented from attending to his round of duties, but when he started on this campaign, or at all events on the day that he reached Chancellorsville, from motives which do him honor, he stopped drinking entirely.

this commander of genius. Nothing will as well round the conception of him which we have already acquired from following his successful career as the testimony of the ablest and noblest representative of the Southern cause. On hearing that he was wounded Lee wrote to him: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead."¹ After the war he declared, "Had I Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, I would have won a great victory."²

With the fervent abolitionist poet, we of the North may "let a tear fall on Stonewall's bier."³ He was the leader and the type of the very religious Scotch-Irish of the South, who, as we found out to our cost, were redoubtable fighters. They will never again meet us in civil strife; indeed in the war with Spain of 1898 the descendants of those who with sublime devotion had followed Stonewall Jackson responded to the common country's call.

Who may pretend to explain the incongruity of man? Both the conscientious Jackson and Barère, the man without a conscience, believed in waging war like barbarians. During the wars of the Revolution the Frenchman proposed to the Convention that no English or Hanoverian prisoners be taken.⁴ "I always thought," declared Jackson, that "we ought to meet the Federal invaders on the outer verge of just right and defence, and raise at once the black flag, viz., 'No quarter to the violators of our homes and firesides.' It would in the end have proved true humanity and mercy. The Bible is full of such wars, and it is the only policy that would bring the North to its senses."⁵

¹ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 769.

² Life of Lee, Fitzhugh Lee, p. 281. Longstreet wrote of Jackson's death: "The shock was a very severe one to men and officers, but the full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains of the beloved general had been sent home. The dark clouds of the future then began to lower above the Confederates." — Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 245.

³ Barbara Frietchie.

⁴ La Révolution, Taine, tome iii. pp. 248, 250.

⁵ Life of Jackson, by his wife, p. 310.

Owing to the censorship of the telegraph by the War Department, the news of the disaster at Chancellorsville reached the North slowly. When its full extent became known, discouragement ruled. Many men who were earnest in the support of the war gave up all idea that the South could be conquered. Nothing demonstrates more painfully the sense of failure of the North to find a successful general than the serious and apparently well-considered suggestion of the *Chicago Tribune* that Abraham Lincoln take the field as the actual commander of the Army of the Potomac. We sincerely believe, the writer of this article concluded, that "Old Abe" can lead our armies to victory. "If he does not, who will?"¹

Nevertheless, the gloom and sickness at heart so apparent after the first and second Bull Run, the defeat of McClellan before Richmond, and the battle of Fredericksburg are not discernible in anything like the same degree. It is true that the newspapers are not so accurate a reflection of public sentiment as they had been. There was unmistakably a large amount of editorial writing for the purpose of keeping up the hope of their readers; but even after the evidence of the newspapers is corrected by the recollections of contemporaries which are printed or still exist as tradition, it is impossible to resist the inference that the depression was different in kind and measure from that which had heretofore prevailed. Business, which had commenced to improve in the autumn of 1862, was now very active. An era of money-making had begun. It is seen in wild speculation on the stock exchanges, in legitimate transactions, and in the savings of the people finding an investment in the bonds of the government. Noticeable, also, is the sentiment that the war has helped trade and manufactures. The government was a large purchaser of material; one activity was breeding another; men honestly, and in some cases dishonestly, were gaining profits although the State was in distress. When

¹ May 23.

the news of the defeat at Chancellorsville reached New York, gold rose in price temporarily, but railroad stocks, at first unsettled, soon resumed their active advance, while government bonds remained steady and the subscriptions of the public to the five-twenties went on. That men had ceased to enlist was an indication alike of the weariness of the war and of the many opportunities of lucrative employment offered by the improvement of business. The war, so far as getting privates into the army was concerned, had become a trade. Men were induced to shoulder the musket by bounties from the national government, States, towns, and city wards.¹

¹ See N. Y. *Tribune*, May 4, 8, 11, 12, 14, 20; *Times*, May 7, 9; *World*, May 6, 7, 8, 11; *Herald*, May 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; *Boston Courier*, May 9; *Boston Advertiser*, May 14, 20; *Chicago Tribune*, May 5, 6, 8, 23; *Nat. Intelligencer*, May 9; *Phila. Inquirer*, May 8, 9.

Sumner wrote the Duchess of Argyll, June 2: "The North was never more prosperous; there is nothing in its streets or its fields to show the contest in which we are engaged. Wages are high, business is active, and every form of industry is well rewarded. The havoc of death reminds society of distant battles, and also the lame and maimed in the streets tell the same story." — *Pierce's Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 140.

The censorship of the telegraph demands more notice than the brief reference in the text. The first order that I have found in regard to it is July 8, 1861: "Henceforward the telegraph will convey no despatches concerning the operations of the Army not permitted by the Commanding General Winfield Scott. The above order is confirmed. — SIMON CAMERON." The second order is August 7, 1861: "By the fifty-seventh article of the Act of Congress entitled 'An act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States,' approved April 10, 1806, holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either directly or indirectly, is made punishable by death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial. Public safety requires strict enforcement of this article. It is therefore ordered that all correspondence and communication, verbally, or by writing, printing, or telegraphing, respecting operations of the Army or military movements on land or water, or respecting the troops, camps, arsenals, intrenchments, or military affairs within the several military districts, by which intelligence shall be directly or indirectly given to the enemy without the authority and sanction of the major-general in command, be, and the same are, absolutely prohibited, and from and after the date of this order persons violating the same will be proceeded against under the fifty-seventh article of war. — SIMON CAMERON. Approved: A. LINCOLN." — MS. War Dep't Archives.

Stanton issued an order Feb. 25, 1862, declaring that the President took

After the battle of Chancellorsville, Lee gave his army a rest of some weeks. He employed the time in its reorganization, dividing it into three corps, each of three divisions, commanded respectively by Longstreet,¹ Ewell, and A. P. Hill. Believing that nothing was to be gained by his army "remaining quietly on the defensive,"² he decided, with the approval of Davis, on the invasion of Pennsylvania. This movement would at all events, by threatening Washington and drawing Hooker in pursuit of him, relieve Virginia of

"military possession of all the telegraphic lines in the United States." "All newspaper editors and publishers [were] forbidden to publish any intelligence received by telegraph or otherwise respecting military operations by the U. S. forces" unless "expressly authorized by the War Department" or by commanding generals. "If [this order is] violated by any paper issued to-morrow seize the whole edition," was the word sent by Stanton that day to all important cities. O. R., Series III. vol. i. p. 899. The newspapers complained of the censorship in the summer of 1862, also in Dec., when Seward resigned. At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville their complaints became bitter. I cite the expressions of three which supported the administration. "What does the government mean by this persistent suppression of telegraphic war despatches from Washington? The whole country is in an agony of expectation to know the progress of the tremendous combat which is going on in Virginia. Why should it not be allowed to know? We have too much respect for the members of the Cabinet to suppose for a moment that it is done for the benefit of stock-jobbers, and yet the whole effect of it is to give them the opportunities they so much desire." — *N. Y. Eve. Post*, May 5. "The distressing uncertainty which prevails as to the position of affairs on the Rappahannock is a sufficient illustration of the ill effects of the present system of dealing with military intelligence." — *Boston Advertiser*, May 14. "In the absence of any authentic or official news from the Army of the Potomac, our contemporaries at the North are very soundly berating the Secretary of War because of the 'Military Censorship' he established over the transmission of intelligence relating to the advance, progress, and retreat of General Hooker on the occasion of his recent brief campaign. And from the uniformity as well as the number of the complaints uttered on this source, we are left to infer that the manner in which the embargo upon despatches as to military affairs was carried out during the late operations has met with very general censure, even from those who are most liberal in their views as to the supervision that may be judiciously exercised by the Government." — *Nat. Intelligencer*, May 19.

¹ After the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet with his detachment joined Lee; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. i. p. 291.

² Lee to Seddon, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 868.

the presence of a hostile army. But after such victories as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville he would have been modest past belief had not his expectations gone far beyond so easy an achievement. He hoped to fight the Army of the Potomac on favorable conditions. With his own well-disciplined troops in high spirits and full of confidence in their leader, he could not have entertained an idea that the result would be other than a Confederate victory: perhaps even he might destroy the Union army, when Washington would be at his mercy and he could conquer a peace on Northern soil. Nothing at this time so disturbed the Southern high councils as the operations of Grant against Vicksburg. More than one project was proposed to save it from capture, but no diversion in its favor could be so effectual as the taking of the federal capital. If ever an aggressive movement with so high an object were to be made, now was the time. Not only was it to take advantage of the flush of Confederate success, but the South by delay would lose its efficiency for the offensive. "Our resources in men are constantly diminishing," wrote Lee to Davis, "and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting."¹ We have had frequent occasion to admire the ability and decision of Lee. To those qualities were joined uncommon industry and attention to detail. He was a constant and careful reader of the Northern newspapers, and from the mass of news comment and speculation he drew many correct inferences, and hardly lost sight of any of the conditions which should be taken into account by him who would play well the game of war. He meditated on the weariness of the contest so largely felt at the North and the growing strength of the Democrats, due in the main to Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. "We should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies," he wrote to Davis. We should "give all the encouragement we can, consistently with the truth, to the

¹ June 10, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 881.

rising peace party of the North. Nor do I think we should, in this connection, make nice distinctions between those who declare for peace unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means of restoring the Union, however much we may prefer the former."¹ Lee must have followed with interest the career of Vallandigham, his arrest, trial, and banishment, and he must have noted the indignant protest that went up from the party opposed to the administration and the mild censure from some of its friends, both of which grew in strength with the suppression of the *Chicago Times*.

June 3 Lee began to move his army from the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and one week later put Ewell's corps in motion for the Shenandoah valley. Ewell drove the Union troops from Winchester and Martinsburg, and on the 15th part of his corps crossed the Potomac, the rest of it soon following. Hill and Longstreet moved forward, and by June 26 their corps had passed over the river and were in Maryland.

Hooker early suspected Lee's project of invasion, and when the movement commenced thought that he ought to attack the rear of the enemy: this operation he suggested to the President.² "I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you," Lincoln replied, "and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs in front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."³ When Lee's

¹ June 10, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 881. What follows shows that Lee favored no peace except on the condition of the acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern Confederacy.

² June 5, 11.30 A. M., *ibid.*, part i. p. 30.

³ June 5, 4 P. M., *ibid.*, p. 31.

plan of operations was further disclosed, Hooker proposed to march "to Richmond at once." He felt sure that he could take it, thus "giving the rebellion a mortal blow."¹ Lincoln's reply was prompt. "If left to me," he said, "I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications and with them your army would be ruined. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your sure objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your line while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."²

In these despatches Lincoln exhibits common-sense. His diligent reading of military books, the acquirement of knowledge from his generals when occasion offered, the study of the field of war, the close observation of the campaigns and battles of his armies had borne fruit, making him now the best of counsellors in the relation of the civil commander-in-chief to his officers of technical training and experience. Especially at this time was such counsel necessary from a chief who possessed tact and knowledge of men. The relations between Halleck and Hooker were strained. There was a lack of the harmonious co-operation requisite between those holding so responsible positions.³ "Almost every request I made of General Halleck was refused," testified Hooker,⁴ while Halleck complained that Hooker reported directly to the President.⁵ The correspondence between the two generals is marked with acerbity. Moreover, some of the corps and

¹ June 10, 2.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 34.

² June 10, 6.40 P. M., *ibid.*, p. 35.

³ "You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success." — Hooker, June 16, *ibid.*, p. 45. For Lincoln's reply, see *Complete Works*, vol. ii. pp. 354, 355.

⁴ C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 175.

⁵ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 506.


division commanders of the Army of the Potomac had lost confidence in their general.¹ This strained situation while the Army of Northern Virginia under its able leader was advancing into the heart of the North might well have dismayed many a stout soul. Lincoln met the crisis without faltering.

When Lee's northward movement seemed certain, Hooker broke up his camps on the Rappahannock. In his march to the Potomac his management and dispositions were excellent. The Confederates kept to the west of the Blue Ridge, he to the east, covering Washington constantly. Until this campaign the South had enjoyed the advantage of better cavalry: that superiority had now disappeared. This is one of many indications how surely the North was mastering the trade of war. The improvement in the Federal cavalry, which now did credit to the service, was in some degree due to Hooker, for it was a part of his efficient reorganization of the Army of the Potomac. During the march northward they met in combat several times the Confederate horsemen, and in the main fought successfully. Yet so obstinate were the contests and so skilful were the manœuvres that each body of horse acted as a screen to its army, and Lee and Hooker were each kept in ignorance of the movements of the enemy. Formerly it had been too frequently the case that the Confederate knew everything and the Union commander little or nothing.

Ewell waited at Hagerstown, Maryland, until Longstreet and Hill should be within supporting distance. June 22 he received orders allowing him to move forward. "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it," was one of the directions which came from Lee.² Ewell, advancing into Pennsylvania to Chambersburg, reached Carlisle on the 27th, and sent Early with one division to seize upon York. On the formal surrender of the town by the chief burgess and a deputation of citizens, Early laid it under contribution, receiving 1000 hats, 1200 pairs of shoes, 1000 socks, three days' rations of all kinds, and \$28,600 United States money. He destroyed between

¹ O. R., vol. xxv. part ii. p. 479.

² Ibid., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 914.



MAP SHOWING ROUTE OF EWELL'S CORPS FROM FREDERICKSBURG, VA., TO GETTYSBURG, PA., AND RETURN TO ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, VA.

Hanover Junction and York the Northern Central Railroad, which ran from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and sent an expedition to take possession of the Columbia bridge over the Susquehanna. He intended to march his division across it, cut the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, take Lancaster, make a requisition upon the town for supplies, and attack Harrisburg in the rear while the rest of Ewell's corps assailed it from the front. But a regiment of Pennsylvania militia in fleeing before the Confederates set fire to the bridge and destroyed it. Meanwhile Ewell sent forward his cavalry with a section of artillery to make a reconnaissance. They approached within three miles of Harrisburg, engaging the pickets of the militia forces assembled there under General Couch for its defence. June 29 Ewell had everything in readiness, and purposed moving on the defences of Harrisburg. Two days previously Longstreet and Hill had reached Chambersburg, and Lee was there in command. His whole army, numbering 75,000 men, was on Pennsylvania soil.

By the middle of June the movements of Lee in Virginia warned the North of the approaching invasion. The President called for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia,¹ the States regarded as in immediate danger. The Secretary of War asked help from the governors of thirteen of the other States. No response was so prompt, no action so effective, as that of Horatio Seymour of New York. "I will spare no effort to send you troops at once" was the word which came from him over the wires.² June 16 the Confederate cavalry were heard of at Chambersburg, and busy preparations were made to defend the threatened points. At first the surmise gained ground that Pittsburg was in jeopardy.³ Alarm spread through the city, business was suspended, shops were closed, factories stopped.

¹ Proclamation of June 15, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

³ "Lee's army is in motion towards the Shenandoah valley. Pittsburg and Wheeling should be put in defensible condition as rapidly as possible."
— Halleck to Brooks, June 14.

The citizens turned out in crowds to throw up intrenchments on the surrounding hills. One day it was reported that 14,000 were at work with picks and shovels, and these men were ready to take up rifles or man the batteries should the enemy appear. Mill-owners organized their laborers into companies, and the government furnished them arms and ammunition. A number of prominent citizens, representing the committee of public safety, requested the President to authorize Brooks, the general in command, to declare martial law, although Brooks thought this step unnecessary and unwise. Some desired that McClellan be placed in command of the militia for home defence; others urged the President to give them Frémont, who would inspire confidence and enthusiasm, and bring forward many thousand volunteers.¹

At one time there was some anxiety for Washington and Baltimore. Stuart in a cavalry raid passed between the Union army and these cities. It was in the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania, however, that the presence of the enemy was actually and painfully felt. Yet the Confederates under the immediate command of Lee committed little or no depredation and mischief. Before he himself crossed the river into Maryland, he wrote to Davis, "I shall continue to purchase all the supplies that are furnished me while north of the Potomac, impressing only when necessary,"² and he exerted himself to the utmost to have his wishes in this regard observed. His order of June 21 enjoined scrupulous respect for private property, and that of the 27th, after he had reached Chambersburg, manifested his satisfaction with his troops for their general good behavior, but mentioned that there had been "instances of forgetfulness," and warned them that such offenders should be brought to summary punishment.³ Military discipline, mercy, and the desire to do everything possible

¹ O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. pp. 143, 168, 188, 204, 240, 348; despatch from Pittsburg to Phila. *Inquirer*, June 23; N. Y. *Times*, June 26; Pittsburg *Gazette*, cited by N. Y. *Times*, June 27.

² June 23, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 298.

³ *Ibid.*, part iii. pp. 912, 942.

"to promote the pacific feeling" at the North¹ prompted him to such a course. It is true that the payment for supplies was made in Confederate money which turned out to be worthless, but in estimating his motives it must be remembered that he paid with the only currency that he had, a currency which bade fair to have a considerable value should his confident expectation of defeating the Union army on Pennsylvania soil be realized. No attestation of Lee's sincerity in issuing these orders is needed, but it is grateful to read in various Northern journals of the time words of praise of the Southern commanders for restraining their soldiers from "acts of wanton mischief and rapine."²

No matter how mercifully war may be carried on, it is at the best a rude game. At first the raid of the Confederate horsemen caused excitement in the Cumberland valley. The feeling of relief when they fell back was only temporary, and gave place to alarm and distress as Ewell's corps advanced, and later the rest of Lee's army. The country was wild with rumors. Men, women, and children fled before the enemy, and care was taken to run their horses out of the way of the invader. The refugees deemed themselves and their property safe when they had crossed the broad Susquehanna. The bridge over the river, the communication of the Cumberland valley with Harrisburg, was thronged with wagons laden with household goods and furniture. Negroes fled before the advancing host, fearing that they might be dragged back to slavery. June

¹ See Lee to Davis, June 25, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 930.

² *National Intelligencer*, June 30; *N. Y. Herald*, June 28; *Boston Courier*, June 23; *Columbia (Pa.)* despatch to *N. Y. Tribune*, June 29. This is all the more creditable to Lee as he did not believe that the Northern generals had shown the same forbearance. "I grieve over the desolation of the country and the distress to innocent women and children, occasioned by spiteful incursions of the enemy, unworthy of a civilized nation." — Lee to Seddon, June 13. In a letter of June 15 to Hunter, Lee speaks of the "outrages of our barbarous enemy. Their conduct is such as to excite the horror and detestation of the civilized world." — O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. pp. 886, 894. See, also, the charges in his order of June 27, when, however, he declares against any measure of retaliation. "We make war only upon armed men," he said. — *Ibid.*, p. 943.

26 Curtin, the governor of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation calling for 60,000 men to come forward promptly "to defend their soil, their families, and their firesides."¹ Harrisburg, the capital of the State, was indeed in danger, as was realized by the authorities and the citizens. Thirty regiments of Pennsylvania militia, besides artillery and cavalry, and nineteen regiments from New York² assembled under the command of General Couch, who disposed his forces to the best advantage, stationing a large portion of them for the defence of Harrisburg. In the city all places of business were closed, and citizens labored on the fortifications with the pick and the spade. Men were enrolled by wards and drilled in the park and on the streets. The railroad depot was a scene of excitement, caused by the arrival in large numbers of volunteers and the departure of women and frightened men. The progress of the enemy was pretty accurately known. Reports ran that he was twenty-three miles from the city, then eighteen. June 28 cannonading was heard for two hours, and every one knew that the Confederates were within four miles of the Capitol. Harrisburg would probably have been taken had not Ewell's corps been called back by Lee.³

If Harrisburg were captured it was thought that the Confederates would march on Philadelphia. Men well informed

¹ O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 347.

² "The President directs me to return his thanks to His Excellency Governor Seymour and his staff for their energetic and prompt action." — Stanton, June 18, *ibid.*, p. 205. "I cannot forbear expressing to you the deep obligation I feel for the prompt and candid support you have given to the Government in the present emergency. The energy, activity, and patriotism you have exhibited, I may be permitted personally and officially to acknowledge without arrogating any personal claims on my part in such service or to any service whatever." — Stanton to Seymour, June 27, *Public Record of H. Seymour*, p. 117. "The Governor of New York pushed forward his regiments with alacrity. They were generally armed and equipped ready for field service, and their arrival brought confidence." — Couch's report, July 15, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 214.

³ Couch's report and correspondence, *ibid.*, parts ii. and iii.; Harrisburg correspondence, *Phila. Inquirer*, June 16 to 28.

believed that Lee had nearly 100,000 men and 250 pieces of artillery.¹ A strong pressure in Philadelphia and elsewhere was brought to bear upon the President to place McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, or, at all events, of the militia for the defence of Pennsylvania. The *Washington National Intelligencer*, in an article entitled "A Calm Appeal," said, "After much reflection and with a full sense of the responsibility which it involves, we feel it our solemn duty at this juncture to avow the deliberate but earnest conviction that the President cannot by any one act do so much to restore the confidence of the nation as by the recall of General McClellan to the Army of the Potomac."² These words were the expression of a serious and powerful sentiment at the North. The board of Councilmen of New York City passed unanimously a resolution, Republicans as well as Democrats voting for it, asking for the restoration of McClellan to the command.³ It was reported that certain prominent citizens of Philadelphia had requested him to come to their city and "take military charge of things generally."⁴ Governor Parker telegraphed to the President that "The people of New Jersey want McClellan at the head of the Army of the Potomac. If that cannot be done, then we ask" that he be placed in command of the militia from New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania "defending these Middle States from invasion. If either appointment be made the people would rise *en masse*."⁵ A. K. McClure, a steadfast Republican and friend of the administration, urged that McClellan be given a command.⁶ The Common Council of Philadelphia asked it.⁷ When Governor Curtin made a speech in that city to rouse its citizens, he was interrupted by cries,

¹ Simon Cameron to Lincoln, June 29, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 409.

² June 18.

³ *Nat. Intelligencer*, June 23.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 391.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

⁶ McClure to Lincoln, June 30, *ibid.*, p. 436.

⁷ N. Y. *Tribune*, July 1.

"Give us McClellan."¹ A rumor got abroad in New York City that he had been made general-in-chief in the place of Halleck. He chanced to come to town that day from New Jersey, and was greeted with cheers from crowds of enthusiastic people.² But there was probably no thought of placing him at the head of the Army of the Potomac or of the militia in Pennsylvania. Lincoln replied kindly to Governor Parker: "I beg you to be assured that no one out of my position can know so well as if he were in it, the difficulties and involvements of replacing General McClellan in command, and this aside from any imputations upon him."³

On the evening of June 28 the rumor circulated in Philadelphia that the Confederates were shelling Harrisburg. Chestnut and Market streets were thronged with thousands of men eager for news. The next day two prominent citizens telegraphed to the President that they had reliable information that the enemy in large force was marching upon Philadelphia. Other men of influence desired him to give the general in command authority to declare martial law. Business stopped. The merchants, the manufacturers of iron, the proprietors of machine shops, the coal operators held meetings, and offered inducements to their workmen to enlist for the defence of the State. The members of the Corn Exchange furnished five companies. A meeting of the soldiers of the War of 1812 and another of clergymen were held to offer their services for home defence. It was said that bankers and merchants were

¹ N. Y. *Tribune*, July 2.

² N. Y. *Herald*, July 1. Less than a month before, Thurlow Weed had endeavored without success to induce McClellan to identify himself with the Union party. — Life of Weed, vol. ii. p. 428; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 247.

³ June 30, O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 437. One gets an inkling of this from the comment of the N. Y. *Eve. Post* on the *Nat. Int.* article of June 18. It said, June 23: "The utter rout and annihilation of the Army of the Potomac by the rebel forces under Lee in a pitched battle would not be a severer blow to the hopes of the friends of the Union than such an act of folly on the part of Lincoln," — *i. e.*, the restoration of McClellan to the command.

making preparations to remove specie and other valuables from the city. Receipts and shipments on the Pennsylvania Railroad were suspended. With all the disturbance and alarm there was no panic. The excitement was at its height from June 27 to July 1. July 1 the sale of government fifties for the day amounted to \$1,700,000. Few trains were running on the eastern division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and it was expected that the track would in many places be destroyed, yet the shares of this company sold in Philadelphia at 61 $\frac{3}{4}$ June 27, and at 60 July 1, on a par basis of 50, — a fact as worthy of report as the story of Livy that the ground on which Hannibal encamped his army three miles from Rome, happening at that very time to be sold, brought a price none the lower on account of its possession by the invader.¹ While gold advanced in New York, there was no panic in the stock market.²

When the alarm at the invasion of Pennsylvania was at its height, when every man in the North tremblingly took up his morning newspaper and with a sinking heart watched the daily bulletins, the intelligence came that there had been a change in commanders of the Army of the Potomac.³ Those in authority depended for the salvation of Harrisburg, Baltimore, and Washington on this army, which the public with its half-knowledge of the situation also felt to be their mainstay.⁴

Hooker, following upon Lee's right flank and covering

¹ Book xxvi. c. xi.

² O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. pp. 366, 409; Phila. *Inquirer*, June 29, 30, July 1, 2; Boston *Advertiser*, N. Y. *Times*, *World*, *Tribune*, July 1. Pennsylvania Railroad sold no lower than 60 on the regular board June 29, 125 shares were sold outside of the board at 55. June 30 there were no transactions.

³ This news appeared in the N. Y. journals of June 30.

⁴ "Neither this capital nor Harper's Ferry could long hold out against a large force. They must depend for their security very much upon the co-operation of your army." — Halleck to Hooker, June 5, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 32. "My whole force organized is perhaps 16,000 men. Five thousand regulars will whip them all to pieces in an open field." — Couch to Stanton, Harrisburg, June 29, *ibid.*, part iii. p. 407.

Washington, crossed the Potomac,¹ and June 27 made his headquarters at Frederick, Maryland. He proposed to strike Lee's line of communications with Richmond, and desired the garrison of 10,000, holding Maryland Heights, which commanded Harper's Ferry, as a reinforcement to the corps he had ordered to march west for that purpose. "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned?" he asked Halleck.² "I cannot approve their abandonment," was the answer, "except in case of absolute necessity."³ Hooker wrote a reply proving that the troops in question were "of no earthly account at Harper's Ferry," while, if placed at his disposition, they might be used to advantage. He ended his despatch with begging that it be presented to the President and the Secretary of War. Immediately after he had sent it, his growing anger at what he considered the unwise and shackling instructions of the general-in-chief prompted him to write, apparently in a fit of petulance, a second despatch asking to be relieved of his position.⁴ Halleck received the second telegram five minutes after the first, and referred it to the President. Lincoln made up his mind quickly, and sent an officer to the Army of the Potomac with an order relieving Hooker and appointing in his place George G. Meade. It was an excellent choice. Meade looked like a student, had scholarly habits, was an officer of courage and ability, and commanded now the Fifth Corps, having served in the Potomac army with credit, even distinction. Receiving the communication from the President late on the night of June 27 or early the next morning, he answered it at 7 A. M. in a tone of genuineness which betokened confidence. "As a soldier," he said, "I obey the order placing me in command of this army, and to the utmost of my ability will

¹ June 25, 26.

² June 26, 7 P. M., O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 58.

³ June 27, 10.30 A. M., *ibid.*, p. 59.

⁴ Both of these despatches are noted as having been sent at 1 P. M. June 27.

execute it.”¹ The appointment was satisfactory to the officers of the army. Although the risk was great in making a change of generals at so critical a moment, Fortune attended the step and smiled on the new commander during the next five days which gave him fame.

“You are intrusted,” wrote Halleck to Meade, “with all the power which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer upon you, and you may rely upon our full support.” In answer to a specific inquiry, Meade received for a second time the permission to do as he pleased with the garrison on Maryland Heights.² He withdrew it, and posted the larger part of the troops at Frederick as a reserve.

He estimated Lee’s force at 80,000 to 100,000; his own he placed at the larger number.³ His resolution was prompt. June 29 and 30 he advanced northward, and by the evening of the 30th the First Corps had crossed the Pennsylvania line, while the Third and the Eleventh were in the northern part of Maryland; these three constituting the left wing of the army under the command of General Reynolds. The Twelfth Corps lay in Pennsylvania, but at some distance east of the First. Meade established his headquarters at Taneytown, Maryland, thirteen miles south of Gettysburg, retaining the Second and Fifth Corps within easy reach. The Sixth Corps was likewise in Maryland, but lay farther to the eastward, thirty-four miles from Gettysburg. Meade had been prompt to command, his subordinates zealous to obey. The officers, sinking for the moment all their rivalries and jealousies, were careful and untiring in their efforts, while the soldiers did wonders in making long and rapid marches in the hot sun and sultry air of the last days of June. The main idea of Meade had been “to find and fight the enemy,”⁴

¹ O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 61.

² June 27, 28, *ibid.*, pp. 61, 62, 63. In the controversy which has arisen on this subject, this is sometimes spoken of as the garrison at Harper’s Ferry.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 114.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

at the same time covering Baltimore and Washington. Hearing now that Lee was falling back and concentrating his army, he announced his present design in a despatch to Halleck. "The news proves my advance has answered its purpose," he said. "I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear on which the army can be rapidly concentrated." ¹

The first mistake in Lee's campaign arose from the absence of Stuart's cavalry. He had no accurate and speedy knowledge of the movements of the Federals. His own and Longstreet's instructions to Stuart lacked precision, and Stuart made an unwise use of his discretion. Forgetting perhaps that the main use of horsemen in an enemy's country is to serve as the eyes of the army, the spirit of adventure led him into a raid about the Union troops which lost him all communication with the Confederate army, so that Lee was in the dark as to the progress of his adversary. On the night of June 28 a scout brought word to him that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was advancing northward. His communications with Virginia were menaced, and he did not dare to let them be intercepted. He might indeed for a while live upon the country, but he could not in his position suffer the interruption of his supplies of ammunition. He called Ewell back from his projected attack upon Harrisburg, and ordered him as well as Longstreet and Hill to march to Gettysburg, on the east side of the South Mountain range.

July 1 Reynolds came in contact with the Confederates. Buford with his cavalry having the day before taken possession of Gettysburg and occupied Seminary Ridge west of the town was resisting their advance when Reynolds with the First Corps came to his assistance. Sending orders to Howard to advance promptly with the Eleventh, Reynolds selected the battle-field and opened the battle of Gettysburg, but he

¹ On Pipe Creek (Maryland). Meade's despatch is from Taneytown at noon, July 1.

did not live to see the result of his heroic stand. Before noon he received a bullet in his brain and died instantly. "The death of this splendid officer," writes Fitzhugh Lee with grace, "was regretted by friend and foe," and borrowing the words of another, he adds, "No man died on that field with more glory than he; yet many died, and there was much glory!"¹

After Reynolds's death matters went badly for the First and Eleventh Corps. They were "overborne by superior numbers and forced back through Gettysburg with great slaughter."² Buford's despatch of 3.20 P. M. points out an important reason for the defeat. "In my opinion," he said, "there seems to be no directing person."³ All was confusion and looked like disaster when Hancock arrived on the field. On hearing that Reynolds was killed, Meade, with his excellent judgment of the right man for the place, sent Hancock forward to take the command. He restored order and inspired confidence while the Union troops were placed in a strong position on Cemetery Hill east of the town. It is thought that if the Confederates had been prompt they might have carried the height, but the order to do so from Lee to Ewell was conditional, and with his force then present he did not deem the attempt practicable.⁴ Nevertheless, the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was a Confederate success.

Late in the afternoon of July 1 Slocum with the Twelfth Corps had arrived at Gettysburg. Sickles with the Third Corps marched thither with celerity and zeal. The reports of Hancock, Howard, and others decided Meade that Gettysburg was a good place to fight his battle, and he issued orders to all of his corps to concentrate at that point. He himself arrived upon the battle-field at one in the morning,⁵ pale, tired-looking, hollow-eyed, and worn out from want of sleep, anxiety, and the weight of responsibility.⁶

¹ Life of General Lee, p. 272.

² Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 264.

³ O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 925.

⁴ Ibid., part ii. p. 318.

⁵ July 2.

⁶ Doubleday, p. 156; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 246.

By the afternoon of July 2, Lee and Meade had their whole forces on the field,¹ the armies being about a mile apart. Lee had 70,000, Meade 93,500, less the losses of the first day, which had been much greater on the Union than on the Confederate side. The Confederates occupied Seminary Ridge in a line concave in form, the Federals Cemetery Ridge in a convex line, a position admirably adapted for defence. Meade decided to await attack, and if he had studied closely the character and history of his energetic adversary, he might have been almost certain that it would come. Longstreet, however, differed with his commander. In a conversation at the close of the first day's fight, he expressed a desire that their troops be thrown around the left of the Union army, interposing themselves between it and Washington and forcing Meade to take the offensive. The anxiety of Lee at receiving no information from his cavalry had become excitement, and, somewhat irritated at a suggestion contrary to what he had determined upon, he said, "No, the enemy is there and I am going to attack him."² From the commencement of his invasion, he had shown contempt of his foe. The stretching of his line from Fredericksburg to Winchester in the face of an opponent who had greater numbers can bear no other construction.³ While he deemed Meade a better general than Hooker, he thought that the change of commanders at this critical moment counterbalanced the advantage in generalship;⁴ and while he was astonished at the rapid and efficient movements of the Army

¹ The statements in regard to Pickett are not exactly the same, but I have followed Lee's report of January, 1864, in which he says that "Pickett's three brigades arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d." — O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 320.

² Longstreet's article, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 339.

³ Hunt's article, *ibid.*, p. 265; *Life of Lee*, Long, p. 271. Lincoln to Hooker, June 14: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg [north of Winchester] and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" — *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 352.

⁴ Long, p. 274.

of the Potomac after Meade took command, he had undoubtedly become convinced from his almost unvarying success that he and his army were invincible,—a confidence shared by nearly all of his officers and men. His victories on his own soil were extraordinary, but if we compare his campaigns of invasion with those of Napoleon we shall see how far he fell short when he undertook operations in an unfriendly country, although the troops that followed him were in fighting qualities unsurpassed. "Except in equipment," writes General Alexander, "I think a better army, better nerved up to its work, never marched upon a battle-field."¹ With such soldiers, if Lee had been as great a general as Napoleon, Gettysburg had been an Austerlitz, Washington and the Union had fallen.

Lee was up betimes on the morning of July 2, but the movements of his soldiers were slow, and he lost much of the advantage of his more speedy concentration than Meade's. The afternoon was well advanced when he began his attack, and by that time the last of the Union army, the Sixth Corps, which had marched thirty-four miles in eighteen hours, was arriving. There was tremendous fighting and heavy loss that afternoon on both wings of each army. On the Union side Warren and Humphreys distinguished themselves. Sickles was struck by a cannon ball that caused the loss of a leg and was borne from the field. The result of the day is accurately told by Lee: "We attempted to dislodge the enemy, and, though we gained some ground, we were unable to get possession of his position."² The Confederate assaults had been disjointed: to that mistake is ascribed their small success.

The feeling among the officers in Meade's camp that night was one of gloom. On the first day of the battle the First

¹ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 358.

² July 4, to Davis, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 298. Meade to Halleck, 8 P. M., July 2: "The enemy attacked me about 4 P. M. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded." — Ibid., part i. p. 72.

and Eleventh corps had been almost annihilated. On the second day the Fifth and part of the Second had been shattered; the Third, in the words of its commander who succeeded Sickles, was "used up and not in good condition to fight."¹ The loss of the army had been 20,000 men.² Only the Sixth and Twelfth corps were fresh. But the generals had not lost spirit, and in the council of war called by Meade all voted to "stay and fight it out."³ The rank and file had fought as Anglo-Saxons nearly always fight on their own soil. On the first day and the morning of the second the martial ardor of many of the men had been mingled with cheerfulness at the report that McClellan had been restored to his old command. "The boys are all jubilant over it," said a soldier to General Hunt, "for they know that if *he* takes command everything will go right."⁴ We may guess that on this gloomy night the men went over again in their minds the fate of their army when under Pope, Burnside, and Hooker it had encountered the veterans of Lee, but in spite of this doleful retrospect they must have felt in some measure "the spirit that animated general headquarters,"⁵ the energy of Meade and the faithful co-operation of his generals.

Meade had no thought of taking the offensive, and was busy in improving the natural defences of his position with earthworks. The partial successes of the Confederates⁶ determined Lee to continue the attack on the 3d of July. In the early morning there was fighting on the right of the Union line. Then followed an unnatural stillness. "The whole field became as silent as a churchyard until one

¹ Birney at the Council of War, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 74; Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, p. 185, note 1; Walker's Hancock, p. 130.

² C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 350.

³ The words of Slocum which summarize the decision, O. R., vol. xxvii, part i. p. 73.

⁴ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 301.

⁵ Gen. Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 99.

⁶ Well stated by Gen. Hunt, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 369.

o'clock." ¹ Suddenly came from the Confederate side the reports of two signal guns in quick succession. A bombardment from one hundred and fifteen cannon commenced, and was replied to by eighty guns of the Union army, whose convex line, advantageous in other respects, did not admit of their bringing into action a large part of their artillery. "It was a most terrific and appalling cannonade," said Hancock.² But it did little damage. The Union soldiers lay under the protection of stone walls, swells of the ground, and earthworks, and the projectiles of the enemy passed over their heads, sweeping the open ground in their rear. Everybody from the commanding general to the privates felt that this was only preliminary to an infantry charge, and all braced themselves for the tug of war. Hancock with his staff, his corps flag flying, rode deliberately along the front of his line,³ and by his coolness and his magnificent presence inspired his men with courage and determination. For an hour and a half this raging cannonade was kept up, when Hunt, the chief of the Union artillery, finding his ammunition running low, gave the order to cease firing. The Confederates thought that they had silenced the Federal batteries, and made preparation for their next move.

Longstreet had no sympathy with the vigorously offensive tactics of his chief; and when Lee on the morning of this July 3 directed him to be ready after the bombardment had done its work to make an attack with Pickett's fresh division reinforced from Hill's corps up to 15,000 men, he demurred, arguing that the assault could not succeed. Lee showed a little impatience, apparently made no reply, and by silence insisted on the execution of his order. Longstreet took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge, pointed out to him what was to be done, and left him with a heavy heart. Alexander of the artillery was directed to note carefully the effect of his fire, and when the favorable moment came to give

¹ Alexander, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 362.

² C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 410.

³ Walker's Hancock, p. 130.

Pickett the order to charge. He did not like this responsibility, and asked Longstreet for specific instructions, but the reply which came lacked precision. Still the artillery must open, and when the fire of the Federal guns had ceased, as has been related, Alexander, looking anxiously through his glass at the points whence it had proceeded, and observing no sign of life in the five minutes that followed, sent word to Pickett: "For God's sake, come quick. . . . Come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly."¹ Pickett went to Longstreet. "General, shall I advance?" he asked. Longstreet could not speak, but bowed in answer. "Sir," said Pickett, with a determined voice, "I shall lead my division forward."² Alexander had ceased firing. Longstreet rode to where he stood, and exclaimed: "I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now but that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed."³ But as he spoke Pickett at the head of his troops rode over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent down the slope. "As he passed me," writes Longstreet, "he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap raked well over on his right ear, and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed a holiday soldier."⁴ From the other side the Union soldiers watched the advance of Pickett and his fifteen thousand with suspense, with admiration. As they came forward steadily and in perfect order with banners flying, those who looked on might for the moment have thought it a Fourth of July parade.

The Confederates had nearly a mile to go across the valley. As they descended the slope on that clear afternoon under the July sun in full view of their foe, they received a dreadful fire from the Union batteries, which had been put in entire readiness to check such an onset. Steadily and coolly they advanced. After they had got away, the Confederate artillery reopened over their heads, in the effort to draw the deadly fire

¹ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 364.

² Ibid., p. 365.

³ Ibid., p. 345.

⁴ Ibid., p. 345.

directed at them from Cemetery Ridge; but the Union guns made no change in aim, and went on mowing down Pickett's men. Half-way across there was the shelter of a ravine. They stopped for a moment to breathe, then advanced again, still in good order. A storm of canister came. The slaughter was terrible. The left staggered; but, nothing daunted, Pickett and what was left of his own division of forty-nine hundred pressed on in the lead. The other divisions followed. Now the Union infantry opened fire. Pickett halted at musket range and discharged a volley, then rushed on up the slope. Near the Federal lines he made a pause "to close ranks and mass for a final plunge."¹ In the last assault Armistead, a brigade commander, pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waved his sword with his hat on it, shouted, "Give them the cold steel, boys!" and laid his hands upon a gun.² A hundred of his men had followed. They planted the Confederate battle-flags on Cemetery Ridge among the cannon they had captured and for the moment held. Armistead was shot down; Garnett and Kemper, Pickett's other brigadiers, fell. The wavering divisions of Hill's corps "seemed appalled, broke their ranks," and fell back. "The Federals swarmed around Pickett," writes Longstreet, "attacking on all sides, enveloped and broke up his command. They drove the fragments back upon our lines."³ Pickett gave the word to retreat.

The Confederates in their charge had struck the front of the Second Corps. Hancock, its commander, "the best tactician of the Potomac army,"⁴ showed the same reckless courage as Armistead, and seemed to be everywhere directing and encouraging his troops. Struck by a ball, he fell from his horse; and lying on the ground, "his wound spouting blood," he raised himself on his elbow and gave the order, "Go in,

¹ Longstreet, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 346.

² This is almost exactly quoted from Doubleday, p. 195.

³ *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 347.

⁴ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, p. 296.

Colonel, and give it to them on the flank.”¹ Not until the battle of Gettysburg was over did he resign himself to his surgeon, and shortly afterwards he dictated this despatch to Meade: “I have never seen a more formidable attack, and if the Sixth and Fifth corps have pressed up, the enemy will be destroyed. The enemy must be short of ammunition, as I was shot with a tenpenny nail.”² I did not leave the field till the victory was entirely secured and the enemy no longer in sight. I am badly wounded, though I trust not seriously. I had to break the line to attack the enemy in flank on my right, where the enemy was most persistent after the front attack was repelled. Not a rebel was in sight upright when I left.”³

Deery war as we may and ought, “breathes there the man with soul so dead” who would not thrill with emotion to claim for his countrymen the men who made that charge and the men who met it?⁴

Longstreet, calm and self-possessed, meriting the name “bulldog” applied to him by his soldiers,⁵ expected a counter attack, and made ready for it. Lee, entirely alone, rode up to encourage and rally his broken troops. “His face did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance,” recorded an English officer in his diary on the day of the battle, “and he was addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement, such as, ‘All this will come right in the end: we’ll talk it over afterwards, but in the mean time all good men must rally. We want all good and true men just now.’ He spoke to all the wounded men that passed him, and the slightly wounded he exhorted ‘to bind

¹ Walker's Hancock, p. 143.

² For an exact account of Hancock's wound, see *ibid.*, p. 148.

³ O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 366.

⁴ The loss of the Union army in the three days' battles was 3155 killed, 14,529 wounded, 5365 captured or missing, total 23,049; that of the Confederates, 3903 killed, 18,735 wounded, 5425 captured or missing, total 28,063. — Livermore, Numbers and Losses, p. 102.

⁵ Three Months in the Southern States, Lieut.-Col. Fremantle (N. Y. 1864), p. 266.

up their hurts and take up a musket' in this emergency. Very few failed to answer his appeal, and I saw many badly wounded men take off their hats and cheer him. He said to me, 'This has been a sad day for us, Colonel — a sad day; but we can't expect always to gain victories.' . . .

Notwithstanding the misfortune which had so suddenly befallen him, General Lee seemed to observe everything, however trivial. When a mounted officer began licking his horse for shying at the bursting of a shell, he called out, 'Don't whip him, Captain; don't whip him. I've got just such another foolish horse myself, and whipping does no good.' "

An officer almost angry came up to report the state of his brigade. "General Lee immediately shook hands with him and said cheerfully, 'Never mind, General, *all this has been MY fault* — it is *I* that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can.' " ¹

The Books are full of the discussion whether or not Meade should have made a counter-attack. Those who say he ought to have done this maintain that the Confederate army might have been destroyed. It is true that he did not appreciate the magnitude of his victory,² but ought the critic to demand from him any greater military sagacity than from Lee? The Confederate general under similar circumstances did not comprehend how badly he had beaten Burnside at Fredericksburg and did not follow up his great success.³

We need concern ourselves only for a moment with the controversy between Longstreet and the friends of Lee. It is clear that Longstreet did not give his commander the

¹ Three Months in the Southern States, Lieut.-Col. Fremantle (N. Y. 1864), p. 268.

² See his despatch to Halleck, July 3, 8.35 P. M., O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 74.

³ *Ante*, p. 198. Halleck wrote Grant, July 11: "Meade has thus far proved an excellent general, the only one, in fact, who has ever fought the Army of the Potomac well. He seems the right man in the right place. Hooker was more than a failure. Had he remained in command he would have lost the army and the capital." — *Ibid.*, vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 498.

hearty co-operation which the occasion demanded. On the other hand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to traverse his argument that Lee should have put some officer in charge of the movement who had confidence in the plan of attack, or, as so much depended on it, that the commander himself should have given to the operations of the third day his personal attention.¹ The champions of Lee maintain that his orders required the charge of Pickett to be made by a more powerful column than was sent across the valley under the murderous fire of the foe, and that Longstreet was at fault for neglecting to supply his remaining two divisions for the attack. Reduced to figures, it means that 23,000 instead of 15,000 should have made the assault.² They would have had to contend with 70,000 men, strongly intrenched, of whom two corps were fresh, whose generals were prepared and alert. There is no reason for thinking that the result would have been different. The comparison which is frequently made between Lee's attack at Gettysburg on the third day and Burnside's storming of Marye's Heights is a reproach to the generalship of the Confederate commander, and is keenly felt by his friends, who would all regard him infallible. Had it not been for the Gettysburg campaign, the intimations in Southern literature would be more frequent than they are that he is entitled to rank with Napoleon in the class of great commanders. But the likeness in military ability will halt before it is pushed far. Nevertheless, let the comparison of the emotions of Napoleon and Lee after disaster be made, and his countrymen will perceive what reason they have to revere the memory of the American. Thus he wrote, July 9, to Pickett: "No one grieves more than I do at the loss suffered by your noble division in the recent conflict, or honors it more for its bravery and gallantry."³ At the end of the account, said Napoleon in 1813, what has the Russian campaign cost

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 388.

² *Ibid.*, p. 398; Taylor, *Four Years with Gen. Lee*, p. 107.

³ O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 987.

me? 300,000 men, and what are the lives of a million to a man like me!¹

On the morning of the Fourth of July the people of the North received this word: "The President announces to the country that news from the Army of the Potomac, up to 10 P. M. of the 3d, is such as to cover that army with the highest honor, to promise a great success to the cause of the Union, and to claim the condolence of all for the many gallant fallen, and that for this he especially desires that on this day He whose will, not ours, should ever be done be everywhere remembered and revered with profoundest gratitude."² The rejoicing of the people was not boisterous; it took the character of supreme thankfulness for a great deliverance. The victory of Gettysburg demonstrated that Lee and his army were not invincible, and that the Confederates had lost in playing the card of an invasion of the North. Nothing ~~now~~ remained to them but a policy of stubborn defence. That this would likewise end in ruin was foreshadowed by the fateful event of the Fourth of July. Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant. Meade's sturdy and victorious resistance to attack was followed by the glorious end of the most brilliant offensive campaign of the war. Had the war been one between two nations, it would now have undoubtedly terminated in a treaty of peace, with conditions imposed largely by the more successful contestant.

The Fourth of July at Gettysburg passed in tranquillity. "Under the cover of the night and heavy rain,"³ Lee began his retreat. Meade followed. The President comprehended the importance and moral effect of the victory better than did his general. He may not have seen the remark of Napoleon in 1809, "In war the moral element and public opinion are half the battle;"⁴ but the fact he knew well. Nevertheless, he wrote Halleck at seven in the evening of July 6 from his

¹ Taine, *Le Régime Moderne*, tome i. p. 115.

² Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 365.

³ Meade to Halleck, 8.30 A. M. July 5, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 79.

⁴ Sloane's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 28.

country residence at the Soldiers' Home: "I left the telegraph office a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the phrase [Meade's] 'Drive the invaders from our soil.'" ¹ Mentioning other circumstances, he added: "These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter rejected." ² The next day he sent this word to Halleck: "We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work, so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over." ³ At the same time Halleck telegraphed Meade: "Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac." ⁴ He sent other telegrams, probably on the prompting of the President, urging Meade to attack the enemy, ⁵ but forwarded two despatches inconsistent with the importunity of the others. "Do not be influenced by any despatch from here against your own judgment," he said. "Regard them as suggestions only." Again he wrote: "I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle" until everything is ready. ⁶ Perhaps all of those telegrams which urged prompt action were the President's.

By July 11 Lee in his retreat had reached the Potomac, his army covering the river from Williamsport to Falling

¹ A paraphrase of the words of Meade in his congratulatory order of July 4. See O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 519. "This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan," he said; "it is the same spirit that moved him to claim a great victory because Pennsylvania and Maryland were safe. Will our generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil." — John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.

² O. R., vol. xxvii. part iii. p. 567.

³ July 7, *ibid.*, part i. p. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ July 8, *ibid.*, pp. 84, 85,

⁶ Halleck to Meade, July 9, 10, *ibid.*, pp. 88, 89.

Waters. Three days before he had written Davis: "A series of storms . . . has placed the river beyond fording stage, and the present storm will keep it so for at least a week. I shall therefore have to accept battle if the enemy offers it, whether I wish to or not. . . . I hope your Excellency will understand that I am not in the least discouraged, or that my faith in the protection of an all-merciful Providence or in the fortitude of this army is at all shaken." The condition of the army "is good, and its confidence unimpaired."¹ July 10 he sent confidentially this word to Stuart: "We must prepare for a vigorous battle, and trust in the mercy of God and the valor of our troops."² July 12, after he had taken up his very strong position on the Potomac, he wrote Davis: "But for the power the enemy possesses of accumulating troops I should be willing to await his attack, excepting that in our restricted limits the means of obtaining subsistence are becoming precarious. The river has now fallen to four feet, and a bridge, which is being constructed, I hope will be passable by to-morrow."³

By July 11 Meade in his pursuit had come within striking distance of Lee. Reinforced by some fresh troops, he might have attacked on the 12th or 13th and ought to have done so.⁴ Defeat could not result in disaster. A success no greater than Antietam would be a help to the cause, and a complete victory was possible that might end the war. While proceeding with great caution, Meade had determined to make an attack July 13; but,⁵ wavering in mind and weighed down with responsibility, he called, contrary to the best military maxims, a council of war. Five out of seven of his corps

¹ O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 299.

² 5.30 A. M., *ibid.*, part iii. p. 991.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 301.

⁴ I have been led to this judgment by the testimony of Warren, Humphreys, and Hunt (C. W., 1865, vol. i. pp. 379, 395, 455), supported by a mass of comment and opinion. Contrariwise, see Meade's testimony, *ibid.*, p. 336; his unofficial letter to Halleck, July 31, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 108; Hunt, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 382.

⁵ Meade to Halleck, July 12, 4.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 91.

commanders were opposed to the projected attack, which influenced him to delay giving the orders for it. He devoted July 13 to an examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works, and the next day advanced his army for a reconnaissance in force or an assault if conditions justified it, when he ascertained that during the night previous the Confederate army had crossed the Potomac. "The escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President," telegraphed Halleck.¹ Meade asked to be relieved of the command of the army: his application was refused.²

During the 12th and 13th of July Lincoln was a prey to intense anxiety, and when he got the intelligence, soon after noon of the 14th, that Lee and his army were safely across the river, he could hardly restrain his irritation within bounds. "We had them within our grasp," he declared; "we had only to stretch forth our hands and they were ours, and nothing I could say or do could make the army move." I regret that I did not myself go to the army and personally issue the order for an attack.³ On the spur of the moment he gave vent to his feelings in a letter to Meade which on second thoughts he did not sign or send. Prefacing his censure with "I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you," he wrote: "You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated, and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till by slow degrees you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure without attacking him. . . . Again, my

¹ July 14, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 92.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³ John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.

dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect [that] you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it."¹

The disappointment of Lincoln was profound and enduring. Somewhat later he said: "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it. We had gone through all the labor of tilling and planting an enormous crop, and when it was ripe we did not harvest it. Still I am very grateful to Meade for the great service he did at Gettysburg."²

Nothing can so fitly close my account of the battle of Gettysburg as the reproduction of Lincoln's two-minute address at the dedication of the Gettysburg National Cemetery, November 19, 1863: "Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate — we cannot consecrate — we cannot hallow — this ground. The brave

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 280.

² John Hay's diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 278.

men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”¹

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 439. In chap. vii. vol. viii. Nicolay and Hay have given a very interesting account of this address; see, also, the *Nation*, Nov. 28, 1895, p. 387.

My authorities for the campaign of Gettysburg are the correspondence and orders in O. R., vol. xxvii. parts i., ii., and iii.; reports of Halleck, Hooker, Meade, Ingalls, Hunt, Doubleday, Hancock, Gibbon, Webb, Hays, Humphreys, Sedgwick, Howard, Schurz, Slocum, part i.; reports of Couch and W. F. Smith, part ii.; reports of Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, A. P. Hill, part ii.; testimony of Butterfield, Doubleday, Hancock, Humphreys, Hunt, Meade, Sedgwick, Sickles, Wadsworth, Warren, Williams, C. W., 1865, vol. i.; articles of Longstreet, Hunt, Halstead, Gibbon, Law, Allan, Alexander, Francis A. Walker, *Century War Book*, vol. iii.; *Life of Lee*, Long; do. by Fitzhugh Lee; do. by Cooke; do. by White; Taylor, *Four Years with Gen. Lee*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii.; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii.; Walker, *History of the Second Army Corps*; Walker's Hancock; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*; Davis, *Confederate Government*, vol. ii.; Schuckers's Chase; *Life of Seward*, vol. iii.; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; do. *Decisive Battles*; General Wolseley in the *North American Review* for Sept. and Oct. 1889; the files from May 11 to July 6 of the *N. Y. Tribune*, *Times*, *World*, *Herald*, *Eve. Post*; *Boston Courier*, *Advertiser*; *Chicago Tribune*, *Phila. Inquirer*; *Washington Nat. Intelligencer*; *Columbus Crisis*.

CHAPTER XXI

BEFORE and during the war the Mississippi River possessed, as a channel of communication and commerce, a great importance, which has steadily diminished with the development of the railroad system of the West. The importance of gaining the control of it was from the first appreciated at the North. Looked upon in the East as a military advantage, it was deemed by the people of the Western States indispensable to their existence as an outlet to their products, an artery for their supply. "The free navigation of the Mississippi" were words to conjure with, not only in the Southwest, but everywhere west of the Alleghanies, except in the region directly tributary to the great lakes.¹ From the location of his home Lincoln was brought up with this sentiment, he had his mind impregnated with it in manhood, and now he did not for a moment lose sight of its military and commercial consequence. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the resulting operations had freed the Mississippi north of Vicksburg; the capture of New Orleans had given us its mouth. But the Confederates had practical possession of it between their two strong fortresses of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, a distance of about two hundred miles, and thereby retained communication between Louisiana and Texas on one side and the rest of the Confederacy on the other. Louisiana supplied them with sugar, and the great State of Texas furnished quantities of grain and beef, besides affording, by virtue of its contiguity to Mexico, an avenue for munitions of war received from

¹ California and Oregon are manifestly excepted from this general statement.

Europe at the Mexican port of Matamoras,¹ — a consideration of weight, for the ports of the Southern States were now pretty effectually sealed by the Federal blockade. Of the two fastnesses Vicksburg was by far the more important, and the desire in the Confederacy to keep it was ardent. Sentiment as well as military judgment inclined Jefferson Davis to make a strenuous effort for its defence. It was in his own State, whose notables were dear to him not only because in his view they were patriots, but because most of them were personal acquaintances or friends. His own plantation, too, was in the neighborhood of Vicksburg. He had in December, 1862, paid a visit to the State of Mississippi, and inspected with his soldier's eye the fortifications of the city, and, tarrying in Jackson to address the legislature, had urged them fervently to do their utmost in co-operation with the Confederate government to preserve this stronghold and their State from the inroads of the enemy.

From the Union point of view the three most important strategic points in the South were Richmond, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga. Vicksburg ranked second, for its capture would give the United States the control of the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy asunder. One attempt had been made to take it by a bombardment from gun-boats and mortar-vessels, and later another by an assault of the army. Both had failed.² Nevertheless, the government, the army, and the navy determined to persevere. Since it was within his province, Grant assumed, January 30, 1863, "the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg."³

Vicksburg, which for the most part was built upon a bluff two hundred feet above high-water mark of the river, was a natural stronghold, strengthened by art and unassailable from the front. The problem was to reach the high ground on the

¹ Capt. Mahan's *Farragut*, pp. 207, 223, 241; Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, p. 37.

² See Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 348, vol. vii. p. 131; Capt. Mahan's *Farragut*, p. 177; Swinton's *Decisive Battles*, chap. vii.; *ante*, p. 221.

³ O. R., vol. xxv. part i. p. 11.

east bank of the river so that it might be attacked or besieged from the side or rear. Grant prosecuted the work on a canal which had been begun with the object of making a channel across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, by which transports might pass below it, carrying troops and supplies to a new base. With the same purpose he endeavored to open a route through the bayous from Milliken's Bend on the north to New Carthage on the south. Other devices of artificial channels connecting natural water-courses above Vicksburg were tried; apparently, indeed, every experiment was made that engineering skill or military initiative could suggest. Nearly two months were spent in such operations, and all of them failed.

It had been a winter of heavy and continuous rains. The river had risen to an unusual height, and in places the levees had given way. "The whole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers, measles, and small-pox broke out among the men."¹ From newspaper correspondents, from letters which the soldiers wrote home, from reports of visitors to the camps, the people of the North knew in detail of the many attempts and failures, of the exceeding discomfort of the army, and received exaggerated accounts of the sickness which prevailed.² Having in mind the Grant of Shiloh rather than the Grant of Donelson, they looked upon his actions in a fault-finding mood, and believed the stories of his intemperance which were now in large measure revived. McClernand, one of his corps commanders who had hoped to head the expedition against Vicksburg, a patriotic War Democrat, a clever politician, and a man of influence in the West, was a mover in the intrigue for his displacement.³ An able

¹ Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 458. This is directly and indirectly supported by Grant's contemporaneous despatches to Washington. See O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. pp. 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 24.

² See Grant to Halleck, Feb. 18, *ibid.*, p. 18; Grant to E. B. Washburne. March 10, Grant letters edited by Wilson, p. 25.

³ Gen. Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 315; Dana and Wilson, *Life of*

Western journalist who swayed public opinion maintained, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, that Grant was incompetent, accused him of gross misconduct, and demanded, "in the name of the Western people and the Western troops, that his command should be taken from him and given to Rosecrans."¹ Chase sent this letter to the President with his sanction, and added that reports inculcating General Grant "are too common to be safely or even prudently disregarded."² Nevertheless, Lincoln stood by his general faithfully.³

Grant was slandered. To Rawlins, his assistant adjutant-general, his true friend and mentor, he had early in March given a pledge on his honor that he would drink no more during the war, and at this time he was adhering to the pledge in the main.⁴ His despatches and letters exhibit a cool brain, his actions show a steady judgment and unremitting energy. Since the battle of Shiloh⁵ he had most of the time had a

Grant, p. 113; Badeau, *Milt. Hist. of Grant*, vol. i. p. 180; *Grant's Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 458; *N. Y. Eve. Post*, July 8.

¹ April 4, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 153.

² *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³ It is to this period that Nicolay and Hay assign the retort of Lincoln to the zealous persons who demanded Grant's removal because he drank too much whiskey: "If I knew what brand of whiskey he drinks, I would send a barrel or so to some other generals." — *Ibid.*; Richardson's *Life of Grant*, p. 299; *Anecdotes of A. Lincoln*, J. R. McClure, p. 94. Nicolay and Hay do not vouch absolutely for the authenticity of this anecdote, and I doubt it, for the reason that if the traditions be true the President and Stanton were disturbed at the reports of Grant's intemperance. In his *Reminiscences*, Charles A. Dana gives a partial confirmation of this. "Stanton sent for me to come to Washington," Dana writes. "He wanted some one to go to Grant's army, he said, to report daily to him the military proceedings and to give such information as would enable Mr. Lincoln and him to settle their minds as to Grant, about whom at that time there were many doubts and against whom there was some complaint." The letter sending Dana his appointment is dated March 12. — *McClure's Magazine*, Nov. 1897, p. 29. See Dana to Stanton, July 13, *ibid.*, Jan. 1898, p. 254.

⁴ Letter of Rawlins to Grant, June 6, From Chattanooga to Petersburg, W. F. Smith, p. 179. In this connection see Charles A. Dana's *Reminiscences*, *McClure's Magazine*, Jan. 1898, pp. 254, 258.

⁵ This took place April 6, 7, 1862. See vol. iii. p. 620.

responsible command, but had done nothing to attract public attention. Useful as the commander of a department, his service in the field had been small and inconspicuous, but in these ten months he had observed much and thought much about the conflict that tore his country. He was not a reader of military books, nor a close student of the campaigns of the great masters of his art, nor did he con the principles of strategy and the rules of tactics; but he was in his own way and within certain lines a deep thinker. After we read the despatches and comprehend the aim of such accomplished soldiers as McClellan and Meade, what refreshment there is in the grasp of the absolute purpose of the war shown in these words of Grant: "Rebellion has assumed that shape now that it can only terminate by the complete subjugation of the South or the overthrow of the government."¹ There must have passed through his mind the thought that if the chance came he could show the stuff that was in him. In taking command of the expedition against Vicksburg, he created the opportunity and began with two months of failures. Sensitive to detraction, he felt the calumnies propagated at the North, and was undoubtedly annoyed that, held in no higher estimation than Hooker and Rosecrans, he was with them on trial at the bar of public opinion, and in Washington, too, was regarded only as an equal contestant for a prize offered by the government.² This was in the last days of March, 1863, after Rosecrans had won his victory of Stone's River and before Hooker had met with his defeat at Chancellorsville.

The failure of the engineering expedients to turn or to supplement the courses of the waters, the necessity of accommodating himself to the natural features of the country,

¹ April 11, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 186.

² Halleck to each, Hooker, Rosecrans, and Grant, March 1: "General: There is a vacant major-generalcy in the Regular Army, and I am authorized to say that it will be given to the general in the field who first wins an important and decisive victory." — *Ibid.*, p. 75. Of course this was by direction of the President.

brought home to Grant the question, What was to be done? "The strategical way according to the rule," he writes, "would have been to go back to Memphis; establish that as a base of supplies . . . and move from there along the line of the railroad."¹ This was the advice of Sherman, his ablest and most trusted lieutenant.² But, reasoned Grant, that is a backward movement and gravely objectionable, because it will intensify the discouragement with the war prevailing at the North.³ "There was nothing left to be done," he said, "but to *go forward to a decisive victory*."⁴ Without a council of war, without consulting any of his able officers, he formed his plan, and hoped for approval from Washington after he had begun to carry it out. He told it to his government in his despatches to Halleck, all of which are marked by courtesy and respect. From the confident and masterly tone of his communications, we may imagine with what satisfaction they were read by the President, who at first consented by silence, and, before the news of any signal success was received, authorized a despatch which gave Grant "full and absolute authority to enforce his own commands," and bore this further assurance: "He has the full confidence of the government."⁵

His execution was as prompt as his conception was bold. March 23 he ordered the concentration of his army at Milli-

¹ Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 443.

² Ibid., p. 542 note; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 315.

³ *Ante*, pp. 199, 221.

⁴ Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 443.

⁵ Stanton to Charles A. Dana, May 5, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 84. Dana, as special commissioner of the U. S. War Department, was now at Grant's headquarters, and made frequent reports to Stanton. He filled the position with cleverness and discretion. He estimated correctly Grant, Admiral Porter, Sherman, and McPherson, seems to have received their confidence, and did not abuse it. His despatches, written in the clear, terse English of which he was a master, are an excellent history of the progress of the campaign. The words of Stanton (June 5) to him are none too strong: "Your telegrams are a great obligation and are looked for with deep interest. I cannot thank you as much as I feel for the service you are now rendering." — Ibid., p. 93.

ken's Bend. The roads having dried up somewhat, although still "intolerably bad,"¹ he ordered, March 29, McClelland's corps to march to New Carthage, while Sherman and McPherson with their corps were in due time to follow. The movement was slow, the transportation of supplies and ammunition and the progress of the artillery were difficult. For the success of the enterprise, the co-operation of the navy was necessary, and from Admiral Porter Grant received efficient and generous support.² Gun-boats and other craft were needed for service below Vicksburg, more rations than could be hauled over a "single narrow and almost impassable road"³ were wanted, hence gun-boats and transports must run the batteries. On the night of April 16 such a movement was made. In utter darkness the fleet started; but the Confederates fired houses on the Louisiana side, and lighted bonfires on the east side of the river, disclosing to their view and aim seven iron-clads, three steamers with ten barges in tow, — these last heavily loaded with supplies. The Vicksburg batteries opened with shot and shell, and the gun-boats returned the fire. All the vessels were struck, but only one was disabled. A shell burst in the cotton surrounding the boilers of the steamer "Henry Clay," set her on fire, and she burned to the water's edge. "I was out in the stream when the fleet passed Vicksburg," writes Sherman, "and the scene was truly sublime."⁴ "The sight was magnificent but terrible," are the words of Grant.⁵ The running of the batteries had been a success, and again on the night of April 22 six steamers towing twelve barges loaded with hay, corn, and provisions steamed and drifted past Vicksburg, bringing an abundance of supplies to the army south of this stronghold.

¹ Grant's report of July 6, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 47.

² "Never in the history of combined movements has there been more hearty co-operation between the army and the navy than in the Vicksburg campaign of 1863, under the leadership of Grant and Porter." — Captain Mahan's *Farragut*, p. 206.

³ Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 471.

⁴ *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 317.

⁵ *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 464.

Still remained the problem how to get on the high ground on the east bank of the river. McClelland's and McPherson's corps were set in motion for Hard Times, part of them in the steamers and barges, the others afoot. To mask the main movement, Sherman made a demonstration on Haynes's Bluff above Vicksburg. April 29 Porter's gun-boats attacked the fortress of Grand Gulf. Hoping that these would silence the enemy's batteries, Grant had ten thousand troops on board the steamers and barges, while he himself was in a tug-boat out in the stream, watching the assault, and ready, if the conditions warranted, to give the order to the troops to land and take the place by storm. But Grand Gulf was too high above the river, and its fortifications too strong to be captured by a front attack, and after five hours of bombardment the attempt was abandoned. "I immediately decided," wrote Grant, "upon landing my forces on the Louisiana shore and march them across the point to below the Gulf. At night the gun-boats made another vigorous attack, and in the din the transports safely ran the blockade."¹ The vantage-ground on the east bank of the Mississippi was determined by intelligence from a negro who told Grant that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson. At daylight in the morning of April 30, employing the iron-clads and steamers as ferry-boats, he began the work of transferring the troops to Bruinsburg, on the east side of the river. Once across they commenced their march, and in two miles reached high ground. As soon as Grant had made sure that he would effect this landing, he had telegraphed Halleck, "I feel that the battle is now more than half won."² Yet all the obstacles of nature had not been overcome. The country with its bayous, swamps, and ravines, its timber, undergrowth, and almost impenetrable vines and canebrakes, rendered offensive operations difficult and hazardous. But, urged by their general, the soldiers pressed on. At two o'clock in the morn-

¹ Grant to Halleck, May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 32.

² April 29, *ibid.*

ing of May 1, on the road to Port Gibson they met the Confederates, whom they outnumbered. Skirmishing began, developing, as it grew light, into battle. "The fighting continued all day," said Grant, "and until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. . . . The enemy was driven from point to point."¹ They were "sent in full retreat."² The next day Port Gibson was ours. The Confederates evacuated Grand Gulf. From that fortress Grant wrote a long despatch to Halleck, giving an account of his success. "This army is in the highest health and spirits," he said. "Since leaving Milliken's Bend they have marched as much by night as by day, through mud and rain, without tents or much other baggage and on irregular rations, without a complaint and with less straggling than I have ever before witnessed."³ Could the army have transmitted a collective despatch, they might have said, Our general has been subject to the same discomforts as we, he has shared all our hardships.⁴

Grant had now a secure base of supplies at Grand Gulf. He had intended to co-operate with General Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson, and after its capture move with the united armies against Vicksburg; but he now learned that Banks had not made the progress expected, and, on the other hand, that General Joe Johnston was on his way to Jackson to take charge of the defence of Vicksburg, for which, as the South had taken alarm, reinforcements were constantly arriving. "Under this state of facts, I could not afford to delay," was his after explanation.⁵ May 3 he announced his purpose to Halleck thus: "I shall not bring my troops into this place [Grand Gulf], but immediately follow the enemy, and, if all promises as favorable hereafter

¹ Grant to Halleck, May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 32.

² Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 484.

³ May 3, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 33.

⁴ See Grant's account of his inconveniences, Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 490.

⁵ To Halleck, May 24, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 38.

as it does now, not stop until Vicksburg is in our possession.”¹ He was soon joined by Sherman's corps, and had a force of about 43,000. Opposed to him was Pemberton with 40,000 in Vicksburg and along the line of the railroad, and Johnston with about 15,000 in Jackson.² With the Napoleonic idea Grant proposed to beat these forces in detail. He moved with amazing celerity. With only a single road leading from Grand Gulf, he knew that he could not supply his army from that point, and therefore stopped long enough to arrange for the transport of his ammunition and to get up what rations he could of hard bread, coffee, and salt, intending for the rest to live upon the country. He cut loose from his base and moved forward. “As I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more . . . you may not hear from me again for several days,” was his laconic despatch to his government.³ May 12, outnumbering the enemy, he beat him at Raymond after “a brisk fight of more than two hours.” “I will attack the State capital to-day,” he said in his telegram announcing this victory.⁴ He was as good as his word. May 15 he telegraphed: Jackson “fell into our hands yesterday after a fight of about three hours. Joe Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicksburg forces. I am concentrating my forces at Bolton to cut them off if possible.”⁵

From an intercepted despatch he knew correctly the intentions of Johnston, who before the loss of the State capital had ordered Pemberton to come up if practicable, on the rear of the Union army at once. Pemberton with a large part of his force had reached Edwards Station, but deemed the movement ordered by his superior “suicidal.” Not comprehending that in Grant he had a man of original mind to contend with, one who had got from his West Point training mental

¹ O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 33.

² Johnston himself did not arrive in Jackson until May 13.

³ May 11, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 36.

⁴ May 14, *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

discipline and not merely a set of rules, he moved south of the railroad, intending to get between the Union army and its base on the Mississippi, — a useless movement, for, as we have seen, the great general had some days before abandoned his base of supplies. Owing to the heavy rains and high water in the creek which he had to cross, Pemberton had not proceeded far with his southward march when he received a despatch from Johnston, who was ten miles north of Jackson, saying, "The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton."¹ He made a retrograde movement with the design of taking a road north of the railroad to Clinton, when he encountered the forces of Grant, who, after his victory over Johnston, had set out to vanquish the other Confederate host. May 16 the two armies met in the battle of Champion's Hill. Again the Union force was the larger, again the Confederates were discomfited. They fled, and Grant pursued them. The next day they made a stand at Big Black River bridge. He attacked. They had lost heart and were filled with consternation at the swift movements and impetuous onsets of Grant. Let Pemberton tell the story of the day: "The enemy . . . advanced at a run with loud cheers. Our troops in their front did not remain to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, it very soon became a matter of *saue qui peut*."² Himself depressed and his troops demoralized, he retired within the defences of Vicksburg.

As soon as he could get across the Big Black River, Grant followed and took possession of the long-coveted heights of Walnut Hills and Haynes's Bluff, securing a base of supplies which had safe and unobstructed water communication with the North. As Grant and Sherman together rode up on the dry high ground north of Vicksburg and looked down upon the Confederate fortress and then upon the Federal fleet within easy distance, Sherman, perceiving the full force of what they had

¹ May 15, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 263.

² Ibid., p. 207.

gained, and overcome with the recollection of the time when he had panted for that position,¹ broke out into enthusiasm which knew no bounds, while Grant, imperturbable, thought and smoked on. There was reason for rejoicing. In nineteen days Grant had crossed the great river into the enemy's territory, had marched one hundred and eighty miles through a most difficult country, skirmishing constantly, had fought and won five distinct battles, inflicting a greater loss upon the enemy than he himself sustained and capturing many cannon and fieldpieces, had taken the capital of the State and destroyed its arsenals and military manufactories, and was now in the rear of Vicksburg.

From the demoralization of the Confederates, he hoped that he might carry their works by storm, and made an assault,² which was unsuccessful. He then commenced the investment of the city. Since he had crossed the Mississippi only five days' rations had been issued from the commissary department; but the troops, drawing the rest of their supplies from the country, had lived fairly well, although they had suffered from the want of bread, as the cry from the private soldiers of "Hardtack! hardtack!" informed Grant as he rode one day along the lines.³ Solicitous for the comfort of the men, he soon made arrangements by which they had a full supply of coffee and bread.

May 18 Pemberton received a despatch from Johnston, saying that if Vicksburg were invested it must surrender ultimately; "instead of losing both troops and place, we must if possible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and march to the northeast."⁴ By immediate compliance with this order there is a bare chance that Pemberton might have saved a part of his army, but, after a council of war, he decided to make the attempt to hold Vicksburg.

Grant still hoped that he might take the place by storm. His soldiers were eager, and the advantages of a speedy cap-

¹ *Ante*, p. 221.

² May 19.

³ *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 530.

⁴ *O. R.*, vol. xxiv. part i. p. 272.

ture were great.¹ May 22 he ordered an assault in force: this failed, with a loss of 3199.² On the evening of that day he wrote, "I now find the position of the enemy so strong that I shall be compelled to regularly besiege the city."³ "I intend to lose no more men," he said on the morrow, "but to force the enemy from one position to another without exposing my troops."⁴ "The position is as strong by nature as can possibly be conceived of, and is well fortified," he advised Halleck. . . . "The enemy are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of Vicksburg and the capture of most of the garrison can only be a question of time. I hear a great deal of the enemy bringing a large force from the East to effect a raising of the siege."⁵ His next despatch shows watchfulness as well as confidence: "I can manage the force in Vicksburg and an attacking force on the rear of 30,000, but may have more to contend against. Vicksburg will have to be reduced by regular siege. My effective force here is about 50,000, and can be increased 10,000 more from my own command."⁶ Halleck had anticipated his desire for reinforcements, and had ordered troops to him from Missouri and Kentucky, so that by the time he was ready for a final assault he had an army of 72,000.

The head-work of the siege fell largely upon the engineers, who were too few in number. Therefore all the officers who were graduates of West Point were pressed into this branch of the service, and their academic knowledge of military engineering was made of avail. Grant, Sherman, and McPherson did double duty, counting no labor too mean which would contribute to the glorious result in view. Much of the

¹ These are well stated by Grant in his report of July 6, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 55.

² 502 killed, 2550 wounded, 147 missing. The loss in his five successful battles of May had been but 4337. — *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 549.

³ To Porter, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 337.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁵ May 24, *ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶ May 25, *ibid.*, p. 39.

drudgery was performed by negroes, who, attracted by the promise of wages ushered in by the new era, flocked into the Union lines. "We are now approaching with pick and shovel," wrote General Sherman to his brother, the Senator. . . . "In the mean time we are daily pouring into the city a perfect storm of shot and shells, and our sharpshooters are close up and fire at any head that is rash enough to show itself above ground."¹ "The approaches are gradually nearing the enemy's fortifications," said Grant in his despatch to Halleck, June 3. . . . "We shell the town a little every day and keep the enemy constantly on the alert. We but seldom lose a man now. The best of health and spirits prevail among the troops." "Vicksburg is closely invested" is, five days later, the report of his progress. "I have a spare force of about 30,000 men with which to repel anything from the rear. . . . Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton." June 18 he wrote, "Deserters come out daily. All report rations short."²

The situation of the besieged was pitiable. The mass of demoralized soldiers who poured into the city, fleeing from the victorious Union army after the battle of Big Black River bridge, was a bad augury, and, while the feeling was for the moment relieved by the repulse of the two assaults of Grant, gloom settled down upon soldiers and people before the steady systematic work of the investing army. The "tumultuous, joyous city full of stirs" became a camp and a trench.³ In the town were many non-combatants, some of whom were women and children; and while the casualties among them were not many, the nervous strain from the continual bombardment by the fleet on one side and the Federal artillery on the other was great. One soldier remarked the demoralizing effect of the howling and bursting shells, another the intense and hideous hiss of the conical balls from the heavy

¹ May 29, Sherman Letters, p. 206.

² O. R., vol. xxiv. part. i. pp. 40, 41, 43.

³ Edward S. Gregory, *Annals of the War*, p. 116.

rifled-guns of the steamer *Cincinnati*, and a lady tells of the fearful noise, the wild screams, the whizzing and clattering sound of the shrapnel-shells that struck terror to the heart.¹ The lie of the ground lent itself to the building of caves which served as a refuge for women and children. The caves soon became dwelling-places where they ate and slept. Their fathers, husbands, and sons were on duty in the trenches. The bombardment from the mortars across the Mississippi, the constant fire on the Confederate lines by artillery and sharpshooters, caused the loss of many officers and men,² and immediate anguish to their households. "The screams of the women of Vicksburg," writes one of them, "were the saddest I have ever heard. The wailings over the dead seemed full of a heart-sick agony. I cannot attempt to describe the thrill of pity, mingled with fear, that pierced my soul, as suddenly vibrating through the air would come these sorrowful shrieks! — these pitiful moans! — sometimes almost simultaneously with the explosion of a shell."³ Grief, anxiety, sordid cares, and suffering at the deprivation of the necessaries and conveniences of life made up the existence of the citizens and the women. Soon there was lack of the proper kind of food, then hunger stared them in the face.

The sole hope was that Johnston would break the investment, and the appeals of Pemberton, which were sent to him with great difficulty, were urgent. Jefferson Davis was in deep concern at the impending fate of Vicksburg, and did his utmost to forward reinforcements from all available points, but, after draining the resources of the Confederacy, he was able to increase Johnston's army to a total of only 24,000 to 34,000 men.⁴ The reinforcements to Grant were coming

¹ Lockett, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 483; Gregory, *Annals of the War*, p. 122; *My Cave Life in Vicksburg* (New York, 1864), p. 124.

² See Pemberton to Johnston, June 10, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 958.

³ *My Cave Life in Vicksburg*, p. 131.

⁴ Johnston said his force was 24,000; the War Department put it at 34,000. — O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. pp. 194, 195, 223, 224. For most of the time Johnston's headquarters were either at Canton or Jackson.

more rapidly and in greater numbers, and there was no time when Johnston could have brought more than an equal force to attack that which Grant had set apart to frustrate any attempt to break the siege. The Union troops would fight behind breastworks with the probability of repulsing the Confederates with great slaughter. Johnston was wise when he refused to give battle with an inadequate army. The acrimony exhibited in the correspondence between him and his President is apt to induce friends of the South to impute a share of the blame for their great disaster to one or the other, but, it seems to me, with little reason. Johnston ought, indeed, to have proceeded in person to join Pemberton as soon as he arrived at Jackson, but he offers the excuse that he was too weak physically to attempt such a ride.¹ With that exception he seems to have done everything possible,² and Davis in Richmond wrought in his sphere with energy and zeal. The superior resources of the North were bound to tell whenever a great military leader should arise. The leader had arisen, the government furnished him everything, and he bore full sway. Despatches were so long in transmission from Washington to his headquarters that the orders or the wishes of the President or Halleck were ineffectual when received. Halleck directed him to unite, if possible, his forces with Banks's in order to attack Vicksburg and Port Hudson separately with the combined armies, but he received the despatch on the battle-field of the Big Black just before his soldiers charged the enemy, and, flushed with his victories, he knew that by the logic of events he should disregard the order.³ Against this able handling of abundant resources the efforts

¹ Johnston's Narrative, p. 187.

² After the war Grant said: "I have had nearly all of the Southern generals in high command in front of me, and Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others. I was never half so anxious about Lee. . . . Take it all in all, the South, in my opinion, had no better soldier than Joe Johnston—none at least that gave me more trouble."—J. R. Young, *Around the World with Gen. Grant*, vol. ii. pp. 212, 213.

³ Halleck's order is dated May 11, and was received the 17th. — O. R., vol. xxiv. part 1. p. 36; Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 524.

of the Confederates were vain. Johnston comprehended the situation, and placed the dilemma before the authorities in Richmond. "Without some great blunder of the enemy we cannot hold both Mississippi and Tennessee," he telegraphed June 15; "which it is best to hold is for the Government to determine . . . I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless."¹ With so difficult a choice before him, Jefferson Davis may not be blamed that he did not order Bragg's army to Mississippi, leaving Tennessee open to Rosecrans.

The communication between Johnston and Pemberton was irregular and precarious. One courier availing himself of the river went as far as he dared in his skiff, then landed and waited for the darkness of night. He removed all his clothes, fastened his despatches securely within them, and bound them in turn firmly to a plank. This he pushed into the stream, and floated with it down the river past the gun-boats to Confederate ground.² June 14 Johnston sent this word: "All that we can attempt to do is to save you and your garrison. . . . Our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg." This was received within a week, and Pemberton in reply suggested a plan for this relief.³

Meanwhile the garrison was suffering from fatigue, lack of food, enfeeblement, and sickness. Soon after the commencement of the siege the meat ration was reduced one half, and in lieu thereof, that of sugar, beans, and rice was increased. As an encouragement to the troops Pemberton impressed the chewing tobacco in the city, and issued it to them; this, he said, "had a very beneficial influence."⁴ The meat became almost exhausted, bacon gave out. Recourse was had to the flesh of horses and mules. It is said that the Frenchmen among the Louisiana troops prepared a toothsome dish of

¹ O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 227. I have transposed somewhat the words of the despatch without harm to the meaning.

² My Cave Life in Vicksburg, p. 115; see, also, Gregory, *Annals of the War*, p. 123; O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 958.

³ *Ibid.*, part i. pp. 244, 279.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

rats. Corn meal ran low, and the supply was eked out by a mixture of dried peas ground up. The incessant work of countermining against the greater number of besiegers who pushed operations night and day, the labor of defence, the exposure in the trenches "to burning suns, drenching rains, damp fogs and heavy dews,"¹ wore the men out, and, together with a growing want of confidence in their commander, caused a loss of morale. Of this, the conversations of pickets during their temporary truces and the reports of deserters gave Grant an inkling, as he steadily and grimly closed about the beleaguered city and made ready for a final assault. Pemberton, who seems to have been a brave and conscientious officer, saw his power of resistance declining day by day. June 28 he received an "appeal for help" from many soldiers in the trenches, which from its sincerity must have moved his feelings and may have been an influence in determining his action. "Our rations," it said, "have been cut down to one biscuit and a small bit of bacon per day, not enough scarcely to keep soul and body together, much less to stand the hardships we are called upon to stand. . . . If you can't feed us, you had better surrender us, horrible as the idea is, than suffer this noble army to disgrace themselves by desertion. . . . Men are not going to lie here and perish if they do love their country dearly. . . . Hunger will compel a man to do almost anything. . . . This army is now ripe for mutiny unless it can be fed."²

When July 1 came, Pemberton made up his mind that he could not repel another assault, which he knew was at hand, and that he must surrender or endeavor to cut his way out. He submitted the question by confidential notes to his division commanders, and afterwards held with them a council of war; all being unanimous for capitulation, he decided on opening negotiations with Grant. July 3 white flags denot-

¹ O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 286.

² Found among General Pemberton's papers, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 982; see a pathetic account by Major Hogane of a stripling who from weakness "could not lift his spade." — Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, vol. xi. p. 484

ing his desire for a parley were raised on his works, causing hostilities thereabouts to cease. Two officers bearing a flag of truce with a letter from him asking for terms wended their way toward the Union lines. This resulted in a conference that afternoon between Grant and Pemberton, who were old acquaintances, having served in the same division during a part of the Mexican war. They met on a hillside, near a stunted oak-tree, a few hundred feet from the Confederate lines, and after their interchange of views Grant wrote that evening a letter offering terms of capitulation which, after a little delay, were accepted. At 10.30 on the morning of July 4, in the self-same hour that Lincoln announced to the country the result of Gettysburg, he sent this word to his government: "The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war."¹ "Glory, hallelujah!" wrote General Sherman to Grant, "the best Fourth of July since 1776."² The number of prisoners taken was 29,491, while the Confederate loss up to that time had probably reached 10,000. Besides, 170 cannon and 50,000 small arms were captured. The muskets, being of an improved make recently received from Europe, were used to replace the inferior arms of many regiments of the Union army. The result had been gained at small cost: Grant's loss during his whole campaign was 9362.

"In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of results," wrote Halleck, a scholar in military affairs, your "operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm."³ Others of his friends have drawn a parallel with the Italian campaign of 1796.⁴ On the day that the news was received in Washington the government conferred on him the honor of a major-generalship in the regular army; and later, on his recommendation, made Sherman and

¹ O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 44.

² July 3, *ibid.*, part iii. p. 461.

³ *Ibid.*, part i. p. 63.

⁴ Gen. Sherman, *Century Magazine*, Feb. 1888, p. 588; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 170; Badeau, *Military Hist. of U. S. Grant*, vol. i. p. 285.

McPherson, his efficient and faithful lieutenants, brigadiers in the regular service.

Of what occurred when the Federal troops took possession of the city and the Confederates marched out, accounts differ in detail but agree in essence. Grant wrote, "Not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain." A Confederate officer of high rank recollects a hearty cheer from a division of the Union army, but it was given "for the gallant defenders of Vicksburg."¹

When the news of the victory reached Port Hudson, the Confederate commander surrendered it to General Banks, who had invested it with his army.² July 16 the steamboat *Imperial*, which had come directly from St. Louis, landed its commercial cargo on the levee at New Orleans.³ As Lincoln said, "The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea."⁴

Since the first of January the eyes of the North had been on Vicksburg. There were crushed hopes and hope deferred, elation at the success of Grant's May campaign and at a false report of the capture of the stronghold, then weary waiting with hearts buoyed up by anticipation. When the final triumph came, the joy was rendered all the greater by the

¹ Personal Memoirs, vol. i. p. 570; Lockett, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 492. See, also, Gregory, Annals of the War, pp. 129, 130; My Cave Life in Vicksburg, p. 139. "Grant entered the city at eleven o'clock, and was received by Pemberton with more marked impertinence than at their former interview. He bore it like a philosopher, and in reply treated Pemberton with even gentler courtesy and dignity than before."—C. A. Dana to Stanton, July 5, Dana's Reminiscences, *McClure's Magazine*, Jan. 1898, p. 265.

² This was on July 8, O. R., vol. xxvi. part i. p. 52 *et seq.*

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 327.

⁴ He then added: "Thanks to the great Northwest for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it."—Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 398. Grant's army was mainly from the Western States, although there were several Eastern and some Southern regiments in it; part of the latter were colored. Banks's army was principally from the East, with a few Western and some Southern regiments.

long suspense, and it was augmented by the coincidence with Gettysburg, the popular mind associating both victories with the Fourth of July, the day of the nation's birth.¹ Gettysburg and Vicksburg ought to have ended the war. While the North took courage that a great military leader had arisen to give aim to its resources, the South was deeply depressed at her defeat in the two campaigns. On account of the failure of the invasion into Pennsylvania and the "expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition," and the fear that such a feeling might extend to his soldiers, Lee earnestly requested Davis to supply his place as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia with "a younger and abler man ;" but this request was promptly refused.²

¹ See Lincoln's speech, July 7, the day on which intelligence of the capture of Vicksburg was received. — Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 366. The news was sent up the river by steamer to Cairo, 626 miles, whence it was telegraphed.

² Lee to Davis, Aug. 8, Life of Jefferson Davis by his wife, vol. ii. p. 393 ; Davis to Lee, Aug. 11, *ibid.*, p. 396 ; O. R., vol. xxix. part. ii. p. 639.

The main authorities for the campaign of Vicksburg are the despatches of Grant, Dana, Johnston, and Pemberton, O. R., vol. xxiv. parts i. and iii. ; Grant's report of July 6 (of which Halleck wrote : " Your narrative of this campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in every respect creditable and satisfactory ") ; reports of Pemberton, Aug. 2, of Johnston, Nov. 1. I have also used the correspondence in general and the reports of McPherson and Stephen D. Lee ; Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. ; Gen. Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. ; The Sherman Letters ; Johnston's Narrative ; articles of Johnston, Lockett, and Grant, Century War Book, vol. iii ; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. ; Capt. Mahan, Life of Farragut, The Gulf and Inland Waters ; J. Davis, Confed. Government, vol. ii. ; Life of Davis by his wife, vol. ii. ; Greene, The Mississippi ; Badeau, Milt. Hist. of Grant, vol. i. ; Life of Grant by Dana and Wilson ; Pollard's Third Year of the War ; Wolseley in *North Amer. Rev.*, Oct. 1889 ; Annals of the War ; South. Hist. Soc. Papers, vol. xi. ; My Cave Life in Vicksburg ; The Vicksburg *Daily Citizen* (printed on wall paper), July 2 ; Swinton, Decisive Battles ; N. Y. *Tribune*, May 23, July 7, *Times*, July 7, 9, *Eve. Post*, *Herald*, *World*, *Chicago Tribune*, Phila. *Inquirer*, Boston *Advertiser*, July 8, Boston *Courier*, July 9 ; Charles A. Dana's Reminiscences, *McClure's Magazine*, Nov. Dec. 1897, Jan. 1898 ; Grant's Letters, edited by Wilson.

I have not thought it necessary to go into the trouble between Grant and McClernand. See O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. pp. 37, 43, 84, 102, 158 *et seq.* ; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. pp. 135, 141, 286.

The cavalry raid of Colonel Grierson " was of great importance," attract-

With superior resources, larger armies as well disciplined as those of the South and better equipped and supplied, with generals equal on the whole in ability, the North was certain to win in the end provided it would with persistency and patience make the sacrifice of men and money necessary to subjugate the brave and high-spirited people of the Southern Confederacy who were still determined on resistance. But volunteering had practically ceased,¹ and only a pretty rigorous conscription could furnish the soldiers needed. Such a measure was contrary to the genius and the habits of the people, and it could not be enforced unless the government were backed by public sentiment. Whether the President would receive that necessary support might have been momentarily doubted from what took place in New York City shortly after the victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

During the enrolment under the Conscription Act of March 3, 1863,² disturbances had occurred, but they were

ing "the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg." — Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 489.

Johnston hoped to attack Grant about July 7. See O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 245. See Grant's after opinion of this project, J. R. Young, vol. ii. p. 213. For Sherman's pursuit of Johnston, see O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 517 *et seq.*

The President appointed a day "for national thanksgiving, praise, and prayer," and in his proclamation said: "These victories have been accorded not without sacrifices of life, limb, health, and liberty, incurred by brave, loyal, and patriotic citizens. Domestic affliction in every part of the country follows in the train of these fearful bereavements. It is meet and right to recognize and confess the presence of the Almighty Father, and the power of his hand equally in these triumphs and in these sorrows." — *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 370.

The opinion of the government of the respective merits of the commanders at Vicksburg and Gettysburg may be gauged by the appointment on the same day of Grant as major-general and Meade as brigadier-general, in the regular service.

As support to my statement that Gettysburg and Vicksburg ought to have ended the war, see Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 567; Gen. Sherman, *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 334; Longstreet, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 350; Edward Channing, *The United States of America*, p. 283; William A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, p. 62; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 309; Greene, *The Mississippi*, p. 208.

¹ *Ante*, p. 236.

² *Ante*, p. 237.

speedily quelled,¹ and though giving rise to local excitement, were not of such nature as to indicate any extended and violent opposition to the policy of filling the armies of the North by compulsion. July 7 the draft began in Rhode Island, the next day in Massachusetts, and proceeded quietly in various districts until Saturday, July 11, which had been the day appointed for the drawings to commence in New York City. Our attention must be directed to the Ninth Congressional District, which was inhabited mainly by laborers, largely of foreign birth, and had the previous autumn given a Democratic majority of over 3000. The popular dissatisfaction with the draft was known, and there were rumors of trouble; but, although a large crowd assembled at the provost-marshal's office on Saturday, the drawing took place without any disturbance whatever, good humor prevailing, even jocularly. Sunday intervened. The names of the conscripts, who were nearly all mechanics and laborers, were published in the newspapers; and as the meaning of compulsory military service for three years was brought home to them, they fell into despondency, while their wives and mothers abandoned themselves to excitement and rage. As crowds gathered to discuss the provisions of the law, as the opinion of prominent Democrats that it was unconstitutional circulated, the wrath of the common people grew. The provision which allowed a man to buy himself loose for three hundred dollars was the moving cause of the bitterness and hate. Introduced into the act when it was supposed that this amount of money as a bounty would procure a substitute, it now fell short of hiring a soldier, owing to the continued decline in the purchasing power of the paper currency, the demand for labor, the rise of wages, and the cost of living, and was therefore looked upon as a cheap device for the rich to escape by making the poor men bear their burdens. It was a day of busy and seething agitation. The populace

¹ J. D. Cox, *Reminiscences*; Report of the Provost-Marshall-General, p. 19; Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1863, p. 817.

felt that the draft was unjust; they were on the verge of resistance.

Monday¹ dawned. Aware of the commotion in the city, the authorities had taken some measures for protection. Shortly after seven the provost-marshal opened the headquarters of the Ninth District, on the corner of Third Avenue and Forty-sixth Street, and made ready to continue the draft. The wheel was placed on the table. Slips of paper, bearing the names of the men liable, rolled tightly and bound with a ring of india-rubber, were put into the wheel. One-fifth of the names were to be drawn, and if the corresponding persons were not rejected as physically or mentally unfit for service or exempted for other reasons under the law, or did not furnish a substitute, or pay three hundred dollars, they must serve in the army for three years or until the end of the war. At ten o'clock the wheel began to turn, and at each revolution a man blindfolded drew out a name which the provost-marshal read to the comparatively orderly crowd of mechanics and laborers who filled the room. For half an hour all proceeded quietly. A hundred names had been drawn when a pistol was fired in the street, and a mass of brickbats and paving-stones came crashing through the windows and doors of the house, hurled by a mob of some thousand, which had been gathering since early in the day. The workmen of the Second and Sixth Avenue street-railroads and of many of the manufactories in the upper part of the city had stopped work and, parading the streets, had persuaded and compelled others to join their ranks. When their force had grown to a little army, they moved with one accord to where the drafting was going on, attacked and took possession of the house, driving the provost-marshal and his deputies away. The furniture was broken up, turpentine poured on the floor, the building set fire to, and soon this and the adjoining houses in the block were ablaze. The superintendent of police came near on a tour of inspection,

¹ July 13.

and, though not in uniform, was recognized, set upon, mauled badly, and only through his indomitable spirit escaped with his life. The provost-marshal's guard from the Invalid corps, hurrying to the scene, were stopped and pelted with stones by the dense crowd of rioters which filled the streets for two squares from the burning buildings. The soldiers fired into the mob, but with little effect; they were overpowered, their muskets taken away, and many of them were cruelly beaten. A strong squad of police appeared and received a volley of stones; they drew their clubs and revolvers and charged the mob, but after a fight of a few minutes they were forced by vastly overpowering numbers to retreat.

Emboldened by these victories, the mob roamed about the city at will. The cry of the Roman populace, "Seek! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!"¹ tells the story. The rioters, who were almost all foreign born, with a large preponderance of Irish, marched through the streets of the upper part of the city, still gaining by constraint or sympathy constant accessions to their numbers, and shouting, "How are you, Old Abe?" "Down with the rich men," and "We'll hang Horace Greeley to a sour-apple tree." Excitement and drink inflamed them to frenzy. Because the proprietor of the Bull's Head hotel on Forty-fourth Street refused to furnish them liquor, the torch was applied. The residence of the mayor on Fifth Avenue was attacked. Houses of other obnoxious men were sacked and set afire. The headquarters of the Eighth District on Broadway,² where two hundred and sixteen names had been drawn from the wheel that morning, were burned to the ground, as were also those of the Fifth, both districts being strongly Democratic. The fire-engine companies responded to the alarms, but some of the firemen had been drafted on Saturday and their sympathies ran with the mob. Between their lukewarmness and the interference of the rioters nothing was done to check the flames in the odious buildings, but the chief engineer, by ardent pleading, gained permission to

¹ Julius Cæsar, act iii. scene 2.

² Near Twenty-ninth Street.

turn the hose on the fire where it had spread to the houses of owners who were innocent according to the ethics of the tumultuous crowd. The prejudice of the Irish against the negroes, the feeling of the populace that they were being drafted for an abolition war, broke out into wrath that vented itself in cruel assaults on blacks found in the streets. Hotels and restaurants where they were employed were invaded, and the fleeing servants pursued with unbridled fury. A number of negroes were beaten to death, hanged to trees and lamp-posts, and burned as they hung. Towards evening the mob attacked the fine building of the Colored Orphan Asylum on Fifth Avenue,¹ a benevolent institution giving shelter to several hundred children; the few policemen present were able to defend it long enough for the inmates to escape, were then overpowered, whereupon the rioters wreaked their rage by sacking the building and deliberately firing it. Next to negroes, the rioters hated abolitionists and radical Republicans, and attacked some of their houses; they hunted for Horace Greeley, and failing in their search, assailed with brickbats the *Tribune* office, rushed into the counting-room, seized the newspapers, tore them and trampled them in the street, gutted the office, and were about to set it afire when a strong police force coming across the Park on the run charged and dispersed the mob. A despatch to Stanton at 9.30 represents well the state of affairs at the close of the first day of the riot: "The situation is not improved since dark. Small mobs [are] chasing isolated negroes as hounds would chase a fox. . . . In brief, the city of New York is to-night at the mercy of a mob."² The police in the main had been able to act only on the defensive, but by their efficiency had saved the town from utter pillage. The Seventh Regiment, whose mere presence would have been a restraint on tumult, was in Maryland, while nearly all the other militia companies of the city and the State had been sent to Pennsyl-

¹ Between Forty-third and Forty-fourth streets.

² O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 886.

vania to aid in repelling the invasion of Lee. At midnight mischief was still afoot, and the sky was aflame with the lurid glow of burning buildings; but a heavy rain fell, quenching the fires and driving the rioters to their homes.

Tuesday, July 14, witnessed depredations of a larger, bolder, and more frantic mob. Perceiving their opportunity, the thieves and ruffians of the city who on Monday had swelled the crowd now almost dominated it, and went about plundering as the laborers and mechanics strove against the draft. The rioters, who had no leader, were armed with pistols, guns, bludgeons, clubs, pieces of iron rails, and pitchforks, and while making few demonstrations down town, had complete possession of the city from Union Square to Central Park. The sacking and burning of houses, the outrages on negroes, continued. Gentlemen were robbed in the streets. The street cars and omnibuses ceased to run, and the tracks of the Hudson River and of the Harlem railroads were torn up. All business stopped. Shopkeepers shut and barred their doors and windows, while the mob compelled the closing of warehouses. Laborers on new buildings, in the manufactories, on the docks, left off work and augmented the mass of people, part of whom were actors in the mob and part only spectators. One report stated that the women were more excited than the men. The city fell into a tremor of fear.

Governor Seymour hastened from Long Branch to New York, and at noon on Tuesday made from the steps of the City Hall to a crowd of men and boys a speech for which he and his supporters have since made many apologies. Addressing the rioters as "My friends," he coaxed, pleaded, and promised. In his agitation he truckled to them, evidently thinking for the moment that honeyed words would assuage the tumult which had run wild for thirty hours, and persuade the mob to stay its destroying hand.¹ The same day, how-

¹ The Public Record of H. Seymour, pp. 127, 128, gives four reports of this speech. My description is warranted by those of the *Tribune*, *Herald*, and *Times*.

ever, he issued two proclamations which, taking into account that he sincerely believed the Conscription Act unconstitutional and the draft unnecessary, were all that could be desired.¹

Although the riot was more formidable than on Monday, and indeed raged more furiously than on any day of the four, measures were in train to put it down. The governor, the mayor, General Wool, and General Sandford, commander of the New York State National Guards, co-operated harmoniously in the one aim of restoring the supremacy of the law. Wool brought all the soldiers except small guards from the forts in the harbor to the city, and obtaining a reinforcement from the Rear-Admiral of the Navy Yard, and calling a company from West Point, he secured in all about 800 troops. All the militia who were at home were ordered on duty, and the military were aided in the most effective manner by 2000 police. Hampered as they had been from the first by the continued cutting of the telegraph wires, their defensive work was energetic and successful. In this they were assisted by veterans out of the service and citizens who volunteered and organized themselves and were furnished arms and ammunition. The rioters were repulsed in their attacks on two arsenals, and while they captured another and got possession of the arms, these were afterwards taken from them by the marines and the regulars. The police had a bloody and successful fight in Second Avenue, when they retook a lot of carbines stolen from a factory. The gas works, shipyards, and manufactories threatened by the mob were protected, while two companies guarded the Treasury buildings. A gun-boat was stationed in East River, ready to open fire on Wall and Pine Streets when the proper signal should be given. In Broadway, in Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth avenues, and in the cross streets from Twenty-seventh to Thirty-second streets, the military fought the rioters, and defeated or dispersed them. A stiff fight took place on

¹ These are printed in the Public Record of H. Seymour, p. 126.

Forty-second Street; the barricades in Twenty-ninth were stormed and carried, but not without loss. The police had many conflicts with the rioters, and were successful in them all, although they suffered many casualties. No blank cartridges were used, and a large number of the mob were killed; but the populace had tasted blood and were maddened by the sight of their own dead. They drove furiously on, and at the close of the day there was some discouragement among the forces of law and order. It was reported that the police were exhausted, and could not much longer sustain the unequal contest.¹

Wednesday, July 15, broke with the feeling feverish all over the city, but as the day wore on the situation began to look better. In the afternoon Robert Nugent, assistant provost-marshal-general, who had charge of the draft in New York City, was sent for by the governor and the mayor, and when he arrived at the St. Nicholas Hotel, their headquarters, was asked whether he had received any word from Washington to stop the draft. He said yes: the day before he had received from James B. Fry, his superior officer,² a telegram directing him to suspend it, but he had no authority to publish the order. At their earnest solicitation, however, and for the reason that the drawings had been discontinued by necessity, he consented to write a notice over his own name, saying, "The draft has been suspended in New York City and Brooklyn."³ This appeared in nearly all the newspapers, and undoubtedly was the cause of the rioters retiring to their homes and employments. The militia regiments which had been sent to Pennsylvania began to arrive, and used harsh measures to repress the mobs, who still with rash boldness fronted the lawful powers. Cannon and howitzers raked the streets.

On the 16th more regiments, among them the Seventh, reached the city, and continued without abatement the stern

¹ O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 889.

² Provost-marshal-general, with headquarters in Washington.

³ O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 903.

work of the day before, capturing, moreover, from the rioters a quantity of arms. Order began to be restored; street cars and omnibuses were running; laborers were resuming work. The Hudson River Railroad had been relaid, and trains arrived and departed as usual. The last fight of note took place in the evening near Gramercy Park, where the rioters, who were sacking houses, fired upon a force of United States infantry and cavalry which had been sent thither to protect the property. The soldiers entered the houses, killed many of the rioters, arrested the ringleaders, pursued those who had escaped up the avenue, and dispersed them in all directions. This practically ended the riot. It had lasted four days, with an estimated loss in killed and wounded of 1000, most of whom were of the mob, and a probable damage to private property of \$1,500,000.¹

¹ My authorities for this account are the despatches and reports of Wool, E. S. Sanford, Fry, Nugent, Jenkins, Mayor Opdyke, D. D. Field, Charles W. Sanford, Hall, Lefferts, Berens, and others, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii.; Report of the Provost-Marshal-General, March 17, 1866; *Nat. Int.*, July 9; *N. Y. Tribune*, July 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, *Times*, 14, 15, *Eve. Post*, 14, 15, 16, *Herald*, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, *World*, 13, 14, 15, 16; New York letter to London *Times*, July 14, 15, do. London *Daily News*, July 15, appearing in the issues of July 28; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1863; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii.; *Harper's Magazine*, Sept. 1863; Life of Abby Hopper Gibbons, Emerson, vol. ii.; James B. Fry, New York and the Conscription of 1863; Howard Carroll, Twelve Americans; Greeley's American Conflict, vol. ii.; Morgan Dix, Memoirs of J. A. Dix, vol. ii.; Public Record of H. Seymour; Life of Thurlow Weed, vol. ii.; The Draft Riots in New York, Barnes (New York, 1863). Barnes writes: "Eighteen persons are known to have been killed by the rioters, eleven of whom were colored. The number of buildings burned by the mob from Monday morning until Wednesday morning was over fifty" (p. 6). "Of the twenty persons tried on charge of being concerned in the riots, nineteen were convicted" and sentenced to imprisonment (p. 112). For a description of the sacking of a house, see Life of A. H. Gibbons, vol. ii. pp. 43, 44, 48, 49, 65, 66, and *Eve. Post*, July 15. See also J. R. Gilmore, Per. Rec. of A. Lincoln.

Senator Collamer, of Vermont, wrote J. S. Morrill, July 17: "The hope which I entertained that our military successes would smooth the way to a quiet and satisfactory execution of our enrolment and draft has been in some degree frustrated by the New York riots; yet I do not despair." — *The Forum*, Nov. 1897, p. 268.

Riots in resistance to the draft broke out in Boston and in Troy, but were speedily suppressed.

Following the draft riots, Governor Seymour earnestly requested the President to suspend the draft, in order to see whether the quota of New York could not be filled by volunteers; and, believing that one-half the people of the loyal States thought the Conscription Act unconstitutional, he asked a further postponement until a decision on it could be had from the courts. He had no difficulty in showing that the enrolment in some of the districts in New York and Brooklyn was excessive and unfair, and since these had given strong Democratic majorities at the preceding election, he argued, with an array of figures, that it had been of a "partisan character." The President would not consent to suspend the draft, and waste time by a recurrence to the volunteer system, already deemed inadequate by Congress; and while he would be willing to facilitate the obtaining of a decision from the United States Supreme Court, he could not afford to delay operations while waiting for it. "We are contending with an enemy," he wrote, "who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will now turn upon our victorious soldiers, already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. . . . My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional and yet practical."¹ Justice was shown by the correction at once of the glaring disparities in the quotas which affected the New York and Brooklyn districts. These errors undoubtedly crept in through inadvertence, unavoidable in the devising of the complicated machinery necessary for the execution of a new and far-reaching statute. James B. Fry, the provost-marshal-general and head of the bureau, was a man of parts, of a high sense of honor, and zealous for the impartial administration of the law;² he appointed his subordi-

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 382.

² Seymour in his letter of Aug. 3 said: "I do not doubt the impartiality of Colonel Fry."

nates in New York City only on excellent recommendations, and they aimed to secure a just and equitable enrolment.

Many writers have asserted that one of the causes of the draft riots was the belief of the people in certain of the districts that they had been tricked in the assignment of their quotas. I have been unable to find any evidence supporting this view, nor am I aware of any fault-finding with the enrolment until after those days in which the mob stopped with violence the prosecution of the draft. Fry states distinctly that no such complaints were received by the War Department.¹

The draft was only temporarily interrupted. Strenuous precautions were taken to insure order during its continuance. Ten thousand infantry and three batteries of artillery — “picked troops including the regulars” — were sent to New York City from the Army of the Potomac;² the First Division of the New York State National Guard was ordered upon duty; and the governor by proclamation counselled and admonished the citizens to submit to the execution of the law of Congress. August 19 the draft was resumed and proceeded with entire peacefulness. It went on generally throughout the country, and while it did not actually furnish many soldiers to the army, owing to the numerous exemptions under the statute and the large number of those drafted who paid the commutation money,³ it stimulated enlistments by inducing States, counties, cities, and towns to add to the government bounty other bounties sufficient to prevail upon men to volunteer and fill the respective quotas.

The correspondence between Lincoln and Seymour which has been referred to⁴ reveals the earnest patriotism of each of

¹ New York and the Conscription, p. 32.

² Meade to Halleck, Aug. 16, *ibid.*, p. 84; Stanton to Dix, Aug. 15, *Life of Dix*, vol. ii. p. 86. Dix had succeeded Wool in the command at New York.

³ See Report of the Provost-Marshal-General, p. 28.

⁴ Seymour's of Aug. 3 and 8, *Public Record*, pp. 148, 157; Lincoln's of Aug. 7, 11, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. pp. 381, 386.

these men, and arouses a keen regret that they did not pull together, when the country needed the devotion of all who loved it. Appreciating the benefit and even the necessity of support from the Democratic executive of the chief State of the Union, the President wrote him a serious letter, with the design of becoming "better acquainted," and with the wish for "a good understanding" in the common purpose of "maintaining the nation's life and integrity."¹ In three weeks Seymour wrote a formal reply, promising soon a longer letter in which he should express himself without reserve touching "the condition of our unhappy country;"² but this communication he never sent. Meanwhile the arrest of Vallandigham, his burst of righteous indignation at it,³ and the President's defence of it showed how far apart they were in certain essential principles, and may have influenced him to withhold the answer which he had promised to Lincoln's friendly advance.⁴ In the common danger of Lee's invasion into Pennsylvania, when the governor displayed a patriotic zeal and well-directed energy which could not have been excelled by a Republican in his position, amicable relations seemed to grow up between Washington and Albany, to be disturbed again by the friction occasioned by the draft riots and the correspondence between the two capitals regarding the suspension of the draft.⁵

In these letters the greater magnanimity of the President is discovered, and is the mark of the greater man.⁶ How far

¹ March 23, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ Letter of May 16 to Erastus Corning and others, Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1863, p. 689. See, also, Diven to Fry, May 22, New York and the Conscription, p. 73.

⁴ Howard Carroll, in the Twelve Americans, p. 29, gives an apparently authoritative explanation why a second letter was not sent, but it does not fit into the situation.

⁵ See Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. chaps. i. and ii.; Fry, New York and the Conscription.

⁶ See, also, Lincoln's opinion on the draft which he did not publish, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 49.

Seymour was influenced by the general opinion of cultivated Democrats of New York, that Lincoln was an uncouth, grotesque personage and a weak though well-meaning man, is not disclosed, but he could not have been unaffected by it; nevertheless, he reposed confidence in the President's sense of justice, which came home again to the people of the North now that the distrust and gloom of the preceding winter had been dispelled by the signal victories in the field.

While Irishmen were killing negroes in New York, negroes were laying down their lives for the common country in an attack on one of the strong defences of Charleston. Prompted more by sentiment than by military sagacity, another attempt was made to capture the city in which the secession had begun. In the chain of occurrences, when "some one had blunder'd," an assault was ordered on Fort Wagner,¹ with two brigades constituting the forlorn hope. At the head of the storming column was the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, the first colored regiment of the North to go to the war, commanded by Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, "the blue-eyed child of fortune, upon whose happy youth every divinity had smiled."² The troops charged with spirit, and none exhibited greater courage than the negroes; but, subjected to a deadly fire, the gaps made in the ranks were terrible. They rushed on and planted their flag on the parapet, Shaw waving his sword and crying, "Onward, boys!"

"Right in the van,
On the red rampart's slippery swell,
With heart that beat a charge, he fell
Foeward, as fits a man."³

The troops could not maintain their hold and were forced to retire.

The sacrifice of Shaw was not in vain. That a gentleman

¹ July 18.

² Oration of Prof. William James on the day of the unveiling of the Shaw monument.

³ Lowell, *Memoriæ Positum*; inscribed upon the Shaw monument.

should leave a congenial place in the Second Massachusetts and part from brothers in friendship as well as brothers in arms because his anti-slavery sentiment impelled him to take a stand against the prejudice in the army and in the country against negro soldiers;¹ that he brought his regiment to a fine degree of discipline; that when the supreme moment came his blacks fought as other soldiers have fought in desperate assaults, — all this moved the hearts and swayed the minds of the Northern people to an appreciation of the colored soldier, to a vital recognition of the end which Lincoln strove for, and to the purpose of fighting out the war until the negro should be free.

Thirty-four years later appeared on Boston Common the contribution of sculpture to this heroic episode. The thought and skill of Augustus St. Gaudens portraying Shaw and his negro soldiers marching to Battery Wharf to take the steamer for the South has forever blazoned the words of Lincoln: "And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue and clenched teeth and steady eye and well-poised bayonet they have helped mankind on to this great consummation."²

¹ Major Henry L. Higginson said in his address in Sanders Theatre, Cambridge, May 30, 1897: "One morning in February, 1863, as our regiment . . . lay in camp before Fredericksburg, . . . Robert Shaw came to tell us that he was going home to be Colonel of the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, colored. . . . We all knew how much Robert cared for his own regiment, the 2d Massachusetts, how fond he was of his old comrades, and how contrary to his wishes this move was." We knew "well the full significance and nobility of the step, . . . for at that date plenty of good people frowned on the use of colored troops." — Shaw Monument Book, p. 29.

² The great consummation was to prove "That among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost." — Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 398.

NOTE. — The inscription upon the back of the frame of the tablet of the Shaw monument, written by President Charles W. Eliot, is a succinct history of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, and typifies that of the colored troops in general: "The white officers, taking life and

honor in their hands, cast in their lot with men of a despised race unproved in war, and risked death as inciters of servile insurrection if taken prisoners; besides encountering all the common perils of camp, march, and battle.

The black rank and file volunteered when disaster clouded the Union cause, served without pay for eighteen months till given that of white troops, faced threatened enslavement if captured, were brave in action, patient under heavy and dangerous labors, and cheerful amid hardships and privations.

Together they gave to the nation and the world undying proof that Americans of African descent possess the pride, courage, and devotion of the patriot soldier. One hundred and eighty thousand such Americans enlisted under the Union flag in 1863-1865."

A joint resolution of the Confederate Congress, approved May 1, 1863, declared, "That every white person being a commissioned officer . . . who shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States . . . shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall if captured be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the Court." A final section provided that the negroes captured should be delivered to the authorities of the States to be dealt with according to their present or future laws.—Statutes at Large, Confederate States. See correspondence between Generals Grant and Taylor, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. pp. 425, 443, 469, also pp. 589, 590.

In this account I have been helped by the addresses of Major H. L. Higginson, Governor Roger Wolcott, Mayor Josiah Quincy, and Booker T. Washington, by the report of Colonel Henry Lee, and the oration of Professor William James, printed in the Shaw Monument Book (Boston, 1897). Colonel Lee spoke of "the antipathy and incredulity of the army and the public at the employment of colored men as soldiers," and added, "'I was opposed on nearly every side when I first favored the raising of colored regiments,' said President Lincoln to General Grant, and no one can appreciate the heroism of Colonel Shaw and his officers and soldiers without adding the savage threats of the enemy, the disapprobation of friends, the antipathy of the army, the sneers of the multitude here, without reckoning the fire in the rear as well as the fire in front" (p. 58). Governor Wolcott said: "On the blood-stained earthworks of Fort Wagner a race was called into sudden manhood" (p. 63). William James declared that "The war for our Union . . . has throughout its dilatory

length but one meaning in the eye of history. It freed the country from the social plague. . . . And nowhere was that meaning better symbolized and embodied than in the constitution of this first Northern negro regiment" (p. 74). I have likewise used, Letter from E. L. Pierce to Governor Andrew, July 22, 1863, Pierce's Addresses and Papers, p. 133; The Negro as a Soldier in the War of the Rebellion, N. P. Hallowell, a paper read before the Military Historical Soc. of Mass., Jan. 5, 1892; Nicolay and Hay, vols. vi. and vii.; Army Life in a Black Regiment, Thomas W. Higginson; Harvard Memorial Biographies, vol. ii.; Hist. of the Negro Race in America, Williams, vol. ii.

For a better understanding of the subject I shall add some other references to the employment of colored soldiers. — Chase to Garfield, May 14, 1863. "The enlistment of colored troops is going on well." — Schuckers, p. 467. See Halleck to Grant, March 31, O. R., vol. xxiv. part iii. p. 156. Grant wrote Halleck, April 19: "At least three of my army corps commanders take hold of the new policy of arming the negroes and using them against the enemy with a will. They, at least, are so much of soldiers as to feel themselves under obligation to carry out a policy which they would not inaugurate in the same good faith and with the same zeal as if it was of their own choosing." — O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. p. 31. Dana wrote Stanton, June 10: "'It is impossible,' says General Dennis, 'for men to show greater gallantry than the negro troops in this fight [Milliken's Bend].'" — Ibid., p. 96; and he wrote, June 22: "I am happy to report that the sentiment of this army with regard to the employment of negro troops has been revolutionized by the bravery of the blacks in the recent battle at Milliken's Bend. Prominent officers, who used in private to sneer at the idea, are now heartily in favor of it." — Ibid., p. 106. Grant wrote Banks, July 11: The capture of Port Hudson "will prove a death to Copperheadism in the Northwest, besides serving to demoralize the enemy. Like arming the negroes, it will act as a two-edged sword, cutting both ways." — Ibid., part iii. p. 499; and to Halleck, July 24: "The negro troops are easier to preserve discipline among than our white troops, and I doubt not will prove equally good for garrison duty. All that have been tried have fought bravely." — Ibid., p. 547. Lincoln wrote Grant, Aug. 9: "General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have no reason to doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it is a resource

which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works doubly — weakening the enemy, and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now I think at least 100,000 can and ought to be organized along its shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Dana understands you as believing that the Emancipation Proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so.” — *Ibid.*, p. 584. Grant wrote Lincoln, Aug. 23: “By arming the negro we have added a powerful ally. They will make good soldiers, and taking them from the enemy weakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us. I am therefore most decidedly in favor of pushing this policy to the enlistment of a force sufficient to hold all the South falling into our hands and to aid in capturing more.” — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 466.

In August Fort Sumter was demolished, but was still held by the Confederates as an infantry outpost. Siege had been laid to Fort Wagner, and Sept. 7 it succumbed. Charleston was not taken.

CHAPTER XXII

WE have examined the trend of English sentiment on our civil war and the action of the British government as late as the reception of the news of McClellan's defeat before Richmond, in June, 1862, and the escape of the *Alabama* in July.¹ Bolstered by the Southern success, James M. Mason, the special commissioner of the Confederate States, residing in London, applied to Earl Russell for the recognition of his government asking also the honor of a personal interview, that he might the better impart by word of mouth the claim made in his formal letter. Russell declined the interview, and two days later, after submitting a draft of his answer to the Cabinet, replied to Mason's application and arguments that "Her Majesty's government are still determined to wait."²

Then came the intelligence of Pope's defeat at the second battle of Bull Run, the last of August. The London *Times* was of the opinion that the federal government was "brought to the verge of ruin," but did not favor the recognition of the Southern Confederacy.³ This journal was not, however, at this time in the confidence of the ministry. The correspondence between Palmerston and Russell indicates that they were about ready to propose to the Cabinet that England should take the initiative, and ask France, Russia, and the

¹ *Ante*, p. 76 *et seq.*

² Letters of Mason to Russell, July 24, Aug. 1, 1862, Russell to Mason, July 31, Aug. 2, Confederate Dip. Corr., U. S. Treas. Dep't, Washington. This correspondence is printed in *Life of Davis* by his wife, vol. ii. p. 334.

³ Sept. 15, 16.

other powers to join her in some intervention in the struggle in America. The Federals "got a very complete smashing," the Prime Minister wrote, September 14; and if Washington or Baltimore "fall into the hands of the Confederates," as "seems not altogether unlikely," should not England and France "address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation"? Russell replied: "I agree with you that the time has come for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree, further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State." He suggested, moreover, a meeting of the Cabinet, and if a decision were arrived at, to propose, first, the intervention to France, and "then on the part of England and France to Russia and the other powers." When Palmerston replied to this letter, he was watching the Antietam campaign, and thought that if the Federals sustained "a great defeat" it would be well to proceed with the project of mediation; but if "they should have the best of it we may wait awhile and see what may follow."¹ At about the same time Lord Granville, who was in attendance on the Queen at Gotha, expressed an opinion averse to any present interference.² While Adams got no inkling of this confidential correspondence, since he had at this time no interviews with Earl Russell, who was away from London, he was depressed at the state of affairs, and noted in his diary, "Unless the course of the war should soon change, it seems to me that my mission must come to an end by February."³

¹ This correspondence, the dates being respectively Sept. 14, 17, 23, is printed in Walpole's *Life of Russell*, vol. ii. pp. 349, 350.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351. Granville's letter may possibly be a confirmation of the apparently well-founded and general impression that the influence of the Queen was employed on the side of the North. But he spoke of "the strong antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish to have cotton;" and Russell's letter of Sept. 17 was written when attending the Queen.

³ Entry Sept. 21.

Soon afterwards came the news of the victory of Antietam, which had a "very considerable" effect on the popular mind,¹ and influenced Palmerston to write Russell, suggesting delay for the reason that "ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects."² With the succeeding intelligence, which lessened the import of the victory, the movement towards mediation went on, and, October 13, Earl Russell sent his colleagues a confidential memorandum, putting the question "whether it is not a duty for Europe to ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciliatory terms, to agree to a suspension of arms."³

Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the third member of the Cabinet in importance, must have known of the interchange of views between Palmerston and Russell in reference to the policy of the government; at all events, he gave public expression to their meaning. October 7, at a banquet at Newcastle, he made a speech in which he denied that England "had any interest in the disruption of the Union," felicitated himself on her "perfect neutrality," and at the same time that he professed sympathy with the people of the Northern States, struck them the most telling blow they had received from any member of the English government. "There is no doubt," he declared, "that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what is more than either — they have made a nation." This statement caused great sensation, and was received with loud cheers. He continued: "We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as their separation from the North is concerned."⁴ The construction which the country naturally put upon this speech was that the government had determined on the recognition of the Southern

¹ Adams to Seward, Oct. 3, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 205; *London Times*, Oct. 1, 2; *Daily News*, Oct. 1; *Spectator* and *Saturday Review*, Oct. 4.

² Walpole's Russell, vol. ii. p. 351.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The *Times*, Oct. 8, 9. "Hear, hear!" was the response.

Confederacy,¹ and it was looked upon by the manufacturers of Lancashire as an expression of vital significance. The trade

¹ Disraeli said in the House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1863 : " Her Majesty's Government commissioned one of their members to repair to the chief seats of industry in the country to announce, as I understood it, an entire change in the policy which they had throughout supported and sanctioned. It was not an accident ; the declaration [that cited in the text] was made formally, and it was made avowedly with the consent and sanction of the Government. Now, sir, what did that declaration mean ? If it meant anything, it meant that the Southern States would be recognized ; because, if it be true that they have created armies, navies, and a people, we are bound by every principle of policy and of public law to recognize their political existence." — Hansard, 82. Palmerston replied at length to Disraeli, but did not touch on his reference to Gladstone's speech or in any way on American affairs. — *Ibid.*, 123.

" It is hard to believe that Mr. Gladstone, cabinet minister and dialectician, as familiar with English words as with European politics, would have used either of those expressions, except to announce a settled and official resolve. . . . The recognition may not be immediate, may be postponed till Parliament meets, or may await a combination of many powers, but the Cabinet has made up its mind that the American struggle is over, and that henceforward two nations must exist on the American continent. We cannot, bitterly as we lament the decision, honestly blame the Cabinet. They have only followed the lead of the people, and followed it at far distance. The educated million in England, with here and there an exception, have become unmistakably Southern. . . . The Cabinet is not to blame if, after enforcing delay sufficient for reconsideration, it obeys the national will. . . . The only point left is one of time, and the Premier will be wise to wait as long as events and precedents permit." — *Spectator*, Oct. 11.

Adams wrote in his diary, Oct. 8 : " If Gladstone be any exponent at all of the views of the Cabinet, then is my term likely to be very short. The animus as it respects Mr. Davis and the recognition of the rebel cause is very apparent." Oct. 9 : " Unless things should materially change at home, I do not expect to stay beyond Christmas at the farthest." See Adams to Seward, Oct. 10, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 209 ; the *Times* and *Daily News*, Oct. 9 ; *Sat. Review*, Oct. 11 ; Letter from Bright to Sumner, Oct. 10, Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 157.

Louis Blanc wrote, Oct. 18 : " I fear that Mr. Gladstone yielded to the temptation of courting popularity." Oct. 24 : " How eagerly did the Conservatives seize upon these words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. . . . To hear them speak, it was now all over ; the recognition of the Confederate States by England was about to take place. . . . The sympathies for the North are a dam ; the sympathies for the South are a torrent. This is the reason why Mr. Gladstone's words went straight to the heart of the nation, and why they were interpreted with eagerness in the sense of an early recognition of the Confederate States." — *Letters on England*, pp. 176-178.

in cotton and cotton goods at Manchester was paralyzed, and orders which had been sent abroad for cotton were countermanded.¹

This speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the confidential memorandum of the Foreign Secretary were the acme of the movement of the English Cabinet at this time towards mediation or recognition. While Gladstone had spoken in public only what Palmerston and Russell were thinking of, he had been indiscreet, and a pressure was now undoubtedly brought to bear upon him to explain away the meaning of his words. In conventional and courteous terms, a gentleman of Manchester asked by letter, on behalf of the cotton trade, What do you mean by your speech? Gladstone's private secretary replied that "the words at Newcastle were no more than the expression, in rather more pointed terms, of an opinion he had long ago stated in public, that the effort of the Northern States to subjugate the Southern ones is hopeless."²

October 14 Sir George Cornewall Lewis, the member of the Cabinet ranking next in importance to Gladstone, made a speech which plainly left the inference that the government had no intention of recognizing the independence of the Southern States.³ By that day, or soon thereafter, Palmerston and Russell had determined to continue the existing policy of non-intervention, and they represented, undoubtedly, the majority of the Cabinet. In an interview which Adams had with Earl Russell, October 23, he said: "If I had entirely trusted to the construction given by the public to a late speech, I should have begun to think of packing my carpet-bag and trunks. His Lordship," as Adams proceeds

¹ Mosley to Gladstone, Oct. 13, *Times*, Oct. 20; *Sat. Review*, Oct. 25.

² Letters of Oct. 13, 16, *Times*, Oct. 20; *Life of Gladstone*, Emerson, p. 236. In August, 1867, Gladstone wrote: "I must confess that I was wrong; that I took too much upon myself in expressing such an opinion. Yet the motive was not bad."—*Life* by G. B. Smith, p. 297; see also Gladstone to Cyrus W. Field, Nov. 27, 1862, Feb. 20, 1863, April 20, 1864, *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1896, p. 846 *et seq.*

³ *Times*, Oct. 17.

to relate the conversation, "at once embraced the allusion, and whilst endeavoring to excuse Mr. Gladstone, in fact, admitted that his act had been regretted by Lord Palmerston and the other cabinet officers. Still he could not disavow the sentiments of Mr. Gladstone; so far as he understood them [his meaning] was not that ascribed to him by the public. Mr. Gladstone was himself willing to disclaim that. He had written to that effect to Lord Palmerston. . . . His Lordship said that the policy of the government was to adhere to a strict neutrality, and to leave this struggle to settle itself. . . . I asked him if I was to understand that policy as not now to be changed? He said 'Yes.'"¹

The change of opinion of Palmerston and Russell was complete. It is evident from the sequence of events that it was not caused by the victory of Antietam, nor was it due to the President's Proclamation of Emancipation, which had not at first any favorable influence on the action of the English government. It is a fair conjecture, that the reason for this sudden alteration was the knowledge conveyed to Russell, indirectly, of the response which the United States would make to any offer of mediation, and of the course it would adopt should the Confederacy be recognized. Anticipating certain contingencies, Adams had asked for instructions, and these he had received from the President in a despatch of Seward of August 2. "If the British government," he said, "shall in any way approach you, directly or indirectly, with propositions which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seem to imply a purpose to dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit, or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. . . . If the British government, either alone or in combination with any other government, should acknowledge the insur-

¹ Charles Francis Adams's Diary, MS. entry Oct. 23. See Adams to Seward, Oct. 17, 24, Dip. Corr., 1862, pp. 221, 223.

gents . . . you will immediately suspend the exercise of your functions, and give notice of that suspension to Earl Russell and to this department. . . . [The] possible consequences have been weighed, and [the] solemnity is therefore felt and freely acknowledged. [We] meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain and other States. . . . We have approached the contemplation of that crisis with a caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us.”¹

October 12, while Adams was on a visit to William E. Forster (a staunch friend of the North) at his Yorkshire home, he communicated, in confidence, the substance of these instructions. Forster thought that he ought to make the government aware of them before they committed themselves. Adams replied that he “had been thinking of it, but waited to see how far Mr. Gladstone should appear to be sustained.”² Adams never communicated these instructions to Earl Russell; but considering the political friendship between Forster and Russell, and between the two and Cobden, the intimacy between Forster, Cobden, and Bright, and Bright’s relations with Milner Gibson of the Cabinet, it is not a far-fetched conjecture that the purport of Adams’s instructions was indirectly communicated to Russell, and that this was the reason why the project of mediation or recognition was so suddenly abandoned. The English government, and the public who supported it, did not wish to take any action in regard to the struggle in America by which they should run the risk of war with the United States. The cabinet meeting which had been determined for October 23 was not held, but a continuance of the policy of non-intervention was informally agreed upon.³

Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was received with

¹ MS. State Department.

² Diary, entry Oct. 12.

³ Adams to Seward, Oct. 28, Dip. Corr., p. 225 ; Walpole’s Russell, vol. ii. p. 352 ; Slidell to Benjamin, Oct. 28, France and the Confederate Navy, John Bigelow, p. 144.

coldness and suspicion. The governing classes, whose organs in 1861 had asserted that if the North made her fight for the emancipation of the negro she would commend her cause strongly to their sympathies,¹ could now see in it nothing but an attempt to excite servile insurrection.² Even by the friends of the United States the constitutional basis and scope of it were not comprehended, and their comments were dubious and chilling.³ John Bright did not understand it

¹ Vol. iii. p. 510, note 6.

² The *Times* of Oct. 7 said: "Mr. Lincoln will, on the 1st of next January, do his best to excite a servile war in the States which he cannot occupy with his armies. . . . He will appeal to the black blood of the Africans. He will whisper of the pleasures of spoil and of the gratification of yet fiercer instincts; and when blood begins to flow and when shrieks come piercing through the darkness, Mr. Lincoln will wait till the rising flames, till all is consummated, and then he will rub his hands and think that revenge is sweet. . . . We are in Europe thoroughly convinced that the death of slavery must follow . . . upon the success of the Confederates in this war . . . ; but sudden and forcible emancipation resulting from the 'efforts the negroes may make for their actual freedom' can only be effected by massacre and utter destruction. . . . Where he has no power Mr. Lincoln will set the negroes free; where he retains power he will consider them as slaves." The *Saturday Review* of Oct. 11 said: "If the proclamation of freedom for the slaves had been strictly legal, it would nevertheless be a crime." For a caustic criticism of such opinions, see the *Daily News*, Oct. 10. John Stuart Mill wrote Motley, Oct. 31: "In England the Proclamation has only increased the venom of those who, after taunting you so long with caring nothing for abolition, now reproach you for your abolitionism as the worst of your crimes." — Motley's *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 95.

³ The *Spectator* of Oct. 11 said: "The Proclamation . . . has been made in a way which takes from it half its usefulness and almost all its grace. The principle at stake is entirely disregarded, and emancipation promised as a mere incident in the war. The government liberates the enemy's slaves as it would the enemy's cattle, simply to weaken them in the coming conflict." See the *Daily News*, Oct. 7, 8. The Duchess of Argyll wrote Sumner, Oct. 20: "In England there are great misgivings about the effect of the Proclamation. God grant that the spirit of forgiveness may be given to that race to the end. But it is difficult not to tremble." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. Mr. Pierce told me that the Duchess of Argyll in this correspondence with Sumner represented faithfully the opinions of the Duke (who was a member of the Cabinet and friendly to the North), which was the main reason why Sumner did not suffer his correspondence with her to cease.

In making the first reference to these papers since the death of Edward L. Pierce in September, 1897, I cannot forbear expressing my deep obliga-

fully,¹ and when in his speech to his constituents, December 18, he made a powerful plea for their sympathy for the free States, he made no allusion to it whatever. Nevertheless, there was a slight undercurrent of feeling and hope that the policy might turn out better than for the moment it promised. John Stuart Mill did not join in the general disapproval; he wrote Motley that no American could have exulted more than he over the anti-slavery Proclamation.²

Affairs across the English Channel now claim our attention. On account of a money dispute France, Spain, and Great Britain had sent, in 1861, an expedition to Mexico; but Great Britain and Spain withdrew their forces in April, 1862, and the movement became, on the part of France, an attempt to conquer Mexico, to restore the prestige of the Latin race on this side of the ocean, and to place on the throne a European monarch.³ The people of the United States looked upon her operations with suspicion, which, Seward diplomatically wrote, was allayed in the mind of the administration by her assurance that she did not propose to establish an anti-republican government in Mexico.⁴ Still later, after large reinforcements had been ordered to the invading army, he believed, or affected to believe, that the Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, concealed no "hidden design against the United States,"⁵ while at the same time

tion to him, not only for affording me the use of this valuable manuscript material and for his very excellent biography of Sumner, but for the ideas and impressions I have received from him in familiar intercourse during a friendship of four years. Living through the period of history that I am endeavoring to picture, he had the faculty of throwing himself back to those times in which he had been an actor, and while revivifying them to me he maintained the position of an impartial observer, remarkable in a man who had espoused so zealously one side of the contest.

¹ Letter of Oct. 10 to Sumner. — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

² Letter of Oct. 31, Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 95.

³ For an interesting account of this movement, see Frederic Bancroft, *Political Science Quart.*, March, 1896; also, H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of Mexico*, vol. vi.; Lothrop's Seward, p. 387; Letters on England, Louis Blanc, vol. ii. p. 70 *et seq.*

⁴ Seward to Dayton, June 21, 1862, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 355.

⁵ Seward to Dayton, Nov. 10, *ibid.*, p. 404, also p. 400.

Adams "suspected his object to be to grasp at a new dependency in that region, with its borders on the Mississippi River."¹

Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, had an interview with the Emperor at Vichy, July 17, and intimated that as the Lincoln government sympathized with Mexico, the Confederate States would make common cause with him against the common enemy;² at the same time he offered Louis Napoleon a hundred thousand bales of cotton, worth, in Europe, \$12,500,000, if he would send his war-ships to break the blockade. The proposition, he reports, did not seem disagreeable to the Emperor. He also asked for the recognition of his government, and later saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and made a formal demand for it. During the summer the Emperor took no action, but continuing to observe closely events in America, he made up his mind in the autumn that it was time to interfere in the struggle. October 22 he accorded to Slidell an interview at St. Cloud, in which he intimated that he should endeavor to bring about the joint mediation of France, England, and Russia. "My own preference is for a proposition of an armistice of six months," he said; "this would put a stop to the effusion of blood, and hostilities would probably never be resumed. We can urge it on the high grounds of humanity and the interest of the whole civilized world; if it be refused by the North, it will afford good reason for recognition, and perhaps for more active intervention."³ In eight days from this time the Emperor, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a despatch

¹ Adams's statement to Russell in interview of Nov. 15, Adams's Diary.

² It is quite probable that in this assurance Slidell went beyond his instructions. See Benjamin to Slidell, Oct. 17, an intercepted despatch, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 64.

³ Confed. Dip. Corr., MS., cited by John Bigelow, *France and the Confed. Navy*, p. 128. For an account of Slidell's first interview, *ibid.*, p. 116, also pp. 114, 177. I have verified the part of these despatches used in the text by having a comparison made with the originals in the archives.

to his ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London, proposing that the three governments "exert their influence at Washington, as well as with the Confederates, to obtain an armistice for six months." The reply of Russia, declining to be a party to such a mediation, was, in its terms, most friendly to the North. "In our opinion," it said, "what ought specially to be avoided [is] the appearance of any pressure whatsoever of a nature to wound public opinion in the United States, and to excite susceptibilities very easily aroused at the bare idea of foreign intervention." Earl Russell also declined to join in any such mediation, for the reason "that there is no ground at the present moment to hope that the federal government would accept the proposal suggested, and a refusal from Washington at the present time would prevent any speedy renewal of the offer."¹ The decision of the government was entirely satisfactory to the British public.²

Two months later a combination of circumstances induced the Emperor to propose, for his government alone, a mediation between the two belligerents. The apparently crushing

¹ Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1862, p. 738 *et seq.* The French proposal is printed in the *Times*, of Nov. 14, and Earl Russell's answer, Nov. 15. "His Lordship seemed a little elated by his paper, and was more cordial than usual." — Adams's Diary, Nov. 15.

² See the *Times*, *Daily News*, and *Spectator*, Nov. 15, and the *Sat. Rev.*, Nov. 22. John Bright wrote Sumner, Dec. 6: "I can assure you that the refusal of Lord Russell to unite with France in that matter has been cordially approved throughout the country, and even by those who, like Mr. Gladstone, believe your undertaking hopeless, and many of whom doubtless wish that you may ultimately fail in your efforts to restore the Union. Judging from the tone of our press and from all I can hear, I think England is not *more*, but is really less hostile than she was some time ago — and the more you seem likely to succeed, the more will your friends and moderate men show themselves, and your enemies be driven into obscurity. To me it seems that mediation or intervention is less likely and less possible than ever, and that recognition will be a thing not even talked about by any sane man if you once obtain possession of your Atlantic and Gulf ports." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

For an example of the tortuous diplomacy of the Emperor, cf. the Emperor's conversation with Slidell already quoted, with the assurances given by Drouyn de l'Huys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Dayton, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 404.

disaster of Fredericksburg¹ satisfied him, as, indeed, it confirmed the public opinion of Europe, that the cause of the North was hopeless. At the same time the distress in the cotton-manufacturing districts of France, which had become acute, was brought home as the winter wore on. More than a hundred thousand operatives in one department alone were out of work, and in a condition of utter misery, subsisting, according to report, "by roaming at night from house to house, and demanding, rather than asking, alms."² Seizing the fit opportunity, Slidell, on January 8, sent, through the private secretary of the Emperor, a memorandum to him, praying for the separate recognition by France of the Confederacy.³ If Louis Napoleon had not already determined to move alone, this communication furnished the final arguments guiding him to a decision. The next day he dictated a despatch, in which he offered, in courteous and diplomatic words, the friendly mediation of his government between the two sections without the suggestion of an armistice which had been contained in his former proposition. This message went through the usual diplomatic channels, and was presented, February 3, by the French Minister at Washington to Seward, who, three days later, by the President's instructions, declined the offer in a polite, gently argumentative, and considerate letter.⁴ The Emperor lacked the courage to proceed further in his policy of intervention without the co-operation of Great Britain, which was persistently withheld.⁵

¹ "Another tremendous disaster has fallen on the Federal arms. So great has been the carnage, so complete and undeniable the defeat, that the North appears stunned by the blow." — *Times*, Dec. 29, 1862.

² The *Spectator*, Jan. 3, 1863; the *Times*, Jan. 10; the *Index*, Jan. 8.

³ Slidell to Benjamin, Jan. 11, 21, 1863, Confed. Dip. Corr., MS., Treas. Dep't, Wash.

⁴ This correspondence is printed in Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 38, 37 Cong., 3 Sess. Seward's reply is printed in his works, vol. v. p. 376; *vide ante*, p. 222.

⁵ Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor-General, wrote in a private letter, Jan. 8: "The bearing of the upper classes (Conservatives and Liberals alike) to the side of the South is so strong that, but for the apparently opposite bearing of the intelligent industrial population, there would be some danger of

In the record of our relations with England during the Civil War, we now come to a splendid page, which, unrolling, as it does, the response of anti-slavery opinion in England to the President's Proclamation of Emancipation, delights those who have faith in the common people. In contrast with the sneers from the governing classes, the friends of the North suspended their judgment to await a better understanding of the matter; and knowing that the September proclamation was preliminary, and believing that it was tentative, they were anxious to see whether it would be confirmed and perfected on the first of January. In November, 1862, however, an Emancipation Society had been established, to encourage the Federal government and people; but a meeting which they held in London to give expression to their sentiments was boisterous, for it was somewhat disturbed by Southern sympathizers.¹ The December 1st message of the

the Government being driven, or drifting of its own accord, into the enormous mistake (as I think it would be) of a premature recognition of the South, *flagrante bello*. For such a step there could not, I believe, be found anything like a precedent in the whole range of modern history, except the recognition of the United States themselves by France, which was treated by us, very justly, as equivalent to a Declaration of War; and, if we were to do the same thing now, the United States would certainly *view* the act in the same light, and would resent it accordingly, whether at once, or afterwards, would (of course) depend upon circumstances." — Memorials, Earl of Selborne, vol. ii. p. 438.

March 3 Congress, by a large majority, adopted a concurrent resolution which declared that any proposition from a foreign power for mediation or for any other form of interference would be regarded as an unfriendly act. — Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 122; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 308.

¹ The *Daily News*, Nov. 14, 15, 1862. John Bright wrote Sumner, Dec. 6: "The anti-slavery sentiment here has been more called forth of late, especially since the Proclamation was issued, and I am confident that every day the supporters of the South among us find themselves in greater difficulty, owing to the course taken by your government in reference to the negro question. . . . The Proclamation, like everything else you have done, has been misrepresented, but it has had a large effect here, and men are looking with great interest to the first of January, and hoping that the President may be firm." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

Adams wrote Seward, Nov. 15, 1862: "Efforts are now making here, with a good prospect of success, for a more effective organization of the anti-

President to Congress, which was widely read and commented on in England, made it clear that he would take no backward step.¹ With the end of the year, therefore, the tide of anti-slavery sentiment began to rise perceptibly. On the last day of December² a great public meeting was held in London, which, in a resolution, hailed "the dawn of the new year as the beginning of an epoch of universal freedom upon the Western continent, and of closer friendship between the people of England and America." The same night, six thousand workmen and others of Manchester, "with the greatest enthusiasm and unanimity," declared their "profound sympathy" with the United States, and adopted an address to President Lincoln which showed a full understanding of what had been accomplished and what hope there was in the future.³ A public meeting in Sheffield, on the 31st of December,⁴ resolved "that it is the duty of England to give her sympathy and moral influence to the Northern States," and eleven days later another assemblage in the same city prayed "that the rebellion may be crushed and its wicked object defeated."⁵

When the intelligence came that the emancipation policy of the President was confirmed by the supplementary proclamation of January 1,⁶ the demonstrations of support were greater

slavery sentiment in our behalf." In his letter of Nov. 20 he spoke of the "active revival of the anti-slavery feeling among the people at large." — *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. pp. 3, 4.

¹ The *Spectator* said, Dec. 20, 1862: "'The mills of God grind slowly,' but when an American President can take and express that view of the great national offence, then surely, amidst all our impatient doubts, the world is not moving back."

² 1862.

³ *Daily News*, Jan. 1, 2. Heywood, the mayor of Manchester, to Adams, Jan. 1. Adams to Seward, Jan. 2. Adams wrote: "This meeting is in every respect a most remarkable indication of the state of popular sentiment in Great Britain." — *MS. Dip. Corr.*, State Dep't, Wash. The address of the Manchester meeting is printed in Moore's *Reb. Rec.*, vol. vi. Docs. p. 344. The President sent a reply, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 301.

⁴ 1862.

⁵ *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 55.

⁶ 1863.

than had been known for any movement since the uprising for the abolition of the duties on corn. A deputation from the Emancipation Society waited on the American Minister to offer to President Lincoln their warmest congratulations; Rev. Newman Hall, one of the speakers, asserting that "the leading newspapers really did not represent the feelings of the masses."¹ On a Sunday Spurgeon thus prayed before his congregation of many thousands: "Now, O God! we turn our thoughts across the sea to the terrible conflict of which we knew not what to say; but now the voice of freedom shows where is right. We pray Thee, give success to this glorious proclamation of liberty which comes to us from across the waters. We much feared our brethren were not in earnest, and would not come to this. Bondage and the lash can claim no sympathy from us. *God bless and strengthen the North; give victory to their arms!*" The immense congregation responded to this invocation in the midst of the prayer with a fervent amen.² The address, eight years before, of half a million English women, which spoke of the "frightful results" of negro slavery, and implored that something might be done for the amelioration of the sad condition of the slaves, received at this time a reply from Harriet Beecher Stowe. Now that we had really grappled with the evil, she prayed for the sympathy of her sisters in England.³ Public meetings were constantly occurring.⁴ The Duke of Argyll and Milner Gibson, both cabinet ministers, made speeches, indicating "greater confidence in the treatment of the American question and its relations to slavery." There was even a reaction at Liverpool, which had seen with joy the departure of the *Alabama*. Bristol, the last port in Great Britain to relinquish the slave-

¹ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 57.

² Adams to Seward, Jan. 22, *ibid.*, p. 80.

³ Published in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan. 1863; Life of Mrs. Stowe, Mrs. Fields, p. 263; Life by C. E. Stowe, p. 374; letters of John Bright and Hawthorne, *ibid.*, pp. 389, 394, of Abp. Whately, *Times*, Jan. 16; see, also, the *Spectator*, Jan. 10.

⁴ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 81.

trade, addressed the President with "respectful sympathy."¹ January 29 Exeter Hall was the scene of a more earnest demonstration of public opinion than had been known in London since the days of the Anti-Corn-Law League. So vast was the crowd that an overflow meeting was held in a lower room, and another in the open air. In the great hall the mention of Jefferson Davis brought out manifestations of dislike, while the name of Abraham Lincoln was greeted with a burst of enthusiasm, the audience rising, cheering, and waving hats and handkerchiefs. The resolutions adopted showed intelligence as well as fellow-feeling.² On the same night a public meeting at Bradford, Yorkshire, declared "that any intervention, physical or moral, on behalf of the slave power would be disgraceful," and closed its proceedings with three hearty cheers for President Lincoln. A large anti-slavery meeting in Gloucestershire, in a sympathetic address to the President, deplored "any apparent complicity [of Englishmen] with the Southern States in the clandestine equipment of war-ships."³ "Everybody now that I meet," declared John Bright, "says to me, 'public opinion seems to have undergone a considerable change.'"⁴

The month of February witnessed similar large meetings, which adopted like resolutions. There were gatherings at Leeds, Bath, Edinburgh, Paisley, Carlisle, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Merthyr Tydvil, and many other places. A concourse of citizens in Glasgow said to the Presi-

¹ *Spectator*, Jan. 24, 31; *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. pp. 88, 104.

² *Daily News*, Jan. 30; the *Spectator*, Jan. 31; *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 97; *Speeches of John Bright*, vol. i. p. 240; *Vacation Rambles*, Thomas Hughes, p. 395. Bright wrote Sumner, Jan. 30: "You will see what meetings are being held here in favor of your emancipation policy and of the North in general. I think in every town in the kingdom a public meeting would go, by an overwhelming majority, in favor of President Lincoln and of the North. I hope what is doing may have an effect on our Cabinet and on Parliament, which meets on the 5th of February." — *Pierce-Sumner Papers*, MS.

³ *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 100 *et seq.*; *Daily News*, Jan. 30; *Spectator*, Jan. 31.

⁴ *Speech of Feb. 3*, Bright's *Speeches*, vol. i. p. 241.

dent in their address, "We honor you and we congratulate you."¹ March 26, at a meeting of skilled laborers, held in London at the call of the Trades-Unions, John Bright took the chair, and made an eloquent speech, in which he expressed the meaning of the assemblage and the spirit of their address to Abraham Lincoln. "Privilege has shuddered," he said, "at what might happen to old Europe if this grand experiment should succeed. But you, the workers — you, striving after a better time — you, struggling upwards towards the light with slow and painful steps — you have no cause to look with jealousy upon a country which, menaced by the great nations of the globe, is that one where labor has met with the highest honor, and where it has reaped its greatest reward." This fearful struggle, he went on, is between one section where "labor is honored more than elsewhere in the world," and another section where labor "is degraded and the laborer is made a chattel." He closed his speech with prophetic words: "Impartial history will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your press — which ought to have instructed and defended — was mainly written to betray, the fate of a continent and its vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an unfaltering trust that God in His infinite mercy will yet make it the heritage of all His children."²

¹ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 104 *et seq.*; *Daily News* and *Spectator*, Feb. 21. Adams wrote Seward, Feb. 19: "The current of popular sentiment flows with little abatement of strength, as was made manifest last night at another great assemblage at St. James's Hall in this town. I have taken no part whatever in promoting these movements, having become well convinced that the smallest suspicion of my agency would do more harm than good." — Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 117.

² Bright's Speeches, vol. i. pp. 248, 253; Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. pp. 162, 244; *Spectator*, March 28. Bright wrote Sumner, April 4: "It was a great meeting, and means much for those present, who are the choice men of the London workmen and artisan class. I endeavored in my speech to widen your great question, and to show its transcendent importance to labor all over the world. The speeches of the workingmen were logical and good, and I am sure the effect of the meeting must be great." — Pierce-Sumner

It is interesting to look, with the eyes of Adams, upon these expressions of a noble public opinion. Thus he wrote in his diary: "January 17. It is quite clear that the current is now setting very strongly with us among the body of the people. This may be quite useful on the approach of the session of Parliament. . . . January 30. Things are improving here. The manifestation made at Exeter Hall last night is reported as one of the most extraordinary ever made in London, and proves, pretty conclusively, the spirit of the middle classes here as well as elsewhere. It will not change the temper of the higher classes, but it will do something to moderate the manifestation of it. . . . February 3. I think there can be but little doubt that the tendency of the popular current now sets in our favor," and, speaking of a large and respectable delegation of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, he wrote: "They left me with hearty shakes of the hand that marked the existence of active feeling at bottom. It was not the lukewarmness and indifference of the aristocracy, but the genuine English heartiness of goodwill." February 11 he said: "I am still overrun with reports of public meetings, to the notices of which I am obliged to give an answer;" and February 26, "The current is still setting strongly with us among the people."

These demonstrations show what potent arguments for the Northern side were the Emancipation Proclamation and the organized anti-slavery agitation. The English who had espoused the cause of the South now became, by the logic of the situation, apologists for slavery. The *Times* presented the Biblical argument for the justification of it, and told the story of Paul and Onesimus in the language and temper of men on Southern plantations. Slavery, it argued further, is no more at variance with the spirit of the gospel than "sumptuous fare, purple and fine linen;" and it said of

Papers, MS. On the sentiment generally, see Mill to Motley, Jan. 26, Bright to Motley, March 9, Motley to his mother, March 3, Motley's Letters, vol. ii. pp. 111, 118, 119; Cobden to Sumner, Feb. 13, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1897, p. 308; Bright to C. W. Field, *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1896, p. 846.

the Proclamation that was arousing the enthusiasm of the masses, President Lincoln "calls to his aid the execrable expedient of a servile insurrection. Egypt is destroyed, but his heart is hardened, and he will not let the people go."¹ The *Saturday Review* urged that the laws dictated from on high, as recorded in the Old Testament, sanctioned and protected property in slaves. But "the American law-giver not only confiscates his neighbor's slaves, but orders the slaves to cut their masters' throats. Nor," it went on to say, "is the matter left to the remote guidance of Old Testament precedent. . . . St. Paul sent Onesimus, the fugitive slave of that time, back to his master, Philemon; so that without the master's consent it was not competent, even in an Apostle, to release a slave. But what St. Paul might not do Abraham Lincoln may."² Later, it spoke of the movement which was ennobling the common people of England as "a carnival of cant—arousing agitation on behalf of the divine right of insurrection and massacre."³ The *Times* and *Saturday Review*, according to the *Spectator*, represented "the higher intelligence of England,"⁴ and their ground of reasoning displays well the bond of sympathy between the two landed aristocracies separated by the sea. The Southern lords, by their system of labor, were relieved from the minute cares of making money, were enabled to maintain an open and generous hospitality, and were afforded leisure for devotion to society and politics, thus reaching a communion in conditions, tastes, and aims with the English noblemen, who, in turn, had taken a leaf out of the book of their Southern brethren, for, having begun by looking kindly upon the South-

¹ Jan. 6, 15.

² Jan. 3. Cf. these arguments with the Southern arguments. See vol. I. p. 370.

³ Jan. 24.

⁴ Jan. 10. The *Spectator* is filled with "profound consternation. We could not have believed for a moment a year ago that the *Times* and *Saturday Review* would both in the same week devote their ablest pens to an apology, not merely for slavery itself but for the Christian character of that institution."

ern Confederacy, and wishing for its success, they had ended with taking up the cudgels in behalf of the institution of negro slavery.¹ A contrast of these arguments which reflected the sentiment of the best with the resolutions and addresses of the popular meetings will establish the faith of those who believe in government by the people. The people² were right; the wealthy, the educated, the refined, were wrong. These saw things as they were; those wilfully threw dust into their own eyes.

Strenuous efforts were made by the Confederates in England to counteract the opinion aroused by this agitation of the slavery question.³ The *Index*, a weekly journal which was appearing in London, an "organ of Southern interests and opinions," and was sustained partly by money from the Confederate government, exerted itself with vigor to stem the current.⁴ "Our Southern newspapers," wrote Bright to

¹ Cf. vol. i. pp. 54, 68, 360, 365. Motley wrote Holmes, Nov. 2, 1862: "We are Mudsills beloved of the Radicals; the negro breeders are aristocrats, and, like Mrs. Jarley, the pride of the nobility and gentry." — Motley's *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 100.

² "These lower classes! which one calls the lower, but which in God's eyes are surely the highest!" — Goethe, Lewes, p. 215.

³ April 12, 1862, Secretary Benjamin wrote Mason that he had appointed Edwin de Leon as confidential agent of the State Department, "and he has been supplied with twenty-five thousand dollars as a secret service fund to be used by him in the manner he may deem most judicious, both in Great Britain and the Continent, for the special purpose of enlightening public opinion in Europe through the press." Jan. 16, 1863, Benjamin wrote Hotze at London: "You are aware that your position of commercial agent was conferred principally with the view of rendering effective your services in using the press of Great Britain in aid of our cause; and until our recognition all other objects must be made subordinate to that end. . . . Your plan of engaging the services of writers employed in the leading daily papers, and thereby securing not only their co-operation but educating them into such a knowledge of our affairs as will enable them to counteract effectually the misrepresentations of the Northern agents, appears to be judicious and effective; and after consultation with the President he is satisfied that an assignment to the support of your efforts of two thousand pounds per annum out of the appropriation confided to him for secret service will be well spent." — MS. Confed. Dip. Corr., Treas. Dep't, Wash.; see, also, Dayton to Seward, Feb. 13, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 642.

⁴ Slidell wrote Benjamin, Dec. 6, 1863: I had concurred "at Mr. Mason's

Sumner, meaning the major part of the London press, "are surprised and puzzled at the expression of opinion in favor of the North;"¹ at times they were full of irritation which they vented in virulent attacks on the Proclamation and in sneers at the Exeter Hall meeting.² Even Earl Russell was influenced more by the sentiment of his order than by his love for liberty; and in a letter to Lord Lyons condemned the Proclamation in harsh words: "It makes slavery at once legal and illegal. There seems to be no declaration of a principle adverse to slavery. . . . It is a measure of war of a very questionable kind;" and he intimated that its object was not "total and impartial freedom for the slave," but "vengeance on the slave owner."³

suggestion, in a recommendation for the advance of a moderate sum to sustain the *Index*." — MS. Confed. Dip. Corr., Treas. Dep't. I am indebted to Mr. Charles F. Adams for the convenient loan of the volumes of the *Index* from Oct. 30, 1862, to Dec. 31, 1863.

¹ Jan. 30, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. "Our London press is mainly in the hands of certain ruling West End classes; it acts and writes in favor of those classes." — Bright's Speeches, vol. i. p. 222.

² See *Morning Post*, *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 31, cited by the *Index*. "But what is said," demanded Bright, "by the writers in this infamous Southern press in this country with regard to that meeting? Who was there? 'A gentleman who had written a novel and two or three dissenting ministers.'" — Feb. 3, Speeches, vol. i. p. 241. The *Times* said, Jan. 31: "The speakers were a minor novelist and two or three dissenting ministers, who seem to be of the usual intellectual calibre. Not one man whose opinion the country would listen to on any political subject — not one statesman, not one person endowed with genius, however self-willed or erratic; no representative of the Peerage, only one of the House of Commons, not one of the Church, of the gentry, or the commercial world was found to stand on that platform and make himself responsible for Mr. Lincoln's Proclamation." Among the speakers were Thomas Hughes, Rev. Newman Hall, and Rev. Baptist Noel. Adams wrote in his diary, Jan. 31: "The newspapers are much exercised by this popular demonstration. The *Times* . . . intimates that it is stimulated by money from the government through me. Had I been able to effect it in any way, the operation might not have been a feat without something to boast of."

³ Despatch No. 57, Jan. 17, N. A. Papers. This despatch was not printed until somewhat later. Sumner wrote to Bright, March 30, that it was "cold and unsympathizing." — Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 130. Adams spoke of it in his diary, May 27: "The most flagrant case of all is the construction

It will be instructive to sum up in numbers, as best we may, the popular opinion as evinced by the demonstration in favor of Lincoln's Proclamation. The agitation had little, if any, direct effect on the aristocracy and upper middle classes, who, in the main, still sympathized with the South;¹ but it supported the friends of the North, in the Cabinet, who were bent on maintaining a strict neutrality. Four-fifths of the House of Lords were "no well-wishers of anything American,"² and most members of the House of Commons³ desired the success of the South, although a majority were willing to follow the lead of the government in its policy of non-intervention. The total number of electors in Great Britain was about a million; but the figures appear to indicate that only four-fifths of those ever voted, while in the general election, in 1859, which chose the existing House of Commons, the whole number of votes registered was under 370,000, the falling off being largely for the reason that

put by Lord Russell on the President's Proclamation of Emancipation. Such is English manliness! Such is English honesty!" The Duchess of Argyll wrote Sumner, March 26: "Is it not natural that those unacquainted with American politics should be puzzled by the Proclamation, which leaves the slaves of the loyal in slavery? and worst of all there was hope held out of the continuance of the Fugitive Slave Law. These things are puzzling. . . . There are many who hate slavery very much, who have from the first thought there was more hope of its destruction when separation is accomplished. I have never been able to see any reason for this hope, but I am sure it is honestly entertained by some." She wrote Sumner, May 15: "I do not think you trust Lord Russell as you might. His strictures on the Proclamation may have been a mistake, but it was a friend's hand." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

¹ But Mason's opinion did not prove to be correct. He wrote Benjamin, Jan. 15: "The abolition decree of the first of January is characterized in the *Times* of this morning . . . as the 'execrable expedient of a servile insurrection;' and this, I think, will be the judgment passed upon it by all except the most ignorant classes of England. It will have an effect exactly opposite to that which was intended, if the object was to conciliate the public opinion of Europe." — MS. Confed. Dip. Corr.

² Adams to Seward, March 26, Dip. Corr., p. 157.

³ Mason wrote Benjamin, April 27: "It is perfectly understood in the House of Commons that the war professedly waged to restore the Union is hopeless, and the sympathies of four-fifths of its members are with the South." — MS. Confed. Dip. Corr.

many members were returned from boroughs and counties without a contest. There were, according to John Bright, five to six million men who did not possess the franchise.¹ Nearly all of these, who had any opinion whatever, sympathized with the North; and their hearty manifestations of friendship came at the most gloomy period of the war, when patriots at home and friends abroad despaired of our ability to conquer the South, and when Englishmen of position and influence were gloating over the prospect of a divided republic.² The Great Britain of to-day, which in the general election of 1895 cast 4,280,000 votes,³ would have been with the

¹ See Speeches of John Bright, vol. ii. pp. 140, 172, 179, 191, 232; The Platform, Jephson, vol. ii. pp. 344, 355.

² John Stuart Mill wrote Motley, Oct. 31, 1862: "We are now beginning to hear what disgusts me more than all the rest, the base doctrine that it is for the interest of England that the American republic should be broken up. Think of us as ill as you may (and we have given you abundant cause), but do not, I entreat you, think that the general English public is so base as this. . . . I am deeply conscious and profoundly grieved and mortified that we deserve so ill and are making in consequence so pitiful a figure before the world." — Motley's Letters, vol. ii. pp. 96, 98. John Bright said, in his speech of Dec. 18, 1862: "I have heard . . . that there are members of the aristocracy who are terrified at the shadow of the Great Republic. . . . One of the most eminent statesmen in this country . . . told me twice at an interval of several months, 'I had no idea how much influence the example of that Republic was having upon opinion here until I discovered the universal congratulation that the Republic was likely to be broken up.' " — Speeches of John Bright, vol. i. pp. 218, 222. Charles Darwin, with his transparent truthfulness of soul, wrote Asa Gray, Feb. 23, 1863: "I read Cairnes's excellent lecture (*ante*, p. 79), which shows so well how your quarrel arose from slavery. It made me for a time wish honestly for the North; but I could never help, though I tried, all the time thinking how we should be bullied and forced into a war by you when you were triumphant. But I do most truly think it dreadful that the South with its accursed slavery should triumph and spread the evil. I think, if I had the power, which, thank God, I have not, I would let you conquer the border States and all west of the Mississippi, and then force you to acknowledge the cotton States. For do you not now begin to doubt whether you can conquer and hold them?" — Life of Darwin, vol. ii. p. 195.

³ This was the vote of England, Wales, and Scotland as computed and estimated by the *Times*. The whole electorate was 5,595,055. — *Times*, July 31, 1895; the *Speaker*, Aug. 3, 1895. In 1863 about one person in twenty-three had a vote; in 1895 about one in six.

North; and no doubt can exist that if the same wide franchise had obtained in 1863, the House of Commons would have sympathized with the Union, and determined the government to a friendly instead of a grudging neutrality, with the result that there would have been no *Florida* or *Alabama* destroying our shipping on the high seas. If there still remain an American Jingo¹ who wishes to retaliate, when the bided time comes, for the depredations of the Confederate cruisers, the cynical ill-will of Palmerston, the speech of Gladstone, the leaders in the *Times* and the *Saturday Review*, he must remember that the England which arouses his indignation has passed away. In truth, we have reason to thank the English common people for their comprehension, right thinking, and hearty utterance of sympathy, and for their appreciation and admiration, in 1863, of Abraham Lincoln. They received his words gladly; and while trained writers criticised his grammar, his inelegant English, his backwoodsman style of expression,² they grasped the ideas for which he stood, and their hearts went out to him. The expressions of the *beau monde*, preserved by the antiseptic of style, are repeated with their irritating sting, while the prosaic resolves of the masses are not remembered. But it is no longer true, as it was in Voltaire's time, that the *beau monde* rules the world.³

While the meeting in Exeter Hall was, as the *Spectator* said, "crowded with scholars and workmen,"⁴ the sympathies of many of the literary men were not extended to the North. Grote, who loved democracy in Greece, and could palliate its excesses in Athens, criticised, with acrimony, the Northern people, because they insisted that England had violated the neutrality which she had declared, and because they did not

¹ Jan. 1899.

² See the *Spectator*, Dec. 20, 1862, Jan. 17, 31, Dec. 26, 1863; *Saturday Review*, Sept. 19, 1863.

³ "'Get good society on your side,' Voltaire used to say; 'the *beau monde* rules the *monde*.'" — James Parton in the *Forum*, Sept. 1888, p. 61

⁴ Jan. 31.

in their criticisms use courteous and refined language.¹ Carlyle, who had received the first money for his "French Revolution" from Boston, when "not a penny had been realized in England," and who had thankfulness of heart for what it implied, as well as for the needful money, had now no fellow-feeling with the North. "No war ever raging in my time," he said, "was to me more profoundly foolish looking. Neutral I am to a degree: I for one." Again, he spoke of it as "a smoky chimney which had taken fire;" and when asked to publish something in regard to the conflict, he wrote his *Πίσις Americana in nuce*. "Peter of the North (to Paul of the South): Paul, you unaccountable scoundrel, I find you hire your servants for life, not by the month or year, as I do. You are going straight to hell, you —

Paul: Good words, Peter. The risk is my own. I am willing to take the risk. Hire you your servants by the month or the day, and get straight to heaven; leave me to my own method.

Peter: No, I won't. I will beat your brains out first! (And is trying dreadfully ever since, but cannot yet manage it.)"²

¹ Grote wrote to Sir G. C. Lewis, Dec. 29, 1862: "I quite agree in the remarks contained in your last note about the unreasonable and insane language of the Americans against England. The perfect neutrality of England in this destructive war appears to me almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. . . . And the way in which the Northern Americans have requited such forbearance is alike silly and disgusting. I never expected to have lived to think of them so unfavorably as I do at present. Amidst their very difficult present circumstances they have manifested little or nothing of those qualities which inspire sympathy and esteem and very much of all the contrary qualities; and among the worst of their manifestations is their appetite for throwing the blame of their misfortunes on guiltless England." — *Life of Grote* by Mrs. Grote, p. 262. I have expressed in the text probably the average Northern opinion of this letter; for a fair statement of the Southern view of Grote's position, see article of Gildersleeve in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan. 1892, p. 79.

² While this was not published in *Macmillan's Magazine* until Aug., 1863, it is dated May, and it is proper to refer the thought to this period. See the *Magazine*; Froude's Carlyle, vol. iv. p. 209, also, vol. iii. p. 131. Much the same notion as that in the text was expressed by Carlyle, July

Dickens, who had sent cheer and humor and pathos into every household from the Atlantic to the Missouri River, who was loved in the free States as few writers have been loved, who, one might have thought from his vehement denunciation of slavery in the "American Notes,"¹ would, now that the battle was joined, see that the right would prevail, treated the opinion of a friend, who returned from America in the spring of 1863 and said that the North would ultimately triumph, as a "harmless hallucination."² Indirectly and undesignedly he was himself a contributing cause to the view which the English higher classes took of the North, for his caricatures in "Martin Chuzzlewit" came to be regarded as a true portrayal³ of the character of the men and women who were now risking all for unity and freedom. But Tennyson, the poet of the people, though filled with conventional horror at the war, was inspired by the hope of the abolition of slavery, and used to sing, with enthusiasm,

"Glory, glory, hallelujah,
His soul goes marching on."⁴

All interested in the attitude of Great Britain towards American affairs awaited, anxiously, the opening of Parliament. The terrible defeat which Burnside had met at Fredericksburg, and the cabinet crisis which followed, together with the Democratic success in the fall elections, seemed to presage the breaking-up of the war party of the North, and affected profoundly the public opinion which moved the House of Commons. Mason wrote Benjamin, January 15:

30, 1862, Notes from a Diary, Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 204. See an article and a parody by F. D. M., *Spectator*, Aug. 8.

¹ Chapter xvii. and *passim*.

² *Cornhill Magazine*, April, 1892, p. 368.

³ "The American part of 'Martin Chuzzlewit' is, we think, one of the very cleverest things ever written in fiction. There are not many pages in it, but Mr. Dickens has so thoroughly caught the spirit and reproduced the character of the people he set himself to describe, that almost everything said or done in public by Americans is virtually contained in 'Martin Chuzzlewit.'" — *Saturday Review*, Oct. 25, 1862.

⁴ *Memoir of Tennyson*, vol. i. p. 490.

"Though I doubt not a word from the Minister suggesting that the time had arrived for recognition would meet with unanimous response in the affirmative, both from the ministerial and opposition benches in the House of Commons, I do not think Lord Palmerston is disposed to speak that word."¹ Nevertheless, Adams had reason for anxiety, for, in spite of the rising tide of anti-slavery sentiment, military affairs looked so gloomy for the North that even Forster "seemed inclined to give way to a proposal of recognition of the rebels if brought up . . . in Parliament."² Parliament assembled February 5. In the Queen's speech reference was made to a condition operating to the advantage of the North: the distress in Lancashire was diminishing. Throughout the autumn it had been great;³ but towards the end of the year

¹ Confed. Dip. Corr., MS. Mason added: "Nor will the Tories make an issue with him on American affairs. The fact is that parties are so nearly balanced in the House, and, as it would seem, in the country, that the latter are very coy in measuring strength with their opponents."

² Adams's Diary, entry Jan. 21. Two days later Forster modified his opinion.

³ Adams wrote Seward: Sept. 12, 1862, "There are announcements of increasing distress among the operatives as the growing scarcity of cotton has the effect of closing more of the mills;" Sept. 25, "The distress in the manufacturing districts is rather on the increase, and the demand for cotton more imperative;" Oct. 3, "The distress in the manufacturing region rather increases in severity; but I am inclined to believe that the further closing of the mills is no longer made imperative by the diminution of the material. Large supplies of cotton of the old crop were received from India last week, and 300,000 bales are announced as far on their way. The new crop will soon follow;" Dec. 4, "It is more than likely that the distress from this time will become less and less burdensome. Such engagements have been entered into for the prospective supply of cotton from other sources than the United States, that the probability of a sudden reopening of our ports is beginning to be viewed with quite as much apprehension as desire. . . . Thus far it is notorious here that all the markets of the world to which the English have access had been, prior to the troubles, so much glutted with their cotton goods as, in spite of the subsequent cessation of manufacture, not yet to have recovered their equilibrium."—Dip. Corr. Bright wrote Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862: "This country is passing through a wonderful crisis, but our people will be kept alive by the contributions of the country. I see that some one in the States has proposed to send something to our aid. If a few cargoes of flour could come, say 50,000 barrels, as a gift from persons

an improvement began, and by the first of January, 1863, the crisis in the cotton trade had been passed.¹ Egypt, Syria, and Brazil were sending cotton,² and at the same time it began to be understood that the suffering was not due solely to the cutting off of the raw material by the American war. The glut of cotton goods in the great markets of China and India³ indicated that without any other disturbing element the manufacturers of Manchester would have been forced to curtail operations from an inability to dispose of their product. Nevertheless, the generous people in the eastern part of the United States were touched by the tale of distress that came across the water, and sent, in the early part of January, from New York City, a ship loaded with flour, bread, and meat to the suffering workmen of Lancashire.⁴

The debate on the Queen's speech was favorable to the North. "The most marked indication respecting American affairs," wrote Adams, in his diary, "was the course of Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, which decidedly discouraged movement. On their minds the effect of the President's Proclamation on public sentiment here had not been lost."⁵

In your Northern States to the Lancashire workingmen, it would have a prodigious effect in your favor here. Our working class is with you, and against the South; but such a token of your good-will would cover with confusion all those who talk against you." — *Pierce-Sumner Papers*, MS. Bright said in his speech of Dec. 18: "Nearly 500,000 persons — men, women, and children — at this moment are saved from the utmost extremes of famine, not a few of them from death, by the contributions which they are receiving from all parts of the country." The *Times* said, Jan. 8: "The number of persons dependent more or less on the support, compulsory or voluntary, of the public was not much less than a million."

¹ *Spectator* and *Saturday Review*, Jan. 3.

² John Bright's Speeches, vol. i. p. 209.

³ See Earl of Derby's Speech in the House of Lords, Feb. 5.

⁴ *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 10; *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 18. The cotton operatives held meetings, and sent a formal expression of their thanks to the New York City merchants, and to the people of the United States generally. — *Daily News*, Jan. 30, Feb. 4. John Bright, Speeches, vol. i. p. 227; see, also, *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 103.

⁵ Entry, Feb. 6. For these Speeches, see Hansard, 23, 82. Mason wrote Benjamin, Feb. 9: "Whilst both the ministry and the opposition agree

Towards the end of March the situation between the two countries again looked grave. Owing to the depredations of the *Alabama*, which had been built at Liverpool and was almost sweeping our flag from the seas, the irritation in the United States against Great Britain was constantly on the increase. Adams persistently urged upon the English government, in a correspondence marked by some acerbity between him and Earl Russell, its responsibility for the destruction caused by this cruiser, when Russell at last wrote: "Her Majesty's Government entirely disclaim all responsibility for any acts of the *Alabama*."¹ The *Alabama* was manned by British seamen, showed frequently the English flag, and received a hearty welcome in all ports of the English colonies; on one occasion she was greeted by enthusiastic demonstrations from an English ship bound from Australia to England, the men cheering and the ladies waving their handkerchiefs. This incident, by the time it reached the United States and was told and retold, became the story of the passengers of a British packet making the "sea resound with cheers" as they witnessed the burning of two American ships which had been captured by the *Alabama*.² She was a swift screw steamer, with full sail power, and had an able Southern commander, who by his watchfulness aided by a certain degree of good fortune, eluded all the attempts made by the United States Naval Department to catch her and destroy her. During her career she burned fifty-seven vessels

that the separation of the States is final, yet both equally agree that in their judgment the time has not yet arrived for recognition. Both parties are guided in this by a fixed English purpose to run no risk of a broil, even far less of a war with the United States. . . . The ground taken by Lord Derby that recognition without other form of intervention would have no fruits, is constantly assumed here by those who are against any movement; and with those willingly deaf it is vain to argue." — Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.

¹ March 9, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 145.

² Sinclair, *Two Years on the Alabama*, pp. 16, 29, 73; *Cruise of the Alabama*, Semmes, vol. i. p. 298, vol. ii. pp. 60, 79. I have assumed that the incident related by Semmes is the same as that described by Sumner in his speech of Sept. 10, 1863, *Sumner's Works*, vol. vii. p. 354.

of a value of over six and one-half million dollars.¹ Despite the damage which was being done by this cruiser, it was then fully recognized that the blockade of the Southern ports must in no wise be weakened for the purpose of capturing her or the *Florida*. At Liverpool the construction was now going on of at least three ships of war which, it was notorious, were destined for the Confederates. A Confederate loan of three million pounds had been floated in London, and the money obtained from it was to be used in the building of war vessels in England for commerce destroyers, for breaking the blockade, and, perhaps, for attacking New York and Boston. The critical condition at this time is told by Adams in his diary: "The talk about the *Alabama* is 'it is done and cannot be helped.'"² "Over all this grows a cloud, hanging darker and darker from this country. I now begin to fear again that the peace will scarcely last six months. The last aggravation is the making of a loan of three million sterling to the rebels, which the government had absolutely done nothing to discountenance. The temper of our people is already roused enough by the constant annoyance created by the ravages of the *Alabama* not to have an additional spur to it from the prospect of a supply of money to fit out others."³ "My spirits are also failing me a good deal, as the public indications grow more threatening. The course of the wealthy classes is turning the scale against us. They are recovering from the shock occasioned by the public manifestation of the popular sympathy, and are doing by indirection what they cannot effect directly. The only thing which would really check them, military success, does not come at our call."⁴ March 22 Adams wrote again: "Had a visit from Mr. Forster, and talked earnestly with him about the very grave condition of our affairs. I feared that a collision would come

¹ Two Years on the *Alabama*, Sinclair, p. 3; British Blue-Book, Proceedings of the Geneva arbitration, part i. p. 368. The first capture of the *Florida* was in Feb. 1863; the captures of the *Shenandoah* were in 1865, pp. 369, 370.

² March 18.

³ March 20.

⁴ March 21.

unless the ministry here could be persuaded to act with more energy in restraining the outfits from this kingdom." . . . For there "would be a demand in America for the issue of letters of marque which the government would find it hard to resist. But if the President should yield, the chances of a collision on the ocean would be much increased. . . . I urged him, therefore, to do something to make the ministry alive to the nature of the difficulty."¹

March 27, in the House of Commons, Forster called the attention of the government to the fitting out of ships of war in the English ports for the Confederates, referred to the destroying career of the *Alabama*, and contrasted favorably the course of the United States during the Crimean War with that of England at present. Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor-General, maintained that in the case of the *Alabama* the British government had acted with diligence and promptitude, and was free from blame. John Bright took part in the debate, and charged that a gun-boat, the *Alexandra*, had been launched from a ship-yard in Liverpool, and that two iron-clad rams were building by the Lairds at Birkenhead,² all three being intended for Confederate cruisers to make war against the United States. Laird, whose sons had built the *Alabama*, declared that in the

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of a value of over six and one-half million dollars.¹ Despite the damage which was being done by this cruiser, it was then fully recognized that the blockade of the Southern ports must in no wise be weakened for the purpose of capturing her or the *Florida*. At Liverpool the construction was now going on of at least three ships of war which, it was notorious, were destined for the Confederates. A Confederate loan of three million pounds had been floated in London, and the money obtained from it was to be used in the building of war vessels in England for commerce destroyers, for breaking the blockade, and, perhaps, for attacking New York and Boston. The critical condition at this time is told by Adams in his diary: "The talk about the *Alabama* is 'it is done and cannot be helped.'"² "Over all this grows a cloud, hanging darker and darker from this country. I now begin to fear again that the peace will scarcely last six months. The last aggravation is the making of a loan of three million sterling to the rebels, which the government had absolutely done nothing to discountenance. The temper of our people is already roused enough by the constant annoyance created by the ravages of the *Alabama* not to have an additional spur to it from the prospect of a supply of money to fit out others."³ "My spirits are also failing me a good deal, as the public indications grow more threatening. The course of the wealthy classes is turning the scale against us. They are recovering from the shock occasioned by the public manifestation of the popular sympathy, and are doing by indirection what they cannot effect directly. The only thing which would really check them, military success, does not come at our call."⁴ March 22 Adams wrote again: "Had a visit from Mr. Forster, and talked earnestly with him about the very grave condition of our affairs. I feared that a collision would come

¹ Two Years on the *Alabama*, Sinclair, p. 3; British Blue-Book, Proceedings of the Geneva arbitration, part i. p. 368. The first capture of the *Florida* was in Feb. 1863; the captures of the *Shenandoah* were in 1865, pp. 369, 370.

² March 18.

³ March 20.

⁴ March 21.

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building of that ship "everything was perfectly straightforward and above board," and in the midst of great cheering¹ he said, "I would rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen *Alabamas* than as the man [referring to Bright] who applies himself deliberately to set class against class, and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when they come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." Palmerston closed the debate, treating the American grievances in a conventional and flippant manner, but hinting at the same time at the difficulties under which his government labored, owing to the eager money-making spirit of British merchants and ship-builders. He said: "Whenever any political party, whether in or out of office in the United States, finds itself in difficulties, it raises a cry against England as a means of creating what in American language is called political 'capital.' . . . The Solicitor-General . . . has demonstrated, indisputably, that the Americans have no cause of complaint against us. . . . Honorable members have argued as if the seizure of a vessel were equivalent to its condemnation. . . . You cannot seize a vessel under the Foreign Enlistment Act, unless you have evidence on oath confirming a just suspicion. . . . When a vessel is seized unjustly, and without good grounds, there is a process of law to come afterwards, and the Government may be condemned in heavy costs and damages. Why are we to undertake an illegal measure which may lead to those consequences, simply to please the agent of a foreign government? . . . I have, myself, great doubts whether, if we had seized the *Alabama*, we should not have been liable to considerable damages. . . . I can assure the House that Her Majesty's Government have no indisposition to enforce the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act."²

Mason was in glee at this debate. "The reply of the

¹ *Times, Daily News, Morning Star*, March 28.

² This debate may be found in Hansard, 33 *et seq.*, and a report of it, though not strictly accurate, in *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 164.

Solicitor-General," he wrote, "besides a clear and able exposition of the law of the question, was a scathing rebuke to the pretensions of the United States; but the logic of Mr. Laird's facts were conclusive against them." Lord Palmerston's "speech told capitally. . . . It was felt on all hands that the debate was a most damaging one to the arrogance of the Yankee pretensions as well as their advocates."¹ Adams wrote of it in his diary: "Sir Roundell Palmer made a lawyer's plea, and Lord Palmerston indulged, as usual, in derogatory and insulting language rather than in conciliation."²

The feeling of the friends of the North in England was that this debate of March 27 meant war;³ and even before the report of it was received in the United States, the hope there was but faint that the calamity could be avoided.⁴ Forster

¹ March 30, Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.

² Entry March 28. Bright wrote Sumner, April 4: "The debate on the *Alabama* was badly managed, and told against us. . . . The speeches of the Solicitor-General and Palmerston were untrue and altogether bad in tone." He also said: "I am very uneasy at the irritation which arises from the building of the pirate ships in this country. Some meetings will be held to condemn the conduct of the builders and of the government, but the House of Commons is not disposed to say anything in the matter. The government is supported nearly as much by the Tory party as by the Liberals, and there is little chance at present of any change. Palmerston, I am convinced, is no friend of your country, and his cold or hostile neutrality is well liked by the great aristocratic party and class, of which he is the chief."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. The *Spectator* of April 4 said: "We read the debate . . . on the *Alabama* question with profound humiliation. . . . The House of Commons . . . cheered and cheered again the statements of the Prime Minister and Sir Roundell Palmer. As if to remove all doubt of the temper of the House, Mr. Laird . . . got up in his place, and was not ashamed to justify his infraction of the provisions of the English statute book." The *Daily News* of March 28 had a severe comment on the debate, in which it said: "If, when we were at war with Russia, powerful fighting vessels, built in American dockyards, manned by American crews, and paid by American

³ Adams's Diary, entry March 29.

⁴ Sumner wrote Cobden, March 16: "I am anxious, very anxious, on account of the ships building in England to cruise against our commerce. Cannot something be done to stop them? Our people are becoming more and more excited, and there are many who insist upon war. A very important person said to me yesterday, 'We are now at war with England, but

was disappointed at the result, and so anxious about the matter¹ that he redoubled his energies to have justice done.

money, had preyed on the commerce, destroying British trading vessels by scores, what would have been the general feeling in this country?"

I subjoin a fac-simile of the call for a meeting.

SHIPS OF WAR

FOR THE

SLAVEHOLDERS' CONFEDERACY

On MONDAY, April 6th, 1863,

A

PUBLIC MEETING

Of the Members and Friends of the UNION AND EMANCIPATION SOCIETY, will be held in the

FREE TRADE HALL,

MANCHESTER,

To PROTEST against the Building and Fitting-Out of
PIRATICAL SHIPS, in support of the SOUTHERN
SLAVEHOLDERS' CONFEDERACY.

At this meeting Professor Goldwin Smith, of Oxford, thus spoke : "The duties of nations towards each other were not bound by the technical rules of law. They were as wide as the rules of morality and honor : and if in our dealings with America we violated the rules of morality and honor, we should abide the consequences of wrong doing, though our lawyers might advise us that we were secure. . . . No nation ever inflicted upon another a more flagrant or more maddening wrong [permitting the *Alabama* to escape]. No nation with English blood in its veins had ever borne such a wrong without resentment. . . . Built and equipped in a British port,

the hostilities are all on her side.' " — Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 129. On receipt of this letter, Cobden wrote Earl Russell in regard to the matter, with good effect, *ibid.*, note 5; Cobden to Sumner, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1897, p. 309; see Cobden to Forster, April 5, *Life of Forster*, Reid, vol. i. p. 358. Sumner wrote Bright, March 30: "If those ships get to sea, our commerce is annihilated." On April 7: "All the signs are of war, more surely than in the time of the *Trent*. . . . All look forward to action of a most decisive character, should those ships come out." After he read the report of the debate of March 27, he was sad and anxious. — Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 130 *et seq.* See also *N. Y. Times*, March 7, April 13; Letters of Belmont, privately printed, p. 79.

¹ See letter to his wife, April 7, *Life of Forster*, Reid, p. 359.

He went to see Adams, and asked "if the stopping of one vessel would do any good." Adams said, "Yes, much good."¹ April 5 Earl Russell stopped the *Alexandra*. While the decision of the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer was against the position which the government had taken in seizing the ship, still the case remained in the courts, on one legal point and another, for a long while, with the result that she never got into the hands of the Confederates to be used against American commerce.² The significance of this seizure lay in the excellent action of the English government, directed undoubtedly by Earl Russell, and the sincere manner in which it prosecuted the case.³

manned by British seamen, with the English flag flying, she [the *Alabama*] went forth to cruise from an English port against the commerce of our allies. That was the substantial grievance of the American government, and no technicalities of the Solicitor-General would make it otherwise than a heinous wrong. . . . The Americans would soon have read the speech of the Solicitor-General, treating their complaints with little courtesy, and the speech of Mr. Laird avowing (it might be said) his crime ; they would have seen that a large party in the House of Commons received Mr. Laird, not with disapprobation, but with enthusiastic cheers ; they would have seen that the announcements of the success of the *Alabama* herself were cheered by the House ; and all this would excite in them bitter feelings, and perhaps they might do on their side something that would cause our government to demand reparation. . . . We could not mistake from the bearing of Lord Palmerston that he was at the head of the Southern party. It was clear, too, from some expressions of Lord Russell that his heart was on the right side." — *Daily News*, April 8.

¹ Adams's Diary, March 29.

² *Ibid.*, entry April 5, June 24; Appendix to the British Case at Geneva, p. 219 *et seq.*

³ Adams to Seward, April 23; Memorials of Earl of Selborne, vol. ii. p. 440 *et seq.* The Manchester meeting of April 6 received with loud cheers the intelligence that the *Alexandra* had been stopped. There came simultaneously a considerable fall in the Confederate loan. Mason, in a letter of April 9 (Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.), tells of the desperate efforts he, Slidell, Erlanger & Co, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co. made to sustain the market. See Bigelow, p. 179 *et seq.*

An incident shows the indirect pressure on men of position. R. P. Collier had been of such service in the *Alabama* that Adams desired to retain him again, but he intimated that he "had been found fault with for his former course, and that his connection with the admiralty might conflict with further engagements to us." Adams added: "No lawyer of eminence will

The effect of the stopping of the *Alexandra* was good, but the uneasiness continued pretty nearly through the month of April.¹ The debate of April 24, in spite of a bitter attack on the North by one member had an assuaging effect, and the next day Adams had a call from the speaker of the House, who "made a species of apology for his inability to put a check on the abuse of America under the rules of order, which," Adams adds, "quite moved me."² In the first days of May a change of tone for the better is apparent.³

have the courage to repeat Mr. Collier's experiment." — Entry March 18. Collier was appointed Solicitor-General in Oct., 1863, and later became Lord Monkswell. William M. Evarts was sent to London by the United States government to assist Adams with his legal advice, and he was of much service.

¹ Adams wrote in his diary, April 10: "I am conscious of a much increased pressure of anxiety of late, from the course which matters are manifestly taking here." It was at this time that Sir George C. Lewis died, and Gibson told Adams "that it was a great loss to us, as he had generally exercised his influence in the Cabinet for our benefit." — Entry April 15. Adams adds: "Matters are daily approaching a crisis, and the turn of the tide may send me on my way home with the countries on the brink of a conflict." April 16 he wrote: Mr. Forster talked "of the probability of avoiding a collision, about which I grow more and more doubtful." John Bright wrote Sumner, April 24: "There seems mischief brewing between your government and ours. You are justly irritated about the pirate ships. . . . I hope the course taken by our government in respect to the ship *Alexandra* now in Liverpool, will do something to calm the feelings of your people. So far as I can learn, our government is in earnest in the prosecution begun against the persons concerned in the building and equipment of this ship, and I believe they will act at once in any other case where evidence can be obtained." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. See also Cobden to Bright, April 22, Morley's Cobden, p. 588; Letters of Belmont, privately printed, p. 81.

² Adams's Diary, April 25.

³ Ibid., May 5. Bright wrote Sumner, May 2: "I believe Lord Russell is really sorry that the case of the *Alabama* occurred, and that he is now anxious to prevent further mischief. The debate [March 27] to which you refer was unfortunate, and the speeches of Palmerston and Palmer were wicked. I am satisfied that they were opposed in *tone* to the foreign minister's intention, and I have reason to believe that he was dissatisfied and has remonstrated against it. The subsequent debate [April 24] was a different affair, and the Prime Minister and his Solicitor-General were as mild and decent as we could wish them to be. I hear too, from the best sources, that no more ships will be allowed to go out if any fair ground can be shown for interfering with them. The speech of Mr. Cobden was excellent, and

The most significant feature in the aspect of English sentiment at this time is the feeling of our friends that our cause was utterly hopeless.¹ The news of the disaster of Hooker at Chancellorsville strengthened this belief.² Then came the intelligence of Lee's invasion into Pennsylvania, fostering the rumors which were abroad that England and France would decide on intervention.³ Attempts were now made by assemblies of people, to arouse the sentiment in the country which favored the recognition of the Southern Confederacy. Meetings were held at Manchester, Preston, Sheffield, and some other places which recommended this policy, and were answered by other gatherings which protested against any interference.⁴ The Confederate commercial agent in London wrote to Benjamin, June 6: "There is, then, this new symp-

opinion this week is moderate and without excitement."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. See also Cobden to Sumner, May 2, 22, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1897, pp. 310, 311; *Sat. Rev.*, May 9. The Confederate commercial agent wrote Benjamin, May 9: "The public mind has settled down into a state of quiescence on American affairs which resembles stagnation. Everybody—that is to say, the mass of intelligence and respectability—wishes well to the Confederate cause, but nobody now speaks of recognition, nobody thinks about it, nobody even writes pamphlets about it."—Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.

¹ The Duke of Argyll wrote Sumner, April 24: "I regard your undying confidence with astonishment, but I should rejoice to see that confidence justified by the event. . . . There are many here who hold that slavery is even more sure to fall by the success of secession than by the conquest of the South. I cannot allow my sympathies to be guided by any such belief, even if I entertained it. I wish those who are in the right to triumph; I wish those who represent a wicked cause to fail."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

² The Duke of Argyll wrote Sumner, May 30: "You wrote after Hooker's failure must have been known, but you still speak as if the subjugation of the rebel States would certainly be effected, and as if it were only delayed by the sympathy which you attributed to foreign nations. I confess that, however strongly my wishes have been and are with your government . . . the probability of such success seems to me to be now very small."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

³ The *Morning Post* and *Morning Herald*, cited in the *Index* of July 2, favored the recognition of the Confederacy. But the *Times* and *Saturday Review* opposed such action.

⁴ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 302; Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.; letter of Louis Blanc, May 17, Letters on England, second series, vol. i. p. 183; *Spectator*, May 30.

At a reception, July 18, at Lady Palmerston's, he notes, however, that the Prime Minister was more civil to him than "at any time since our difficulty." "July 20. Perhaps the most curious phenomenon is to be seen in the London newspapers, which betray the profound disappointment and mortification of the aristocracy at the result. They persist in disbelieving the fact of the fall of Vicksburg." "July 21. The incredulity is yet considerable. It is the strongest proof how deep-seated is the passion in the English heart." "July 27. The London *Times* condescends to admit this morning, that Vicksburg is taken. Its tone, like that of the other journals, is depressed. The whole English public mourns as for a calamity." "July 28. The people here are waking from their dream."¹ The Confederates in London were disheartened. "The news of the check sustained by our forces at Gettysburg," wrote the commercial agent to Benjamin, July 23, "coupled with the reported fall of Vicksburg, was so unexpected as to spread very general dismay, not only among the active sympathizers with our cause, but even among those who take merely a selfish interest in a great struggle;" and August 27 he said, "You have here, in the tremulous condition of the loan, a sufficiently accurate description of the state of public opinion."²

¹ Bright wrote Sumner, July 31: "I need not tell you with what feelings of gratification and relief I have received the news of your recent success. The debate on the foolish Roebuck proposition took place when there was much gloom over your prospects, and the friends of the 'secesh' here were rejoicing in the belief that your last hour had come. How soon are the clouds cleared away, and how great is now the despondency of those who have dishonored themselves by their hatred of your people and government! The loan [Confederate] is down near twenty per cent. in little more than a week, and is now, I suspect, unsalable, and people are rubbing their eyes and wondering where the invincible South has gone to. Our pro-slavery newspapers are desperately puzzled, and the whole mass of opinion is in confusion." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. See the *Times*, July 16, 20, 21, 23, 27, Aug. 3; *Daily News*, July 21. The *Saturday Review* was impressed with the importance of the Northern victories, see Aug. 1, 8, 15; *Spectator*, July 25; see letter from Louis Blanc, July 25, Letters on England, second series, vol. i. p. 255.

² Confed. Dip. Corr., MS. Adams wrote, July 30: "A panic has . . .

In the mean time work was proceeding on the two steam iron-clad rams which the Lairds were building at Birkenhead for the Confederates. Adams was diligent in calling the attention of Earl Russell to the transaction, and in furnishing him evidence, supplied by Dudley, our consul at Liverpool, which showed the character and destination of these vessels;¹ and, should a grave contingency arise, he had for his guidance an unequivocal despatch from the Secretary of State. If more vessels which become armed cruisers get away, Seward wrote, rendering it evident that the laws of Great Britain, or their administration, or the judicial construction of them is not sufficient to insure a proper observance of neutrality, then the United States must protect themselves. Being brought to a condition of things where war is waged against them "by a portion, at least, of the British nation," the President may decide to order the navy to pursue these "pirates"² into the British ports, and while perceiving the "risks and hazards" consequent on such a determination he does not think that the responsibility of war will fall upon the United States.³

In pursuance of the communications of Adams, Earl Russell, with honest intent, set affairs in train to ascertain for whom these iron-clad rams were building, with the design of stopping them should there be, under the law, warrant for such action. While their construction was a matter of common knowledge, and while, as the *Times* remarked, "ninety-nine people out of a hundred believe that these steam rams are 'intended to carry on hostilities sooner or later against the Federals,'"⁴ Captain Bulloch, the able

happened among the holders of the rebel loan. The feeling of regret at the course of events is very general."—Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 329, see pp. 319, 336; Bright's letter of Aug. 7 to Cyrus W. Field, *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1896, p. 848.

¹ Letters of July 11, 16, 25, Aug. 14.

² An erroneous designation of Seward.

³ July 11, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 309.

⁴ Sept. 7; but the remark would have been exactly true at least a month earlier.

naval representative of the Southern Confederacy, who had contracted for these war-ships as well as for the *Alabama*, and had been enlightened by the seizure of the *Alexandra*, was managing the business astutely, with the sympathetic co-operation of the Lairds. To a report that they were for the Emperor of the French, Palmerston, in an allusion in the House of Commons, gave some credence:¹ when this was shown to be without foundation,² it was stated to the English government that they were for the viceroy of Egypt. This was in turn denied.³ Representations were then made to the officials who were investigating the matter, that they were owned by a firm of French merchants, and for this there was a legal basis. Fearing that they might be seized, Bulloch had in June sold the ships to a French firm who had engaged to resell them to him when they should get beyond British jurisdiction. He had no idea that the Lairds suspected that the sale was not a *bona fide* transfer:⁴ indeed, they wrote to the English Foreign Office that they were building the vessels for a Paris copartnery.⁵

Earl Russell caused all the facts which were submitted to him to be sifted with care by the Law officers of the Crown, who gave him two positive opinions nearly a month apart, that there was "no evidence capable of being presented to a

¹ July 23, Hansard, 1272. The Duchess of Argyll wrote Sumner the same day: "As to the iron-plated ships there seems to be great difficulty at getting at the truth, but it is said that one at least is for the French." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

² Earl Cowley at Paris to Earl Russell, Aug. 24, in answer to inquiry, Appendix to British Case at Geneva, vol. ii. p. 338, also p. 328. This will hereafter be referred to as Brit. Case, and vol. ii. will be understood.

³ By telegram from Alexandria, *ibid.*, p. 341.

⁴ Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confederate States, vol. i. p. 400 *et seq.*

⁵ Brit. Case, p. 355. This letter, dated Sept. 5, was received Sept. 7, after the English government had substantially arrived at the final decision and it could not of itself have affected the first determination. But I refer to it for the reason that its positive statement was quite likely communicated previously by some indirect way to Earl Russell and the Law officers of the Crown. According to legal knowledge, the statement was true, although it was not in reality.

Court of Justice" that the ships were intended for the Confederates, but that, on the other hand, the claim of French ownership seemed to be legally sustained: they could not, therefore, advise the Government to detain the vessels.¹ Still Russell was not satisfied, and he continued his inquiries, leaving no stone unturned to arrive at the truth; but in spite of his suspicions he could not get over the palpable tokens that they belonged to a firm of Paris merchants.² He therefore wrote Adams, September 1, that the government was advised that they could not in any way interfere with these ships, but he promised that they would maintain a careful watch, and be ready to stop them, should trustworthy evidence show any proceeding contrary to the statute.³ At this time he was at his country-seat in Scotland, and his letter did not reach Adams until four o'clock of September 4.⁴

Our minister had returned from his outing, cheered by his friendly intercourse with members of the government;⁵ but on his arrival in London he was immediately confronted with the critical question of the iron-clad rams, one of which Dudley had good reason to believe would at any time go to sea.⁶ September 3 Adams wrote to Russell, transmitting copies of further depositions, and averring that there were no reasonable grounds for doubt that these iron-clad rams were intended for the Confederate service;⁷ and the next day, hearing from Dudley that one of them was about to depart,⁸

¹ Letters of July 24, Aug. 20, Brit. Case, pp. 327, 336. This was followed by a supplementary opinion of Palmer, Aug. 21 (after the consideration of more evidence), to the same purpose, p. 337.

² Ibid., pp. 338-343.

³ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 363.

⁴ Ibid., p. 362; Adams's Diary.

⁵ "I met several of them in the course of my trip into Scotland, with whom my conversation was of the most friendly nature, though, being altogether social, it of course is not suitable to be reported. I still remain of the conviction that the disposition of the greater part of the ministry is friendly."

—Adams to Seward, Sept. 3, Dip. Corr., MS.

⁶ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 361.

⁷ Ibid., p. 357.

⁸ Adams's Diary, entry Sept. 4.

he sent to the Foreign Office a "last solemn protest against the commission of such an act of hostility against a friendly nation."¹ Soon afterwards he received Russell's note of September 1, which, he wrote in his diary, "affected me deeply. I clearly foresee that a collision must now come out of it. I must not, however, do anything to accelerate it, and yet must maintain the honor of my country with proper spirit. The issue must be properly made up before the world on its merits. The prospect is dark for poor America."² After a night given to such reflections, "My thoughts turned strongly upon the present crisis. . . . My conclusion was that another note must be addressed to Lord Russell. So I drew one which I intended only to gain time previous to the inevitable result."³ This was his celebrated despatch of September 5: "My Lord," he wrote: "At this moment, when one of the iron-clad vessels is on the point of departure from this kingdom, on its hostile errand against the United States, I am honored" with yours of the 1st instant. "I trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have arrived. I can regard it no otherwise than as practically opening to the insurgents free liberty in this kingdom to execute a policy" of attacking New York, Boston, and Portland, and of breaking our blockade. "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war. . . . I prefer to desist from communicating to your lordship even such portions of my existing instructions as are suited to the case,⁴ lest I should contribute to aggravate difficulties already far too serious. I therefore content myself with informing your lordship that I transmit by the present steamer a copy of your note for the consideration of my government, and shall await the more specific directions that will be contained in the reply."⁵

If Russell had been in London, the tale of the iron-clad

¹ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 361.

² Entry Sept. 5.

³ Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 367.

⁴ Entry Sept. 4.

⁵ Seward of July 11, *ante*, p. 377.

rams would have been simple and brief: one friendly interview between him and Adams would have cleared up the matter, for both had the same end in view. It is the crossing of their letters which makes the story complex, and which necessitates a close attention to the dates when the notes were received as well as when they were sent. Had the Foreign Secretary been of the mind to admit our minister somewhat more to his confidence, such an unravelling of the correspondence would not be required to manifest that Russell deserves applause for his methodical straightforwardness and his honest purpose in this affair where action was hedged about with difficulties, owing to the evasion of the true ownership and to the force of the precedent made by the narrow and doubtful construction of the statute in the case of the *Alexandra*.

As early as September 1 he was better than his word to Adams. Layard, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was in London, wrote on that day to the Treasury: "I am directed by Earl Russell to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury that so much suspicion attaches to the iron-clad vessels at Birkenhead, that if sufficient evidence can be obtained to lead to the belief that they are intended for the Confederate States Lord Russell thinks the vessels ought to be detained until further examination can be made."¹ Reflection, in which the belief that he had been tricked in the escape of the *Alabama* undoubtedly played a part, led him, two days later [September 3], to direct that the iron-clad rams be stopped.² On this

¹ Brit. Case, p. 343. He promised Adams future action; he acted at once. Cf. the letters of Sept. 1.

² I have adopted this explanation of Russell's apparently sudden change in two days only after a very careful consideration. From the whole correspondence it seems to me that he was gradually working to this point. The steps are exactly those which a very honorable man given somewhat to vacillation would take. The additional evidence which Adams sent to the Foreign Office had not yet reached him.

Another explanation may be suggested which it might be assumed that I should adopt in order to be consistent with my treatment of his alteration

day he wrote from Meikleour, Scotland: "My dear Palmerston, — The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the two iron-clads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The Solicitor-General has been consulted, and concurs in the measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law. We shall thus test the law, and, if we have to pay damages, we have satisfied the opinion, which prevails here as well as in America, that that kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it. If you do not approve, pray appoint a Cabinet for Tuesday or Wednesday next [the 8th or 9th]." ¹ Palmerston did not dissent, and therefore called no meeting of the Cabinet.

of opinion in October, 1862. Adams, on a visit to the Duke of Argyll at Inverary Castle, Scotland, makes this entry in his diary, Aug. 28: "In the evening a little conversation with the Duke of Argyll about the fitting out of the iron-clad vessels. He said that he had received a letter from Mr. Sumner, dwelling very strongly on the danger of war from this cause. I said that I felt the same apprehension. He wanted to know something of the French claim. I replied that I had exposed the motive of that pretence. . . . The Ministry dislikes to assume a responsibility which may make it the object of popular attack at home. It thus hazards the evil of war upon a doubt. He seemed a little impressed with my earnestness. I told him I had instructions on the subject far more stringent than I had yet been disposed to execute. My own inclinations had been to make as little of the difficulty as I could. But I could not fail to regard the question as grave and critical." It is no unnatural supposition that the Duke should have communicated this conversation to Earl Russell by letter, and it may have been a slight contributing cause to the decision, but the main reason seems to me to have been that, full of regret at the escape of the *Alabama* and her depredations, he was determined not to give our country another similar cause of offence.

The difference of feeling too in England after McClellan's reverses before Richmond, and after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, is an element to be taken into consideration. "The progress of the Federal arms," wrote Cobden to Bright, Sept. 8, "will help the Cabinet over some of the legal technicalities of the enlistment act." — Morley, p. 589. The Northern victories undoubtedly strengthened Russell's arm to do what he considered right. The feeling of the ministry is probably well expressed by the Duchess of Argyll to Sumner, Sept. 8: "I have just heard that the iron-clads are to be arrested. I trust there may be evidence sufficient to do what we wish to do." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

¹ Walpole, Life of Russell, vol. ii. p. 359, note.

But Russell was not content to wait the slow course of the post or the approval of the Prime Minister, and on the same day [September 3] telegraphed to Layard to give directions to stop the iron-clads "as soon as there is reason to believe that they are actually about to put to sea, and to detain them until further orders."¹ September 4 he sent word to Adams that "the matter is under the serious and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government;"² but this the minister did not receive until after he had despatched his note, saying, "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war."³ September 5 Russell ordered that the vessels "be prevented from leaving Liverpool" on a trial trip "or on any other pretext" "until satisfactory evidence can be given as to their destination,"⁴ and on the same day he sent a confidential note to the *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, requesting that Secretary Seward be apprised that they had been stopped from leaving port;⁵ but for some unexplained reason he did not advise Adams of this action until three days later.⁶

After the iron-clad rams were "detained," the Foreign Secretary employed the utmost circumspection to prevent the one almost ready from slipping away to sea through any artifice. While two different constructions may be drawn from the correspondence, it seems, on the whole, that he had confidence in the honor of the Lairds, although it was at times clouded with suspicions, born of the escape of the *Alabama*⁷ and augmented by their persistence in asking permission for a trial trip, that, if the steamer went out to test her machinery, she would never come back, through causes ostensibly beyond their control. A large body of seamen from the Confederate

¹ Brit. Case, p. 349.

² Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 364.

³ Diary, Sept. 5.

⁴ Brit. Case, p. 352.

⁵ Layard to Stuart, Sept. 5, State Papers, 1864, Corr. respecting iron-clad vessels, No. 14; Memorandum State Dep't Archives, MS.; Seward to Adams, Sept. 19, "confidential," *ibid.*; Russell's statement in House of Lords, Feb. 11, 1864, Hansard, 438.

⁶ Sept. 8, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 368; Brit. Case, p. 355. Russell was still in Scotland. Palmerston was in London.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 89.

cruiser *Florida* had recently come to Liverpool for the purpose, it was suspected, of carrying out a plan for the "forcible abduction of the vessel," and to checkmate this game Russell had moved the Board of Admiralty to authorize the Admiral of the Channel fleet, then in the Mersey, to place "on board the iron-clad, about to be tried, a sufficient force of seamen and marines in her Majesty's naval service to defeat any attempt to run away with the vessel."¹ But it then turned out that the ship was not ready, and the trial trip was postponed.²

In the mean time the Foreign Office made a systematic and careful investigation, demonstrating, to a moral certainty, that the French ownership was a blind, and that the iron-clad rams were intended for the Confederates.³ October 8, by the order of Earl Russell, the vessel the more advanced in her construction was seized, and the next day the Broad Arrow was likewise put upon the other.⁴ The Lairds were annoyed at this action, and their operatives showed much ill feeling. To ward off any attempt at a rescue, the ships were watched by a powerful naval force.⁵ The question whether the iron-clads should be condemned was never passed upon by the courts. Neither the government nor the owners were eager to run the chances of a trial. In the end, as the best way out of the complication, the vessels were purchased by the British Admiralty.⁶

¹ Brit. Case, p. 367 *et ante*.

² Ibid., p. 370 *et seq*.

³ Ibid., p. 353 *et seq*.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 388-391; Morley's Cobden, p. 589. When this word came to the immense audience Henry Ward Beecher was addressing in Manchester, "the whole audience rose to its feet. Men cheered and waved their hats, while women waved their handkerchiefs and wept."—Life of Beecher, p. 410. As indications of public sentiment at the time the rams were detained, see *Times*, Sept. 7, *Daily News*, Sept. 8, 9, *Spectator*, Sept. 5, *Sat. Rev.* Sept. 12.

⁵ Brit. Case, pp. 397, 415, 417, 420 *et seq*.; Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confed., vol. i. p. 435 *et seq*.

⁶ The purchase was consummated in May, 1864 (Brit. Case, p. 457 *et seq*.) but such an outcome was thought of by Russell as early as Sept. 14, 1863. See Life by Walpole, vol. ii. p. 359, note.

These iron-clad rams were formidable vessels of war, and had they got away they would undoubtedly have broken the blockade at Charleston and Wilmington;¹ and as the blockade, constantly growing in efficiency, was a potent weapon on the Northern side, the harm would have been incalculable: the victories even of Gettysburg and Vicksburg might have been neutralized. Bulloch dreamed that "our iron-clads" might "sweep the blockading fleet from the sea front of every harbor," "ascend the Potomac," and "render Washington itself untenable," and lay Portsmouth (N. H.) and Philadelphia under contribution.² From some such damage Earl Russell, by his careful and decisive action, saved the North, and thereby prevented a war between the United States and Great Britain, which the energy of Bulloch and the sympathy and cupidity of a firm of Birkenhead ship-builders came near bringing about.³ The seizure of the rams was a blow to the Confederate cause.⁴

The debate in the House of Commons, June 30, made it evident that England would not recognize, singly or jointly, the Southern Confederacy, or offer to mediate between the two belligerents; and the proceedings which I have just re-

¹ Through the kindness of Mr. Charles F. Adams and Mr. S. A. B. Abbott, I have received the following statement made in Jan., 1898, from Captain Page, who had been selected as the commander of these vessels: I never received from the Confederate government any instructions, written or of any other kind, as to the course I should pursue after taking command of the rams, but I had outlined in my own mind a plan of operations. My intention was to sail at once to Wilmington and to raise the blockade there and at Charleston. Having accomplished this, I intended to raise the blockade of the gulf ports and cut off all communications of the North by water with New Orleans. I had at the time perfect confidence in my ability to accomplish my purposes, and I now believe, in the light of what I have since learned, that if the rams had been permitted to leave England I would have been successful. I never had any intention of attacking New York, Boston, or Hampton Roads, or any Northern port, as I did not believe in that kind of warfare; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. ii. pp. 22, 45, 92.

² Bulloch to the Richmond Secretary of the Navy, July 9, Secret Service of the Confed. States, vol. i. p. 411.

³ See *Spectator*, Sept. 5, *Saturday Review*, Sept. 12.

⁴ Bulloch, vol. i. p. 414 *et seq.*

lated showed that the Confederates could no longer hope to build and get away from England vessels of war. The contrast of the action now, and that in regard to the *Alabama* was marked, especially as the case against the cruiser was the stronger of the two. Her depredations, the claims for damages, urged persistently by our government, the Proclamation of Emancipation, Gettysburg and Vicksburg, invigorated the friendship of Russell,¹ and added to his supporters in the Cabinet.

As early as January, Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, complained, when writing to Slidell, that Mason had "been discourteously treated by Earl Russell," in March, that "the irritation against Great Britain is fast increasing;" and in June he indulged in words almost abusive of the English government.² August 4 he wrote Mason that the President was convinced, from the recent debates in Parliament, that England would not recognize the Confederacy, and he therefore instructed him to consider his mission at an end, and withdraw from London.³ Mason received this despatch September 14, and after waiting a week to consult with Slidell, notified Earl Russell that in accordance with his instructions he should terminate his mission.⁴ Jefferson Davis,

¹ "I have generally had occasion to infer a favorable disposition on the part of Lord Russell. . . . In our personal relations we have been uniformly friendly but not intimate." — Adams to Seward, Sept. 24, MS. State Dep't Archives.

² "The mutual relations of the United States and Great Britain . . . seem to have now become settled on the established basis of insulting aggression on the one side and tame submission on the other. . . . It is impossible not to admire the sagacity with which Mr. Seward penetrated into the secret feelings of the British Cabinet, and the success of his policy of intimidation which the world at large supposed would be met with prompt resentment, but which he with deeper insight into the real policy of that Cabinet foresaw would be followed by submissive acquiescence in his demands." — June 22, Confed. Dip. Corr., MS.

³ *Ibid.* A private letter sent at the same time advised Mason that he might exercise some discretion in carrying out this order.

⁴ Adams wrote Seward, Sept. 24: "The *Times* distinctly admits this to be a relief to the Government, though I confess myself at a loss to understand how he annoyed them. The selection of Mr. Mason to come here was an

in his message to his Congress in December, gave vent to his "dissatisfaction with the conduct of the British government," two of his many grievances being that they respected the Federal blockade, and had seized the iron-clad rams.¹

While Seward's diplomacy after the *Trent* affair may, on the whole, be commended in the view of the results accomplished, there was in it so much of the "claim everything" principle that it is not extolled by adepts in international law. The course of Adams was well-nigh faultless. There being no Atlantic cable, it took from three weeks to a month to obtain instructions that he asked for. In an exigency therefore he could not wait for these, and was forced many times to act on his own judgment, with a result, since his knowledge was larger and his vision clearer than Seward's, that was beneficial to our cause. As I have told the story of the iron-clad rams, his language in the celebrated despatch of September 5 may seem more peremptory than the occasion required, but he must be judged in the light of the facts he himself knew. Applying that test, we perceive that his action, which showed both decision and reserve, denoted diplomatic ability of the highest order.

Russell lacked the force of Palmerston, the many-sidedness and the promptitude of initiative of Gladstone; he belonged to that class of honorable gentlemen whose service to their country and their order is safe rather than impressive, and if his conduct be estimated, not by a hard and fast line which the historian with the knowledge of the after event may draw in his study, but with a due allowance for the difficulties which beset the path of a practical statesman,² it may be

unfortunate one from the outset. I can scarcely imagine an agency to have been more barren of results. Mr. Mason's efforts have been of late to concentrate the attacks upon Lord Russell, as if he were the chief barrier to the rebel progress in the Cabinet." — MS. State Dep't Archives. Even had Mason possessed the peculiar ability needed for his position, the constant iteration that he was the author of the Fugitive Slave Law would have impaired his usefulness.

¹ Moore's *Reb. Rec.*, vol. viii. Docs. p. 265.

² Touching the stopping of the iron-clad rams, Adams wrote Russell,

asserted, in spite of his deviations from a consistent course, that he deserved well of both English-speaking nations. While the course of England towards us was not as just as ours towards her during the Crimean War,¹ it must be borne in mind that "our only well-wisher in Europe" was Russia,² and that if a contrast be instituted with the policy of France, the action of the government of Great Britain will appear to border on friendliness.³ England, indeed, was the insurmountable obstacle to the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by France and other European nations.⁴ While the

Oct. 12: "The President, not insensible of the difficulties in the way of the decision to which Her Majesty's Government . . . had arrived, is gratified in being able to regard it in the light of a sincere desire on just principles to maintain its friendly relations with the United States." — Brit. Case, p. 400.

¹ Adams to Russell, Dec. 30, 1862, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 43. Forster and Palmer in the House of Commons, March 27, 1863, Hansard, 40, 53; Collier, Feb. 23, 1864, 1009; *Saturday Review*, March 28, 1863: Letters of Belmont, privately printed, p. 79. In making this statement, however, it is but fair to cite a defence made by Russell in a private letter, about July 23, to the Duchess of Argyll, who had transmitted to him some newspaper extracts sent to her by Sumner. "We do not 'fit out ships by the dozen.' . . . One, two, three ships may have evaded our laws just as the Americans evaded the American laws during the Canadian contest. We are not in the habit of condemning and punishing without proof." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

² This is on the authority of Motley, March 3, then at Vienna. — Letters, vol. ii. p. 119; see also Dip. Corr., 1863, part ii. p. 763. It is difficult to reconcile this with the statement G. W. Smalley makes regarding Bismarck, London Letters, vol. i. p. 27. Yet Motley's relations with Bismarck were intimate. But many of the German people were friendly to the North. "The German mind was obstinately bent against us [the South]." — De Leon to Benjamin, Feb. 23, 1863, Confed. Dip. Corr., MS. Bright declared, Dec. 18, 1862: "A German merchant in Manchester who had recently travelled all through Germany, said, 'I am so surprised I don't find one man in favor of the South.' " — Speeches, vol. i. p. 222. The purchase of our bonds by Germans is a well-known fact.

³ J. S. Mill wrote Motley, Sept. 17, 1862: "I believe that our Government has felt more rightly all through than a majority of the public [*i. e.* the voters]." — Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 92.

⁴ This is a fact so well known, having appeared also in the course of the narrative, that it will be unnecessary to cite a mass of evidence to support it; but a reference to Cobden's opinion, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1897, p. 313,

English Cabinet looked with regret on the operations of English merchants and ship-builders who, by selling arms, munitions, and vessels to the South, entangled Great Britain in its relations with the United States, Louis Napoleon instigated the Confederates to construct two iron-clads and four clipper corvettes in France, giving indirectly the assurance that they might be armed and equipped, and permitted upon a plausible pretext to leave his ports.¹ While Russell declined to see Mason, subsequent to their first meeting, shortly after his arrival in February, 1862, and Palmerston saw him only twice, at a time when all danger of foreign interference had passed, the Emperor accorded three interviews to Slidell, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other members of the imperial ministry and household held with him unrestrained intercourse. Moreover, Louis Napoleon conquered Mexico, and placed a European monarch on her throne.² Notwithstanding his designs were not so clear in 1863 as they are now, enough was known to arouse in the mind of the American public a suspicion that was undoubtedly shared by Seward,³ although the tone of his despatches to France, either

and to Bigelow, *France and the Confed. Navy*, p. 135, will be pertinent. I will quote three expressions of Benjamin: "Jan. 17. Both Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason are entirely convinced of the hearty sympathy of the Emperor, and of his desire to give it active expression, as well of the opposite feeling and tendency in the Cabinet of St. James." "July 20. It has become perfectly plain to the whole world . . . that Great Britain stands the only real obstacle to our recognition." "Aug. 17. The important fact has been saliently developed that France is ready and anxious for our recognition, and that England is opposed to it." — *Confed. Dip. Corr.*, MS.

¹ Slidell to Benjamin, Jan. 11, March 4, *Confed. Dip. Corr.*, MS. But they never got to sea as Confederate vessels. In November Louis Napoleon began to change his tune. For a history of this transaction, see Bigelow, *France and the Confed. Navy*; Bulloch, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. chap. x.

² On Mexico, besides the article of Bancroft already cited, see Nicolay and Hay, vols. vi., vii.; H. H. Bancroft's *Mexico*, vol. vi.

³ Adams wrote Seward, Sept. 25: "I am sorry to be obliged to confess to a belief that there is more or less of duplicity in the policy of the Emperor of France towards the United States. Little as I am disposed to be satisfied with the action of the Ministry here, I prefer their rougher and colder truth to his more polished and courtly insincerity." — *State Dep't Archives*, MS.

from motives of policy, or because he was influenced by the traditional amity of that nation and the sympathy of liberal Frenchmen,¹ was considerate and kindly, in striking contrast with his roughness to England.

After October, 1863, there was no danger of foreign intervention in our struggle. This chapter therefore concludes my extended review of English sentiment, and the course of the English government, and my cursory treatment of the designs and action of the Emperor of the French during our civil war.²

¹ Mill wrote Motley from Avignon, Oct. 31: "All liberal Frenchmen seem to have been with you from the first. They did not know more about the subject than the English, but their instincts were truer." — Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 96. "There is unquestionably a strong feeling in a portion of French society in favor of the North, and a majority of the educated classes are desirous that the relations of France with the Federal government should continue amicable . . . The Emperor entered on a policy unfriendly to the Federal States and strongly condemned by the educated classes in France when he sent his troops to Mexico." — *Sat. Rev.*, Oct. 3. "No doubt it is true that the cultivated portion of English society has far more sympathy with the Slave Power than the cultivated portion of French society." — *Spectator*, Oct. 3. Slidell's despatch of Jan. 21 gives a different view of French sentiment, but I have not hesitated to accept the other authorities.

² The numerous references which I have made to the diary of Charles Francis Adams by no means indicate the full value that it has been to me in affording me the best of daily commentaries on the diplomatic negotiations. Besides the specific dates noted, I have used the files of the *Times*, *Daily News*, *Spectator*, and *Saturday Review* for the period. The distinct references do not measure fully my obligations to Bulloch's candid and useful work. The chapters in Nicolay and Hay's volumes vi., vii., viii., have been of use to me. Authorities other than those mentioned from time to time are: Letters of Asa Gray, vol. ii.; Letters of J. R. Lowell, vol. i.; the Biography of Henry Ward Beecher; the Neutrality of Great Britain, Bernard; several articles in the Dict. of Nat. Biog.; Sumner's speech, Sept. 10, 1863, Works, vol. vii. p. 333; Earl Russell's speech, *Times*, Sept. 28, *Spectator*, Oct. 3, 1863; Louis Blanc, Letters from England, second series, vol. i.; Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers. For the friction arising from our contiguity to Canada, see The Northern Lake Frontier during the Civil War, J. M. Callahan, Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n, 1896, p. 343 *et seq.* Also, in general, Callahan's Dip. Hist. Sou. Confed.

NOTE. — I have avoided entering upon two subjects of dispute between Seward and Adams on one side and Russell on the other.

Several citations will give a fair presentation of them. In a letter to Russell of July 11, Adams complained of the despatch from the United Kingdom of "numbers of steam vessels laden with arms and munitions of war of every description together with other supplies, well adapted to procrastinate the struggle with a purpose of breaking a blockade legitimately established and fully recognized by her Majesty." [Reference is made to merchant vessels intending to run the blockade or to transfer their cargoes to blockade runners at Nassau.] Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 314. Russell wrote Adams, Sept. 11: "With regard to the general duties of a neutral, according to international law, the true doctrine has been laid down repeatedly by Presidents and judges of eminence of the United States, and that doctrine is that a neutral may sell to either or both of two belligerent parties any implements or munitions of war which such belligerent may wish to purchase from the subjects of the neutral. . . . Admitting also, that which is believed to be the fact, that the Confederates have derived a limited supply of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the federal blockade of their ports; yet, on the other hand, it is perfectly notorious that the federal government have purchased in and obtained from the United Kingdom a far greater quantity of arms and war-like stores." — Ibid., p. 373. Russell made his meaning clear in his speech of Sept. 26: "The principle [of the Foreign Enlistment Act] is clear enough. If you are asked to sell muskets, you may sell muskets to one party or to the other, and so with gunpowder, shells, or cannon; and you may sell a ship in the same manner. But if you will on the one hand train and drill a regiment with arms in their hands, or allow a regiment to go out with arms in their hands to take part with one of two belligerents, you violate your neutrality and commit an offence against the other belligerent. So in the same way in regard to ships, if you allow a ship to be armed and go at once to make an attack on a foreign belligerent, you are yourself, according to your law, taking part in the war, and it is an offence which is punished by the law." — *Times*, Sept. 28. Bright wrote Sumner, May 2: "The people too are not informed on the legal difference between selling arms and equipping war-ships, and as they know that great quantities of arms have been sold to the North, they argue that it must be equally lawful to sell arms or ships to the South. And Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams have lent some support to this view in complaining of the sale of arms to the Confederacy as if it were an offence in

magnitude equal to that of furnishing ships of war. Since the South were admitted as belligerents, in respect of the sale of arms, you have been treated as two nations equal in the sight of our government and one as much in their favor as the other. You have imagined that our sympathy with the United States government should have given it an advantage in this matter over the concern at Richmond; but it has not been so. The love of gain and the sympathy for the South openly expressed by our papers, and almost universally felt by our richer classes, have entirely prevented this. But with regard to ships, we have an express enactment, and that has clearly been broken; but our people confound the two things." — *Pierce-Sumner Papers*, MS. Seward wrote Adams, Oct. 5: "The proclamation of neutrality was a concession of belligerent rights to the insurgents, and was deemed by this government as unnecessary, and in effect as unfriendly, as it has since proved injurious to this country. . . . The United States stand upon what they think impregnable ground, when they refuse to be derogated, by any act of the British government, from their position as a sovereign nation in amity with Great Britain, and placed upon a footing of equality with domestic insurgents who have risen up in resistance against their authority." — *Dip. Corr.*, 1863, part i. p. 393. See my vol. iii. p. 420, note 1. The persistent complaints of Seward and Adams and the progress of our arms had their effect. Bulloch writes: After "the seizure of the rams, Earl Russell applied the Foreign Enlistment Act so stringently with reference to the Confederate States, that it was very difficult to forward the most essential supplies, and while the drain of battle and the lack of necessary comforts were thinning the ranks and wasting the strength of the armies in the field, and the difficulty of placing funds in Europe was daily increasing, the cheapest and most favorable market, that of England, was well-nigh closed to the Confederacy, while the United States were permitted to buy and ship what they liked without hindrance, and at the ordinary current prices." — *Secret Service of the Confed. States*, vol. i. p. 443.

As I shall not recur to this subject again, I will add some citations showing the course of opinion and events after the time to which I have brought down the story in the text. Adams wrote in his diary, Oct. 24: "There certainly is more inclination to let matters go without meddling." "Nov. 21: The present threatening aspect of things in Europe is soothing the temper towards us surprisingly. I have never felt so serene before." Gladstone wrote Sumner, Nov. 5: "In

England I think nearly all consider war against slavery unjustifiable; but all without exception will rejoice if it should please God that by the war slavery shall be extinguished. I could go further and say it will please me much if by the war the Union shall be re-established. But it would be a shabby way of currying favor with you to state a proposition which though in its terms strictly true contemplates a contingency which as it seems to me is wholly unattainable, and in the endeavor to attain which you are as a people displaying infinite courage, and inflicting the most frightful suffering. Does the history of the world offer an instance in which, within so short a period and among only thirty millions of men, there has been so vast a deluge of blood and treasure? But the almost immeasurable distance of the American view from ours — let us rather say from mine, as I have no right to speak for others — as to facts and as to possibilities, not as to wishes, calls, I admit, for the exercise of a boundless Christian charity on your part to endure it, and on mine leaves only space for the hope that it may please Him, who governs the hearts of men as the rivers of water, to lead them in the way of peace. Years and years hence, with what wonder shall we, or our children, look back upon these things.” — *Pierce-Sumner Papers*, MS. John Bright wrote, Nov. 20: “Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the past two years. There are still heard some voices against you — for there is a wonderful ignorance here in all classes on everything American; but I can see and feel all around me that another tone prevails, and that the confident predictions as to your failure are uttered much less frequently even by the most rash of your opponents. . . . The Slaveholders’ loan falls still — it is now at 32 dis’t, 90 stock having fallen to 58.” — *Ibid.* Bright wrote, Jan. 22, 1864: “On your great question opinion seems to settle in or towards the belief that you can and will restore the Union; but great difficulties are anticipated, and some are still unconvinced.” — *Ibid.* Adams made this entry, Jan. 30, 1864: “In the evening I went by invitation . . . to Lady Palmerston’s. . . . I went to make my bow to Lord Palmerston. ‘How d’ ye do, Adams.’” Bright wrote Sumner, Feb. 18, 1864: “You will have noticed the tone taken by our Attorney-General and Lord Palmerston a few days ago in speaking of your prize Courts and your dealing with international law — nothing could be more friendly — it was all I could wish for.” — *Pierce-Sumner Papers*, MS. Earl Russell sent through Lord Lyons, April 1, 1864, “to Mr. Davis at

Richmond . . . the formal protest and remonstrance of Her Majesty's Government against the efforts of the authorities of the so-called Confederate States to build war vessels within her Majesty's dominions to be employed against the Government of the United States." — Appleton's Ann. Cyc., 1864, p. 556. Bright wrote Sumner, Sept. 2, 1864: "With us I think nearly all the friends of the North are most anxious that Mr. Lincoln should be elected again — they think any change must be for the worse, and that it would infuse new faith into the minds of the secessionists, both North and South. I am strongly of this opinion. . . . To elect Mr. Lincoln will be to tell Europe that the country is to be restored and slavery is to be destroyed. . . . Here there is always great interest in your contest — the newspapers are less violent in their opposition to you, always excepting the avowed partisans of the slave cause, and men speak with less confidence in favor of the South. At the same time there is a great uncertainty of opinion — it fluctuates with the varying news from week to week, and men become puzzled with the long-continued strife." Jan. 26, 1865: "I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and our people and indeed our Government is more moderately disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from a member of the Government that it is believed that the feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has been steadily improving. . . . Mr. Adams has done well here — everybody here says so." Feb. 17, 1865: "There seems still to be an idea in America that somebody in Europe intends to meddle in your contest. I suppose the rebels invent the story, and credulous people believe it. With us such a notion is unknown. All *parties and classes* here are resolved on a strict neutrality, and I believe there is an honest intention that no *further* cause of irritation or quarrel shall come from this side. . . . The tone of Parliament is wholly changed, and men begin to be ashamed of what has been said and done during the last four years." — Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

This chapter was written in 1898. New material led me to give in Chapter VII of my Short History of the Civil War (1917) a slightly different account of some phases of English action and sentiment. I confess to not being entirely clear in regard to Earl Russell's "disposition," and I have therefore let stand in this volume my bias in his favor, following our minister's contemporary opinion (note 1, p. 386). Nevertheless the impressions of Henry Adams in his "Education" and of Brooks Adams in the "Seizure of the Laird Rams" are entitled to high respect; and these brilliant writers may be right.

CHAPTER XXIII

TEN days after the battle of Gettysburg, as the story has been told, Lee with his army crossed the Potomac into Virginia.¹ Meade followed leisurely. A campaign of manœuvres ensued, with skirmishes and combats but no general battle, lasting until December, when both armies went into winter quarters on the soil of Virginia. Nothing from a military point of view had been gained by either side, but Meade had held Lee in check and had shown in this sort of warfare² apparently equal alertness and skill.

After the battle of Stone's River,³ Rosecrans remained inactive for nearly six months, recuperating and resupplying his army and fortifying Murfreesborough. The government urged him forward, and persisted that he should drive the Confederates out of Tennessee and take Chattanooga. It was the McClellan drama played over again. The general complained of the lack of supplies, of forage, of revolving rifles for his mounted troops, of his great deficiency in cavalry as compared with his adversary, and in his correspondence with Stanton and Halleck displayed the art of a dexterous controversialist. At last, on June 24, he began to move, and inaugurated a campaign of brilliant strategy which made a momentous gain for Northern arms. Helped by the moral effect of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, he manœuvred the Confederates under Bragg out of middle Tennessee, continued

¹ The night of July 13, *ante*, p. 296.

² Meade's report, reports of Lee, O. R., vol. xxix. part i.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. chap. ix.; Life of Lee, Long, do. by Fitzhugh Lee; Walker, Hist. 2d Army Corps; Humphreys, Gettysburg to the Rapidan.

³ *Ante*, p. 219.

his advance through a very difficult country, and, without having been obliged to fight a battle, marched on the 9th of September into Chattanooga, which with Richmond and Vicksburg constituted the three most important strategic points of the Southern Confederacy.¹ In the mean time Burnside with the Army of the Ohio had advanced into East Tennessee and occupied Knoxville; he reported that he was "in the midst of friends," that he "found the people generally loyal and disposed to do all in their power for our comfort and welfare."² It seemed, indeed, as if the earnest desire of the President for the relief and possession of East Tennessee had at last been realized, but it soon turned out that in order to keep this territory the Union troops must fight for it.

Rosecrans was elated at the success of his strategy, and thought that Bragg was retreating southward. Eager to strike at the Confederate army, he ordered his troops in pursuit, and under the necessity of crossing the mountains at gaps far apart, separated widely his different corps and divisions.³ But Bragg had no idea whatever of making a retreat; on the contrary, he turned on his enemy. This movement placed Rosecrans in peril, and it became, as he himself relates, "a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army."⁴ For nearly a week he wrought with the energy of desperation, and by September 18 the concentration was accomplished, not without some mischance; but the loss of sleep, the fear that Bragg might crush, one after another, his different detachments, as some now think he had it in his power to do, the intense anxiety on two successive nights for the safety of one of his corps: all these combined to unnerve the Union commander, who in the opinion of his army was "whipped" before he went into the battle which the Con-

¹ See p. 173.

² Report, O. R., vol. xxx. part ii. p. 549.

³ Report of Rosecrans; Dana to Stanton, Sept. 12, O. R., vol. xxx. part i. pp. 53, 185.

⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

federate general was determined to bring on. Reinforced by troops from Johnston's army, which became available after the fall of Vicksburg, by Buckner's corps from Knoxville, by Longstreet's corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, Bragg outnumbered his opponent,¹ and September 19 he began his attack. The action of that day was indecisive.²

This was the prelude to the fierce and bloody battle of Chickamauga, "the great battle of the West," which raged the next day and would have been an undecided contest or a Union victory, since the defensive position and the intrenchments compensated for the disparity of force, had it not been for the unfortunate mental state of Rosecrans. His army was the Army of the Cumberland, seasoned and intrepid soldiers, who, as their history shows, were able under proper command to do wonders, but in this case were affected by the spirit, as indeed they were sacrificed by the orders, which went out from headquarters. The battle was proceeding with varying fortune, when the execution of an ill-considered and unlucky order from the commanding general opened a gap in the line of battle, through which the Confederates poured, and, throwing two divisions into confusion and routing two others, drove a mass of soldiers panic-stricken from the field. Rosecrans was carried away in the crowd of fugitives, and, fearing that the whole army was vanquished, rode on into Chattanooga, twelve to fifteen miles away, for the purpose of taking measures for the defence of the city. Having on his arrival "the appearance of one broken in spirit,"³ he sent thence at five o'clock in the afternoon a despatch to Halleck, saying: "We have met with a serious disaster. . . . Enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right,

¹ Burnside, Sept. 11, 13 (O. R., vol. xxx. part i. p. 34), was ordered to join Rosecrans; he disregarded the order, but I do not feel sure that any but his cavalry could have made the junction before the battle of Chickamauga.

² Longstreet's corps had been transported by rail; only part of it was in the battle of Sept. 19. Longstreet himself and nearly all the rest of the corps were engaged in the battle of the 20th.

³ Cist, p. 226.

pierced our centre, and scattered troops there.”¹ Charles A. Dana,² “swept bodily off the battle-field by the panic-struck rabble,” reached Chattanooga somewhat later than Rosecrans, but sent away an hour earlier his report, “Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run.”³ To General George H. Thomas it was due that the four o’clock despatch of Dana, based on the vivid impressions gained from his position on the right of the army, where he had been with the commander, did not prove to be a correct account of this terrible battle. Thomas commanded the left wing of the army, and with 25,000 men repulsed during the whole afternoon the assaults of a force double his number, holding his position with such steadiness that he earned the title of the “Rock of Chickamauga.” James A. Garfield, chief-of-staff of Rosecrans, borne away from the battle-field with the tide, obtained permission from his general, when they had attained a breathing-space, to turn back. He made his way to where the fight continued on the left, and sent at 8.40 P.M. this report: “General Thomas has fought a most terrific battle, and has damaged the enemy badly. . . . From the time I reached the battle-field (3.45 P.M.) till sunset the fighting was by far the fiercest I have ever seen. Our men not only held their ground, but at many points drove the enemy splendidly. . . . On the whole, Generals Thomas and Granger have done the enemy fully as much injury to-day as they have suffered from him, and they have successfully repelled the repeated combined attacks, most fiercely made, of the whole rebel army, frequently pressing the front and both flanks at the same time.”⁴ On the night of the 21st, under orders from Rosecrans, Thomas withdrew to Chattanooga.

¹ O. R., vol. xxx. part i. p. 142.

² Assistant Secretary of War.

³ O. R., vol. xxx. part i. pp. 192, 193.

⁴ Ibid., p. 145. The Union army was 56,965, the Confederate 71,551 (this latter number being the conclusion of Maj. E. C. Dawes); Union loss 16,179, Confederate 17,804. — Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 673 *et seq.* Longstreet states that the forces engaged were: Confederate 59,242, Union 60,867. — From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 458.

The army went to work diligently, and made the place so strong that it could be taken only by a regular siege. Bragg commenced the investment of the city.

Before the battle of Chickamauga reinforcements from Grant at Vicksburg had been ordered to Rosecrans, but it took a week for the despatch to reach him; and while two divisions were on the way and two others were getting ready to move, all of them under the command of Sherman, word to this effect had not reached Washington.¹ Telegrams from Rosecrans to the President, from Dana to Stanton, from Garfield to Chase, all urging the necessity of immediate reinforcements to hold Chattanooga and the Tennessee line, were received late in the evening of September 23;² and Stanton, impressed with the need of prompt action, summoned a midnight conference. Lincoln, to whom John Hay brought the request at his summer abode, the Soldiers' Home, bestrode his horse and took his way this moonlight night to the War Department, where soon were assembled, besides the Secretary and three of his subordinates, Halleck, Seward, and Chase. Stanton proposed sending to Chattanooga troops from the Army of the Potomac; and while the President and Halleck were at first averse to this project, he was so earnest in advocating it that, with the support of Seward and Chase, he overbore their opposition, the council in the end agreeing that if Meade did not purpose an advance at once, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps under Hooker should be sent to Rosecrans. These sixteen thousand men were brought from Culpeper Court House, Virginia, to Washington by rail, there transferred to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and carried, *via* Wheeling, Columbus, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Nashville, to Stevenson and Bridgeport, Alabama. The time of transport, eight days, at that time showed excellent work.³

¹ O. R., vol. xxx. part i. pp. 37, 161, 162, vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 568.

² Received 10.35 P. M. — Ibid., vol. xxx. part i. pp. 168, 197; Warden's Chase, p. 550.

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 112; Warden's Chase, p. 550; O. R., vol. xxix. part i. p. 146 *et seq.*

Yet something was necessary besides additional soldiers: another general must command. Rosecrans, who had lost through his defeat at Chickamauga all his buoyancy and prestige, became more irresolute than ever, and showed himself unable to cope with the difficulties of the situation. The danger lay in being forced to evacuate Chattanooga on account of a lack of supplies. The Confederates commanded the Tennessee River and the direct and good wagon roads on the south side of it; and while the Union army held the country north of it, their supplies had to be wagoned over long, circuitous, and rough mountain roads from Stevenson and Bridgeport, which had rail connections with Nashville. At the best the line of communication was difficult, but with the autumn rains it became exceedingly precarious. The army was verging on starvation, yet its commander was not busy with any plan which promised relief. "I have never seen a public man," said Dana, in a despatch to Stanton of October 12, "possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of purpose. His mind scatters; there is no system in the use of his busy days and restless nights. . . . He is conscientious and honest, just as he is imperious and disputatious." October 18 Dana describes the state of affairs thus: "Our condition and prospects grow worse and worse. The roads are in such a state that wagons are eight days making the journey from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and some which left on the 10th have not yet arrived. Though subsistence stores are so nearly exhausted here, the wagons are compelled to throw overboard portions of their precious cargo in order to get through at all. . . . I rode through the camps here yesterday, and can testify that my previous reports respecting the starvation of the battery horses were not exaggerated. A few days more and most of them will be dead. If the effort which Rosecrans intends to make to open the river should be futile, the immediate retreat of this army

will follow. It does not seem possible to hold out here another week without a new avenue of supplies. General Smith says that as he passed among the men working on the fortifications yesterday, several shouted 'crackers' at him. Amid all this the practical incapacity of the general commanding is astonishing, and it often seems difficult to believe him of sound mind. His imbecility appears to be contagious, and it is difficult for any one to get anything done. . . . If the army is finally obliged to retreat, the probability is that it will fall back like a rabble, leaving its artillery, and protected only by the river behind it. If, on the other hand, we regain control of the river and keep it, subsistence and forage can be got here, and we may escape with no worse misfortune than the loss of 12,000 animals."¹

Two days before this despatch was received, the impression made by the despatches of Rosecrans himself, and the information contained in Dana's frequent and circumstantial accounts decided the government to place Grant in supreme command of all the military operations in the West except those under Banks. At Cairo, whither under instructions he had gone from Vicksburg, he received an order to proceed to Louisville, and on his way fell in with Stanton,² who, disturbed by the gravity of affairs, had left Washington in order to have a personal conference with the general. Being invested with his new authority, Grant was given the option of retaining Rosecrans or of placing Thomas in the command of the Army of the Cumberland. He at once decided to relieve Rosecrans, and issued from Louisville, October 18, the necessary orders, telegraphing also to Thomas the next day to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. Thomas replied promptly: "We will hold the town till we starve."³ "I appreciated the force of this despatch later," writes Grant,

¹ O. R., vol. xxx. part i. p. 221; see also Grant's report, *ibid.*, vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 29.

² At Indianapolis.

³ C. W. Supplement, part i. p. 117; O. R., vol. xxx. part i. p. 5, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 666 *et seq.*; Grant's article, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 681.

"when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. It looked indeed as if but two courses were open,—one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured."¹

Rosecrans had in mind a plan for securing a better line of supply. Thomas is authority for the statement that Rosecrans in consultation with William F. Smith, his Chief Engineer, "had partially planned the movement . . . to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport." "Preliminary steps," are words of Thomas in another report, "had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command devolved upon me."² But the wisdom of Grant in placing Thomas in command was manifest. "The change at headquarters here is already strikingly perceptible," wrote Dana from Chattanooga, October 23. "Order prevails instead of universal chaos."³ Thomas at once pushed on the work which Rosecrans had begun.

Grant proceeded as rapidly as possible by rail from Louisville to Bridgeport, and thence must ride fifty-five miles over the road which served as the main line of supply for the army. Some weeks before, on a visit to New Orleans, he had a fall from a runaway horse, receiving severe injuries which still kept him on crutches. Through a chilling rain-storm he now rode with difficulty over the rough way, where in places, on account of the heavy rain and the wash-outs from the mountains, the mud was knee-deep, and he had to be carried over spots unsafe for him to cross on horseback. He relates that "the roads were strewn with the débris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses."⁴ On the night of October 23 he arrived at Chattanooga, "wet, dirty, and well."⁵ "His clear eye and clear face"⁶ showed to his comrades-in-arms that he was mentally at his best; his

¹ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 684.

² Mar. 9, 1866, C. W. Supplement, part i. p. 118; Nov. 7, 1863, O. R. vol. xxxi. part i. p. 42; Report of Board of Army Officers upon claim of Gen. W. F. Smith, Washington, 1901, *passim*.

³ O. R. vol. xxxi. part i. p. 69. ⁴ Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 684.

⁵ Dana, O. R. vol. xxxi. part i. p. 70; see Horace Porter's interesting account, *Century Magazine*, Nov. 1896, p. 19.

⁶ Life of Grant, Church, p. 198.

energy and enterprise extending to the officers and diffused through the rank and file, the impetus communicated to the operations, the marvellous change from the régime of Rosecrans, all indicate that a compeller of men, like Cæsar and Napoleon, like Robert E. Lee, was at the head of affairs.

The morning after his arrival he made a reconnaissance in company with Thomas and Smith, approved their project, and urged its prompt execution. The result of the operations of the few days thereafter, he has told in a despatch to Halleck of October 28: "General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations."¹

Thus the situation had appeared to Bragg: "Possessed of the shortest road to the depot of the enemy, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time."² The seizure by the Union troops of this advantageous line of supply was a bitter disappointment to him, and he endeavored, without success, to recover it by a night attack. The dissensions in the Confederate army were conspicuous; the corps commanders made no secret of their lack of confidence in the generalship of their chief. October 9 Jefferson Davis had made a five days' visit to the army, and tried to patch up the

¹ O. R., vol. xxxi. part i. p. 56. As Thomas was commander of the department, and had adopted the plan, the ascription of it to him by Grant was formal. Thomas said in his report: "To General W. F. Smith should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Brown's Ferry." — Thomas's report, C. W. Supplement, part i. p. 119. In his report of Nov. 7 he said: "The skilful execution by General Smith of the work assigned him, and the promptness with which General Hooker, with his troops, met and repulsed the enemy on the night of the 28th, reflects the greatest credit on both of those officers and their entire commands." — O. R. vol. xxxi. part i. p. 42. See Report of Board of Army Officers, Washington, 1901, *passim*.

² Report, Dec. 28, O. R. vol. xxx. part ii. p. 37.

quarrels, but had failed in the undertaking. In the first week of November Bragg detached Longstreet and his corps for an expedition against Knoxville and the troops which held it under Burnside. This proved to be an injudicious movement. Yet the President and General Grant were anxious lest Burnside might be defeated and driven from East Tennessee; and when Grant learned of Longstreet's departure, he determined to attack the Confederates, with the expectation that this force would be recalled. From this attempt he was dissuaded by Thomas and Smith, and became convinced that it was "utterly impracticable"¹ to take the offensive until Sherman should arrive.

Sherman was coming along as fast as possible, but river transportation from Vicksburg to Memphis was attended with difficulty. "Our progress was slow," he wrote, "on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity of wood and coal. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails, and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats."² Reaching Memphis October 2, his troubles grew. He had three hundred miles to go through the enemy's country, and construed his instructions from Halleck to mean that he should follow the Memphis and Charleston Railroad eastward, repairing it as he moved forward, that it might serve for the transport of his troops and for a line of supply. He set out. Part of his soldiers went by rail; the rest marched, encountering considerable resistance on the way. At Iuka, October 27, a messenger, who had made most of his journey by paddling down the Tennessee in a canoe, under a continual fire from guerillas, handed him a despatch from Grant, saying, "Drop everything . . . and move with your entire force toward Stevenson."³ He pushed on with vigor, and rode into Chattanooga November 15. His soldiers, who will be mentioned hereafter as the Army of the Tennessee, were close behind him.

¹ Grant's report, O. R., vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 29.

² Sherman's report, Dec. 19, *ibid.*, p. 569.

³ *Ibid.*, part i. p. 713, part ii. p. 571; Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 357.

Grant had already matured his plan of attack, and at the earliest moment put it into execution. November 23 Thomas made a reconnaissance in force "in the most gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line, and securing" important ground.¹ At midnight Sherman began to cross the Tennessee, his men capturing all the Confederate pickets but one on the east bank of the river, and by daylight he had 8000 men over, and a rifle-trench dug to serve as the head of a pontoon bridge about to be constructed. Of this operation Sherman wrote: "I will here bear my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well, and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent (viz. 1350 feet) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith."² By one o'clock in the afternoon [November 24] the bridge was completed. The rest of the army crossed over, and gained and held "the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the railroad tunnel."³

"Hooker," wrote Grant, "carried out the part assigned him for this day [November 24] equal to the most sanguine expectations."⁴ Through driving mists and rains he fought "above the clouds," and won the battle of Lookout Mountain. "Thus on the night of the 24th," is the report of Grant, "our forces maintained an unbroken line with open communications from the north end of Lookout Mountain through Chattanooga valley to the north end of Missionary Ridge."⁵ At daylight⁶ the stars and stripes waved from the most prominent place in the region, the peak of Lookout. This was a harbinger of victory. Sherman began the battle on the

¹ Grant, Report of Dec. 23, O. R., vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 32; Dana to Stanton, Nov. 23, *ibid.*, p. 65.

² Sherman, Report of Dec. 19, *ibid.*, p. 573.

³ Grant's report, O. R., vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Nov. 25.

left against a strong force massed in his front, and had a close, stubborn struggle without gaining advantage. About the middle of the afternoon the word was given to Thomas's soldiers, who held the centre, to advance. They carried the first line of rifle-pits, and should have halted for further commands, but were exposed to a murderous fire, and would not fall back. Without orders, indeed in spite of orders, those twenty thousand Western soldiers and their immediate officers, conspicuous among whom was Sheridan, rushed up Missionary Ridge, carried it, and drove away, in panic, the Confederates.

Grant and Thomas were on Orchard Knob, watching the battle. When the troops broke away, Grant demanded, "By whose orders is this?" "By their own, I fancy," was the slow and measured reply of Thomas,¹ a testimony to the spirit of initiative which distinguished his soldiers. Dana, who witnessed the charge, gave, the next day, this account of it: "The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was accomplished the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those impracticable steepes, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The order to storm appears to have been given simultaneously by Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not to be held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military prudence. Besides, the generals had caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready themselves to undertake impossibilities."²

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 150 ; see another account of this incident, *Century War Book*, vol. iii. p. 725.

² O. R., vol. xxxi. part ii. p. 69.

At 4.30 P. M. Dana telegraphed to Stanton: "Glory to God. The day is decisively ours;" and a few hours later, "Our men are frantic with joy and enthusiasm, and received Grant as he rode along the lines after the victory with tumultuous shouts."¹ "Bragg is in full retreat, burning his depots and bridges," telegraphed Dana the next day.² Some pursuit was made without material result. Sherman was sent to the relief of Burnside, and his approach caused Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville.

The action of November 25 is called the battle of Missionary Ridge; that of the three days the battle of Chattanooga.³ Chattanooga and Knoxville, which commanded East Tennessee, were secured by this victory, and were not afterwards retaken by the Confederates. The result of the campaign denoted the waning fortune of the Southern cause. The news of Missionary Ridge reached the people of the North on the last Thursday of November, and gave them the first genuine Thanksgiving since the commencement of the civil war.⁴

Having assumed the power of a dictator, the President could not, for a long while together, dispense with the support of the people, whose opinion found its clearest manifestation at

¹ O. R. vol. xxxi. part ii. pp. 68, 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

³ The effective strength of the Union army was 60,000, that of the Confederate 20,000 less. The loss of the Union force 5815, Confederate 6687. — Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 729; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 155.

⁴ My authorities for this account of the campaigns of Chickamauga and Chattanooga are the correspondence and the reports of Rosecrans, Burnside, Bragg, Longstreet, Halleck, Grant, Sherman, W. F. Smith, Meigs, Hooker, Sheridan, in O. R., the several parts of vol. xxx. and vol. xxxi.; C. W., 1865, vol. iii., Supplement, part i.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii.; articles of D. H. Hill, Grant, Smith, Cist, Fullerton, Century War Book, vol. viii.; Dodge, *A Bird's-Eye View of the Civil War*; Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Van Horne, *Life of Thomas*, Hist. of the Army of the Cumberland; Sheridan's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Cist, *The Army of the Cumberland*; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*; *Life of Grant*, Church; *Warden's Chase*; *Milt. Hist. of Grant*, Badeau, vol. i.; Chas. A. Dana's *Reminiscences*, *McClure's Magazine*, Feb. and March, 1898; Report of Board of Army Officers upon claim of Gen. W. F. Smith, Washington, 1901.

the regular fall elections. These of 1863 were almost entirely for state officers, but there were circumstances which gave to some of them a very great importance. For this reason Lincoln, feeling, since Gettysburg and Vicksburg, firmer in his seat and more confident of his measures, took the occasion, in his reply to an invitation to be present at a mass meeting of unconditional Union men at his old home of Springfield, Illinois, to write a letter which may be called a stump speech or a powerful argument and appeal to the people for their support of his policy in carrying on the war. "It would be very agreeable to me to thus meet my old friends at my own home," he wrote, August 26, "but I cannot just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require.

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those and other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.

There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise. I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise if one were made with them.

To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace

men of the North get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people, according to the bond of service — the United States Constitution — and that, as such, I am responsible to them.

But to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. [The next few sentences but one I cited in Chap. XVIII.] . . .

But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot be retracted any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation issued; the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know, as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important successes, believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called Abolitionism, or with Republican party politics, but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit these opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively, to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes.

I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can

be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made must be kept.

The signs look better. [The next seven sentences are cited on page 318.] . . . While those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro' [Stone's River], Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all: for the great republic — for the principle it lives by and keeps alive — for man's vast future — thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. [The next sentence and part of the second are cited on page 333.] . . .

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result."¹

In going to the people nothing aids a party more than an honest and positive declaration of public policy. Such an one, coming from the President, upheld by arguments the inherent force of which was increased by the dignity and power of his office, had an immeasurable influence in rallying to his support the thinking and patriotic voters of the North; and it is safe to say that had the result of the elections been

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 396.

really in doubt after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the tide would have been turned by the timely and unanswerable logic of this letter. The feeling in the hearts of many hundred thousands was expressed by the New York *Tribune*: "Again we say, God bless Abraham Lincoln! 'The promise must be kept.'"¹

The most important election was that in Ohio, for the reason that by the enthusiastic and almost unanimous nomination of Vallandigham for governor by the Democrats the issue had practically come to be Vallandigham or Lincoln. "The canvass in Ohio," wrote John Sherman, "is substantially between the Government and the Rebellion, and is assuming all the bitterness of such a strife."² For three months the business of the people seemed to be the political contest. The Democrats held large and enthusiastic meetings all over the State, the estimates of their size running in many cases to twenty, thirty, and forty thousand,³ and able speakers who engaged earnestly in the work received a close attention from these large audiences.⁴ Angry vehemence characterized the meetings of both parties, and the face-to-face discussions day by day of the partisans of both sides. Extreme Democrats contended with ultra Republicans, and quarrels were frequent which ruptured the friendships of years. Vallandigham was called a traitor and a convict; Lincoln, on the other hand, was termed a usurper, a tyrant, and a despot, and given the title of King Abraham.

The real strength of the Democratic canvass lay in their emphatic declarations that their cause was that of civil lib-

¹ Sept. 3.

² Aug. 29, Sherman Letters, p. 214.

³ For example: Bellefontaine, 15,000, Circleville, 40,000, Kenton, 25,000, Upper Sandusky, 40,000 to 50,000, Chillicothe, 35,000, Hamilton, 30,000, Springfield, 30,000 to 40,000, Wooster, 30,000 to 40,000, New Lexington, 20,000 to 30,000, Ottawa, 15,000, Piqua, 20,000 to 25,000, Mt. Vernon, 40,000 to 50,000.—Columbus (Ohio) *Crisis*, Aug. 5, 12, Sept. 16, 30. Of course these numbers are exaggerated.

⁴ Among the speakers were A. G. Thurman, George E. Pugh, George H. Pendleton, D. W. Voorhees, S. S. Cox, William Allen, George W. Morgan.

erty; that their candidate stood for freedom of speech and for freedom of the press; that his arrest, trial, and banishment were unjust, and that his enforced exile spoke loudly for redress: these cries dwarfed all other issues. The feeling inspiring the Democrats of Ohio, it was asserted, is the spirit of '76; it is the courage which actuated the barons on the meadow of Runnymede. A story about Seward, made up apparently out of whole cloth, became an effective illustration of the argument. "My lord," he was reported to have said to Lord Lyons, "I can touch a bell on my right hand and order the arrest of a citizen of Ohio; I can touch a bell again and order the imprisonment of a citizen of New York; and no power on earth except that of the President can release them. Can the Queen of England do so much?" That this story, by dint of iteration and, in spite of denials, by reiteration with circumstantial details, came to be thoroughly believed, is not strange; for while Seward probably made no such remark, he and Stanton had caused many arrests with no more formality than a telegraphic despatch.¹

The Union party nominated for governor John Brough, a war Democrat, an industrious and persuasive stump-speaker, who prosecuted his canvass with zeal, receiving from his party effective assistance.² Their mass-meetings were many

¹ I have searched the printed correspondence of Lord Lyons with his government, and find no authority whatever for the story. One account (*Cincinnati Enquirer*, cited by *Columbus Crisis*, June 10) ran that the conversation took place Nov. 16, 1861, and was in the diplomatic correspondence printed in the *N. Y. Times*, March 1, 1862. But it is not there. Thinking that it may have come from some indiscreet remark of Seward which got into the newspapers, I have had a search made in the journals of Nov. and Dec., 1861, but found no trace of it. Nor did I run across it in 1862. In 1863 it became a stock illustration for Democratic argument. But a misrepresentation dies hard. On the frontispiece of Marshall's *American Bastille* (1870) this remark is quoted as the explanation of a startling, though truthful enough, pictorial illustration. On p. xiii it is referred to as undisputed historical truth. As such it is quoted by S. S. Cox, *Three Decades*, p. 275.

² Among the speakers were Senators Sherman and Wade, Senator Zach. Chandler of Michigan, Geo. W. Julian, A. G. Riddle, John A. Bingham, Judge Luther Day (a War Democrat).

and enthusiastic, but fell short probably in numbers of those which gathered out of warm sympathy with the cause of Vallandigham. The Union speakers maintained that the only issue was whether the government should be supported in its conduct of the war, and argued adroitly that a vote for Vallandigham was equivalent to one for Jefferson Davis, and that his election would be as hurtful to the country as would a terrible defeat of the soldiers in the field.¹ They were listened to gladly by earnest men and women throughout the State, and awakened a high spirit of patriotism. The most interesting assemblies were those of the farmers, who giving, as they termed it, a day to the country, brought their wives, daughters, and sons to the mass-meeting in order that all might understand the issue submitted to the people. At a meeting at Jefferson, Ashtabula County, a district of high political intelligence, Julian, the last of the speakers, was called for a short while before sunset, and after speaking forty-five minutes proposed to stop, as the people had stood for four hours in a cold and drizzling rain; but he received from them in answer the emphatic shout, "Go on." "Go ahead," said a farmer. "We'll hear you; it's past milking-time, anyhow." "It seemed to me," writes Julian, "that I had never met such listeners. I was afterwards informed that the test of effective speaking on the Reserve is the ability to hold an audience from their milking when the time for it comes."²

In spite of the earnest and enthusiastic assemblies of those devoted to the President and the government, the Vallandigham meetings were such impressive outpourings of the people that on the eve of the election considerable doubt existed whether Brough would have a majority of the home vote. The result amazed both Union men and Democrats, and was a testimony of the silent, unobtrusive voters who are sure to come out when the sentiment of the people is really

¹ "Not only the people of the loyal but those of the disloyal States and of England feel that the fate of the Union rests upon the result of the election in Ohio on the second Tuesday in October." — *N. Y. Tribune*, Oct. 3.

² *Political Recollections*, p. 236.

aroused. In an aggregate greater than at any previous election in Ohio, Brough received a majority from the citizens of 61,920, and from the soldiers who were permitted by law to vote in the field, 39,179, a total of over 101,000.¹ It was the expression of an overwhelming and just opinion in favor of the government and a continuance of the war.² While 185,000 citizens and 2200 soldiers gave their voices for Vallandigham, it is gratifying to believe that a large portion of them did not sympathize with his extreme and uncompromising opposition to the conduct of the war.

¹ The election took place October 13.

² As the two parties did not exactly join issue, each evading to some extent the presentation of the other, it is difficult to say what was the pronouncement of the people of Ohio on arbitrary arrests and "drum-head court-martials" (a favorite expression of the Democrats). If I may trust my own memory, which is vivid of this canvass (I was living in Ohio at the time), supported as it is by a fair inference from the contemporary evidence, I can assert that the position of the mass of those who voted for Brough was that of acquiescence in this arbitrary exercise of authority, being brought to it by their deep trust in Lincoln, which was overmastering in the autumn of 1863. Édouard Laboulaye, who had some sort of the same discernment possessed by De Tocqueville, in a course of lectures at the Collège de France in 1864 said: "L'Amérique, malgré la guerre, a conservé la liberté. Je sais que l'on dit le contraire; mais si vous lisiez les journaux américains, si vous voyiez la façon dont le président des États-Unis, M. Abraham Lincoln, est traité, vous seriez vite édifié sur ce qu'est en Amérique cette prétendue compression de la liberté. . . . L'Amérique est assez forte pour n'avoir pas peur de la liberté. Quant au despotisme, les journaux américains se sont amusés de nos terreurs européennes; il leur est difficile de prendre au sérieux Abraham 1^{er}, empereur des Américains. M. Abraham Lincoln ne sera certainement pas l'empereur de l'Amérique. On lui a donné un nom que l'histoire ratifiera; ce sera l'honnête Abraham, le citoyen qui n'a pas désespéré de la patrie, le magistrat qui a défendu énergiquement la cause de la liberté et de l'Union; ce titre lui suffit, et à vrai dire il est plus beau que celui de César." -- Laboulaye, *Histoire des États-Unis*, t. iii. p. 50. Any one who has sat at the feet of Laboulaye may easily conjure up the animation and emphasis that he would give to these words.

J. R. Lowell wrote in the *North American Review*, Jan., 1864, p. 257: "It is a harmless pleasantry to call Mr. Lincoln 'Abraham the First,' — we remember when a similar title was applied to President Jackson; and it will not be easy, we suspect, to persuade a people who have more liberty than they know what to do with, that they are the victims of despotic tyranny."

On the same day as the election in Ohio, Curtin, one of the celebrated war governors, was re-elected governor of Pennsylvania by a good majority. The canvass was notable in that General McClellan, much to the disappointment of Curtin, identified himself with the Democratic party by writing a public letter in support of its candidate. In Indiana, county officers were chosen, in Iowa there was a state election: in both States the Union party was successful.

New York voted in November, and the Union candidate for Secretary of State was elected by a majority of 29,000. The result was regarded as a rebuke to Governor Seymour. "As to Massachusetts," wrote Motley from Vienna, "of course I should as soon have thought of the sun's forgetting to rise as of her joining the pro-slavery Copperheads."¹ This Commonwealth chose Andrew again for governor by 41,000 majority. All the Northern States but New Jersey voted with the Union party, which carried also Maryland, Kentucky, and Delaware. Motley, with a remarkable power in pointing a result, wrote: "The elections I consider of far more consequence than the battles; or, rather, the success of the anti-slavery party and its steady increasing strength make it a mathematical certainty that, however the tide of battle may ebb and flow with varying results, the progress of the war is steadily in one direction. The peculiar institution will be washed away, and with it the only possible dissolvent of the Union."²

It is interesting to note, in two important particulars, the action of the President, whose concern in regard to the political campaign was second only to that touching the military

¹ Nov. 17, Letters, vol. ii. p. 143.

² Ibid. My authorities are the files of the Columbus (Ohio) *Crisis*, N. Y. *Tribune* and *World*, especially the *Crisis* of July 1, 8, 15, 22, Aug. 5, 19, 26, Sept. 2, 9, 16, Oct. 7; the *Tribune*, Sept. 17, 30, Oct. 3, 15; *World*, Sept. 15, 29, Oct. 14; Life of Vallandigham by his brother; Morse's *Lincoln*, vol. ii., Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii.; *Tribune Almanac*; Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1863; Julian, *Political Recollections*; Riddle, *Recollections of War Times*; John Sherman's *Recollections*, vol. i.; Greeley's *American Conflict*, vol. ii.; McPherson's *Political Hist.*

operations. Despite the issue which the Democrats in the Ohio canvass had brought to the front, he felt obliged, on account of many discharges of drafted men and deserters by judges apparently disposed to defeat the object of the Conscription Act, to suspend, by a proclamation of September 15, the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* throughout the United States. The cases in which the suspension should apply were stated in general terms. This proclamation was under the authority of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863,¹ and referred to it, while the gist and manner of the edict were suggested by Secretary Chase, the best lawyer in the cabinet, who, unlike Seward and Stanton, brothers in the profession, did not believe that the laws should be silent in the midst of arms. This procedure differed from the exercise of arbitrary powers previously referred to; owing to the advice and insistence of Chase, it was regular, and it may receive our approval.²

Chase set down in his diary a pretty full account of the two cabinet meetings which considered this comprehensive suspension of the *habeas corpus*, but he neither asserts nor intimates that there was any expression of opinion whatever that it would be politic to withhold the proclamation until after the elections. In connection with this circumstance, it is an indication of public sentiment that the President deemed it prudent to defer a fresh call for troops until after the October States had voted. Four days thereafter, October 17, he issued a proclamation calling out 300,000 volunteers "for three years or the war, not, however, exceeding three years," while any deficiencies in the quotas of any State should be filled by a draft to commence January 5, 1864.³ His immediate action in the one case, and his waiting in the

¹ See p. 236.

² Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 406; Diary of Chase, MS.; Warden's Chase, pp. 543, 545, 554; N. Y. *Tribune*, *World*, Sept. 16. In the enumeration of offenders and offences there were two clauses open perhaps to abuse.

³ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 425.

other, taken in connection with the unmistakable drift of opinion for the past two years, showed that the people of the North were more ready now to applaud stretches of executive authority than to enlist for the war or even to hire mercenaries to fill the ranks.

During the summer and autumn the designs of the Emperor of the French, the progress of his conquest of Mexico, the steps taken towards the establishment of an imperial government for that country, the offer of the throne to Archduke Maximilian of Austria caused considerable uneasiness in the country, and lessened materially the animosity against England, so apparent earlier in the year. Lowell, in a letter to Thomas Hughes, undoubtedly expressed the sentiment of the country. "Pray don't believe a word he [the American correspondent of the London *Times*] says about our longing to go to war with England," he wrote. "We are all as cross as terriers with your kind of neutrality, but the last thing we want is another war. If the rebel iron-clads are allowed to come out, there might be a change."¹ When the iron-clads were stopped, there was a great feeling of relief, which began to develop into amity.

The friendly welcome of a Russian fleet of war vessels, which arrived in New York City in September; the enthusiastic reception by the people of the admiral and officers when offered the hospitalities of the city; the banquet given at the Astor House by the merchants and business men in their honor; the marked attention shown them by the Secretary of State on their visit to Washington,² "to reflect the cordiality and friendship which the nation cherishes towards Russia": all these manifestations of gratitude to the one great power of Europe which had openly and persistently been our friend, added another element to the cheerfulness which prevailed in the closing months of 1863.³

¹ Sept. 9, Lowell's Letters, vol. i. p. 333.

² The President was ill.

³ N. Y. *World*, Sept. 26, *Tribune*, Oct. 2, 13; *Harper's Magazine*, Nov. 1863, p. 848; Dip. Corr., 1864, part iii. p. 279; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 146. In

The circumstances under which the President sent his message to Congress, December 8, were far different from those existing at the corresponding time the year previous, when, on account of successive military defeats, all was gloom; and the days succeeding were not destined to be like those of 1862, when Congress had not fairly started on its work before the crushing disaster of Fredericksburg increased the dejection of those in authority and of the people at large. Yet the House of Representatives was not so friendly, politically, to the administration as the preceding one. It had been chosen for the most part during the Democratic reaction in the autumn of 1862, but by statutory rule it did not meet until the first Monday of December, 1863, — an arrangement in a government of the people difficult to defend, inuring, however, to the benefit of the President in this case, as in the gloomy winter of 1862–63 it was well that he had at his back the strong majority of the House elected in 1860. The House of the Thirty-eighth Congress¹ had 102 Republicans and unconditional Unionists, 75 Democrats, 9 Border State men.² The election of the speaker furnished a measure of the partisan division; 101 members voted for Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, while 81 gave their voices for several different candidates named by the opposition. The Senate was controlled decisively by the party of the administration: 36 were Republicans and unconditional Unionists, 9 were Democrats, and 5 conditional Unionists.³

The President began his message: "Another year of health and of sufficiently abundant harvests has passed. For these, and especially for the improved condition of our national affairs, our renewed and profoundest gratitude to God is due."

the reference of General Banks in the House of Representatives in 1868 to this circumstance as cited by Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. ii. p. 334, there is some exaggeration.

¹ The one assembling Dec. 7, 1863.

² Classification of the *Tribune Almanac*.

³ *Ibid*.

He recommended the encouragement of immigration. "Although this source of national wealth and strength," he said, "is again flowing with greater freedom than for several years before the insurrection occurred, there is still a great deficiency of laborers in every field of industry, especially in agriculture, and in our mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals. While the demand for labor is thus increased here, tens of thousands of persons, destitute of remunerative occupation, are thronging our foreign consulates, and offering to emigrate to the United States if essential, but very cheap, assistance can be afforded them. It is easy to see that, under the sharp discipline of civil war, the nation is beginning a new life."¹

In January of this year Congress had been obliged to pass a resolution of emergency providing for the immediate issue of \$100,000,000 greenbacks for the discharge of the arrears of pay due the soldiers and sailors.² Now the President could say: "All demands on the treasury, including the pay of the army and navy, have been promptly met and fully satisfied. No considerable body of troops, it is believed, were ever more amply provided and more liberally and punctually paid; and it may be added that by no people were the burdens incident to a great war ever more cheerfully borne."

While the navy had performed some brilliant exploits, a large part of its work was of the humdrum useful sort. "The extensive blockade," Lincoln wrote, "has been constantly increasing in efficiency as the navy has expanded; yet on so long a line it has so far been impossible to entirely suppress illicit trade. From returns received at the Navy Department, it appears that more than one thousand vessels have been captured since the blockade was instituted."³

¹ Congress passed an act to encourage immigration, approved July 4, 1864.

² *Ante*, p. 238.

³ He added: "The value of prizes already sent in for adjudication amounts to over thirteen millions of dollars. The naval force of the United

Towards the end of his message the President contrasted with effect the condition of things now and in December, 1862, and entered upon the consideration of his emancipation policy, where, so thoroughly did he understand the question, he was always at his best. "When Congress assembled a year ago," he said, "the war had already lasted nearly twenty months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while, amid much that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores, and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European governments anything hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation and of employing black soldiers gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration, the General Government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State, and for a

States consists at this time of five hundred and eighty-eight vessels, completed and in the course of completion, and of these, seventy-five are iron-clad or armored steamers. The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the navy which will probably extend beyond the war itself. The armored vessels in our navy, completed and in service, or which are under contract and approaching completion, are believed to exceed in number those of any other power."

long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that if it should, the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed, we are permitted to take another review. The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and, by the complete opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which, three years ago, would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits. . . .

No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or cruelty, has marked the measures of emancipation and arming the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and, contemporary with such discussion, the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past." He added: "I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress."

The House of Representatives responding to the President by the voting down of certain resolutions and by the adoption of others, made it manifest that it would back him earnestly

in a vigorous prosecution of the war. "Never since I have been in public life," wrote Sumner to Gladstone, January 1, 1864, "has there been so little excitement in Congress. The way seems, at last, open. Nobody doubts the result. The assurance of the future gives calmness."¹ During the session the course of the Democrats, with the exception of a few individuals who had little following, calls for no censure. They made no factious opposition to the measures providing men and money for the war; they did not avail themselves of the tactics of obstruction; they were even taunted with a lack of stamina.² The sentiment animating them was different from that with which they went to the country in the autumn of 1863. Most of them, indeed, were actuated by a spirit of patriotism, by love for the Union, and these now dictated the action of the party instead of the extreme men who had been discredited by the elections. "The war was never more popular than at this moment," wrote, November 14, John Sherman to his brother.³ In truth, such an opposition as had been made in the year 1863 could thrive only on military failure, while the people now had the buoyancy which proceeds from victory in war.

In a large country where nearly every man and woman has intelligence, information, and an opinion, it is frequently difficult, at the time great movements are making, to tell precisely what the sentiment is on any question that agitates the public mind. No ruler ever knew so well what the people thought as Lincoln; no one ever showed so wise a blending of leadership with susceptibility to the popular will. In the highest sense, it may be said, he followed, in order that he might lead. "I claim not to have controlled events," he wrote, "but confess, plainly, that events have controlled me."⁴ For the reason that Lincoln felt so keenly what the people were thinking about, I have considered that a better history

¹ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 172.

² N. Y. Times, March 4, 1864.

³ Sherman Letters, p. 215.

⁴ April 4, 1864, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 509.

of opinion could not be written than he has outlined in his December message, from which I have quoted at length. James Russell Lowell wrote for the *North American Review* of January, 1864, an estimate of public sentiment which is also remarkable in that the years have demonstrated its exactness. Nothing can so well reinforce the utterance of the backwoods lawyer in the White House as the words of the poet, the apostle of culture, who, from the groves of the academy, spoke in energetic diction for the mass of the common people of the North. "The progress of three years has outstripped the expectation of the most sanguine," he wrote, "and that of our arms, great as it undoubtedly is, is trifling in comparison with the advance of opinion. The great strength of slavery was a superstition which is fast losing its hold on the public mind. When it was first proposed to raise negro regiments, there were many even patriotic men who felt as the West-Saxons did at seeing their high-priest hurl his lance against the temple of their idol. They were sure something terrible, they knew not what, would follow. But the earth stood firm, the heavens gave no sign, and presently they joined in making a bonfire of their bugbear. That we should employ the material of the rebellion for its own destruction seems now the merest truism. In the same way men's minds are growing wonted to the thought of emancipation; and great as are the difficulties which must necessarily accompany and follow so vast a measure, we have no doubt that they will be successfully overcome. The point of interest and importance is, that the feeling of the country in regard to slavery is no whim of sentiment, but a settled conviction, and that the tendency of opinion is unmistakably and irrevocably in one direction, no less in the Border Slave States than in the Free. The chances of the war, which at one time seemed against us, are now greatly in our favor. The nation is more thoroughly united against any shameful or illusory peace than it ever was on any other question. . . . The Rebel leaders can make no concessions; the country is unanimously resolved that the war shall be prosecuted, at whatever

cost. . . . While every day was bringing the people nearer to the conclusion which all thinking men saw to be inevitable from the beginning, it was wise in Mr. Lincoln to leave the shaping of his policy to events. In this country, where the rough and ready understanding of the people is sure, at last, to be the controlling power, a profound common-sense is the best genius for statesmanship. Hitherto the wisdom of the President's measures has been justified by the fact that they have always resulted in more firmly uniting public opinion. It is a curious comment on the sincerity of political professions, that the party calling itself Democratic should have been the last to recognize the real movement and tendency of the popular mind. The same gentlemen who two years ago were introducing resolutions in Congress against coercion, are introducing them now in favor of the war, but against subjugation. Next year they may be in favor of emancipation, but against abolition. It does not seem to have occurred to them that the one point of difference between a civil and a foreign war is, that in the former one of the parties must, by the very nature of the case, be put down, and the other left in possession of government. Unless the country is to be divided, no compromise is possible. . . . If Mr. Lincoln continue to act with the firmness and prudence which have hitherto distinguished him, we think he has little to fear from the efforts of the opposition. Men without sincere convictions are hardly likely to have a well-defined and settled policy, and the blunders they have hitherto committed must make them cautious. If their personal hostility to the President be unabated, we may safely count on their leniency to the opinion of majorities, and the drift of public sentiment is too strong to be mistaken. They have at last discovered that there is such a thing as Country, which has a meaning for men's minds and a hold upon their hearts. . . . In any event, an opposition is a wholesome thing; and we are only sorry that this is not a more wholesome opposition. We believe it is the general judgment of the country on the acts of the present administration, that they have been, in the main,

judicious and well-timed. The only doubt about some of them seems to be as to their constitutionality.”¹

In his annual report to the President, the Secretary of War said that the Conscription Act had been enforced in twelve States, levying fifty thousand soldiers,² and raising by the three-hundred-dollar exemption ten millions for procuring substitutes. “Volunteering is going on, in some States, with much spirit,” he said. “The prime importance of filling up the old regiments, and the superiority of such force over new regiments, is a point on which all military experience and opinions agree. . . . The indications are that the force required will, in a great measure, be raised by volunteering without draft. It is proper to add that commanding generals bear testimony that the drafted men who have gone into the ranks acquit themselves well and make good soldiers.”

The Secretary spoke of the development of the national energy. “At the beginning of the war we were compelled to rely upon foreign countries for the supply of nearly all our arms and munitions. Now all these things are manufactured at home, and we are independent of foreign countries, not only for the manufactures, but also for the materials of which they are composed.”

Congress took effective action towards filling the armies for the campaigns of 1864. By the Act of February 24³ the President was authorized “whenever he shall deem it necessary during the present war to call for such number of men for the military service as the public exigencies may require,” and

¹ Lincoln read this article, which occupies twenty-seven pages of the *North American Review*, and thus wrote of it, Jan. 16, 1864: “Of course, I am not the most impartial judge; yet, with due allowance for this, I venture to hope that the article entitled ‘The President’s Policy’ will be of value to the country. I fear I am not quite worthy of all which is therein kindly said of me personally.” — *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 470.

² Probably an over-statement. According to the report of the Provost-Marshal-General of March 17, 1866, there were held to service 9881, furnished substitutes 26,002; total, 35,883.

³ 1864.

provision was made for a draft in any division where the quota assigned was not filled by volunteers.

The Secretary of the Treasury began his report to Congress by saying that the operations of his department had "been attended during the last fiscal year by a greater measure of success than he ventured to anticipate at its beginning. . . . The Loan Act," he continued, "and the National Banking Act were followed by an immediate revival of public credit. Success quite beyond anticipation crowned the efforts of the Secretary to distribute the five-twenty loan in all parts of the country, as well as every other measure adopted by him for replenishing the Treasury." The receipts from customs, internal taxes, and other ordinary sources for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1863, were \$111,000,000; the expenditures were \$715,000,000; the difference, except \$13,000,000 a balance from the preceding year, was provided by borrowing. The amount of the debt, July 1, 1863, was \$1,099,000,000.¹ "To check the increase of debt," Chase wrote, "must be, in our circumstances, a prominent object of patriotic solicitude. The Secretary, therefore, while submitting estimates which require large loans, and while he thinks it not very difficult to negotiate them, feels himself bound, by a prudent regard to possible contingencies, to urge on Congress efficient measures for the increase of revenue." He recommended that internal taxes to the amount of one hundred and fifty millions yearly be imposed, and spoke of the "importance of an economical and vigorous prosecution of the war." He congratulated himself on the improvement of the public credit. "The first loans were negotiated at seven and thirty hundredths per cent.," he said; "the next at seven; the next at six; more recently large sums have been obtained at five and four" [these at 4 and 5 per cent. were "temporary loans by deposits reimbursable after ten days' notice"].²

¹ The exact figures are reduced to round numbers.

² The reduction of interest was not so great as one might assume from Chase's report. The receipts from the first loans were in gold or paper payable in coin. After the suspension of specie payments Dec. 28, 1861, and the enactment of the Legal-tender law of Feb. 25, 1862, the receipts were in

Anticipating the chronological course of events, it will be convenient in this connection to touch upon the financial legislation of this session of Congress, which began December 7, 1863, and ended July 4, 1864. By two joint resolutions as a temporary expedient the rates of duties on imposts were increased fifty per cent., to take effect April 29, and to continue until July 1. A tariff act, being made up of the usual intricate mass of details, was passed, increasing materially the imposts.¹ Another temporary measure was that of March 8, which levied a tax of sixty cents per gallon on spirits, thus augmenting this excise threefold. A comprehensive act of internal taxation, which repealed, except in some minor particulars, and superseded former acts, was passed, being approved June 30. Many of the duties were reimposed, some of them were increased. The tax on spirits was made \$1.50 per gallon from July 1, 1864, to February 1, 1865, and after the later date it was to be \$2; but the duty on malt liquors was not advanced. An income tax of five per cent. was imposed on incomes over \$600 and less than \$5000, of seven and one-half per cent. on amounts between \$5000 and \$10,000, and of ten per cent. on the excess over \$10,000. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized² to borrow \$400,000,000 by issuing six per cent. bonds, or in lieu of one-half of that amount he might sell \$200,000,000 of interest-bearing legal-tender treasury notes. By the same section of this act the total amount of non-interest-bearing legal-tender notes, popularly known as greenbacks, issued or to be issued, was limited to \$400,000,000, "and such additional sum, not exceeding fifty millions of dollars, as may be temporarily required for the redemption of temporary loan."³

greenbacks or their equivalent (see vol. iii. p. 559 *et seq.*). The date of Chase's report was Dec. 10, 1863. Gold sold that day at 148½, the value being measured in greenbacks.

¹ Approved June 30.

² By act approved June 30.

³ The maximum amount outstanding was for 1864 \$431,178,670
 1865 432,687,966
 1866 400,619,206

This last amount was not afterwards exceeded. — United States Notes, Knox, p. 142.

February 1 the President ordered a draft for 500,000 men, to be made March 10 if the several quotas were not filled by enlistment; but all of the troops who had been raised under the call of October 17, 1863, were deducted from this number, so that it was equivalent only to an additional call for 200,000.¹ March 14, "in order to supply the force required to be drafted for the navy, and to provide an adequate reserve force for all contingencies," a supplementary call was made, and a draft ordered, under the usual conditions, for 200,000 men.²

¹ A call for three years' service. Under it 317,092 men were furnished, 52,288 paid commutation; total, 369,380. In these figures, however, are embraced the men raised by draft in 1863. — Statistical Rec., Phisterer, p. 6.

² Also, for three years. Men furnished, 259,515; men paid commutation, 32,678; total, 292,193. — Ibid. Of these, 3416 drafted men were held to personal service, 8911 drafted men furnished substitutes. — Report of Provost-Marshal-General, March 17, 1866.

Although it will anticipate the chronological course of the narrative, it will be convenient to give here the results obtained from the two succeeding calls.

July 18, 1864. Call for 500,000 men. Men furnished, 385,163. — Phisterer, p. 8.

The result of the draft was as follows :

Whole number drawn	231,918	
Failed to report	66,159	
Discharged, quota full	26,416	
" per order	807	
	93,382	
	<u>138,536</u>	
Total number exempted	82,531	56,005
Held to personal service	26,205	
Furnished substitutes	28,502	
Paid commutation	1,298	56,005

Report of Provost-Marshal-General, March 17, 1866, p. 199.

Dec. 19, 1864. Call for 300,000 men. Men furnished, 211,752. — Phisterer, p. 9.

The result of the draft was as follows :

Whole number drawn	139,024	
Failed to report	28,477	
Discharged, quota full	18,011	
" per order	46,408	
	92,896	
Number examined	46,128	
Total number exempted	28,631	
	<u>17,497</u>	
Held to personal service	6,845	
Furnished substitutes	10,192	
Paid commutation	460	17,497

Report of Provost-Marshal-General, p. 212

The growing dislike of military service and the greater rewards at home for labor and business ability were constantly making it more difficult to get a sufficient number of the proper kind of men. Congress, the President, and the War Department did pretty well; perhaps as well as could be expected in a democracy where every man had an opinion and a vote, and at a time when the coming presidential election in the autumn could not be lost sight of; but the results fell far short of what would have been obtained had the Prussian system been possible. Nevertheless, the conscription went on with "few, if any, disturbances of the peace," "the people having learned to look upon the draft as a military necessity."¹ The government, the States, the counties, and other political divisions were munificent in their offers of bounties, of which a salient example is seen in the advertisement of the New York County Volunteer Committee: "30,000 volunteers wanted. The following are the pecuniary inducements offered: County bounty, cash down, \$300; State bounty, \$75; United States bounty to new recruits, \$302, additional to veteran soldiers, \$100;"² making totals, respectively, of \$677 and \$777 for service which would not exceed three years, was likely to be less, and turned out to be an active duty of little more than one year, besides the private soldier's pay of \$16³ per month with clothing and rations. The bounty in the county of New York was more than that generally paid throughout the country, although in some districts it was even higher.⁴ The system was bad, for it fostered a class of substitute brokers whose business was to get recruits, and whose aim was to earn their brokerage without any regard to the physical or moral quality of the men that they supplied.⁵ It brought into existence

¹ Report of Provost-Marshall-General, p. 147; O. R., III. v. p. 673.

² N. Y. *Times*, *Tribune*, *World*, Feb. 13.

³ After May 1, 1864.

⁴ Report of Provost-Marshall-General, p. 214. Of course the United States bounty of \$300 or \$400 was the same all over the country.

⁵ "The system of recruiting which has recently been followed in this city is one of the greatest scandals of the war. It has been one of organized

the crime of bounty-jumping. Thieves, pickpockets, and vagabonds would enlist, take whatever bounty was paid in cash, desert when opportunity offered, change their names, go to another district or State, re-enlist, collect another bounty, desert again, and go on playing the same trick until they were caught, or until such chances of gain were no longer available. The Provost-Marshall-General stated in his final report that "A man now in the Albany penitentiary, undergoing an imprisonment of four years, confessed to having 'jumped the bounty' thirty-two times."¹ It was stated "that out of a detachment of 625 recruits sent to reinforce a New Hampshire regiment in the Army of the Potomac, 137 deserted on the passage, 82 to the enemy's picket line, and 36 to the rear, leaving but 370 men."²

The wide extent of country, the feverish anxiety in each town and municipal ward to fill its quota, together with a certain lack of administrative system, made it difficult to detect the bounty-jumpers. But the evil of this method was appreciated. "For a shrewd people," wrote General Sherman to his brother, April 11, "we have less sense even than the Mexicans, paying fabulous bounties for a parcel of boys and old men, and swelling our muster rolls, but adding nothing to our real fighting strength."³ The mischief promoted by substitute brokers and bounty-jumping was seen at its worst in the large cities of the East, where it brought into the ranks a number of criminals, bullies, and vagrants; and as these came to be guarded as prisoners, many of them reached

pillage, resort being had to hocusing with narcotic poisons, threats, violence, false representations, and kidnapping in order to furnish victims to the bounty brokers and fill up the army with discontented and unfit men. Cripples, old men, mere boys, men laboring under incurable diseases and soldiers previously discharged for physical disability, form a great part of the recruits recently enlisted in this city."—*N. Y. Tribune*, Feb. 16. See also report of Assistant Provost-Marshall-General of Illinois, p. 28.

¹ P. 153; also *Reminiscences*, J. D. Cox, MS.

² Appleton's *Ann. Cyc.*, 1864, p. 37; see *Recollections of a Private Soldier*, Wilkeson, chap. i.

Sherman Letters, p. 227; see, also, p. 226.

the front.¹ Yet not a large proportion of the recruits of 1864 were these social outcasts. In the country districts, villages, and smaller cities, the business ability of citizens who engaged voluntarily in the work of filling the respective quotas was brought to bear, with the result that attention was paid to the character of the men offering to serve;² and while the enlisted men were inferior physically, morally, and intellectually, to those who had gone into the ranks in 1861 and 1862, and were in great part mercenaries, they were to a considerable extent made up of sturdy men from Canada, and brawny immigrants continually arriving from Europe, who were tempted by the high wage offered for military service. Although the rank and file were deteriorating, the process of weeding out political generals, and those appointed to the lower commands by influence rather than by merit, left their places open to the better officers, who had further improved by the lessons of experience. "I will see," wrote General Sherman to his brother, April 5, "that by May 1st I have on the Tennessee one of the best armies in the world."³ The result of his campaign bore full testimony to the truth of this prophecy. Best of all, the North had developed four great generals, Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan, and in leaders was now superior to the South. In the death-grapple, as the story will tell, Grant was matched against Lee, Sherman against Joseph E. Johnston, who had succeeded Bragg; and, except Lee and Johnston, no one in the Confederacy showed the same ability in the command of an independent army as Thomas, and no one else proved the equal of Sheridan, whose peculiar prowess must have made Lee many times regret bitterly the loss of Stonewall Jackson.

¹ See *Recollections of a Private Soldier*, Wilkeson, chap. i.

² Even in New York City an improvement was noted by the *Tribune* of Feb. 29: "Volunteering continues very brisk, Mr. Blunt having paid the bounty, on Saturday, to 265 men, most of whom were new recruits. The class of men now offering is very good, and many of them come from the interior of this, and from other States."

³ Sherman Letters, p. 226.

"In a military point of view, thank Heaven!" Motley wrote, "the 'coming man,' for whom we have so long been waiting, seems really to have come."¹ Exactly so, thought the President, Congress, and the people. By an act of February 29, Congress revived the grade of Lieutenant-General, and authorized the President to place the General, whom he should so appoint, in command of the armies of the United States under his direction and during his pleasure. It was understood on all sides that the man whom the nation's representatives desired to honor and upon whom they wished to devolve the burden of military affairs was Grant. This action fell in with the ideas of Lincoln. From the first he would have been glad to have some general on whom he could rely, on whom he could throw the responsibility of military operations. Scott failed him, on account of the infirmities of age; McClellan lacked the requisite ability; and Halleck, who was likewise deficient, shrunk from the burden after the disaster to Pope, and became merely the President's chief-of-staff.² It was a welcome function for him to send to the Senate at once the nomination of Grant as Lieutenant-General. It was immediately confirmed.

Grant received orders from the department to report at Washington, and the day that he left Nashville to assume his new duties he wrote General Sherman a private letter, which brings into view the sublime friendship between these two soldiers, always marked by consideration and loyalty, and never to be alloyed with jealousy on the one side or envy on the other. Thus he wrote to his bosom companion-in-arms: "While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of

¹ Dec. 29, 1863, Letters, vol. ii. p. 146.

² Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 122; Horace Porter, *Century Magazine*, Nov. 1896, p. 29; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 335; John Sherman in the Senate, Feb. 24.

those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as *the men* to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction. The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also.”¹

Sherman replied: “You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. . . . You are now Washington’s legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large share for securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability. I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you. Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which I have followed ever since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is the simple faith in success you have always manifested,

¹ March 4, Sherman Memoirs, vol. i. p. 399.

which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his Saviour. This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts, no reserve; and I tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew wherever I was you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you would come—if alive. My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but I confess your common-sense seems to have supplied all this. Now, as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley; let us make it dead sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slope and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk! We have done much; still much remains to be done. Time and time's influences are all with us; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work. Even in the seceded States your word now would go further than a President's proclamation or an act of Congress. For God's sake, and for your country's sake, come out of Washington! I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic."¹

Arriving in Washington, Grant met Lincoln for the first time at a crowded reception at the White House.² An appointment between the two was made for the next day,³ when, in the presence of the Cabinet, General Halleck, and a few others, the President said: "General Grant, the nation's

¹ Sherman Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 399, 400.

² Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 340; H. Porter, *Century Magazine*, Nov. 1896, p. 26.

³ March 9.

appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence."¹

Grant replied: "Mr. President, I accept this commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."²

The next day Grant was formally assigned to the command of the armies of the United States.³ Until his visit to Washington he had the intention of remaining in the West, but he now saw that his place was with the Army of the Potomac. He went to the front, and had a conference with Meade, at which, after an interchange of views creditable to both, he decided that Meade should retain his present command. He then went to Nashville, and discussed with Sherman, who succeeded him as chief of the Western army, the plan of operations in Tennessee and Georgia, returning, March 23, to Washington.⁴ He was now by all odds the most popular man in the United States.⁵ Both parties and all factions vied

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 341.

² *Ibid.*, p. 342.

³ March 10, O. R., vol. xxxiii. p. 663; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 494.

⁴ Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 118; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. pp. 345, 346.

⁵ John Sherman, in a letter to his brother, March 26, gives an account of the homage paid Grant in Washington. "General Grant is all the rage. He is subjected to the disgusting but dangerous process of being lionized.

with one another in his praise. He had met with obstacles in working up to the present position, which was the meed of his genius and character, and had suffered many hours of pain at the obloquy with which he had been pursued. But Vicksburg and Chattanooga were victories the cumulative force of which not only bore down all detraction, but raised the general who won them to a height of glory. It falls to few men of action to receive in their lifetime such plaudits, with hardly a murmur, with scarcely a grudge, as fell to the happy lot of Grant in the winter and early spring of 1864. His modest bearing and unaffected demeanor induced respect for his character, as his great deeds had won admiration for his military genius. Striking, indeed, is it to one who immerses himself in the writings of the time to contrast this almost universal applause of Grant with the abuse of Lincoln by the Democrats, the caustic criticism of him by some of the radical Republicans, the damning him with faint praise by others of the same faction.

Grant had the charm of simplicity of character, and in common with Lincoln he possessed the sentiment that he was one of the plain people, and would fain keep in touch with them. The two furnished, in this respect, a pattern for the great men of a democracy which is constituted of educated and moral persons. But he lacked the external manners, the aloofness of person, the quality of being niggard of his time,

He is followed by crowds, and is cheered everywhere. While he must despise the fickle fools who run after him, he, like most others, may be spoiled by this excess of flattery. He may be so elated as to forget the uncertain tenure upon which he holds and stakes his really well-earned laurels. . . . The opinion I form of him from his appearance is this, — his will and common-sense are the strongest features of his character. He is plain and modest, and so far bears himself well." — Letters, p. 224. General Sherman replied, April 5: "Grant is as good a leader as we can find. He has honesty, simplicity of character, singleness of purpose, and no hope or claim to usurp civil power. His character, more than his genius, will reconcile armies and attach the people. Let him alone. Don't disgust him by flattery or importunity. Let him alone. . . . If bothered, hampered, or embarrassed, he would drop you all in disgust, and let you slide into anarchy." — Ibid., p. 225.

the dignity of bearing that should go with the commander of over half a million of soldiers¹ to whom the nation looked for its salvation. Richard H. Dana, with that power of seeing things keenly, and describing them vividly, which he had exhibited in his early life in the story of "Two Years before the Mast," shows us Grant as he beheld him before he left finally for the field, when his mind was engrossed with the great plans of the campaign. Dana had arrived at Willard's Hotel, Washington, and had gone to the office to inquire for his luggage, when, as he tells the story, "a short, round-shouldered man, in a very tarnished major-general's uniform came up, and asked about his card for General Dana, which led me to look at him. There was nothing marked in his appearance. He had no gait, no *station*, no manner, rough, light-brown whiskers, a blue eye, and rather a scrubby look withal. A crowd formed round him; men looked, stared at him, as if they were taking his likeness, and two generals were introduced. Still, I could not get his name. It was not Hooker. Who could it be? He had a cigar in his mouth, and rather the look of a man who did, or once did, take a little too much to drink. I inquired of the book-keeper. 'That is General Grant.' I joined the starers. I saw that the ordinary, scrubby-looking man, with a slightly seedy look, as if he was out of office and on half pay, and nothing to do but hang round the entry of Willard's, cigar in mouth, had a clear blue eye, and a look of resolution, as if he could not be trifled with, and an entire indifference to the crowd about him. Straight nose, too. Still, to see him talking and smoking in the lower entry of Willard's, in that crowd, in such times, — the generalissimo of our armies, on whom the destiny of the empire seemed to hang!"²

The next morning Dana, having met Grant at breakfast, thus completes his account: "He was just leaving the table,

¹ I take the figures of H. Porter, *Century Magazine*, Nov. 1896, p. 2nd; see Phisterer, p. 62.

² Private letter of April 21, Adams's Dana, vol. ii. p. 271.

and going to the front for the great movement. I said, 'I suppose, General, you don't mean to breakfast again until the war is over.' 'Not here, I sha'n't.' He gets over the ground queerly. He does not march, nor quite walk, but pitches along as if the next step would bring him on his nose. But his face looks firm and hard, and his eye is clear and resolute, and he is certainly natural, and clear of all appearance of self-consciousness. How war, how all great crises, bring us to the one-man power!"¹

I have now brought the story down to the last year of the war, and from this time onward I shall treat military affairs only in a general way. "It was not till after both Gettysburg and Vicksburg," wrote General Sherman, "that the war professionally began."² In 1864 and 1865 the campaigns and the battles were, as in the previous years, the events on which all else depended; but now that the President and generals had learned well the lessons of war, and began to conduct it with professional skill, there is a measure of justification for the writer who prefers henceforward to dwell upon the political and social side of the conflict to the dwarfing of the military picture.³

The details of Grant's plan need not concern us. The two salient features of it are simple and of the utmost importance; they were the destruction or capture of Lee's army by him-

¹ Adams's Dana, vol. ii. p. 272.

² W. T. Sherman wrote R. N. Scott, Sept. 6, 1885: "I contend and have contended with European officers of world-wide fame that the military profession of America was not responsible for the loose preliminary operations of 1862, and that it was not till after both Gettysburg and Vicksburg that the war professionally began. Then our men had learned in the dearest school of earth the simple lesson of war. Then we had brigades, divisions, and corps which could be handled professionally, and it was then that we as professional soldiers could rightfully be held to a just responsibility." — *North Amer. Rev.*, March, 1886, p. 302.

³ The large number of excellent works on the war by military critics is well known. Ropes's *Story of the Civil War*, which by the publication of part ii. in 1899 is brought to the close of 1862, is concise, and will be found interesting by the general reader.

self and his force of 122,000 men, and the crushing of Joseph E. Johnston by Sherman with his army of 100,000.¹ From the nature of the situation a second objective point in the one case was Richmond, in the other, Atlanta. The winter and early spring had been spent largely in systematic and effective preparation. The confidence of the people in Grant was so great that many were sanguine that the war would be over by midsummer.²

On the night of May 3 the Army of the Potomac began its advance by crossing the Rapidan without molestation, and encamping the next day in the Wilderness, where one year before Hooker had come to grief. Grant had no desire to fight a battle in this tangled jungle; but Lee, who had watched him intently, permitted him to traverse the river unopposed, thinking that, when he halted in the dense thicket, every inch of which was known to the Confederate general and soldiers, the Lord had delivered him into their hands. Lee ordered at once the concentration of his army, and with Napoleonic swiftness marched forward to dispute the advance of his enemy. May 5 the forces came together in the Wilderness, and a hot battle raged. The Confederates were in number only half of the Union troops,³ but the difficulties of the battle-ground which their leader had chosen, their better topographical knowledge, the circumstance that the superior Federal artillery could be little used made it an equal contest, neither side gaining the advantage.

Grant perceived that he must fight his way through the Wilderness, and prepared to take the offensive the next day; but Lee had likewise determined on attack. Both desiring the initiative, the battle was on at an early hour. It pro-

¹ For the size of the armies, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 352, vol. ix. p. 2.

² See *N. Y. Tribune*, March 16, 18, *World*, March 29, *Independent*, Feb. 18, and letter of H. Greeley, *ibid.*, Feb. 25; *Life of Seward*, vol. iii. p. 209; *Gray's Letters*, vol. ii. p. 517; Greeley's *Amer. Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 654.

³ The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65, Humphreys, p. 17; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 352.

gressed with varying fortune, each force gaining successes at different moments, and at different parts of the line. At one time the Confederate right wing was driven back, and disaster seemed imminent, when Longstreet came up and saved the day. A Texas brigade of Longstreet's corps went forward to the charge, and Lee, who like his exemplar Washington was an eager warrior, and loved the noise and excitement of battle, spurred onward his horse, and, intensely anxious for the result, started to follow the Texans as they advanced in regular order. He was recognized, and from the entire line came the cry, "Go back, General Lee! go back!"¹ This movement of the Confederates was stopped by the wounding of Longstreet by a shot from his own men, an accident similar to that by which Stonewall Jackson one year before had received his mortal hurt.²

The fighting of these two days is called the Battle of the Wilderness. Both generals claimed the advantage; both were disappointed in the result. Grant, who had expected that the passage of the Rapidan and the turning of the right of the Confederates would compel them to fall back, had hoped to march through the Wilderness unopposed, fight them in more open country, and inflict upon them a heavy blow. Lee, in no way daunted because Grant had taken command in person of the Army of the Potomac, thought, undoubtedly, that his victories in the West had been due more to the lack of skill of his opponents than to able generalship, and had hoped to beat Grant as he had beaten McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, drive him back across the Rapidan, and constrain him, like his predecessors, to abandon his campaign. Measured by casualties, the Confederates came the nearer to victory. The Union loss was 17,666;³ that of the Confederates was certainly less, although an accurate report of it is lack-

¹ Life of Lee, Long, p. 330; do. Fitzhugh Lee, p. 331; Taylor's Four Years, p. 127.

² Longstreet was not able to resume active duty until October. — From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 574.

³ Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 182.

ing. It is stated as half, and, again, as nearly two-thirds of that of the Federals.¹ The Army of the Potomac had the death of the brave General Wadsworth to deplore.

May 7 neither general showed a disposition to attack. Grant decided to continue the movement by the left, and march by night to Spotsylvania Court House. His army started without knowing whether or not it had been beaten, but aware of the great slaughter; and when they came to the parting of the ways, the question in all minds arose, would the orders be to turn northward and recross the river? The columns filed to the right, the faces of the men were set towards Richmond, and Grant, in their estimation, was exalted. The soldiers sang and stepped forward with elastic tread. "The spirits of men and officers are of the highest pitch of animation," was the word which Dana sent Stanton.² Grant rode by, and in spite of the darkness was recognized. The men burst out into cheers, swung their hats, clapped their hands, threw up their arms, and greeted their general as a comrade. They were glad that he was leading them onward to Richmond instead of ordering them to fall back to the camp which they had just abandoned.³

The Confederate soldiers, believing in their invincibility on their own soil, thought that Grant, like the other Federal generals, would give it up and fall back; and Lee at one time held the opinion that he was retiring on Fredericksburg.⁴ But the Confederate general was too sagacious to base his entire action on one supposition, and, surmising that Grant might move to Spotsylvania, he sent thither part of his force, which, having the shorter and easier line of march, reached there first, and took position across the path of the Union

¹ Fitzhugh Lee, p. 332; Humphreys, p. 54.

² O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 64.

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 372; H. Porter, *Century Magazine*, Jan. 1897, p. 347; Wilkeson, *Recollections of a Private*, p. 80; Grant's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 210.

⁴ G. C. Eggleston, *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 230, *A Rebel's Recollections*, p. 236; O. R., vol. xxxvi. part ii. p. 974.

army. The armies coming in contact, there were several days of fighting; at times raging and bloody battles, again naught but skirmishing and the firing of sharpshooters. It was on a day of this desultory work when Sedgwick, the commander of the Sixth Corps, fell. He was mourned by both friend and foe.¹ May 11 Grant sent his celebrated despatch to Halleck. "We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. . . . I . . . propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."² After the furious battle the next day at the Salient — "the bloody angle" — there was a lull, due principally to the heavy and constant rains, which made the roads deep with mud and impassable. It is true, however, that the Union army needed rest, and that Grant was desirous of reinforcements to fill the gaps in his ranks caused by his heavy losses. In these battles at Spotsylvania he was almost invariably the attacking party; he assailed in front the Confederates, whose intrenchments, defended by rifled muskets and by artillery throughout, quadrupled their strength. It is said that the hurling of his men against Lee in chosen and fortified positions was unnecessary, as the roads in number and in direction lent themselves to the operation of turning either flank of the Confederate army.³ "To assault 'all along the line,' " writes General Walker, "as was so often done in the summer of 1864, is the very abdication of leadership."⁴ But Grant was essentially an aggressive soldier, and an important feature of his plan of operations was, as he himself has stated it, "to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources until by mere attrition, if in no other way," the South should be subdued.⁵ Circum-

¹ See *Life of Lee*, Fitzhugh Lee, p. 334.

² O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 4. The battles in the Wilderness as well as those at Spotsylvania are counted in this summing up.

³ Humphreys, pp. 71, 75.

⁴ *Life of Hancock*, p. 193. "Præsertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio." — Cæsar, *De Bello Civili*, Comm. I. cap. lxxii.

⁵ Report of July 22, 1865, O. R. vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 13. The comment of

stances similar to the one which occurred in the Wilderness are to be noted. On May 10, and again on the 12th, at the fight at the "bloody angle," when the Confederates were on the verge of disaster, Lee rode to the head of a column, intending to lead a charge which he deemed might be necessary to save the day. On both occasions the soldiers refused to advance unless their general should go to the rear.¹ Lee did not court danger, and was apparently reckless in the one case only after his lines had been broken, and in the other when the struggle for the Salient demanded the utmost from general and men. It is worthy of record that such incidents in the life of Lee did not take place until Grant came to direct the movements of the Army of the Potomac.

May 18 Grant attacked again, but failed to carry the Confederate intrenchments. On the next day a part of Lee's force in making a demonstration was met and repulsed. Several days later Grant crossed the North Anna River. Lee, concentrating his troops, interposed them between the two wings of the Union army, which were widely separated, and could reinforce neither the other without passing over the river twice. "Grant," write Nicolay and Hay, "was completely checkmated."² Lee begrudged every step Grant took towards Richmond, and had planned now to assume the offensive, when he fell ill. He declared impatiently on his sick-bed in his tent, "We must strike them, we must never let them pass us again;"³ but before he had recovered sufficiently to take personal charge of an attack, Grant, "finding the enemy's posi-

General Sherman in a despatch to Stanton from Kingston, Ga., is interesting. "If General Grant," he said, "can sustain the confidence, the esprit, the pluck of his army, and impress the Virginians with the knowledge that the Yankees can and will fight them fair and square, he will do more good than to capture Richmond or any strategic advantage. This moral result must precede all mere advantages of strategic movements, and this is what Grant is doing. Out here the enemy knows we can and will fight like the devil, therefore he manoeuvres for advantage of ground." — O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 294.

¹ Life of Lee, Long, pp. 338, 341; do. Fitzhugh Lee, p. 336.

² Vol. viii. p. 389.

³ Fitzhugh Lee, p. 339.

tion on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones,"¹ withdrew, unmolested, to the north bank of the river. Meanwhile Butler, with an army, was moving up the James River, and, taking the Confederates by surprise, occupied, without opposition, City Point and Bermuda Hundred. It was in the chances that a skilful and daring general might have captured Petersburg or Richmond. Butler was neither, and dallied while Beauregard energetically gathered together the loose forces in North and South Carolina, and brought them to the defence of the two places. The result of his operations is thus accurately related by Grant: "His [Butler's] army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked."²

Marching forward, and fighting on the way, Grant, by June 2, had gone a considerable distance farther south, had reached the ground which one wing of McClellan's army had occupied in May and June, 1862, and was in position near the scene of Fitz John Porter's gallant fight of Gaines's Mill, almost in sight of the spires of the Confederate capital. Lee, about six miles from the exterior fortifications of Richmond, held a position naturally strong, which by intrenchments he had made practically impregnable. Flanking movements being apparently at an end, Grant, with unjustifiable precipitation, ordered an assault in front.³ This was made at 4.30 in the morning of June 3, and constituted the Battle of Cold Harbor, the greatest blemish on his reputation as a general. The order having at first been given for the attack on the afternoon of the 2d, and then postponed for the morrow, officers and men had a chance to chew upon it,

¹ O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 21.

² Report, July 22, 1865, *ibid.*, p. 20. The expressive phrase was Barnard's. It was seized upon by the public as an excellent statement of Butler's military incapacity, and its wide dissemination caused Grant annoyance afterwards. See *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 152.

³ "Never attack in front a position which admits of being turned." — *Military Maxims of Napoleon* (N. Y. 1845), p. 17.

and both knew that the undertaking was hopeless. Horace Porter, an aide-de-camp of Grant, relates that when walking among the troops on staff duty the evening before the battle, he noticed many soldiers of one of the regiments designated for the assault pinning on the backs of their coats slips of paper on which were written their names and home addresses, so that their dead bodies might be recognized on the field, and their fate be known to their families at the North.¹

The soldiers sprang promptly to the assault. The history of Hancock's corps, the Second, is an epitome of the action. In about twenty-two minutes its repulse was complete.² It had "lost over 3000 of its bravest and best, both of officers and men."³ The true story of the day is told by General Lee: At one part of the Confederate line the Federals were "repulsed without difficulty;" at another, having penetrated a salient, they were driven out "with severe loss," at still another their "repeated attacks . . . were met with great steadiness and repulsed in every instance. The attack extended to our extreme left . . . with like results." Thus he concluded his despatch: "Our loss to-day has been small, and our success, under the blessing of God, all that we could expect."⁴ The casualties in the Union army were probably 7000.⁵ Grant at that time regretted the attack,⁶ as he did also near the close of his life, when he gave expression to his perpetual regret in his Personal Memoirs. "No advantage whatever," he added, "was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained."⁷ After the Battle of Cold Harbor

¹ *Century Magazine*, March, 1897, p. 720; see *Recollections of a Private*, Wilkeson, p. 128.

² *Life of Hancock*, Walker, p. 222.

³ *Memoranda of 2d Corps*, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 367.

⁴ *Ibid.*, part iii. p. 869.

⁵ H. Porter, *Century Magazine*, March, 1897, p. 722; see also Humphreys, p. 182; *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 187.

⁶ *Century Magazine*, March, 1897, p. 722; *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 229. But in a later expression of opinion Grant does not appear to advantage. — *Ibid.*

⁷ Vol. ii. p. 276; also, J. R. Young, vol. ii. p. 304.

he determined to move his army south of the James, and June 12 took up his march, the advance corps reaching the river on the next night.

The loss of Grant from May 4 to June 12 in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James was 54,929,¹ a number nearly equal to Lee's whole army at the commencement of the Union advance; that of the Confederates is not known, but it was certainly very much less. Nor do the bare figures tell the whole story. Of this enormous loss the flower of the Army of the Potomac contributed a disproportionate share. Fighting against such odds of position and strategy, the high-spirited and capable officers were in the thick of danger, and of the rank and file the veterans were always at the front: they were the forlorn hope. The bounty-jumpers and mercenaries skulked to the rear. The morale of the soldiers was much lower than on the day when, in high spirits, they had crossed the Rapidan. The confidence in Grant of many officers and of most of the men had been shaken.

In the judgment of many military critics, Grant had not been equal to his opportunities, had not made the best use of his advantages, and had secured no gain commensurate with his loss. Yet the friends of McClellan who maintain that because McClellan reached the same ground near Richmond with comparatively little sacrifice of life, his campaign had the greater merit, miss the main point of the situation, that the incessant hammering of Lee's army was a necessary concomitant of success. They attach to the capture of the Confederate capital the subjugation of the South, ignoring that Grant was supremely right in making Lee's army his first objective and Richmond only his second. His strategy was superior to McClellan's in that he grasped the aim of the war, and resolutely and grimly stuck to his purpose in spite of defeats and losses which would have dismayed any but the stoutest soul; and criticism of him is not sound unless it

¹ Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 182. The loss in Butler's Army of the James was 6215.

proves, as perhaps it does, that there might have been the same persistent fighting of the Army of Northern Virginia without so great a slaughter of Northern soldiers. The case is certainly stronger for Grant if we compare his work even thus far with the operations of Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. As for Meade, his name is so gratefully associated with the magnificent victory of Gettysburg that our judgment leans in his favor, and would fain rate at the highest his achievements; but it is difficult to see aught that he did afterwards in independent command towards bringing the war to a close. If the narrative be anticipated, and the comparison be made of Grant's total losses to the day on which he received the surrender of Lee's army, with the combined losses of the rest of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac, the result arrived at is that his aggregate was less than theirs,¹ and his was the great achievement. The military literature of the South directly and by implication breathes a constant tribute to the effectiveness of his plan and his execution of it. It must not, however, be forgotten that McClellan and Meade had weakened in some measure the power of resistance of the Army of Northern Virginia.²

Sherman, whose headquarters had been at Chattanooga, began his advance on May 6. He was at the head of three armies: the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and aggregating 99,000 men. Joseph E. Johnston was at

¹ See J. W. Kirkley's computation, *Army and Navy Journal*, March 20, 1897; also, *McClure's Magazine*, May, 1898, p. 34.

² My authorities for this account are the correspondence and reports in O. R., vol. xxxvi. parts i., ii., iii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii.; Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of 1864-65*; *Life of Lee*, Long; do. *Fitzhugh Lee*; Taylor's *Lee*; Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Gen. Grant*, *Century Magazine*, 1896-97; Charles A. Dana's *Reminiscences*, *McClure's Magazine*, May, 1898; *Century War Book*, vol. iv.; *Life of Hancock*, Walker; W. F. Smith, *From Chattanooga to Petersburg*; *Butler's Book*; *Recollections of a Private Soldier*, Wilkeson; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*; George Cary Eggleston's *Recollections of a Rebel*.

Dalton, Georgia, strongly intrenched with a force of 53,000.¹ The campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, which now commenced, is remarkable for the vigor and pertinacity of the attack, the skill and obstinacy of the defence. Two giants met. The greater numbers of Sherman corresponded merely to the nature of his work. In the invasion of an enemy's country, with a constantly lengthening line of supply and a resulting diminution of force by detachments to protect it, an army twice as great as the resistant was necessary to accomplish the object of the campaign, which was the destruction or surrender of the opposing host. Johnston had not as able lieutenants as Sherman, and did not win from them as great a measure of devotion, nor had he in other respects a personnel equal to that of the Union commander, whose army, moreover, had derived confidence for the future from its victory at Chattanooga. But, taking everything into consideration, the conditions of the contest were nearly even. Sherman's work became easier, as will be seen, when he had as antagonist a commander of inferior parts. On the other hand, it cannot be maintained with show of reason that Johnston could have been driven constantly and steadily southward, from position to position, by a general who did not possess a high order of ability. The more one studies this inch-by-inch struggle, the better will one realize that in the direction and supply of each of these brute forces there was a master mind, with the best of professional training, with the profit of three years of warfare. The strife between the two was characterized by honor, as has been that of all noble spirits since Homer's time, who have fought to the end. Either would have regarded the killing of the other as a happy fortune of war, though, indeed, he might have apostrophized his dead body as did Mark Antony that of Brutus;² yet twenty-seven years

¹ Maj. E. C. Dawes, *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 281. This number is variously given. I have preferred to follow Dawes, who has studied the subject with care. I think the same manner of computation which makes Sherman's force 98,797, will ascribe to Johnston 52,992.

² *Julius Cæsar*, act v. scene 5.

later, when the victor in this campaign had succumbed to death, the magnanimous Johnston, though aged and feeble, travelled from Washington to New York to act as a pall-bearer and to grieve as a sincere mourner at his funeral.¹

The position of the Confederates at Dalton was too strong to justify an assault in front, and must therefore be turned. Sherman sent McPherson through Snake Creek Gap against Resaca, while Thomas and Schofield pressed Johnston's front. Somewhat later, with all of his army but one corps and some cavalry, he followed McPherson. This caused Johnston to evacuate Dalton on the night of May 12, and concentrate his army in front of the Union troops at Resaca. On the 14th there was fighting, and the afternoon and evening of the next day "a heavy battle."² "We intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied," telegraphed Sherman, "and I hope he will not attempt to escape. If he does, my bridges are down, and we will be after him."³ Meanwhile he had sent a division across the Oostanaula River to throw up intrenchments. The position of the Confederates becoming untenable, they withdrew from Resaca the night of May 15, crossed the river, and burned the railroad bridge behind them.

Sherman, however, was untiring in his pursuit. May 20 he was able to send this report: "I am in possession of Rome, Kingston, and Cassville, with the line of Etowah. . . . We have fought all the way from Resaca. I think Johnston is now at Allatoona. Railroads and telegraphs are repaired up to our army, and all are in good condition and spirits."⁴ The day previous, when at Cassville, Johnston had determined to accept battle and had issued an address to his soldiers, saying: "By your courage and skill you have repulsed every assault of the enemy. By marches by day and by

¹ Sherman died Feb. 14, 1891; Johnston five weeks later, of heart failure aggravated by a cold taken at the funeral of Sherman.

² O. R., vol. xxxviii. part i. p. 64.

³ May 15, *ibid.*, part iv. p. 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

marches by night you have defeated every attempt upon your communications. Your communications are secured. You will now turn and march to meet his advancing columns.”¹ But that evening he ascertained in conference that two of his corps commanders did not approve his plan, and without their full sympathetic support he did not deem it wise to risk a battle with a force so much his superior.² He therefore gave the order to retreat south of the Etowah River. He was right in wishing to try the fortune of war at this time in this comparatively open country, for in his retreat he had been picking up detachments, while Sherman, from the necessity of protecting the railroad in his rear, his only line of supply, had diminished his numbers for fighting, and the two armies, both of which had received reinforcements, were more nearly equal than at any other time during the campaign.³ Sherman had ever been eager for a battle since he began his advance, and this eagerness was shared by his men. The continual avoidance of it by Johnston when it was constantly offered increased their confidence, which had been high from the outset, and they went forward sure of victory and enduring with patience the privations and hardships of the march. All this while news of the operations in Virginia was furnished to both armies, the one hearing of Union victories in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania, the other that “Lee has whipped Grant” and “General Lee beat Grant again.”⁴

Arrived at Kingston, Sherman gave his army a few days of rest. He thus wrote, May 23: “I am already within fifty miles of Atlanta, and have added one hundred miles to my railroad communications, every mile of which is liable to attack by

¹ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 728.

² Johnston's Narrative, p. 323; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 40.

³ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 274, 725; J. D. Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 63; Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 281.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 110, 172, 682, 683. Lieut.-Col. C. F. Morse of the 2d Mass., who had been with the Army of the Potomac until the autumn of 1863 and who was now in Hooker's corps, Thomas's army, wrote, May 20: “The news from Virginia is grand, but the details terrible.” — Letters privately printed, p. 166.

cavalry.”¹ This despatch gives some idea of the labor attending the invasion of the enemy's territory. Men needed not only marching and fighting qualities, but the temper to endure without grievous murmurs the deprivation of many creature comforts of ordinary army life. The baggage and tents had mainly been left behind,² and a tent fly was the shelter for brigade and division headquarters; but the food, consisting of meat, bread, coffee, and sugar, was good and in plentiful supply.³ All the supplies came over the single line of railroad running from Chattanooga to Atlanta, of which the track was torn up, and the bridges burned by the Confederates, as they retreated. But the engineer corps in charge of the railway repairs was skilful and energetic, renewing bridges as if by magic, to the wonder of Johnston's men, who, under the illusion that their destroying work would cause great delays, were startled to hear the whistle of the locomotive bringing up the supply trains in the rear of the Union army.⁴

¹ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 294. From Kingston he wrote his brother, May 20: "I will make for Atlanta, 59 miles from here and about 50 from the advance." — Sherman Letters, p. 235. The distances by rail are, Chattanooga to Kingston, 80; Kingston to Atlanta, 58.

² For the exception see O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 507.

³ Morse wrote home, June 9: "We don't indulge ourselves now in any irregularities of diet, but stick consistently to our pork and hardtack moistened with coffee. Most of us probably eat about a third as much in weight as if we were at home doing nothing. Still, I have never felt in better health in my life, and feel strong and fit for work, notwithstanding the hot sun." — Letters privately printed, p. 169.

⁴ This subject is well treated by Gen. J. D. Cox, *Atlanta*, chap. vii.; see Sherman Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 22. Sherman wrote his brother, June 9: "My long and single line of railroad to my rear, of limited capacity, is the delicate point of my game, as also the fact that all of Georgia, except the cleared bottoms, is densely wooded, with few roads, and at any point an enterprising enemy can, in a few hours, with axes and spades, make across our path formidable works, whilst his sharpshooters, spies, and scouts in the guise of peaceable farmers can hang around us and kill our wagon men, messengers, and couriers. It is a big Indian war; still thus far I have won four strong positions, advanced a hundred miles, and am in possession of a large wheat-growing region and all the iron mines and works of Georgia." — Letters, p. 236.

At Kingston Sherman was in a country which, as a lieutenant of artillery, he had ridden over on horseback twenty years before. Knowing from his youthful impressions¹ that Johnston's position at Allatoona Pass was very strong and would be hard to force,² he formed the design of turning it, and to that end left the railroad on May 25, made a circuit to the right, and brought on the hard battle of New Hope Church, accomplishing his object, so that when he returned to the railroad he occupied it from Allatoona to Big Shanty in sight of Kenesaw Mountain. The story from June 13 to the 23d is well told by Sherman in his contemporaneous despatches, brief extracts from which will answer our general purpose. June 13 he wrote: "We have had hard and cold rains for about ten days. . . . The roads are insufficient here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As soon as possible I will study Johnston's position on the Kenesaw and Lost Mountains, and adopt some plan to dislodge him or draw him out of his position. We cannot risk the heavy losses of an assault at this distance from our base." June 15: "We killed Bishop Polk³ yesterday, and have made good progress to-day. . . . General Grant may rest easy that Joe Johnston will not trouble him if I can help it by labor or thought." "Losses to-day very small, it having been one grand skirmish, extending along a front of eight miles." June 17: "By last night we had worked so close to Johnston's centre that he saw that the assault must follow. He declined it, and abandoned Lost Mountain, and some six miles of as good field-works as I ever saw." June 23: "We continue to press forward, operating on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have full fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. . . . Our lines are now

¹ "Der Mensch kann seine Jugendeindrücke nicht los werden." — Goethe, *Gespräche von Eckermann*, 12 April, 1829.

² Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 42.

³ Polk had the rank of Lieutenant-General.

in close contact, and the fighting incessant with a good deal of artillery. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, notwithstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear, supplies are ample."¹

For some reason Sherman now disregarded his determination of June 13,² and resolved to make an assault in front on Johnston's almost impregnable position at Kenesaw Mountain,³ an operation which is admittedly a flaw in this otherwise well-conceived and admirably executed campaign. It is a tradition in the Army of the Cumberland that it was a spasmodic decision adopted in a state of excited restlessness, but if this were so it did not preclude a careful preparation for the attack. June 24 Sherman issued the orders for it,⁴ and the onslaught was not made until eight o'clock in the morning three days later. The veteran soldiers entered upon the assault with great courage, but, soon discovering that one rifle in the trench was worth five in front of it,⁵ they demonstrated that the works could not be carried except by an immense sacrifice of life; and with the consent of the division and corps commanders, they abandoned the attempt. Sherman's loss was nearly 3000,⁶ Johnston's 800.⁷ In his report two months and one half later, Sherman justified the assault, saying, "Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that

¹ All these despatches are from Big Shanty. — O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 466, 480, 481, 498, 572, 573.

² See *ibid.*, p. 466; also that of June 5, *ibid.*, p. 408.

³ Morse spoke of it, June 24, as a "line so strong that if decently well held I don't think it could be carried by assault by the best infantry in the world." — Letters privately printed, p. 171.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 582, 588.

⁵ Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 129.

⁶ Report, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part i. p. 69.

⁷ Johnston's Narrative, p. 343.

boldly.”¹ Thomas had no liking for such a method of operation, deeming it a useless sacrifice of men, and, after giving Sherman the information that he had called for that afternoon, added: “We have already lost heavily to-day without gaining any material advantage; one or two more such assaults would use up this army.” Sherman replied: “Our loss is small compared with some of those East. It should not in the least discourage us. At times assaults are necessary and inevitable.” In a later communication he asked, “Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad?” Thomas answered quickly, “If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.”² Sherman then made a flank movement, causing Johnston to relax his hold of Kenesaw. July 4 he had “a noisy but not a desperate battle;”³ and still pushing the Confederates, he compelled them, by July 9, to retreat across the Chattahoochee River, leaving him in full possession of its north and west banks, and in sight of Atlanta. The loss of the Union army during the months of May and June was 16,800; that of the Confederate 14,500.⁴

The allusion to the correspondence between Sherman and Thomas the day of the Battle of Kenesaw Mountain affords an inkling of the difference between their characters and their modes of operation. June 18 Sherman wrote Grant: “My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a ploughed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it

¹ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 69. See his earlier defence, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 24.

² This correspondence is June 27, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. pp. 610, 611, 612.

³ Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 66.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 47, 63; Johnston's Narrative, pp. 325, 576.

seems that the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads."¹ On proposing the movement to Fulton, he relates, "General Thomas, as usual, shook his head."² On the other hand, the officers of the Army of the Cumberland for the most part believed that Sherman's restlessness and impetuosity, which had got them into trouble at Kenesaw, would have led them to other disasters had he not been restrained by the discretion and prudence of Thomas. In this controversy the layman may not venture a decision, and since the campaign was successful to the point which the story has reached, and eminently so to the end of it, he would like to believe that the differing gifts of Sherman and Thomas wrought together to advantage, and that they accomplished in their union, jarring though it was at times, what neither one alone would have done so completely and so well.³

Not alone with military campaigns has the story of 1864 to occupy itself: it must take into account the political campaign, the nomination and the election of a President. The important question was whether Lincoln should succeed himself, and this could not be kept in abeyance even during the preceding year. He was, in a measure, held responsible for the military failures of the summer of 1862, for the disaster of Fredericksburg in December, for that of Chancellorsville in May, 1863, with the result that many came to doubt whether he had the requisite ability and decision to carry on the great undertaking. But he came in for a share of the glory of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and from that time forward his political position became greatly strengthened. Yet

¹ O. R., vol. xxxviii. part iv. p. 507.

² *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 61.

³ My authorities for this account are the reports and correspondence in O. R., vol. xxxviii. parts i. and iv.; J. D. Cox, *Atlanta*; Sherman's *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; Johnston's *Narrative*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix.; *Century War Book*, vol. iv.; *Life of Thomas*, Van Horne.

the disaffection had been strong enough to seek a head, and had found it in Chase, whose craving for the presidency was exceedingly strong. Theoretically, he might seem a formidable candidate. He was the representative of the radical Republicans, and was regarded by them as the counterpoise of Lincoln, who had gone too slow to suit them in his blows against slavery, and was now arousing their antagonism in his policy for the reconstruction of the Union. Chase had made a success of his management of the Treasury, and was in character and ability fit for the office of President. The opponents of Lincoln made an adroit use of the custom then long prevalent of limiting the occupation of the White House to four years: since Jackson was re-elected, in 1832, no man had been chosen for a second term. Van Buren had, indeed, received the nomination for it, but had been beaten at the polls; and since then Presidents in office had been candidates for renomination, but none had even been renominated by their party conventions. This had seemed to become a settled practice.

In August, 1863, Chase declared that he was not anxious for the presidency, and that if the currents of popular sentiment turned towards him he would not take the office unless it came to him without any pledge in relation to appointments. But the desire feeding on itself increased. He listened eagerly to the men who solicited him, and he was sought, writes one of his biographers, "less by strong men and by good men than by weak men and by bad men."¹ It needs no acute judgment to detect the lurking ambition in his letter of apparent self-effacement to his son-in-law, ex-Governor Sprague. "If I were controlled by mere personal sentiments," he wrote, "I should prefer the re-election of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man. But I doubt the expediency of re-electing anybody, and I think a man of differing qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years. I am not anxious to be regarded as that man; and I am quite willing to leave that question to

¹ Warden, p. 530; see, also, pp. 533, 536.

the decision of those who agree in thinking that some such man should be chosen."¹

During the month of January, 1864, a committee of senators, representatives, and citizens was formed with the avowed object of securing the nomination of Chase. Some of them had interviews with him; and he, after exhibiting the usual and feigned coyness of presidential candidates, consented to allow the submission of his name "to the consideration of the people." He desired the support of Ohio, but if "a majority of our friends" should "indicate a preference for another," he would cheerfully acquiesce in their decision.² His private correspondence at this time is pervaded with anxiety for the nomination, and makes one think that he was, with a certain dignity and in his own manner, working hard for it, while he disclaimed everything of the sort. "Some friends are sanguine that my name will receive favorable consideration from the people in connection with the presidency," he wrote. "I tell them that I can take no part in anything they may propose to do, except by trying to merit confidence where I am."³ "So far as the presidency is concerned," are his words, two days later, "I must leave that wholly to the people."⁴

The committee, that has just been referred to, issued a circular, signed by Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, its chairman, which was circulated widely by mail, the pith of which was that radical ideas, the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and the safety of the country would be subserved better by the choice of Chase for President than by that of Lincoln.⁵ By the first of February, however, Chase learned that there was little probability of his receiving the support of his own State,⁶ and he prepared his mind to submit with as much

¹ Nov. 26, 1863, Schuckers, p. 494.

² Warden, pp. 560, 573.

³ Jan. 26, 1864, *ibid.*, p. 563.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 565.

⁵ The circular is dated Feb. 1864. — Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 783; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 319; Pomeroy's remarks, Senate, March 10, *Globe*, p. 1025.

⁶ Warden, p. 568.

cheerfulness as possible to the almost certain choice of his chief. "The signs of the times," he wrote, "*seem* to indicate the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. His personal popularity is great and deserved. If to his kindliness of spirit and good sense he joined strong will and energetic action, there would be little left to wish for in him." But the committee, he continued, "think there will be a change in the current, which, so far as it is not spontaneous, is chiefly managed by the Blairs."¹ February 20 the Pomeroy circular was printed in the Washington *Constitutional Union*,² and called forth a letter from Chase to the President, in which he made a frank avowal of his connection with the Pomeroy committee in respect to his candidacy for President, saying in it, "I have thought this explanation due to you as well as to myself. If there is anything in my action or position which, in your judgment, will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg of you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence."³

Lincoln had long known of Chase's striving for the presidency, and while it may have disturbed him at times,⁴ the attitude of his mind towards it after he had back of him Gettysburg and Vicksburg was expressed in his remark in October, 1863, to his private secretary. "I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes, so far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed, with regret, his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offence to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me, and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt

¹ Feb. 2, Warden, p. 569. The Blairs were Francis P. Sr.; Montgomery the Postmaster-General; Francis P. Jr.

² See Warden, p. 573.

³ Feb. 22, Warden, p. 574; see Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 321.

⁴ See McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, p. 120 *et seq.*

with, and that he would have arranged it very differently. It was so with General Frémont, with General Hunter when I annulled his hasty proclamation, with General Butler when he was recalled from New Orleans. . . . I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes so long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department.”¹ Now he acknowledged at once Chase’s note of February 22, but deferred a full reply for a week, when he wrote a kind, considerate, and magnanimous letter, ending with, “Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service; and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change.”²

February 25 the Union members of the Ohio legislature held a caucus and declared for the renomination of Lincoln.³ March 5 Chase wrote to an Ohio friend that, owing to this action, “it becomes my duty . . . to ask that no further consideration be given to my name.”⁴ If Chase had been as good and wise a man as Lincoln, the jarring between them would now have come to an end.

The declaration in Ohio was only one of many similar indications. By legislative caucuses, by letters, by political conventions, by declarations of the Union Leagues, the Union or Republican party pronounced in favor of the renomination of Lincoln.⁵ Admitting even all that was urged by his oppo-

¹ Diary of John Hay, Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 316.

² Warden, p. 575; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 322.

³ Appleton’s Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 783; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 324. The Columbus, Ohio, correspondent of the N. Y. *Tribune*, which opposed the nomination of Lincoln, said, Feb. 26: “About 63 out of the 105 of the Union members of the Legislature met in caucus and passed a resolution saying that the people of Ohio and soldiers in the army demand the re-election of Abraham Lincoln. Before the adoption of the resolution nearly all the Chase men had left the hall, and there were not at the time a majority of Union members present.”

⁴ Schuckers, p. 503.

⁵ Appleton’s Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 783; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 324, vol. ix. p. 52 *et seq.*

nents of the manipulation by office-holders and politicians, there remains no doubt that the mass of citizens were lending aid to these movements. The President had gained the support of the plain people, of business men, and of a good part of the highest intelligence of the country. Nothing in the study of popular sentiment can be more gratifying than this oneness of thought between farmers, small shop-keepers, salesmen, clerks, mechanics, and the men who stood intellectually for the highest aspirations of the nation. Motley said in a private letter, "My respect for the character of the President increases every day."¹ Lowell wrote in the *North American Review*: "History will rank Mr. Lincoln among the most prudent of statesmen and the most successful of rulers. If we wish to appreciate him, we have only to conceive the inevitable chaos in which we should now be weltering had a weak man or an unwise one been chosen in his stead."² "Homely, honest, ungainly Lincoln," wrote Asa Gray to Darwin, "is the representative man of the country."³

In spite of these many and different manifestations of public opinion, those adverse to the President did not relinquish the hope of defeating his nomination. After the abortive Pomeroy circular their action took the shape of an endeavor to postpone the national convention. Greeley, in a letter to the *Independent*, urged this plan,⁴ and in an article in the *Tribune* enunciated by indirection the opinion that Chase, Frémont, Butler, or Grant would make as good a President as Lincoln, and he added that the selection of any one of them would preserve "the salutary one-term principle."⁵ It is lamentable that a leader of public sentiment should have rated Frémont or Butler as high as Lincoln, and while the *Tribune*

¹ From Vienna, Dec. 29, 1863, Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 146.

² Jan. 1864.

³ Feb. 16, Gray's Letters, vol. ii. p. 523.

⁴ Feb. 25.

⁵ Feb. 23. I have attributed this article to Greeley on internal evidence solely. The National Republican Committee met Feb. 22, and fixed June 7 as the day of the assembling of the convention.

had much less influence now than it had before the war, yet in this judgment it spoke undoubtedly for numbers of well-meaning men. Frémont was strong in a certain popular estimation, and Butler even stronger. In January, 1865, after Lincoln had been chosen for his second term, Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the Republicans in the House of Representatives, declared: "If the question could be put to the loyal people of the United States whom they would select for the next President, a majority of them would vote for General Butler."¹ A prominent writer, in an article in the *Independent*, made unequivocal reference to the present administration in saying: "The country cannot afford to risk any second-rate committee chosen at hap-hazard to be its President and cabinet."² A newspaper editor of prominence from the interior of Pennsylvania, who supported warmly the President, came to Washington during the winter of 1864, and said to Thaddeus Stevens: "Introduce me to some member of Congress friendly to Mr. Lincoln's renomination." "Come with me," was the reply, and, going to the seat of Arnold, who represented the Chicago district and was a personal friend of the President, Stevens broke forth: "Here is a man who wants to find a Lincoln member of Congress. You are the only one I know, and I have come over to introduce my friend to you."³ March 25 many "friends of the government and supporters of the present administration," men of character and political standing, with William Cullen Bryant at their head, wrote to the National Executive Committee of the Union and Republican parties, suggesting the postponement of the convention until September.⁴ Surely Greeley and the *Trib-*

¹ Arnold's Lincoln, p. 386, note; *Globe*, p. 400. I cite this as a remarkable statement of a political leader in touch with the people. Of course it was not true, but that Stevens should have thought so is significant.

² Feb. 18. The N. Y. *World* stated that the article was evidently from the pen of Beecher, but Thomas Shearman assures me that Beecher did not write it, and that he was, on the contrary, in favor of the renomination of Lincoln.

³ Arnold's Lincoln, p. 385, note. This, again, was not exactly true, but significant. See the rest of the note quoted.

⁴ Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, p. 785.

une, Bryant and the *Evening Post*, and the New York *Independent*, Stevens, Julian,¹ and many other members of the House, a number of senators and those men besides who were devoted to the political fortunes of Chase, represented a formidable discontent;² but Lincoln was so confident of his hold on the people that all of this opposition did not greatly disturb him for any length of time. He read public sentiment with accuracy, and felt sure that he would receive the nomination of his party.³

The effort to bring Chase forward as a candidate and that to postpone the convention failed, and with this failure there was a diminishing quantity and strength of opposition to Lincoln, but there was still enough of it to call a convention and name a candidate. Three calls were issued, asking the people to assemble in Cleveland, May 31, "for consultation and concert of action in respect to the approaching presidential election." One came from a committee of radical Republicans, headed by B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri; a second emanated from New York, the first name on the list of signers being

¹ Political Recollections, p. 237.

² Julian wrote: "Opposition to Mr. Lincoln, however, continued, and was secretly cherished by many of the ablest and most patriotic men in the party." — Ibid., p. 238. Riddle describes a visit to the White House of April 28: "There were a number of people in the President's anteroom, and I very soon found that the President himself was undergoing a rude roasting at the hands of those who were waiting for admission to his presence. Even my amiable and excellent friend Worcester spoke ironically of him as 'that great and good man.' The one most loud and bitter was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts. His open assaults were amazing. I withdrew to the President's desk to escape, but was annoyed by it even there, and I turned upon the senator in indignant surprise, asking why he did not assault him in the Senate, — get a seat in the June convention, instead of opening on him in the streets and in the lobbies and offices of the Executive Mansion itself. He conceded what I asserted — that the entire North stood with the President and would renominate him, and said that 'bad as that would be, the best must be made of it.'" — Recollections of War Times, p. 267.

³ In this study of public opinion, besides the authorities specifically quoted, I have been helped by Morse's Lincoln; Greeley's American Conflict; the files of the N. Y. *Tribune*, *World*, *Times*, *Independent*, Boston *Advertiser*, Chicago *Tribune*, and Columbus *Crisis*.

Lucius Robinson; while a third had the counterance of a number of abolitionists. A few hundred men gathered together at the appointed time and place, adopted a platform, and nominated Frémont for President and General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice-President.¹ A friend who related their proceedings to Lincoln said that instead of the many thousands expected in mass convention there were present only four hundred. Lincoln opened his Bible and read: "And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them: and there were with him about four hundred men."² In such a spirit of derision was the work of this convention received by the Republican press, while the Democratic newspapers magnified its importance.³ The real danger of the movement will appear as the story goes on.

I have given an account of the military operations that preceded the National Union or Republican Convention which had been summoned for the 7th of June. The condition of the public mind during these exciting days when the tension was the greatest is also well worth a glance. Before the campaign in Virginia commenced, it was that of breathless suspense. "All eyes and hopes now centre on Grant," said Thurlow Weed, April 17, in a private letter. "If he wins in Virginia, it will brighten the horizon and make him President."⁴ "My hopes under God," wrote Chase on the day that the Army of the Potomac was crossing the Rapidan, "are almost wholly in Grant and his soldiers."⁵ Such outbursts of feeling imaged

¹ Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 785 *et seq.* Two of the calls, the platform, and Frémont's letter of acceptance are printed in full; see also Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. chap. ii.

² 1 Samuel xxii. 2; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 40. The reference to the "political cave of Adullam" by John Bright in the House of Commons was not until 1866.

³ N. Y. Times, June 2; Boston Advertiser, June 3; Chicago Tribune, June 1; N. Y. World, June 2; Columbus Crisis, June 8.

⁴ Memoir of Weed, vol. ii. p. 443.

⁵ Warden, p. 584.

the thoughts of all rational men. The bloody work of the Virginia campaign began and went on. Those who made up their minds from the accounts printed in the newspapers and their editorial comments had not so clear a perception of the events and their consequences as we have at the present time. Their view of the military advantage was, on the whole, more favorable. They had days of joy in great victories, in a general success during the week's campaign, in the nation's triumph, and the vanquishing of Lee's army.¹ To those who read another journal of wide influence, which had implicit confidence in Grant, one day brought "hope and solicitude," the next joy with trembling; still another, the impression that the military aspect was not very hopeful; then, May 14, exultation at the intelligence that the Army of the Potomac had "won a decided if not a decisive victory;" finally, June 2, the assurance that the troops had been "skillfully, and bravely handled," and "that General Grant has succeeded, if not in defeating Lee, certainly in turning his strong position and forcing him to retreat step by step to the very confines of Richmond."² The *Boston Advertiser* doubted, May 11, whether our successes "should be called a

¹ The *N. Y. Tribune* said: May 10, "General Grant has won a great victory." May 12, "The Army of the Potomac has fought another great battle and again is victorious." May 13, "If any doubt has been felt as to the general success on our side during the week's campaign, it must be dispelled by the official despatch of General Grant. The Lieutenant-General is the last man in America to discount in advance expected successes, so when he says, 'The result to this time is much in our favor,' the country knows that it is in our favor—knows that General Grant probably understates the truth. As for the concluding sentence, there is but one man on the continent who could have written, 'I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer'—but one man from whose lips it would be accepted by the country as assurance of ultimate success." May 14, "The Nation's Triumph [double-leaded], Gratitude to God, the Giver of all good. . . . The Rebel army of Virginia has been thoroughly vanquished. . . . We believe Lee's army as an effective force has practically ceased to exist." May 25 the *Tribune* takes a very much less hopeful view. June 6 it shows no appreciation of the disaster of Cold Harbor. June 13 it begins to have some comprehension of Grant's poor success.

² *N. Y. World*, May 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, June 2.

victory or an escape," but two days later it believed Grant's statement when he said "that the general result is good," and declared that "the duty of all patriots is epitomized" in his words "to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." On the morrow confidence was expressed that the "upshot of the week's operations" was "an advance for the cause," yet seven days afterwards it admitted that the feeling was "undeniably less buoyant than was hoped for."¹

The President took a sanguine view. May 9 he recommended by proclamation that all patriots "unite in common thanksgiving and prayer to Almighty God;" and the same day, in a speech responding to a serenade, he said: "I believe, I know that General Grant has not been jostled in his purposes, that he has made all his points, and to-day he is on his line as he purposed before he moved his armies. . . . I am very glad at what has happened." May 24, to Governor Brough, who had asked for "something cheering," he replied by endorsing virtually a despatch from Grant which he had just seen, "Everything looks exceedingly favorable for us." June 15, after he must have realized the extent of the disaster at Cold Harbor, he telegraphed to Grant, "I begin to see it: you will succeed. God bless you all."²

Chase saw the military situation accurately, and wrote in a private letter: "The people are crazy or I am. I don't see the recent military successes. Most earnestly do I pray that we may see them hereafter. *All, under God, depends on Grant. So far he has achieved very little, and that little has cost beyond computation. Still, my hope is in him. He seems the ablest and most persistent man we have. Sherman has done well and*

¹ See, also, N. Y. *Times*, May 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, June 4, 7, 13, 20; the *Independent*, May 12, June 9, 16; *Chicago Tribune*, May 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, June 24; *Columbus Crisis*, May 11, 18, June 29.

² Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. pp. 519, 520, 525, 533. This despatch of June 15, however, was after Grant had announced to Halleck his purpose of crossing the James. Lincoln was very anxious and sad during the battles in the Wilderness. — *Six Months at the White House*, Carpenter, p. 30.

apparently more than Grant."¹ Senator Grimes took a more gloomy view than Chase. He wrote to his wife, May 12: "I think that Grant will in the end destroy Lee's army, but his own will be also destroyed." May 18: "I wish I could satisfy your fears about the Army of the Potomac. Thus far we have won *no victory*. We have suffered a terrible loss of killed and wounded (nearly fifty thousand), and Lee is in an impregnable position. . . . The news from different directions is not at all pleasant to me. I confess that just at this present writing I feel pretty blue."² June 19: "Grant's campaign is regarded by military critics as being thus far a failure. He has lost a vast number of men, and is compelled to abandon his attempt to capture Richmond on the north side and cross the James River. The question is asked significantly, Why did he not take his army south of the James at once, and thus save seventy-five thousand men?"³

The excellent and real progress being made by Sherman was not of a sufficiently striking character to distract the attention of the public mind, even in the Western States whose sons made up his army,⁴ from the duel between Grant and Lee.

A few hours of dejection, leaving their effect behind, were caused by the publication, May 18, of a proclamation purporting to come from the President, which, admitting by implication the failure of Grant's campaign, appointed a solemn day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer, and called for 400,000 men. It was a cleverly conceived and executed forgery, intended for stock-jobbing purposes, and only by certain happy accidents did it fail to appear in nearly all of the journals in New York City connected with the associated

¹ May 23, Warden, p. 594.

² Salter, *Life of Grimes*, p. 262.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 263. All the letters from Grimes at this time are interesting reading.

⁴ "The public attention is so overwhelmingly absorbed with the state of things in Virginia that it is almost in danger of forgetting that a vast army, which includes our old heroes of the West for the most part, is moving to victory in Georgia."—*Chicago Tribune*, May 15.

press. It was printed in the New York *World* and New York *Journal of Commerce*, Democratic newspapers, which had assailed the administration with virulence. Their editors strove earnestly to correct the error into which they had fallen innocently, and made adequate and apparently satisfactory explanations to Dix, the commanding general of the department, but before these were transmitted to Washington, the President had ordered their arrest and imprisonment and the suppression of their journals. A lieutenant with a file of soldiers seized their offices, and held possession of them for several days, but the order of personal arrest was rescinded.¹

"The country is entering on a new and perilous time," wrote Seward, — "a canvass for the presidency in time of civil war."² The culminating reverse of Cold Harbor happened June 3, and the National Union Convention met at Baltimore four days later, but the shadow of this disaster was not over the proceedings. The extent of it was not comprehended. The usual enthusiasm which characterizes such gatherings when the main result is a foregone conclusion, prevailed. The proceedings and platform³ showed confidence and decision, but the sentiment of the delegates was best displayed by the almost unanimous renomination of Lincoln, who received all of the votes except those of Missouri.

For a good while before the convention it was evident that Lincoln would be its nominee, and he looked forward to its assembling with equanimity. "The people are determined

¹ N. Y. *World*, May 23; Manton Marble, the editor of the *World*, to President Lincoln, same issue, which was the first reappearance of that newspaper; N. Y. *Tribune*, May 19; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 389; Life of Dix, Morgan Dix, vol. ii. p. 96 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 47. Nicolay and Hay state that the order for the arrest of the editors and the suppression of the newspapers was issued by "the fiery Secretary of War." Nevertheless, it is dated Executive Mansion, signed by the President, and countersigned by the Secretary of State.—Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 523; O. R., III, iv. p. 392 *et ante*.

² June 1, Life, vol. iii. p. 223; see, also, Life of T. Weed, vol. ii. p. 443.

³ The platform is printed in Appleton's Ann. Cyc., 1864, p. 788; Greeley's Amer. Conflict, vol. ii. p. 650; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 529.

to support and re-elect their excellent President Lincoln," wrote Asa Gray, May 3, "whether Frémont and the like make a coalition with the copperheads or not . . . Lincoln will walk the course. God bless him!"¹ David Davis and Senator Edwin D. Morgan, of New York, did not believe that the withdrawal of Chase from the canvass was sincere,² but the tenor of his private correspondence is that of sullen acquiescence in the inevitable. At all events, his name was not presented to the convention. Missouri, although altering her voice in order to make a unanimous nomination of Lincoln, at first cast her twenty-two votes for General Grant, who might have been a formidable candidate after the battle of Chattanooga if he had not refused positively to give those who beset him any encouragement for the use of his name. Touching the attempt to bring Grant forward, Lincoln exhibited his usual shrewdness. "If he takes Richmond," he said, "let him have it [the nomination],"³ and he wrote a discreet letter to the mass meeting which was held in New York the Saturday before the convention for the purpose of testifying gratitude to Grant, and was planned undoubtedly in the hope that something would turn up to deflect the current of the delegates' favor from the President to the General.⁴

In the nomination of Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, for Vice-President, the convention made an unfortunate choice. Nicolay, who was in Baltimore, asked Hay "whether the President has any preference [for Vice-President] either personally or on the score of policy," and received this reply in Lincoln's handwriting, "Wish not to interfere about V. P."⁵ Johnson was selected for the reason that he was a

¹ Letters, vol. ii. p. 515.

² See their letters of March 21, May 29, to Weed, *Life of Weed*, vol. ii. p. 445.

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 59.

⁴ Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 527; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 50; *N. Y. World*, June 6.

⁵ June 6, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 528.

War Democrat and Border State man.¹ It was entirely in line with the policy of Republicans to nominate War Democrats for important positions, thereby giving significance to the name Union party and strengthening their ticket with the people.² Another sentiment unquestionably had influence. The Republicans were still disturbed at the taunt that theirs was a sectional party, that both their candidates in 1860 had come from the North; and here was an opportunity to end that reproach by choosing for Vice-President a man from the South who had done good service for the Union cause.³ A severe scrutiny of Johnson's personal character would have prevented this nomination, and either of his competitors was fitter for the place, but the ballot for Vice-President was a rush to the rising man. Johnson had 200 votes, Hamlin⁴ 150, Dickinson of New York 108, various other candidates an aggregate of 61; but before the result was announced all of the delegates except twenty-six changed their votes to Johnson, whose nomination was thus made almost unanimous.⁵

In his reply to a delegation from the National Union League, who congratulated him, Lincoln made use of apt and memorable words. "I do not allow myself," he said, "to suppose that either the convention or the League have concluded to decide that I am either the greatest or best man in America, but rather they have concluded it is not best to swap horses while crossing the river, and have further concluded that I am not so poor a horse that they might not make a botch of it in trying to swap."⁶

¹ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 528; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 72. For the Nicolay-McClure controversy see McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, appendix; Life of Hannibal Hamlin, C. E. Hamlin, chap. xxxvi and Supplement; Morse's Lincoln, p. 264.

² "We were accustomed during the war to turning down our own men for Democrats who were not so good, but who were better than the majority of their party." — Riddle, Recollections of War Times, p. 282.

³ Johnson was military governor of Tennessee.

⁴ Hamlin was the actual Vice-President.

⁵ Greeley's Amer. Conflict, vol. ii. p. 660; Stanwood, A Hist. of the Pres., p. 303.

⁶ Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 532. The remarks are somewhat

During the military and political campaigns Congress was in session. The House of Representatives attempted to interfere with the management of foreign relations by the Executive, and, April 4, under the leadership of Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, adopted unanimously a resolution expressing in substance its disapproval of the occupation of Mexico by France, and declaring that the establishment of any monarchical government in America by overthrowing a republic, did not accord with the policy of the United States. The House spoke indubitably the public opinion of the country, but it was, nevertheless, an injudicious utterance. Our democracy and our representatives in Congress probably will never learn that the delicate questions of diplomacy, until they reach the point where constitutionally the Senate and the House must be partakers in the action, ought to be left to the executive. It will prove generally, as it did certainly in this case, that the President and the Secretary of State can deal with such matters with greater foresight and wisdom. The course

differently given in Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 789. Touching the nomination of Lincoln and Johnson, I will give two citations from the *N. Y. World*, which was the ablest and most influential Democratic journal in the country, the organ of the high-toned Democrats of New York City and State, and which inspired throughout the country the most respectable opposition to the administration. It said, June 9: "The age of statesmen is gone; the age of rail-splitters and tailors, of buffoons, boors, and fanatics, has succeeded. . . . In a crisis of the most appalling magnitude, requiring statesmanship of the highest order, the country is asked to consider the claims of two ignorant, boorish, third-rate backwoods lawyers, for the highest stations in the government. Such nominations, in such a conjuncture, are an insult to the common-sense of the people. God save the Republic!" It said, June 20: "A leading member of one of the great religious organizations which have recently been passing resolutions and sending deputations to the White House, and who was intrusted with the speech-making part of the business, publicly describes the demeanor of Mr. Lincoln on this occasion as 'a buffoon and gawk — disgracefully unfit for the high office' to which he again aspires. He says that he departed from the East Room with a sickening sense of hopelessness of our cause which has never left him since. . . . Here again is a Republican Senator honored by the Empire State, and held in high esteem by the religious denomination of which he is a member, reported to have left the President's presence because his self-respect would not permit him to stay and listen to the language which he employed."

of our diplomacy and the result in Mexico show with what patience and discretion Lincoln and Seward handled this affair, preserving peace with France during our critical period, and gaining in the end all that the most ardent shouter for war could have desired, with a moral influence worth troops of soldiers and many battle-ships.¹ Sumner deserves credit for his part in the transaction. When the resolution went to the Senate, it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where his influence and power as chairman were sufficient to keep it slumbering the rest of the session.²

An additional evidence that the public mind was stirred by the French invasion is one of the resolutions adopted by the Union National Convention. Ostensibly an approval of the position of the government, the spirit of it was the same as that of the resolve of the House of Representatives. That Lincoln clung to his prerogative is evident from his reference to this resolution in his brief letter accepting his renomination, which is the more significant because he alluded to no other but the formal tribute to the soldiers and sailors. "While," he wrote, "the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the western continent is fully concurred in, there might be misunderstanding were I not to say that the position of the government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department and approved and indorsed by the convention, among the measures and acts of the executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable."³

Slavery was virtually dead, but it was not legally abolished. To the congressional acts dealing with it, to the President's

¹ Edward Everett wrote Motley, April 11: "Mr. Seward has certainly managed the delicate affair with discretion, as he has many others. Our House of Representatives have, by a unanimous vote, passed a resolution couched in moderate terms, but of pretty significant import." — Motley's *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 159.

² Pierce's *Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 118.

³ *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 538.

Proclamation of Emancipation, there were exceptions, while there were differences of opinion as to their scope. To make freedom sure, to rest it on an impregnable legal base, to "meet and cover all cavils,"¹ a constitutional amendment was necessary, abolishing slavery forever.² A movement with this end

¹ Lincoln's words, June 9, *ibid.*, p. 529.

² Senator Trumbull, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, one of the ablest lawyers of the Senate, in reporting such a constitutional amendment, March 28, stated with clearness this point. After speaking of the congressional enactments against slavery, he considered the proclamation, saying: "The force and effect of this proclamation are understood very differently by its advocates and opponents. The former insist that it is and was within the constitutional power of the President, as commander-in-chief, to issue such a proclamation; that it is the noblest act of his life or the age; and that by virtue of its provisions all slaves within the localities designated become, *ipso facto*, free; while others declare that it was issued without competent authority, and has not and cannot effect the emancipation of a single slave. These latter insist that the most the President could do, as commander of the armies of the United States, would be, in the absence of legislation, to seize and free the slaves which came within the control of the army; that the power exercised by the commander-in-chief, as such, must be a power exercised in fact, and that beyond his lines where his armies cannot go, his orders are mere *brutum fulmen*, and can neither work a forfeiture of property nor freedom of slaves; that the power of Frémont and Hunter, commanders-in-chief for a certain time in their departments, who assumed to free the slaves within their respective commands, was just as effective within the boundaries of their commands as that of the commander-in-chief of all the departments, who as commander could not draw to himself any of his presidential powers; and that neither had or could have any force except within the lines and where the army actually had the power to execute the order; that to that extent the previous acts of Congress would free the slaves of rebels, and if the President's proclamation had any effect it would only be to free the slaves of loyal men, for which the laws of the land did not provide. I will not undertake to say which of these opinions is correct, nor is it necessary for my purposes to decide. It is enough for me to show that any and all these laws and proclamations, giving to each the largest effect claimed by its friends, are ineffectual to the destruction of slavery. The laws of Congress, if faithfully executed, would leave remaining the slaves belonging to loyal masters, which, considering how many are held by children and females not engaged in the rebellion, would be no inconsiderable number, and the President's proclamation excepts from its provisions all of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and a good portion of Louisiana and Virginia — almost half the slave States. If then we are to get rid of the institution, we must have some more efficient way of doing it than by the proclamations that have been

in view began at this session of Congress. December 14, 1863, Representatives Ashley of Ohio and Wilson of Iowa each introduced into the House such an amendment. Somewhat later similar propositions differing in phraseology were brought before the Senate by Henderson of Missouri and Sumner, and were referred to the Judiciary Committee, whose chairman, Trumbull, reported as the joint resolution to be considered what is now the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution. April 8 this passed the Senate by a vote of 38 to 6. June 15 the House voted on it; the yeas were 93, the nays 65, not voting 23; lacking the requisite two-thirds, it was lost. In order to be able to move a reconsideration of the amendment, Ashley changed his vote to the negative, and later made the proper motion, which was entered on the journal and gave him the opportunity to call up the resolution at some future day. Here the matter rested for this session.¹

The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and such parts of the Act

issued or the acts of Congress which have been passed. . . . In my judgment, the only effectual way of ridding the country of slavery, and so that it cannot be resuscitated, is by an amendment of the Constitution forever prohibiting it within the jurisdiction of the United States. This amendment adopted, not only does slavery cease, but it can never be re-established by State authority, or in any other way than by again amending the Constitution. Whereas, if slavery should now be abolished by act of Congress or proclamation of the President, assuming that either has the power to do it, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from re-establishing it." — *Globe*, pp. 1313, 1314.

Reverdy Johnson, another able lawyer, said, April 5, in the debate on the constitutional amendment: "In my judgment, if the war was to terminate to-day, or whenever it shall terminate, without any provision being made for the condition of the slaves who have not come within the actual control of the military authority of the United States, they will be decided by the courts of the United States to be slaves still. . . . If the rebellion was terminated to-morrow, and the authority of the United States was reinstated in every one of the States now in rebellion, the proclamation would have no influence at all upon the status of those bondsmen who were not brought antecedently under the influence and control of the military power." — *Ibid.*, p. 1421. See Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, p. 50 *et seq.*

¹ A good account of this movement may be found in Sumner's *Works*, vol. viii. p. 351 *et seq.*; Pierce's *Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 183.

of 1793 as still remained in force were repealed June 28. It was due largely to Sumner's persistent championship of it that the repeal passed the Senate. When he entered that body in 1851, he had deemed it a special mission to use his best endeavors to secure the abrogation of "the infamous Act of 1850;" and with that aim he had labored in season and out of season, and was now happy in its accomplishment, writing in a private letter, "The repeal of all fugitive slave acts is of immense importance for us abroad; but its practical importance at home is not great."¹

We must now return to the relations between Lincoln and Chase. In December, 1862, as has been related, the Secretary offered his resignation, but since it was not accepted he resumed the duties of his post.² A little more than two months afterwards a difference over the appointment of an internal-revenue collector in Connecticut induced him to write a letter giving up his office, but before sending it the difficulty was patched up and it was withheld.³ Later, trouble occurred about a collector of customs at Puget Sound. As Lincoln insisted on having his way, Chase again tendered his resignation, on May 11.⁴ The President drove to his house, handed him his letter, begged him to think no more about it, and made a compromise appointment.⁵ The New York custom-house with the factional fight in the dominant party for its possession, has perplexed and troubled many presidents, and at this time plagued Lincoln. In the early part of 1864 he desired, for what he deemed sufficient reasons, that Barney should resign his office of collector of customs in New York City, and proposed then to appoint him minister to Portugal. This scheme Chase resisted, and in the end seemed to have

¹ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 176. Pierce gives a good history of this transaction, and a full one may be found in Sumner's Works, vol. viii. p. 403. For an account of other anti-slavery legislation and for Sumner's efforts to secure equal rights of the colored people, see Pierce, p. 177 *et seq.*

² *Ante.*

³ Warden, p. 523.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 527.

⁵ Field, *Memories of Many Men*, p. 303.

gained his point; at all events, at this time Barney neither resigned nor was he removed from office.¹

Another cause of jar followed. Chase disliked the Blairs, and a speech which Francis P. Blair Jr. made in the House of Representatives, April 23, transmuted his dislike into rage and hate.² Blair charged him "with sacrificing a vast public interest to advance his ambition," saying that he had used the power of his office in prescribing trade regulations with the South in a way to provide a fund to carry on the operations of the Pomeroy committee, that is, to secure his own nomination for the presidency. Blair read private letters supporting these accusations, and imparted a communication from a gentleman at the head of one of the largest moneyed institutions of New York City which spoke of the rumors afloat there concerning the Secretary of the Treasury: that he had "given to his son-in-law Governor Sprague a permit to buy cotton at the South, by which he will probably make . . . \$2,000,000," and that he had allowed Jay Cooke & Co., the financial agents of the government, to secure extravagant and irregular profits in the disposal of the five-twenty bonds.³

¹ Warden, pp. 572, 601; Schuckers, p. 477; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 85; Field, p. 304.

² Riddle, *Recollections of War Times*, p. 267.

³ *Globe*, p. 1829 *et seq.* Hendricks said in the Senate, March 11: "I might refer to the fact that a banking company has been made very rich by its intimate relations with the Treasury Department. Perhaps a million dollars has been made by the firm of Jay Cooke & Co., by being made the special and exclusive agent of the Treasury Department in disposing of the bonds of the government which might have been disposed of by the ordinary machinery of that department." — *Ibid.*, p. 1046. Sherman replied: "Jay Cooke was employed as agent to negotiate the five-twenty loan only after other expedients had been tried and failed. He was selected because of his great activity and success in promoting the negotiation of prior loans, and for his undoubted standing and credit. . . . But the senator says that an enormous commission was given to Jay Cooke & Co., and that it was done secretly; that the bankers in the West did not know that Jay Cooke & Co. received this commission. The senator is mistaken. The amount paid to Jay Cooke was published in the newspapers, was known as publicly and broadly as the five-twenty loan; and not only so, but every bank and banker, and every agent who was employed in the negotiation of the loan received two-thirds of the very commission that the

Chase was angry with the President on learning that the same day on which Blair had made this speech he was restored to his command in the army. He thought that Lincoln had endorsed the "outrageous calumny," and had an inclination to resign his office, but from this was dissuaded by Governor Brough and other friends.¹ His envy and inflamed ambition led him to misjudge the President, who, instead of sanctioning Blair's speech, was much annoyed at it. "I knew," he said, "that another beehive was kicked over."² He restored Blair to his military command on account of a previous promise, and had sent the necessary instructions before he knew of the speech; but on hearing of it he was on first thoughts disposed to cancel the order that assigned the Congressman to the army. He concluded, however, to let it stand,³ and a great deal of management of common friends was required to placate the angry Secretary.⁴

The continual sneers of Chase at the President and his associates reveal the state of mind to which he gave way. "I preside over the funnel," he said in a private letter; "everybody else, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, over the spigots — and keep them well open, too." "Nothing except the waste of life," he wrote to another friend, "is more painful in this war than the absolutely reckless waste of means. A very large part of the frauds which disgrace us may be traced to the want of systematic supervision; and yet what encouragement is there to endeavors

senator talks about. The entire expense to the United States of negotiating the loan was limited to three-eighths of one per cent., and every bank and banker employed received one-fourth of one per cent., so that there was left to Cooke only one-eighth of one per cent. Out of the commission allowed the agent paid all the expenses of this loan. . . . I have examined the loans made by the British and French Governments, and I find that the ordinary allowance there in the form of expenses is from one-half of one per cent. to one per cent., and, besides, various facilities are allowed." — *Globe*, pp. 1046, 1047.

¹ Warden, p. 584.

² Riddle, p. 275.

³ *Ibid.*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 80.

⁴ Warden, pp. 583, 584, 593, 594; Riddle, chap. xxxviii.

towards economy? Such endeavors league against him who makes them all the venality and corruption which is interested in extravagance." "It seems as if there were no limit to expense," he wrote to one of his young admirers. "Contrary to all rules, the spigot in Uncle Abe's barrel is made twice as big as the bung-hole. He may have been a good flat-boatman and rail-splitter, but he certainly never learned the true science of coopering."¹

Richard H. Dana, with his vivid pen lets us penetrate affairs at Washington with the eye of a keen and favored observer. "I have had interviews," he wrote, May 4, "with the President, Seward, Blair, Stanton, Welles, and a short one with Chase. The cabinet is at sixes and sevens, or 'Isaac and Josh,' as my witness said. They say dreadful things of one another. (Not Seward; I have never heard him speak *harshly* of one of them.) . . . I spent a half-hour or more with the President. I cannot describe the President; it is impossible. He was sobered in his talk, told no extreme stories, said some good things and some helplessly natural and naïve things. You can't help feeling an interest in him, a sympathy and a kind of pity; feeling, too, that he has some qualities of great value, yet fearing that his weak points may wreck him or wreck something. His life seems a series of wise, sound conclusions, slowly reached, oddly worked out, on great questions, with constant failures in administration of details and dealings with individuals."²

The final rupture between the President and his Secretary of the Treasury did not occur until after the enthusiastic re-nomination of Lincoln. John J. Cisco, who had held the office of assistant treasurer in New York City since the commencement of Pierce's administration, and was in every way qualified for it, had offered his resignation, to take effect June 30, at the close of the fiscal year. As this position was next in consequence financially to that of the Secretary of the

¹ Jan. 24, 28, May 7, Warden, pp. 562, 565, 586.

² Adams's Dana, vol. ii. pp. 273, 274.

Treasury, it was important that a man of special capacity should be selected for the office ; and as politics entered into the matter, it was desirable that the wishes of the New York senators should be regarded. In fact, the President wrote to Chase that any one agreed upon by the three would be satisfactory to him.¹ Senator Morgan, whose business judgment was excellent, took the greater part in the negotiations, and he and the Secretary agreed successively on two men, both of whom, however, declined the office.² Chase then proposed Maunsell B. Field, one of the assistant secretaries of the Treasury, who was a gentleman of breeding, position, and culture, but had not beyond these the necessary qualifications for the post, and was opposed firmly by Morgan. He, in his turn, named three men, any one of whom would be satisfactory to him and his colleague ; but Chase would have none of them. June 28 the President sent his Secretary two kind notes, in which he said that he did not think he could appoint Field, rendering for his refusal cogent and sufficient reasons. In the mean time Chase had urged Cisco to withdraw his resignation, and he with patriotism responded affirmatively to the request. This ought to have ended the difficulty, but Chase took umbrage at one of Lincoln's notes, and, June 29, resigned his office.³

To the summoning of Chittenden, the register of the Treasury, for counsel touching a matter of routine, we owe a knowledge of the thoughts of the President after he had ruminated on the missive which came from his Secretary. When the intelligence was imparted to Chittenden, he exclaimed : " Where is the man " that can be a successor to Chase ? " Mr. President, this is worse than another Bull Run defeat. Pray let me go to Secretary Chase, and see if I cannot induce him to withdraw his resignation. Its acceptance now might cause a financial panic." Lincoln replied :

¹ June 28, Warden, p. 611.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 605, 608.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 609 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 91 *et seq.*; Schuckers, p. 484.

"Chase thinks he has become indispensable to the country; that his intimate friends know it, and he cannot comprehend why the country does not understand it. He also thinks he ought to be President; he has no doubt whatever about that. It is inconceivable to him why people have not found it out; why they don't, as one man, rise up and say so. He is . . . an able financier; . . . he is a great statesman, and, at the bottom, a patriot. Ordinarily he discharges a public trust, the duties of a public office, with great ability — with greater ability than any man I know. Mind, I say *ordinarily*," but he has become "irritable, uncomfortable, so that he is never perfectly happy unless he is thoroughly miserable, and able to make everybody else just as uncomfortable as he is himself. He knows that the nomination of Field would displease the Unionists of New York, would delight our enemies, and injure our friends. He knows that I could not make it without seriously offending the strongest supporters of the government in New York, and that the nomination would not strengthen him anywhere or with anybody. Yet he resigns because I will not make it. He is either determined to annoy me, or that I shall pat him on the shoulder and coax him to stay. I don't think I ought to do it. I will not do it. I will take him at his word."¹ In his letter accepting his Secretary's resignation, he put these thoughts into terse and dignified words.²

He offered the position to David Tod, of Ohio, who declined it, and afterwards he actually forced it upon Senator William Pitt Fessenden, of Maine. The senator calling upon the President to recommend Hugh McCulloch, and being told that his own nomination had been sent to the Senate, exclaimed: "You must withdraw it. I cannot accept [it]." "If you decline," said Lincoln, "you must do it in open day, for I shall not recall the nomination." "We talked about it for some time," he related, "and he went away less decided

¹ Chittenden, *Rec. of Lincoln*, p. 379.

² Warden, p. 614.

in his refusal.”¹ The nomination was confirmed promptly, and the appointment was generally approved. “It is very singular,” said the President, “considering that this appointment is so popular when made, that no one ever mentioned his name to me for that place. Thinking over the matter, two or three points occurred to me: first, his thorough acquaintance with the business; as chairman of the Senate Committee of Finance, he knows as much of this special subject as Mr. Chase; he possesses a national reputation and the confidence of the country; he is a radical without the petulant and vicious fretfulness of many radicals. There are reasons why this appointment ought to be very agreeable to him. For some time past he has been running in rather a pocket of bad luck; the failure to renominate Mr. Hamlin makes possible a contest between him and the Vice-President, the most popular man in Maine, for the election which is now imminent. A little while ago in the Senate, you know, Trumbull told him his ill temper had left him no friends; but this sudden and most gratifying manifestation of good feeling over his appointment, his instantaneous confirmation, the earnest entreaties of everybody that he should accept, cannot but be very grateful to his feelings.”² Fessenden, sighing for the cool sea-breezes of his native State, and congratulating himself that the adjournment of Congress would soon allow him to escape from the sultry and enervating atmosphere of Washington, showed a high sense of patriotic duty in making the personal sacrifice involved in the acceptance of this harassing office.

In the controversy about the appointment of the Assistant Treasurer it is evident that the President was in the right and the Secretary in the wrong, and it was the fault of the latter that their relations had reached the point which Lincoln thus described: “When Chase comes to see me, I feel awk-

¹ Diary of John Hay, Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 99; see, also, Chittenden, p. 381.

² Diary of John Hay, Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 100.

ward and he seems constrained.”¹ The President was considerate and forbearing, because he thought the welfare of the country was furthered by having Chase at the head of the Treasury Department, and he did not request the resignation of his Secretary when he and his friends were doing palpable work to secure the nomination for the presidency, and when, moreover, the supporters of Lincoln charged that he was using the extensive patronage of the Treasury for his own political advancement.² But Chase wrote in a private letter, “I should despise myself if I felt capable of appointing or removing a man for the sake of the presidency.”³ If Lincoln’s political managers had seen this, they would have laughed these words to scorn; and although in Chase’s ascriptions to himself of virtue, one is sometimes reminded of Pecksniff, there is no reason to doubt that he was in his own way sincere, yet he did not hesitate to impute to Lincoln conduct which he would so strongly reprobate in himself. Speaking of a bill which would create some new offices, he wrote in his diary, “The President would almost certainly put in men from political considerations,”⁴ which, in the judgment of the machine workers who supported Lincoln, was a matter of course. To know to what extent the President lent himself to such management would require a laborious and minute investigation,⁵ but from the atmosphere of the time I have no doubt that he made appointments with a view to the control of the machinery by which delegates were sent to the National Convention. A President who selected unfit generals for the reason that they represented phases of public opinion would hardly hesitate to name postmasters and collectors who could be relied on as a personal following. Yet he and the nation were so bound up together that it would have been easy for him to assure himself that, taking a large survey, these ap-

¹ Warden, p. 618.

² See *Life of Weed*, vol. ii. p. 445.

³ Schuckers, p. 497.

⁴ Warden, p. 612.

⁵ I may say, as Gibbon did in a somewhat similar case, “Such inquiries would divert me too long from the design of the present work.” — Chap xxxi.

pointments were for the good of the country rather than dictated by his desire to succeed himself, which was unquestionably very great.

In these controversies, therefore, the blame must be imputed to Chase, and to the practice of making political appointments to purely administrative posts. What a commentary on the system, that when the nation was in the agony of its life struggle the best man in the country for President and the best man for Secretary of the Treasury should be at loggerheads on a question of "the offices"! This breach could not have occurred had the rule of appointing men solely for their fitness obtained. Had it not been for the patriotic sacrifice of Fessenden, the withdrawal of Chase from the cabinet would have been a blow to the cause, for it is difficult to name another successor who would not have given a shock to public confidence. The radicals even now so regarded the change. This is not surprising, as Chase had a strong hold on public sentiment, which, added to his grasp of financial conditions, in a time of chaos made him a potent minister.

At this time, of the leaders of the Republicans and war Democrats who constituted the Union party, Lincoln had by all odds the most powerful influence on public opinion; while next to him I conceive that Butler and Frémont must be ranked, and after them Chase and Sumner. The Butler-Frémont element was made up largely of self-seeking and erratic people and while such were not absent from the Chase-Sumner following, and while many of the Secretary's political workers were not men of character, it is undeniable that he and the Massachusetts senator had the backing of educated, moral, and religious men, who contributed signally to the strength of the nation.

The sixth resolution of the Union National Convention was a sop given to the radicals, who undoubtedly construed its generality of phrase to mean that the President ought to reconstruct his cabinet by the removal of Seward and Blair.

That, instead of the displacement of either of the men whom they did not regard as "worthy of public confidence and official trust," Chase, their representative, should have resigned, or perhaps have been forced out of the cabinet, was a bitter disappointment. This was a rupture with the President on men; soon afterwards there came to a head a difference on a matter of principle. Towards the reconstruction of the Union Lincoln had early taken tentative steps by appointing, in the spring and early summer of 1862, military governors of Tennessee, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Sumner, at the same time, had formulated the doctrine of "State suicide" as a definition of the status of the seceded States.¹ This meant that the States had ceased to exist, and that Congress had the same power over them which it had over the Territories.² Lincoln did not deem it necessary to affirm or deny this thesis. Outlining his plan in his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, and his Message of December 8, 1863, he wrote in the original draft of the message that he considered "the discussion as to whether a State had been at any time out of the Union as vain and profitless. We know they were, we trust they shall be in the Union. It does not greatly matter whether in the mean time they shall be considered to have been in or out;"³ but this he did not allow to stand, deeming the admission that the States might have been out of the Union dangerous. The plan of the President was this: If one-tenth of the qualified voters, according to the election laws before the secession, of any one or all of the Confederate States (the standard being the number of votes cast at the presidential election of 1860), take an oath of fealty to the Constitution, and abidance by the Acts of Congress and by the Proclamations of the President having reference to slaves,⁴ and "shall re-establish a State government," "such shall be recognized as the true government of

¹ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 72; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 14.

² See Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 105 *et seq.*

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 111.

⁴ So long as not "declared void by the decision of the Supreme Court."

the State.”¹ The radical Republicans objected to this scheme, and gave their adherence to one reported in the form of a bill in February, 1864, by Henry Winter Davis, which required a majority of the white male citizens to constitute the new State, and exacted that their Constitution should prohibit slavery forever. Neither plan made any provision for negro suffrage, but in addition to the other differences there was a germ of variance regarding the treatment of the freedmen, which, though playing no part in the present disagreement, was ominous of future dissension. The President, in writing to Michael Hahn, the newly elected governor of Louisiana under his plan of reconstruction, said: “Now you are about to have a convention, which, among other things, will probably define the elective franchise. I barely suggest for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may not be let in — as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. They would probably help, in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty within the family of freedom.”² The feeling of many, if not all, of the radical Republicans was that the negroes ought to be admitted to the suffrage on an equal footing with the whites.³

March 22 Davis, an orator, and a man of brilliant parts, who thought the President’s scheme neither coherent nor orderly, and objected to it strongly because it did not contain a sufficient guarantee for the abolition of slavery, made an energetic speech in the House, advocating the plan of his committee and of the radicals. May 4 this bill passed the House by a vote of 73 to 59, and, July 2, after a disagreement and a conference, it received the assent of the Senate. On July 4, the day on which Congress was to adjourn,⁴ it

¹ Certain persons were exempted from the benefit of these provisions. — Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 443.

² March 13, *ibid.*, p. 496.

³ See proceedings on the Reconstruction bill, Senate, July 1. — *Globe*, p. 3449; Pierce’s Sumner, vol. iv. p. 217.

⁴ At half-past twelve.

reached the President, when he was in his room at the Capitol, signing bills. He laid it aside; but Sumner, Boutwell, and others were there, solicitous as to the fate of the bill, and Senator Zachariah Chandler asked the President if he intended signing it. Lincoln replied: "This bill has been placed before me a few moments before Congress adjourns. It is a matter of too much importance to be swallowed in that way." "If it is vetoed," exclaimed Chandler, "it will damage us fearfully in the Northwest. The important point is that one prohibiting slavery in the reconstructed States." "That is the point," said the President, "on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act." "It is no more than you have done yourself," retorted the Senator. Lincoln rejoined: "I conceive that I may, in an emergency, do things on military grounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress;" and when Chandler, deeply chagrined, went out, he said to the members of the cabinet who were with him: "I do not see how any of us now can deny and contradict what we have always said, that Congress has no constitutional power over slavery in the States."¹

All the members of the cabinet² agreed with him, but the dissent among the Republican members of Congress was almost unanimous.³ Chase, in his diary, spoke for this feeling with a lack of candor. "The President," he wrote, "pocketed the great bill providing for the reorganization of the rebel States as loyal States. He did not venture to veto, and so put it in his pocket. It was a condemnation of his Amnesty Proclamation and of his general policy of reconstruction, rejecting the idea of possible reconstruction with slavery, which neither the President nor his chief advisers

¹ Diary of John Hay, Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. pp. 120, 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122. Fessenden said: "I have even had my doubts as to the constitutional efficacy of your own decree of emancipation, in those cases where it has not been carried into effect by the actual advance of the army." — *Ibid.*, p. 121.

³ Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 218; Blaine, *Twenty Years in Congress*, vol. ii. p. 43; Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, vol. iii. pp. 525, 527.

have, in my opinion, abandoned.”¹ July 5 he returned to the subject, making this entry: “Garfield, Schenck, and Wetmore . . . were bitter against the timid and almost proslavery course of the President.”²

July 8 the President, in a public proclamation, gave his reasons for not signing the bill, and went on to say: “Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people.”³

The convictions of the extremest radicals found expression in a Protest signed by Wade, who had charge of the Reconstruction bill in the Senate, and Henry Winter Davis, which was published, August 5, in the *New York Tribune*, and is known as the Wade-Davis manifesto. It is a bitter attack on the President, remarkable as coming from leaders of his own party after he had received a unanimous nomination from a convention that had made no pronouncement on the question at issue.⁴

¹ *Warden*, p. 623.

² *Ibid.*, p. 625.

³ *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 545.

⁴ This is printed in full in *Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia* for 1864, p. 307. It is the right and duty of the supporters of the administration, they said, “to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.” The President's proclamation of July 8 is a “political manifesto” proposing “a grave Executive usurpation.” Then follows a minute scathing and unreasonable criticism of the proclamation. “The President,” they continued, “by preventing this bill from becoming a law holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. . . . He strides headlong toward the anarchy his proclamation of the 8th of December inaugurated. . . . A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated. . . . The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his Administration have so long practised, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash

We left the Army of the Potomac marching from Cold Harbor to the James River. Grant had hoped to destroy or defeat totally Lee's army north of Richmond, and, failing to do either, had decided to transfer his troops to the south side of the James, and from that quarter besiege the Confederates in their capital.¹ This movement, which began June 12 and ended the 16th, was very successfully accomplished. The precision of the march, the skilful work of the engineers in bridging the river, the orderly crossing showed how like a fine machine the Army of the Potomac, even in its crippled state, responded to efficient direction. The strategy of Grant had deceived Lee, who failed to divine the movement, and did nothing, therefore, to impede it.² The capture of Petersburg, the possession of which would undoubtedly within a brief period compel the fall of the Confederate capital, was included in the plan of the Union general, and was within his grasp. "The enemy shows no signs yet of having brought troops to the south side of Richmond," is his despatch of June 14 to Halleck. "I will have Petersburg secured, if possible, before they get there in much force. Our movement from Cold Harbor to the James River has been made with great celerity, and so far without loss or accident."³ Sending W. F. Smith with his corps to Bermuda Hundred, Grant despatched at the same time to Butler, there in command of the Army of the James, a conditional order "to seize and hold Petersburg."⁴ This he followed up by a personal visit three days later, and an order for its immediate

and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes our support he must confine himself to his Executive duties—to obey and execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress."

¹ Grant's despatch of June 5, also report July 22, 1865, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. pp. 11, 22.

² Humphreys, pp. 202, 209; Walker's Hancock, p. 230. "A plan of campaign should anticipate everything which the enemy can do, and contain within itself the means of baffling him."—Military Maxims of Napoleon, p. 5.

³ O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 12.

⁴ June 11, *ibid.*, vol. xxxvi. part iii. p. 754.

capture,¹ and forthwith returned to the Army of the Potomac to hasten its crossing, and throw it forward by divisions to support this attack. If Butler had been a soldier, he would have led out all his available force and captured Petersburg the next day, knowing, as he did, that its garrison was weak, amounting to about 2500 men.² By Grant's orders he sent forward Smith, who, by nine o'clock on the evening of June 15, had carried the formidable works to the northeast of Petersburg, gaining, in the opinion of Grant, important advantages; and if everything had been properly ordered and carried out, the city itself might that day have been captured and the Appomattox River reached.³

But the golden opportunity was let slip. Beauregard ordered all the available troops in his department to Petersburg, and on June 16 had the works pretty well manned. He asked reinforcements from Lee, but did not get them, for he was unable to convince his commander that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the James, and was thundering at the gates of the city.⁴ Grant and Meade were now on the ground, and on June 16, 17, and 18 ordered successive assaults, which failed to take Petersburg, and resulted in a loss of about

¹ June 14, Report, *ibid.* part i. p. 25.

² Beauregard, who was in command, says an effective of 2200. — *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 540; see, also, Humphreys, p. 213, note 1; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 409; O. R., vol. xl. part ii. p. 675.

³ See Grant's report, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 25; Humphreys, pp. 210, 212, 213; letter of Hancock, June 26, Meade to Grant, June 27, unsigned and unsent letter of Grant to Meade in his handwriting, June 28, O. R., vol. xl. part i. pp. 314, 315; Hancock's report, Sept. 21, 1865, *ibid.*, p. 304; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 293 *et seq.*; W. F. Smith, *From Chattanooga to Petersburg*, pp. 60-134; Smith's report, June 16, O. R. vol. xl. part i. p. 705; Walker, *Life of Hancock*, p. 231 *et seq.*, *The Second Army Corps*, p. 527; Beauregard's article, *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 541; Wilkeson, *Rec. of a Private*, p. 156 *et seq.*; *Life of Lee*, Fitzhugh Lee, pp. 346, 347; Long's *Lee*, p. 373; Butler's *Book*, p. 687 *et seq.*

In the *Nation* of June 9, 1898, p. 445, Gen. J. D. Cox has skilfully analyzed the evidence and thrown new light upon these operations.

⁴ Beauregard's article, *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 541; Fitzhugh Lee, p. 348; incidentally the *Confed. corr.*, O. R.; see, also, Humphreys, p. 213 *et seq.*

10,000 men.¹ Owing to the much greater number of the Union soldiers, the attempt on the first two days was feasible; but the work, according to one on Grant's staff, was not "equal to our previous fighting, owing to our heavy loss in superior officers."² If an intelligent private may be believed, the soldiers of the Second Corps were so discouraged that they had not been sent into Petersburg the night of the 15th, that they went forward to the subsequent assaults without heart and without determination to fight stanchly.³ Although not fully convinced that the Army of the Potomac was on the south side of the James, Lee sent a division to Beauregard, which arrived early in the morning of June 18, and Lee himself reached Petersburg before noon of the same day.⁴ The severe repulse of the Union troops, which took place afterwards, demonstrated that any further attempt to carry the place by storm would be foolhardy. Dana's remark in his despatch to Stanton of June 19 formulates what the situation required: "General Grant has directed that no more assaults shall be made. He will now manœuvre;"⁵ also Grant's determination, as announced six days later: "I shall try to give the army a few days' rest, which they now stand much in need of."⁶

The Army of the Potomac was worn out. The continual fighting for forty-five days at a disadvantage and without success, and the frequent marches by night, had exhausted and disheartened the men. Gallant and skilful officers by the score, brave veterans by the thousands, had fallen. The morale of the troops was distinctly lower than it was even the day after Cold Harbor. Reinforcements were constantly sent

¹ Humphreys, p. 224.

² Dana to Stanton, June 19, O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 24. The staff officer added: "The men fight as well, but are not directed with the same skill and enthusiasm."

³ Wilkeson, *Rec. of a Private*, p. 160 *et seq.*

⁴ Beauregard, *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 543; Humphreys, p. 221.

⁵ O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 25.

⁶ *Ibid.* On June 22 an unexpected combat had occurred, resulting also disastrously.

to Grant,¹ but they were for the most part mercenaries, many of whom were diseased, immoral, or cowardly. Such men were now in too large a proportion to insure efficient work. They needed months of drill and discipline to make good soldiers. Indeed, a reconstitution and reorganization of the army were necessary: these were made during the many weeks of inaction from June 18 to the spring of 1865, covered by the siege of Petersburg, which now commenced.²

At this time the President paid a visit to the army.³ With the impression which I have tried to convey of the unsuccess of the costly operations of Grant and of the demoralization of the army, the imagination might conjure up a private interview between Lincoln and Grant, in which the President entreated the general to be more careful of the lives of his soldiers, and warned him that the country could not or would

¹ Halleck wrote Grant, June 7: "I inclose a list of the troops forwarded from this department to the Army of the Potomac since the campaign opened — 48,265 men. I shall send you a few regiments more, when all resources will be exhausted till another draft is made." — O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 602.

² Humphreys, p. 225; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 412; Walker, *Life of Hancock*, p. 246, *The Second Army Corps*, p. 555; Ropes, *Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, vol. x. p. 267; Porter, *Century Magazine*, April, 1897, p. 830; Wilkeson, *Rec. of a Private*, p. 185. Wilkeson writes (p. 191): "After the battle of June 18, 1864, the enlisted men frequently discussed the condition of the Army of the Potomac. They sat o' nights in groups behind the intrenchments and talked, talked, talked, of the disintegrating force which Grant commanded. Enormous losses of prisoners were reported, losses that were incurred while charging earthworks, which fact clearly showed that our troops had surrendered after reaching the Confederate intrenchments — surrendered rather than attempt to take them or to return to our line under the deadly accurate fire of the Confederate infantry. Many of the volunteers vehemently asserted that the bounty-paid recruits really deserted during action to seek safety in Confederate prison pens. The enlisted men who had gathered into ranks under McClellan, and who had been forged into soldiers by that admirable drill-master, all said that the Army of the Potomac of 1862 was far superior, man to man, to that which crossed the Rapidan in May of 1864, and immeasurably superior to the army which lay in the trenches before Petersburg in July of 1864. They also asserted, and truthfully, that if the original volunteers, or men as good as they were, were commanded by Grant, he would capture Richmond in twenty-four hours."

³ June 21.

not supply the waste of another such campaign of attrition. So far, however, as I know, there is not any evidence of such an entreaty or warning. It is unlikely that the thought of either entered Lincoln's head, inconsistent as it would have been with his despatch of six days earlier;¹ and nothing had since occurred to change his view except the unsuccessful assaults on the intrenchments of Petersburg, while the failure to capture that stronghold was not at this time regarded as so serious a mishap as it came to be later. The opinion of the country, and probably that of the President, assumed a different color after Early's invasion of Maryland. Kindness of heart and humanity, rather than criticism of his general, was shown in his words when contemplated battles were spoken of. "I cannot pretend to advise," he said, "but I do sincerely hope that all may be accomplished with as little bloodshed as possible."²

Horace Porter has given an interesting account of this visit, which one loves to dwell upon for a moment in the midst of the gloom which had settled down on the Army of the Potomac, and was soon to spread over the country. The President on horseback, wearing a high silk hat, frock coat, and black trousers, rode with Grant along the line. A civilian, mounted, was always an odd sight amid the crowd of uniformed and epauletted officers; and Lincoln, although a good horseman, was ever awkward, and now, covered with dust, presented "the appearance of a country farmer riding into town, wearing his Sunday clothes." But the character of the man disarmed the keen sense of the ridiculous of the American soldiers, and as the word was passed along that "Uncle Abe is with us," he was greeted with cheers and shouts that came from the heart. He visited a division of colored soldiers who had won distinction by their bravery in Smith's assault on the works at Petersburg. They flocked around the liberator of their race, kissing his hands, touching his clothes

¹ Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 533; *ante*, p. 466.

² Porter, *Century Magazine*, April, 1897, p. 835.

for the virtue they conceived to be in them, cheering, laughing, singing hymns of praise, shouting, "God bress Massa Lincoln," "De Lord save Fader Abraham," "De day of jubilee am come, shuah." His head was bare, his eyes were full of tears, his voice broke with emotion. As the picture of Lincoln would not be complete did not humor succeed pathos, it reveals him, in the evening, with a group of staff officers before the general's tent, a willing raconteur, plying his wit "to teach them truth," pleased by their appreciation, egged on by their hearty laughs.¹

There is little or no evidence, so far as I know, exhibiting the dejection of Grant at the failure of the high hopes and expectations which filled his soul when he crossed the Rappahannock. His sturdy disposition and strong will, the determination that he must succeed, prevented probably the admission to himself of failure, and even if they had not, his stolid countenance would have concealed it. Yet two circumstances seem to indicate that the bitterness of disappointment was his share. It was commonly believed in the army that his misfortunes had driven him again to drink,² and on this account and others, Butler, with crafty method, acquired a hold on him which prevented him from acting for the best interests of the service. It is not a grateful task to relate the story of Butler using Grant as a tool to accomplish his own ends. The picture of such a relation between the two is repulsive, but it may be fraught with instruction, as men of the type of Butler are never absent from our political life.

¹ *Century Magazine*, April, 1897, p. 832 *et seq.*; Dana to Stanton, June 21, O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 27, also see p. 21. Sumner wrote the Duchess of Argyll, July 4: "The President, on his return from General Grant's headquarters, told me that the general, who is a man of a very few words, said to him: 'I am as far off from Richmond now as I ever shall be. I shall take the place; but as the rebel papers say, it may require a long summer's day.' The President describes Grant as full of confidence, and as wanting nothing. His terrible losses have been promptly made up by reinforcements." — *Pierce's Sumner*, vol. iv. p. 194.

² W. F. Smith, *From Chattanooga to Petersburg*, pp. 52, 174, 178, 193. There is considerable tradition which points the same way.

"Butler," wrote Dana to Stanton, July 1, "is pretty deep in controversial correspondence with 'Baldy Smith,' in which Grant says Butler is clearly in the wrong."¹ On the same day Grant wrote Halleck, "I have feared that it might become necessary to separate General Butler and General Smith. The latter is really one of the most efficient officers in service, readiest in expedients and most skilful in the management of troops in action."² He went on to say that "the good of the service would be subserved" if the command of a department "could be cut out" for Butler, "where there are no great battles to be fought," and that he "would feel strengthened" if Smith, Franklin, or J. J. Reynolds had Butler's position.³ July 6 Grant asked, by telegraph, for an order assigning Smith to Butler's active command.⁴ Having previously received a letter from Halleck which recognized Butler's "total unfitness to command in the field," but implied the absolute necessity of retaining him in a military position, and suggested that he be left in the local command of his department,⁵ Grant, in this despatch of July 6, asked that such a disposition be made of him. The President, Stanton, and Halleck had a conference, the result of which was the issuance, July 7, of an order complying exactly with Grant's request.⁶ Butler, learning of this order, paid a visit, July 9, to Grant at his headquarters,⁷ the outcome of which was seen the next day, when Grant telegraphed Halleck that he had suspended the order depriving Butler of his active command,⁸ thus leaving him in the same position which he had held from the commencement of the campaign; or, rather, as Butler stated the case, in a despatch to his chief-of-staff: "Do not trouble yourself about the order. It is all right now, and better

¹ O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 28. "Baldy" is W. F. Smith. The matter of this controversy does not concern my narrative. It is explained fully in Smith's and Butler's books.

² *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 559.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, part iii. p. 31.

⁵ Halleck to Grant, July 3, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 598.

⁶ *Ibid.*, part iii. pp. 59, 69.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

than if it had not been disturbed.”¹ In the mean time Smith, on account of ill health, had gone away on a leave of absence for ten days, and on his return was relieved from the command of his corps and ordered to New York City.²

There can be but one explanation of this sudden reverse of action of Grant. Butler had some hold on the commander of the armies of the United States, and in that interview of July 9 showed his hand. Perhaps he joined together, in a Mephistophelian manner, the failure of the campaign, the popular horror at the waste of blood, seemingly to no purpose, and the general's relapse from his rule of total abstinence;³ perhaps he told Grant that as a Confederate corps under Early was now threatening Washington, to the exasperation of the people of the North, the commander of the Union armies needed a friend who had a powerful control of public sentiment, and that he was not so secure of his position that he could afford to refuse the proffered aid of Butler, which was his for an

¹ O. R., vol. xl. part iii. p. 114.

² Ibid., pp. 334, 577. The history of this transaction is told in an orderly manner by Smith in his "From Chattanooga to Petersburg;" but while he suppresses nothing which might tell against himself, he does not, it seems to me, appreciate fully one circumstance which may have contributed to his having been relieved. July 10, "in a confidential conversation with General Grant, I tried to show him," he writes, "the blunders of the late campaign of the Army of the Potomac, and the terrible waste of life that had resulted from what I had considered a want of generalship in its present commander. Among other instances I referred to the fearful slaughter at Cold Harbor on the 3d of June. General Grant went into the discussion, defending General Meade stoutly, but finally acknowledged, to use his own words, 'that there had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothing about it because it could do no good.'" — From Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 176. Hardly any one now, I think, would speak of this campaign and its blunders as Meade's; they were Grant's. Neither is it clear why Smith, July 10, 1864, should have imputed the responsibility for them to Meade, unless he were hitting Grant over his subordinate's shoulders. Of course, this criticism must have been very distasteful to Grant, who would have needed the magnanimity of Lincoln to continue Smith under him in command afterwards. This, however, does not affect the main point of the case, — the retention of Butler in active command. Franklin, a very efficient officer, was available for the position. Contrariwise, see Butler's Book, p. 685 *et seq.*

³ See review of Smith's book by J. D. Cox, the *Nation*, May 25, 1893.

equivalent. Indeed, in Grant's despatches to the President and Halleck at this time, we seem to detect a more deprecatory, a less confident and resolute tone than during the first part of his campaign, and this prepares us for the explanation that he was swayed by Butler's threats, exhibiting in this affair less nerve than the President. Disaffection to the administration was growing. Lincoln needed the support of Butler's following, and unquestionably disliked to give the order to shelve the Massachusetts general,¹ but he had the moral courage to say the word and run a personal risk for the good of the country.

I shall now proceed to give a brief account of Early's invasion into Maryland, which had a profound influence on the sentiment of the army and the people who were sustaining the government. Affairs in the Shenandoah valley had gone unfavorably for the Union cause. Sigel at first had been in command, but, proving incompetent, was succeeded by Hunter, who in the beginning had some success,² and, embold-

¹ See the curious change in the wording of the order, O. R., vol. xl. part iii. pp. 59, 69; Smith, p. 33.

² Long thus writes: "From Staunton Hunter advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare. . . . The beautiful valley of Virginia everywhere gave evidence of the ravages of war. Throughout the march down the valley the unsparing hand of Hunter was proclaimed by the charred ruins of its once beautiful and happy homes. At Lexington were seen the cracked and tottering walls of the Virginia Military Institute, the pride of Virginia, and the *alma mater* of many of the distinguished sons of the South, and near them appeared the blackened remains of the private residence of Governor Letcher." — Long's Lee, pp. 355, 357. Hunter in his report (O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 97) says: "On the 12th I also burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the buildings connected with it. I found here a violent and inflammatory proclamation from John Letcher, lately Governor of Virginia, inciting the population of the country to rise and wage a guerilla warfare on my troops, and ascertaining that after having advised his fellow-citizens to this course the ex-governor had himself ignominiously taken to flight, I ordered his property to be burned under my order, published May 24, against persons practising or abetting such unlawful and uncivilized warfare."

ened by it, advanced on Lynchburg, hoping to capture this important strategic point. Lee, greatly encouraged by his victories over Grant, and feeling confident that with a diminished force he could hold his ground against the crippled Army of the Potomac, detached Early and his corps to operate against Hunter.¹ The Confederates forced the Union troops out of the Shenandoah valley, which was left open to their march, affording them an easy route to Maryland and the rear of Washington. July 2 Early reached Winchester, drove Sigel, who had been retained in a subordinate command, to Maryland Heights, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown (July 6), levied \$20,000 from Hagerstown, entered on the morning of the 9th Frederick City, which he laid under contribution for \$200,000, and on the same day fought and defeated Lew. Wallace at Monocacy Bridge. Wallace had a heterogeneous force, composed of regiments of the Potomac Home Brigade, of Ohio and Maryland hundred-days men, reinforced by Rickett's division of the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. He made a determined resistance, and his defeat was more serviceable than many victories, as he delayed Early, and thereby, in all probability, saved Washington from capture.²

The defeat of Wallace, however, caused much alarm in Washington and all over the North. "Baltimore is in great peril," telegraphed a committee of its citizens to the President. . . . "Can we rely upon the prompt aid of the government in sending reinforcements?"³ Lincoln's reply furnished cold comfort, and from its lack of assurance showed to what straits the government was reduced. "I have not a single soldier but who is being disposed of by the military for the best protection of all," he said. "By latest accounts, the enemy is moving on Washington. They cannot fly to either

¹ This was previous to the assaults on Petersburg, June 16-18.

² Rickett's division bore the brunt of the battle with "coolness and steadiness," and he himself deserved credit "for his skill and courage." — Wallace's report, O. R., vol xxxvii. part i. p. 191.

³ July 9, *ibid.*, part ii. p. 140.

place. Let us be vigilant, but keep cool. I hope neither Baltimore nor Washington will be taken.”¹ The President had put the best face upon the situation, and he could not truthfully express a confidence he did not feel. He displayed, however, not the slightest abatement of his physical and moral courage, although he might well be appalled at the conditions confronting him. About 20,000 veterans,² under Early and Breckinridge, flushed with victory and spoils,³ were advancing rapidly towards Washington,⁴ which, so much had this city and its fortifications been denuded of troops to send reinforcements to Grant, was defended only by invalids, hundred-days men,⁵ and District of Columbia volunteers, a total of 20,400, of whom nearly all were perfectly raw troops, and a considerable portion unavailable. Sigel's force was at Harper's Ferry; Hunter was approaching that place slowly from the West (his adjutant taking care to direct that he be received with ceremony and honor as he passed along the railroad),⁶ and Wallace and Ricketts had been beaten so badly that the most expected of them was an essay at the defence of Baltimore.⁷ Stanton had called on several of the governors

¹ July 10, 9.20 A. M., *ibid.*, p. 173.

² This number is variously given, but 20,000 is, I think, within bounds. It is of interest, as bearing on the alarm in Baltimore and Washington, that at the time this was a moderate estimate of the enemy.

³ Early to Breckinridge, July 5, also Gen. Order, same date, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 592.

⁴ “On the morning of the 10th I moved toward Washington, taking the route by Rockville and then turning to the left to get on the Seventh Street pike. The day was very hot, and the roads exceedingly dusty, but we marched thirty miles.” — Early's report, *ibid.*, part i. p. 348.

⁵ The hundred-days men were furnished by the Western States, being the result of a far-sighted offer, April 23, by Governors Brough (Ohio), Morton (Ind.), Yates (Ill.), Stone (Iowa), and Lewis (Wis.). The number offered was: Ohio (whose governor seems to have taken the lead in this transaction) 30,000, Indiana 20,000, Illinois 20,000, Iowa 10,000, Wisconsin 5,000. — Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. pp. 514, 575, 583; O. R., III, iv, v.

⁶ Order of July 2. “General Hunter will probably pass Cumberland on Monday. Please instruct the guards along the railroad to turn out. In case he should stop anywhere, have a salute fired.” — O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 13.

⁷ Lincoln to Grant, July 10, 2.30 P. M., Halleck to Grant, same day, 3.30

for assistance, making this record worthy of note, "Governor Seymour answers the President's call handsomely;"¹ but the notice to them being sudden, no efficient aid could be rendered from these quarters.

Early's plan, which had been suggested or approved by Lee, comprised the release of the 17,000 prisoners at Point Lookout,² arming them, and marching them immediately on the route to Washington, where they might be of assistance in its capture.³ For this object a detachment of cavalry was now on its way to Point Lookout, while Early himself, with his infantry and artillery, marched forward, and on the morning of July 11 appeared on the Seventh Street road north of Washington, before the fortifications of the city, in sight of the dome of the Capitol. Communication from Washington to the Northern cities was cut off; the excitement and alarm were great. The President, who, unmindful of personal danger, had, as usual, the night previous, ridden out to his summer residence, the Soldiers' Home, directly in the line of the advance of the enemy, was brought back to the city by the earnest insistence of the Secretary of

P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 155, 157; Barnard's report cited by Humphreys, p. 245, note; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 163.

¹ July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 91.

² This point is where the Potomac empties into Chesapeake Bay. For the number of prisoners, see *ibid.*, vol. xl. part iii. p. 143.

³ Lee wrote Davis, June 26: "Great benefit might be drawn from the release of our prisoners at Point Lookout. . . . I have understood that most of the garrison at Point Lookout was composed of negroes. I should suppose that the commander of such troops would be poor and feeble. A stubborn resistance therefore may not reasonably be expected. By taking a company of the Maryland artillery, armed as infantry, the dismounted cavalry, and their infantry organization, as many men would be supplied as transportation could be procured for. By throwing them suddenly on the beach with some concert of action among the prisoners, I think the guard might be overpowered, the prisoners liberated and organized, and marched immediately on the route to Washington." — *ibid.*, vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 767, see p. 769; also, letter of John Tyler, July 9, *ibid.*, vol. xl. part iii. p. 759. The reports of Lee and Early of July 14, 19 (*ibid.*, vol. xxxvii. part i. pp. 346, 347), must be read in the light of the earlier correspondence, and allowance must be made for the tendency of the most truthful commanders to make the best of great opportunities missed.

War; and Captain Fox, of the Navy Department, had, without Lincoln's knowledge, a vessel ready to transport him from the capital, should its fall become absolutely certain.¹ If Early had profited by the moment of consternation, he could have gone into Washington early on July 11, seized the money in the Treasury, the large stores of clothing, arms, and ammunition, destroyed a large amount of government property, and, while he might not have been able to hold the place, he could have escaped without harm from the veterans who were on the way to the rescue, having struck the prestige of the Union an incalculable blow.

The veterans of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac and of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans saved the country from the disaster of the capture of its capital. It was, however, little to the credit of Grant that Washington should be in so imminent danger, while Richmond was in none, and that the measures for its safety should have been so tardily taken. During these days the commander seemed to be stunned. Although his despatches are frequent, and evidence good attention to business, he did not realize the danger. He was not the man of prompt decision and ready purpose who commanded at Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga; rather was he the lethargic general of Shiloh. He refused to believe, while Early was marching down the Shenandoah valley, that the self-same Confederate corps had left Petersburg.² It was not until July 5 that he became certain of it,³ and even then he did not show himself complete master of the situation.

Lee had in some measure reckoned on Grant's aversion to diminish his own army. "It is so repugnant to Grant's principles and practice to send troops from him," he had written Davis, "that I had hoped, before resorting to it, he would have preferred attacking me."⁴ But, as we have seen, Grant

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 167.

² O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 3, 15, 16.

³ Ibid., p. 60; Life of J. M. Forbes, vol. ii. p. 99.

⁴ July 7, *ibid.*; p. 593; see, also, p. 595.

was now too weak to assault the Confederates in their intrenchments, and he did not fall into the trap which had been laid for him. July 6 he sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, about 5000 strong, an account of whose service has already been given, and 3000 of the cavalry corps, of whom, however, 2496 were sick, to Baltimore, deeming this reinforcement to the troops already in the field sufficient to guard against the threatened danger; indeed, he even cherished the hope that these veterans from his army, together with Hunter, might "succeed in nearly annihilating Early and Breckinridge."¹ In response to Halleck's alarming telegram the night of the 8th,² Grant ordered, the next day, before he had heard of Wallace's defeat, the remainder of the Sixth Corps to Washington, and suggested that part of the Nineteenth Corps, then on its way from New Orleans to Fortress Monroe, should also be sent as succors to lend aid in capturing or destroying the Confederates who had invaded the North.³ As a later thought, he sent this word: "If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person, I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive."⁴ Lincoln replied: "What I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if

¹ July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 80.

² Of 10.30 P. M. "Sigel and Couch say that scouts, prisoners, and country people confirm previous reports of the enemy's force—that is, some 20,000 or 30,000. Until more forces arrive, we have nothing to meet that number in the field, and the militia is not reliable even to hold the fortifications of Washington and Baltimore. . . . If you propose to cut off this raid and not merely to secure our depots, we must have more forces here. Indeed, if the enemy's strength is as great as represented, it is doubtful if the militia can hold all of our defences. I do not think that we can expect much from Hunter. He is too far off and moves too slowly. I think, therefore, that very considerable reinforcements should be sent directly to this place." — *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 134.

⁴ July 9, 6 P. M., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 134.

the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order.”¹ The President was wiser than the general. Grant, as the sequel proved, made a mistake in not proceeding immediately to Washington, and he failed to furnish satisfying reasons for not acting upon this suggestion of his own, which was so promptly accepted by the President. “Before more troops can be sent from here,” he telegraphed, “Hunter will be able to join Wright [commander 6th Corps] in rear of the enemy, with at least 10,000 men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights. I think, on reflection, it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with General Ord at Baltimore, and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good. I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force.”²

Yet Grant had acted with sufficient promptness to save the capital, as Early, by delay, had missed a great opportunity. The Confederate commander suspected, probably, that the veterans had already arrived, for he did not seize Fort Stevens, which guarded the entrance to Washington by the Seventh Street road, and which he might have had by simply saying the word.³ At noon of this day (July 11), two divis-

¹ July 10, 2.30 p. m., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 155.

² Ibid., p. 156; H. Porter, *Century Magazine*, May, 1897, p. 99. It may be urged that it was not safe for Grant to leave City Point on even a temporary errand, for the reason that Butler, being the senior officer in rank, would then be in supreme command of the operations against Petersburg. That was indeed an additional reason for the displacement of Butler, but the Army of the Potomac being engaged in siege operations was safe certainly under the command of Meade, assisted by his accomplished chief-of-staff Humphreys and the corps commanders Hancock and Warren.

³ John N. Frazee, Lieut.-Col. 150th Reg. Ohio N. G. (100-days men) Com'd'g Fort Stevens, reported, July 16: “The troops garrisoning the fort were composed of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard, 78 men, Capt. Safford; Thirteenth Michigan Battery, 79 men, Capt. Charles Dupont; 52 convalescents, commanded by Lieutenant Turner, of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard.”—O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 247. To support the statement in the text, see the rest of his report; also Hayward's, p. 245, and A. D.

ions of the Sixth Corps, from City Point, with General Wright in command, arrived at the wharf in Washington, and soon after four o'clock in the afternoon were in the neighborhood of Fort Stevens.¹ The capital was saved. The next day a severe skirmish took place, which was watched from the fort by the President, who was apparently oblivious of the flying bullets of the sharpshooters, until the fall of a wounded officer near him caused General Wright to ask him peremptorily to retire to a safer spot.² The night of July 12 the Confederates withdrew, burning, as they departed, the house of Postmaster-General Blair at Silver Spring. A pursuit was attempted which accomplished nothing. Dana,³ who had gone to Washington, saw accurately the situation, and with prophetic insight foretold the result. "Nothing can possibly be done here toward pursuing or cutting off the enemy, for want of a commander," he telegraphed Grant. "There is no head to the whole, and it seems indispensable that you should at once appoint one. Hunter will be the ranking officer if he ever gets up, but he will not do. Indeed, the Secretary of War directs me to tell you, in his judgment Hunter ought instantly to be relieved, having proven himself far more incompetent than even Sigel. He also directs me to say that advice or suggestions from you will not be sufficient. General Halleck will not give orders except as he receives them; the President will give none, and until you direct positively and explicitly what is to be done, everything will go on in the deplorable and fatal way in which it has gone on for the past week."⁴ There was a mass of contra-

McCook's, p. 230. I have been helped in this account by the recollections of my brother, Robert R. Rhodes, then a corporal in Company B, 150th Ohio N. G., stationed at this time at Fort Bunker Hill.

¹ Despatch of Wright, July 11, 4.10 P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 265; see also the reports which follow, p. 265. The advance of the Nineteenth Corps arrived the same day.

² Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 173; Chittenden, p. 415.

³ Charles A.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 223. Grant's flippant words were a poor answer to this weighty communication: "If the enemy has left Maryland," he said, "as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans,

dictory orders, a playing at cross purposes, the outgeneralling of the Federal commanders by Early, and a demoralization of the Union forces. Despatches were a long while in transmission between Washington and Grant's headquarters, and everything operated badly, for the reason that there was no efficient head. As long as he had no competent coadjutor in the Shenandoah valley, the commander of the armies should have been in Washington, or for a time even with the troops in pursuit of the Confederates. Toward the end of July Early turned upon his pursuers, drove them across the Potomac, and sent McCausland, with his cavalry, on a raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland occupied Chambersburg (July 30), and "in retaliation of the depredations committed by Major-General Hunter . . . during his recent raid," demanded from the citizens of the town "\$100,000 in gold, or, in lieu thereof, \$500,000 in greenbacks or national currency."¹ Compliance therewith being impossible, the Confederate general carried out his threat, and laid the best part of the town in ashes.²

militiamen, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them." — O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 300, 301. Grant's support of Hunter is incomprehensible unless it was due to his kindness of heart. See *ibid.*, pp. 332, 365.

¹ McCausland's order, *ibid.*, part i. p. 334.

² Couch's report, *ibid.*, p. 331; see, also, p. 334, and part ii. pp. 515, 525, 542; Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley*, p. 102; McClure, *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, pp. 239, 387.

Lincoln telegraphed Grant, Aug. 14: "The Secretary of War and I concur that you had better confer with General Lee, and stipulate for a mutual discontinuance of house-burning and other destruction of private property." — *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 561. In this connection I add a citation from Grant's celebrated despatch to Sheridan of Aug. 26: "Give the enemy no rest. . . . Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah valley to remain a barren waste." — O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 917.

Pursuit of McCausland was ordered, and resulted in the crippling of his force. "This affair [the final skirmish of the pursuit]," writes Early, "had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign." — Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley*, p. 107.

An aberration or negligence of Grant was certain to be followed by a gleam of his military genius, and such a gleam it now falls to me to record. August 1 he ordered General Philip H. Sheridan to the Shenandoah valley on temporary duty, this order furnishing the text for a despatch from Lincoln, which is sickening in its despair. "I have seen your despatch," the President wrote to Grant, "in which you say, 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move; but please look over the despatches you may have received from here even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of 'putting our army south of the enemy,' or of 'following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it."¹ Grant now paid a visit to the army of Hunter, and as that general in conversation expressed his willingness to be relieved, Sheridan was placed in permanent command.² A different chapter on the Shenandoah valley from that of 1862, 1863, or 1864 until August 1 is henceforward to be written.³

I may not leave this part of my subject without mentioning the tradition that, on account of the failure and great loss of life of Grant's campaign, over which the feeling of the country was intensified by the Confederate invasion of the North and the imminent danger of Washington, the question of his removal from command was mooted; or, to present another phase of the story, that he was warned that a further cam-

¹ Aug. 3, O. R. vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 582.

² Ibid., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 30; vol. xliii. part i. p. 719.

³ On Early's invasion, see reports of Lee, Early, Wallace, Hunter, and the despatches of Sigel, *ibid.*, vol. xxxvii. part i.; the correspondence, *ibid.*, part ii. and vol. xl. part iii.; *Rec. of Lincoln*, Chittenden; *Grant's Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii.; *Life of Lee*, Long; *Early's article*, *Century War Book*, vol. iv.

paing of attrition must be avoided. There are two despatches which may be considered to support, moderately, the less extreme version of the matter. July 17 the President thus telegraphed Grant: "In your despatch of yesterday to General Sherman, I find the following, to wit: 'I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men.' Pressed as we are, by lapse of time, I am glad to hear you say this; and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life."¹ The next day Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 500,000 volunteers, by virtue of the Act of Congress of July 4, 1864,² the passage of which had been largely influenced by the great losses in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, and ordered a draft to take place immediately after September 5 for any unfilled quotas.³ July 19 Halleck wrote Grant: "We are now not receiving one-half as many as we are discharging. Volunteering has virtually ceased, and I do not anticipate much from the President's new call, which has the disadvantage of again postponing the draft for fifty days. Unless our government and people will come square up to the adoption of an efficient and thorough draft, we cannot supply the waste of our army."⁴

Whatever implied warning there may have been in these despatches of Lincoln and Halleck,⁵ I have found no evidence indicating the shadow of an intention of the supersedure of Grant, nor do I believe that such a thought even occurred to the President. Indeed, there was no one to take his place. Extenuating none of his faults, there can be no doubt that so far as any military ability had been developed, Grant was the

¹ Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 549.

² This act repealed the \$300 exemption clause which had been a large factor in the incitement of the New York draft riots; if one were drafted now, he must go into the service or furnish a substitute.

³ Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 551.

⁴ O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 385.

⁵ Halleck, be it remembered, was the President's chief-of-staff.

fittest of all the generals to command the armies of the United States. That the President had confidence in him is plainly manifest. Before Grant knew of the proclamation calling for 500,000 volunteers, he suggested that there ought to be an immediate call for 300,000. Lincoln, in reply, informing him of what he had already done, said, "Always glad to have your suggestions."¹ During July and August there obtained the usual pressure which came in time of disaster, for the restoration of McClellan to command;² but I have written in vain if the reader can suppose that Lincoln entertained the idea of displacing Grant by McClellan, or that such a change would have redounded to the benefit of the Union cause.³

Despondency and discouragement are words which portray the state of feeling at the North during the month of July,

¹ July 19, 20, O. R. vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 384, 400.

² This is well illustrated by Francis P. Blair's self-imposed mission to McClellan about July 20. — Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 790. The *Cincinnati Commercial* (Rep.) of Aug. 2 thought that McClellan should be placed in command of the defences of Washington. The N. Y. *World* of Aug. 5, in citing the *Cincinnati Commercial* article, said that several Republican newspapers had expressed the same view. A pedler told a guest at a New York City hotel that he now sold more of McClellan's portraits than he did of Grant's (N. Y. *Tribune*, Aug. 12), an exhibition of surface public sentiment different from that of the previous April, when at the Metropolitan Sanitary Fair in New York City the sword-voting contest (each vote costing one dollar) terminated amid great excitement and some turbulence in 30,291 votes for Grant and 14,509 for McClellan. — N. Y. *Tribune*, April 23, 25, *World*, April 25.

³ I believe that the following citation from Wilkeson, Rec. of a Private, represents the sentiment which preponderated in the army: "The enlisted men spent much time in comparing Grant with McClellan. The latter had many warm friends among the soldiers. He only of all the men who had commanded the Army of the Potomac was personally liked and admired by his troops. Soldiers' eyes would brighten when they talked of him. Their hard, lean, browned faces would soften and light up with affection when they spoke of him, — and still it was affection only; they did not, as a rule, concede to him military talent. And the general opinion among them was, given Grant in command of the army in 1862, and the rebellion would have been crushed that year. Asked how McClellan would have done with the army of 1864 under his command, they shrugged their shoulders and said dryly, 'Well, he would have ended the war in the Wilderness — by establishing the Confederacy.' " — P. 192.

and the closer one's knowledge of affairs the gloomier was his view; but the salient facts put into every one's mind the pertinent question, "Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed on the opening of Grant's campaign?"¹

A resolution of Congress adopted July 2 was worthy of the Hebrews of the Old Testament or the Puritans of the English Civil War. It requested the President "to appoint a day for humiliation and prayer," and to ask the people "to convene at their usual places of worship" in order that they may "confess and repent of their manifold sins, implore the compassion and forgiveness of the Almighty, that, if consistent with his will, the existing rebellion may be speedily suppressed," and "implore him as the supreme ruler of the world not to destroy us as a people." The President, "cordially concurring . . . in the penitential and pious sentiments expressed" in that resolution, appointed the first Thursday of August to be "observed by the people of the United States as a day of national humiliation and prayer."²

Two despatches during Early's invasion of Maryland are worthy of note. Brigadier-General West having asked Halleck by telegraph from the Continental Hotel, Philadelphia, whether he could be of service in that vicinity,³ Halleck made this grim reply: "We have five times as many generals here as we want, but are greatly in need of privates. Any one volunteering in that capacity will be thankfully received."⁴ Thomas A. Scott, who was always ready to help efficiently the government in a time of trouble, and who now offered the services of himself and his railroad,⁵ telegraphed from Philadelphia to Stanton, "The apathy in the public mind

¹ N. Y. *World*, July 12. Yet this journal was fair in its treatment of Grant, see July 1, 12, 20, Aug. 4.

² Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 544.

³ O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 81.

⁴ July 11, *ibid.*, p. 196. Halleck may have thought of Artemus Ward's proposal to raise a "company composed exclsosively of offissers, everybody to rank as Brigadier-General."

⁵ The Pennsylvania Railroad.

is fearful.”¹ It might well be doubted whether men in sufficient number and money in a sufficient amount would be forthcoming to complete the work of conquering the South. The financial condition of the country was deplorable, and may be measured by the fluctuations of the price of gold. January 2 gold sold in New York at 152, and when in April it reached 175 the Secretary of the Treasury endeavored to depress the price by the sale of about eleven millions; but the effect was only temporary. It continued to advance, and by June 17 had passed 197. On this day the President approved an act of Congress which aimed to prevent speculative sales of gold, and which calls to mind futile human efforts to stay a flood. After this enactment the speculation became wilder than before, and owing to the military failures and the resignation of Chase, gold touched, on the last day of June, 250. July 2 “An Act to prohibit certain sales of gold” was repealed. July 11, when Early was before Washington and communication with that city was cut off, gold fetched 285, its highest price during the war; the next day, the day of the skirmish in the vicinity of Fort Stevens and of the rumor in Philadelphia that the capital had fallen, it sold at 282. Such prices meant that the paper money in circulation was worth less than forty cents on the dollar. As the government bonds were sold for this money, the United States were paying, with gold at 250 (at which price or higher it sold during the greater part of July and August), fifteen per cent. on their loans.² Nevertheless, money could be had. The continued issue of legal-tender notes had inflated the currency. Business, though feverish, was good; and many fortunes of our day had their origin in the excited business years of 1863 and 1864, when sales were easily made, most transactions were for cash, and nearly every one engaged in trade or manufactures seemed

¹ O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 255. On the apathy in New York City, see a startling article in the *N. Y. Round Table* of July 16.

² Schuckers's *Life of Chase*, chap. xxxvi., also p. 633; *N. Y. Tribune*, July 11, 13; *N. Y. World*, July 13; *N. Y. Round Table*, July 23; *Boston Advertiser*, Aug. 10.

to be getting rich.¹ There must have been still considerable financial strength in reserve, and as the value of property depended largely on a stable government, ample funds would have been furnished in the supreme crisis for its maintenance. Even now it was an element of confidence that the Germans were making large and constant purchases of our bonds.²

But the question of men was of far greater seriousness. In spite of the large immigration, labor was scarce, and in spite of the high prices of the staples of living, seemingly well paid. The class of men who enlisted in 1861 and 1862 no longer came forward; the ranks, as the conditions of the narrative have frequently obliged me to state, were filled by mercenaries, part of whom were obtained from the steady influx of European immigrants and from robust sons of Canada who contracted their service for a stipulated sum. Notwithstanding these sources of supply, able-bodied men in sufficient number were difficult to obtain. Many of the veterans, especially those in Sherman's army, the officers generally, the hundred-days men from the Western States, who had originally organized themselves as home guards, were from the best class of the community; and sorrow, now hanging over nearly every household from the casualties of war, augmented the discouragement and gloom.

In the early days of July there was cheer at the news of the spirited duel between the *Alabama* and the *Kearsarge* off the French coast in the English Channel, which resulted in the defeat and sinking of the Confederate cruiser, while the *Kearsarge* suffered little, its casualties being only three wounded men; but it was the gladness over a heroic exploit and the gratification of revenge that this formidable destroyer of our commerce had at last been driven to her ruin.³ That

¹ George Ticknor wrote Pickard, May 10, 1864: "Luxury reigns as it never did before in Boston, New York, and through the North generally." — *Life and Letters of Ticknor*, vol. ii. p. 456.

² City article *London Times*, Aug. 15, cited by *Boston Advertiser*, Sept. 1.

³ The fight took place June 19. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 143; *Century War Book*, vol. iv. p. 600. Motley wrote, June 27: "The sinking of the

the destruction of the *Alabama* had no effect in lightening the general gloom, since it was universally regarded as of no moment towards terminating the war, demonstrates how little, if anything, the ravages of the Confederate cruiser had to do directly with the prolongation of the civil conflict.¹

Nor did the operations of Sherman dispel the gloom. Successful though they were, they lacked a striking character, and while steadily making for the destruction of Johnston's army and the capture of Atlanta, neither of these objects had yet been accomplished. July 17 Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee River, and began his movement directly against Atlanta. Jefferson Davis on the same day assisted him greatly by the removal of Johnston from the command, for the reason, in the words of the order, that "you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta . . . and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him."² So masterly had been the strategy of Johnston in retreat that the intelligence of his displacement was glad tidings to the Union general, and to all the officers and men in the Union army. J. B. Hood, who superseded him, had been personally known at West Point by McPherson, Schofield, and Howard, and they with Sherman proceeded to measure the new commander: the result is summed up in Sherman's words, "the change . . . meant fight."³ In truth, the removal of Johnston implied that the Confederates must take the offensive, and Hood lost no time in carrying out the design of Jefferson Davis, which confirmed the judgment of Sherman. Thrice he attacked and brought on a battle; thrice

Alabama by the plucky little *Kearsarge* will occasion great glee everywhere at home, and I can almost hear the shouts of delight at this distance."—Letters, vol. ii. p. 164. Farragut wrote: "I would sooner have fought that fight than any ever fought on the ocean."—Mahan's Farragut, p. 252.

¹ Grant shows no joy when he refers to the intelligence.—O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 60. Mr. Pierce prints no letter in which Sumner rejoices at it. I use the word "directly," in the text, as the escape and destructive work of the *Alabama* might have caused war between Great Britain and the United States.

² Johnston's Narrative, p. 349.

³ Sherman Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 72

he was repulsed with severe loss: these are the battles of Peach Tree creek, July 20, Atlanta, the 22d, and Ezra Church, the 28th. The chief feature of the battle of Atlanta, which was fought within two and one-half miles of the city, was a vigorous and skilful attack by Hardee, which struck a portion of the Union line in the rear, and would have caused a panic among any but sturdy veterans; but the soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee leaped over their breastworks and fought from the reverse side. McPherson, however, their commander, was killed. He had just left Sherman to investigate the unexplained firing in his rear, and to make the necessary dispositions to meet it; he had already given several orders, when he rode into the woods and ran into a Confederate skirmish line. The Confederates called upon him to surrender; he wheeled his horse in the attempt to ride away; there was a volley of musketry, and one of the noblest soldiers of the war fell dead. His sudden loss, telegraphed Sherman, "was a heavy blow to me."¹ This misfortune, together with the Confederate claims of victory,² contributed partially, without doubt, to the lack of comprehension of what had really been gained during the month of July in this campaign, for the general notion seemed to be that the whole story was told in the statement, "Sherman is checked before Atlanta."³ But in fact Hood's army had been crippled, and

¹ July 24, O. R., vol. xxxviii, part v. p. 240. He wrote the same day: "General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant knight and gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate its honor and integrity. History tells us of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith, and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, ne'er spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect; those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth." — *Ibid.*, p. 241.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 903, 908, 909.

³ *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 4; *Boston Advertiser*, Aug. 2.

after the battle of Ezra Church he did not attack Sherman again for more than a month. The casualties of the Confederates during July were about 10,841, of the Union army 9719.¹

The apathy and discouragement throughout the country took the shape of a yearning for peace,² and this found an emphatic expression in much of the public and private writing of Horace Greeley, who in the month of July made an attempt to initiate negotiations which should bring the war to an end. On questionable authority he had received information that "two ambassadors of Davis & Co." were in Canada, "with full and complete powers for a peace." Placing this intelligence before the President, and writing that "our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace, shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood," he urged Lincoln to make "a frank offer . . . to the insurgents of terms which the impartial will say ought to be accepted," and to invite "those now at Niagara [Canada] to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum."³ Lincoln replied: "If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you."⁴ Such a mode of prosecuting the business was not in accordance with Greeley's idea; therefore it was not until after further correspondence and some

¹ Sherman Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 93. This is one of my principal authorities on this campaign. See also Sherman's report, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part i. p. 71; the correspondence, *ibid.*, part v.; J. D. Cox, Atlanta; Johnston's Narrative; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix.; J. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii.; Howard's article, Century War Book, vol. iv.

² Lowell wrote Motley, July 28: "The mercantile classes are longing for peace, but I believe the people are more firm than ever." — Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 168.

³ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 185 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 187, 188.

pressure from the President ¹ that he with reluctance accepted the mission and proceeded to Niagara Falls, where, on the American side of the river, he began negotiations with the Confederates in Canada. He exceeded his mandate, but ascertained that the Confederates were without authority from the Richmond government. This compelled him to ask for fresh instructions, upon which the President sent to him his private secretary, John Hay, with the famous paper of July 18: "To Whom it may Concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. ABRAHAM LINCOLN." ² This was transmitted to the Confederates, and stopped all further negotiations, prompting from them an indignant manifesto, and from Greeley a sad, discouraged, reproachful letter. ³

It was the idea of Greeley that for political as well as other reasons the President should have invited the Confederates to Washington, and asked them to submit their terms, without pronouncing at the outset an ultimatum, "however inherently reasonable," ⁴ which precluded any negotiation whatever; and indeed the President's ultimatum had for the moment an unfortunate effect on public opinion. Its form was deemed infelicitous; its substance gave a shock to those people who would willingly see the strife of arms cease on the simple

¹ Lincoln made the following effective statement: "I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made." — Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 189.

² Ibid., p. 192.

³ Ibid., chap. viii.; Greeley's *Amer. Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 664; Appleton's *Ann. Cyc.*, 1864, p. 780; Raymond's *Life of Lincoln*, p. 571; J. Davis's *Rise and Fall of the Confed. Government*, vol. ii. p. 611; *N. Y. Tribune*, July 22, 25; Benjamin to Mason, Aug. 25, *Richmond Dispatch*, Aug. 26.

⁴ *American Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 665.

condition of the restoration of the Union, and who believed that the exaction from the South of the abandonment of slavery stood in the way of peace. The course of after events, however, has amply justified the conduct of the President.

In truth, a conference occurring at the very time made it evident how well Lincoln grasped the situation, how he comprehended that any sure and satisfactory peace could come only from the destruction or surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaquess and J. R. Gilmore went, with the knowledge and consent of the President, on an irregular mission to Richmond, and obtained on the evening of July 17 an interview with Jefferson Davis. The burden of their conversation was, Could any means be tried that might lead to peace? "I desire peace as much as you do," said Davis, but the war "must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, *unless you acknowledge our right to self-government*. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for Independence, and that or extermination we *will* have." As Jaquess and Gilmore took their departure, Davis said: "Say to Mr. Lincoln from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our Independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

Taking into account the actual military situation, a different attitude on the part of the Richmond government could not have been expected. Davis also stated with clearness the understanding of present conditions by the aggressive people of the South. "We are not exactly shut up in Richmond," he said. "If your papers tell the truth, it is your capital that is in danger, not ours. Some weeks ago, Grant crossed the Rapidan to whip Lee and take Richmond. Lee drove him in the first battle, and then Grant executed what your people call a 'brilliant flank movement,' and fought Lee again. Lee drove him a second time, and then Grant made another 'flank movement;' and so they kept on, — Lee whipping, and Grant flanking, — until Grant got where he is now.

And what is the net result? Grant has lost seventy-five or eighty thousand men — *more than Lee had at the outset* — and is no nearer taking Richmond than at first; and Lee, whose front has never been broken, holds him completely in check, and has men enough to spare to invade Maryland and threaten Washington! Sherman, to be sure, *is* before Atlanta; but suppose he is and suppose he takes it? You know that the farther he goes from his base of supplies the weaker he grows, and the more disastrous defeat will be to him. And defeat *may* come. So, in a military view, I should certainly say our position was better than yours. As to money, we are richer than you are. You smile; but admit that our paper is worth nothing, — it answers as a circulating medium, and we hold it all ourselves. If every dollar of it were lost, we should, as we have no foreign debt, be none the poorer. But it *is* worth something; it has the solid basis of a large cotton crop, while yours rests on nothing, and you owe all the world. As to resources, we do not lack for arms or ammunition, and we have still a wide territory from which to gather supplies.”¹

Bad as was the military situation, the North had not yet come to the end of its misfortunes. A promising attempt to capture Petersburg by blowing up a portion of the Confederate works through the agency of a huge mine charged with powder failed on account of the inefficiency of the corps commander and the incompetence and cowardice of the general of a division, who were unequal to their opportunity after the mine had properly done its work. The casualties were great, the blundering was indisputable.² This affair intensified the

¹ Down in Tennessee, Kirke (Gilmore), pp. 272, 273, 280; letter of J. R. Gilmore in *Boston Evening Transcript*, July 22; *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept. 1864; Benjamin's circular from the State Department, Aug. 25, *Richmond Dispatch*, Aug. 26; comments of *Richmond Dispatch* and *Whig*, Aug. 26, of *Richmond Enquirer*, Aug. 27; letter of J. R. Gilmore, Sept. 3, to N. Y. *Tribune*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. chap. ix.; Davis, *Rise and Fall of Confed. Government*, vol. ii. p. 610; J. R. Gilmore, *Personal Recollections of A. Lincoln*, chap. xvii.

² This was July 30, O. R., vol xxxvi. part i. p. 27; *ibid.* vol. xl. part i.

depression in the Army of the Potomac and in the country at large.

"I shall say nothing about politics, my dear Charles," wrote Lowell to Norton, August 1, "for I feel rather down in the mouth, and moreover I have not had an idea for so long that I shouldn't know one if I saw it. The war and its constant expectation and anxiety oppress me. I cannot think."¹

The intense gloom displayed itself in two forms, — in eagerness for peace and in dissatisfaction with Lincoln. "I know," wrote Greeley to Lincoln, August 9, "that nine-tenths of the whole American people, North and South, are anxious for peace — peace on almost any terms — and utterly sick of human slaughter and devastation. I know that, to the general eye, it now seems that the rebels are anxious to negotiate and that we repulse their advances. I know that if this impression be not removed we shall be beaten out of sight next November. I firmly believe that, were the election to take place to-morrow, the Democratic majority in this State and Pennsylvania would amount to 100,000, and that we should lose Connecticut also. Now, if the Rebellion can be crushed before November, it will do to go on; if not, we are rushing on certain ruin. . . . Now I do not know that a tolerable peace could be had, but I believe it might have been last month; and at all events, I know that an honest, sincere effort for it would have done us immense good. And I think no government fighting a rebellion should ever close its ears to any proposition the rebels may make. I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for peace forthwith. And in case peace cannot now be made, consent to an *armistice for one year*, each party to retain, unmolested, all it now holds, but the rebel ports to be opened. Meantime, let a

p. 163 *et seq.*, p. 556; Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 315; Humphreys, p. 254; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 420; Century War Book, vol. iv. pp. 543, 561.

¹ Lowell Letters, vol. i. p. 839.

national convention be held, and there will surely be no more war at all events.”¹

The dissatisfaction with Lincoln found expression in New York City in a private call which had the support of many influential men for a convention to be held in Cincinnati, September 28, to nominate, if necessary, a new candidate for president. “Mr. Lincoln is already beaten,” wrote Greeley, August 18. “He cannot be elected. And we must have another ticket to save us from utter overthrow. If we had such a ticket as could be made by naming Grant, Butler, or Sherman for President, and Farragut for Vice, we could make a fight yet. And such a ticket we ought to have anyhow, with or without a convention.”² Chase, in a letter to George Opdyke, showed partial sympathy with this movement. Henry Winter Davis wrote in hearty advocacy of a new candidate, and vouched for the support of Wade.³ Daniel S. Dickinson gave countenance to the enterprise,⁴ which had also the backing of Governor Andrew.⁵ Other prominent men, not willing to go to the length of Greeley, Davis, Wade, and Andrew, would have looked with supreme satisfaction on the

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. pp. 196, 197.

² N. Y. *Sun*, June 30, 1889. The call for the convention is also therein printed.

³ Aug. 19, 25, *ibid.*; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. ii. p. 102.

⁴ Dickinson wrote, Aug. 26: “I cannot believe that Mr. Lincoln, if fully advised of the public mind, would desire to enter upon a canvass. If the necessities of the shoddy contractors and longing office-holders had been less, the Union convention would have been postponed to September, and the true popular sentiment might be consulted and obeyed. . . . The war has been protracted beyond popular expectation. Men and money have been given freely. The helm has not been held with a firm and steady grasp, and there is a cry of change, which, no matter whether wise or ill-founded, should be both heard and heeded.” — *Ibid.* See, also, Dickinson’s *Letters and Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 650.

⁵ *Memoir of J. A. Andrew*, Chandler, p. 111. It is a tradition that Andrew’s objection to Lincoln, growing out of his own radical views and associations, was heightened by an incident during a visit of his to the White House. While the governor was setting forth a matter he had at heart, the President, by way of putting him off, told him in illustration a smutty story, which turned the manner of his presentation into ridicule and caused him disgust.

withdrawal of Lincoln that a stronger candidate might be named.¹ In Boston a number of radicals asked Frémont if he would withdraw from the canvass provided that Lincoln would do the same. He did not answer this question categorically, but suggested a new "popular convention upon a broad and liberal basis," and by implication a new candidate.² The proposition that both Lincoln and Frémont should retire from the field received the support of Richard Smith, the editor of the *Cincinnati Gazette*. "The people regard Mr. Lincoln's candidacy as a misfortune," he wrote. "His apparent strength when nominated was fictitious, and now the fiction has disappeared, and instead of confidence there is distrust. I do not know a Lincoln man, and in all our correspondence, which is large and varied, I have seen few letters from Lincoln men. . . . The withdrawal of Lincoln and Frémont, and the nomination of a man that would inspire confidence and infuse a life into our ranks would be hailed with general delight."³

Acutely conscious of public sentiment, did Lincoln, in view of the yearning for peace,⁴ change his ground from his "To Whom it may Concern" manifesto of July? He certainly did not in any published missive, but he revealed his mind in words written down in the form of a letter which probably was never sent. "If Jefferson Davis," he wrote, "wishes for himself, or for the benefit of his friends at the North, to know what I would do if he were to offer peace and reunion, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me."⁵

¹ *E. g.* Charles Sumner, Amasa Walker, L. Robinson, John Jay, White-law Reid. See their letters Aug. 29-Sept. 2, *N. Y. Sun*, June 30, 1889; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 197; see, also, Lieber's letter to Halleck, Sept. 1, *Life and Letters*, p. 350.

² *Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 791.

³ *N. Y. Sun*, June 30, 1889.

⁴ Many peace meetings were held in Ohio, a notable one at Peoria, Ill. Vallandigham addressed a large peace meeting at Syracuse. He had returned to Ohio in June, 1864, and went about unnoticed and unmolested by the President. — *Columbus Crisis*, Aug. 10, 24; *Life of Vallandigham*, p. 351 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 359.

⁵ Aug. 17, *ibid.*, vol. ix. p. 217; see, also, draft of instructions to Raymond, *ibid.*, p. 220.

On the face of things this may seem a change of ground. In July he made two conditions for peace, Union and the abandonment of slavery, now only one, reunion, "saying nothing about slavery;" but if the conversation of Jefferson Davis with Jaquess and Gilmore had sunk deeply into his soul, the change was one of words and naught in essence. "You have already emancipated nearly two millions of our slaves," Davis said, "and if you will take care of them you may emancipate the rest. I had a few when the war began. I was of some use to them; they never were of any to me. Against their will you 'emancipated' them; and you may 'emancipate' every negro in the Confederacy, but we will be free! We will govern ourselves! We *will* do it, if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames!"¹

Lincoln's eager desire for military success was expressed, on the day of his seeming change of ground, in a despatch to Grant, wherein is the quaint phraseology which brings a smile when read at the present day, although undoubtedly used with no attempt at humor, but, on the contrary, with a sad and heavy heart. "I have seen your despatch," he said, "expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible."²

The Democrats, who were to meet in convention at Chicago on August 29, were sure to nominate McClellan, who was the most popular man they could name. As he would receive the support of the Democrats and of a certain conservative element in the Union party, and since Frémont would draw off the radicals from their ordinary party allegiance in some of the doubtful States, the election of Lincoln was endangered, and the jubilation of the Democrats at their prospect of success was, in the existing state of the public mind, well

¹ Down in Tennessee, Kirke (Gilmore), p. 279. See Seward's speech, Sept. 3, Works, vol. v. p. 502. For an allusion of Lincoln to a declaration of Davis to Jaquess and Gilmore, see Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 553.

² Aug. 17. *ibid.*, p. 563.

founded. The friends of Lincoln became alarmed. August 22 Thurlow Weed wrote to Seward: "When, ten days since, I told Mr. Lincoln that his re-election was an impossibility, I also told him that the information would soon come to him through other channels. It has doubtless ere this reached him. At any rate, nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States who authorizes the slightest hope of success. Mr. Raymond, who has just left me, says that unless some prompt and bold step be now taken all is lost. The people are wild for peace. They are told that the President will only listen to terms of peace on condition [that] slavery be abandoned."¹ The Republican National Executive Committee met in New York City for consultation: this was the report given, August 22, to the President of its deliberations by Henry J. Raymond, its chairman, the editor of the *New York Times*, the representative of a wing of the Republican party which had steadfastly supported the administration and was antagonistic to the faction headed by Greeley. "I feel compelled," Raymond wrote, "to drop you a line concerning the political condition of the country as it strikes me. I am in active correspondence with your staunchest friends in every State, and from them all I hear but one report. The tide is setting strongly against us. Hon. E. B. Washburne writes that, 'were an election to be held now in Illinois, we should be beaten.' Mr. Cameron writes that Pennsylvania is against us. Governor Morton writes that nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry Indiana. This State, according to the best information I can get, would go 50,000 against us to-morrow. And so of the rest. Nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the Government and its friends can save the country from falling into hostile hands. Two special causes are assigned for this great reaction in public sentiment, — the want of military successes, and the impression in some minds, the fear and suspicion in others, that we are not to have peace in any event under this Administration

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 250.

until slavery is abandoned. In some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused that we can have peace with Union if we would. It is idle to reason with this belief — still more idle to denounce it. It can only be expelled by some authoritative act at once bold enough to fix attention and distinct enough to defy incredulity and challenge respect.”¹

The reading of the sentiment of the country by Lincoln affords us a glimpse into his soul which discloses judgment of affairs, patriotism, and magnanimity. August 23, the day probably on which he received Raymond's letter, he wrote this memorandum to be seen at that time of no one: “This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.”²

August 29 the Democratic National Convention met in Chicago. Governor Seymour was its permanent chairman, but in its proceedings Vallandigham³ seemed equally influential. Seymour and his following dictated the candidate, McClellan being nominated for President on the first ballot; but Vallandigham drew up the important resolution, carried it through the committee, and got it adopted by the conven-

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 218. Raymond went on to suggest a peace commission to make proffers of peace to Davis, which he had little doubt would be rejected, and the rejection of them would “unite the North as nothing since the firing on Fort Sumter has hitherto done.” For the sequel of this, *ibid.*, pp. 220, 221.

² *Ibid.*, p. 251. In my study of this subject I have consulted the files of the *N. Y. Tribune*, *World*, *Times*, *Independent*, *Round Table*, *Boston Advertiser*, *Springfield Republican*, and *Chicago Tribune*. See especially the *Tribune*, July 25, Aug. 4, 12, 17, *World*, July 21, Aug. 11, 17, 20, *Times*, Aug. 10, 24, Sept. 8, *Round Table*, July 23; *Springfield Republican*, Aug. 2, *Cincinnati Gazette*, Aug. 27, cited by the *Tribune*; Forney's *Chronicle* cited by the *World*, Aug. 18; see Seward's private letters, *Life*, vol. iii. pp. 238, 239, 240, 241; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. ii. p. 101.

³ See note 4, p. 519.

tion,¹ which thus resolved: "That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."²

At first the nominations at Chicago³ were received with enthusiasm by the Democrats and with solicitude by some Republicans. "The Chicago men seem to take well," wrote Henry Winter Davis, "and I hear daily of defections to them in quarters least expected from us."⁴ "We think McClellan and Pendleton a very strong ticket," wrote Whitelaw Reid from Cincinnati, "and fear the result."⁵ But this was simply an instant outburst of sentiment. A marked revulsion was at hand. While the people were pondering the resolution of the Democratic convention which, with epigrammatic brevity, they had reduced to the words, Resolved that the war is a failure, they read in their newspapers of September 3, "General Sherman has taken Atlanta," and they made up their minds that the declaration of the Democrats was untrue. Two days later the modest words of Sherman were printed: "Atlanta is ours and fairly won."⁶ This was the culmination

¹ Vallandigham wrote, Oct. 22, to the N. Y. *Daily News*: "Mr. Vallandigham wrote the second, the material resolution, of the Chicago Platform, and carried it through the Sub-Committee and the General Committee, in spite of the most desperate and persistent opposition on the part of Cassidy and his friends." — *Tribune*, Oct. 26.

² Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 793. See Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 254 *et seq.*; Stanwood, *Hist. of the Pres.*, p. 304; *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 30, 31; N. Y. *Tribune*, Sept. 1, *Independent*, Sept. 1; *Springfield Republican*, Sept. 1.

³ George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, was nominated for Vice-President.

⁴ From Wilmington, Del. The letter is undated, but was written about Sept. 1. — N. Y. *Sun*, June 30, 1889.

⁵ Sept. 2, *ibid.*

⁶ N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 5; O. R., vol. xxxviii. part v. p. 777. Hood abandoned Atlanta the night of Sept. 1.

of his striving and of that of his able lieutenants and their devoted armies. The campaign was all the more glorious in that "a victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers."¹ The army which entered Atlanta was substantially the same as the army which Sherman led out of Chattanooga.²

In August Farragut had fought the great battle of Mobile Bay, defeated the Confederate fleet, and had become master of the bay, compelling the surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan. "In the lofty courage and stern determination which plucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat, the battle of Mobile Bay was to the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was to that of Nelson."³ Mobile, now the most important port in the Gulf of Mexico remaining to the Confederates, was no longer available for blockade-running. Another door to the outside world was shut. The persistent work of the navy by the blockade and the capture of ports was reducing the South to complete isolation.⁴

In August the demonstrations of joy over this naval exploit were perfunctory, but the capture of Atlanta by Sherman seemed to give Farragut's victory a cumulative force. The President, on September 3, issued a proclamation asking the people, when they assembled in their churches on the next Sunday, to make a "devout acknowledgment to the Supreme Being" for the success of the fleet in the harbor of Mobile, and the glorious achievements of the army in the State of Georgia; he issued orders of thanks to Farragut and Sherman; and he ordered salutes of rejoicing to be fired from the navy-yards and arsenals of the country.⁵ On the Sunday appointed by the President, the people, with one accord, thanked God and took courage.⁶

¹ *Much Ado about Nothing*, act i. scene 1.

² J. C. Ropes, *Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, vol. x. p. 267.

³ Mahan's *Farragut*, p. 239.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240 *et seq.*; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 230. Fort Gaines was surrendered Aug. 7, Morgan, Aug. 23.

⁵ Lincoln, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 571.

⁶ *N. Y. Times*, Sept. 12; see, also, *Life of Seward*, vol. iii. p. 244.

McClellan accepted the nomination of the Democrats, but repudiated the pivotal resolution of their platform.¹ Grant furnished a strong campaign document, in a private letter to E. B. Washburne, written August 16, but not published until twenty-four days later. "I state to all citizens who visit me," he wrote, "that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment North. The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for entrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing, from desertions and other causes, at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant, if we will only be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcements from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, while it would weaken us. With the draft quickly enforced, the enemy would become despondent, and would make but little resistance. I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter-revolution; they hope the election of the Peace candidate. In fact, like 'Micawber,' they hope for something to 'turn up.' Our Peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would but be the beginning of war with thousands of Northern men joining the South because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have 'peace on any terms,' the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed; they would demand indemnity for losses sustained, and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave-hunters for

¹ Letter of Sept. 8, Appleton's Ann. Cyc., 1864, p. 794; Stanwood, Hist of the Pres., p. 306.

the South. They would demand pay for the restoration of every slave escaping to the North.”¹

The State elections in Vermont and Maine, during the first half of September, showed that the disaffection with the administration was small, and indicated a favorable result for Lincoln in November.²

During the month of August, Sheridan, who, it will be remembered, had been placed in command of the army in the Shenandoah valley, accomplished no positive results, but in his marches and countermarches, in his advance and retreat, he was learning the ground and studying his adversary. Grant, watching all the movements, and alive to the importance of the valley, paid his lieutenant a visit, September 15, and gave him an order in the two words, “Go in!”³ Four days later Sheridan gained a brilliant victory over Early at Winchester, announcing it in these words to Grant: “I attacked the forces of General Early . . . and after a most stubborn and sanguinary engagement, which lasted from early in the morning until five o’clock in the evening, completely defeated him, and, driving him through Winchester, captured about 2500 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, 9 army flags, and most of their wounded.”⁴ September 20 Lincoln sent this hearty message to Sheridan: “Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men.”⁵ The Confederates “rallied and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher’s Hill,”⁶ where Sheridan again attacked them and put them to rout. “I achieved a most signal victory over the army of General Early at Fisher’s Hill to-day,” he telegraphed to Grant, September 22; “. . . only darkness has saved the whole of Early’s army from total destruction. My attack could not be made until four o’clock in the evening, which

¹ N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 9; Appleton’s Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 134.

² Greeley’s *Amer. Conflict*, vol. ii. p. 670.

³ O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 30.

⁴ N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 21; Sept. 19, 7.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 117.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 31.

left but little daylight to operate in. . . . The victory was very complete."¹

These victories of Sheridan appealed to the popular imagination, as had those of Stonewall Jackson in 1862; but now it was the North which rejoiced that the commander who united dash and prudence was on their side, giving them long-wished-for but unexpected victories in the Shenandoah valley, which had been the death of so many hopes, and the open door to the invasions of the North. What campaign speeches were Sheridan's despatches, telling the stories of Winchester and Fisher's Hill! How they contrasted with the declaration of the Chicago platform that there had been "four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war," and with its demand that there should be "a cessation of hostilities"! While such victories are gained, said one citizen to another as they shook hands and rejoiced, the war is not a failure; and victors in such battles do not ask for an armistice.

The political campaign was now prosecuted with vigor. Secretary Seward, in a brief speech at Washington, said, "Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations."² Chase, who during July and August had been sulky and wavering, and had sneered at the President, now announced his support of Lincoln, went on the stump, and made effective speeches for the Union candidate.³

¹ N. Y. *Times*, Sept. 24; O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 26. Sept. 23 Sheridan telegraphed: "General Crook struck the left flank of the enemy, doubled it up, advancing down along their line. Ricketts's division, of Sixth Army Corps, swung in and joined Crook, Getty's and Wheaton's divisions taking up the same movement, followed by the whole line, and attacking beautifully, carried the works of the enemy. The rebels threw down their arms, and fled in the greatest confusion, abandoning most of their artillery. . . . I do not think that there ever was an army so badly routed." — *Ibid.*, p. 27.

² Sept. 14, before Sheridan's victories. — Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1864, p. 794; *Life of J. M. Forbes*, vol. ii. p. 107.

³ Judge E. R. Hoar once told me that he met Chase at a dinner in Boston during the summer, and that the ex-Secretary spoke with no attempt at concealment in offensively contemptuous terms of Lincoln. Lowell wrote Norton, Aug. 18: "To-day I am going to help dine Mr. Chase. I shall come

Dickinson wrote: "I make no doubt of Lincoln's triumphant election."¹ Whitelaw Reid, in a newspaper despatch from Washington, said that the radicals had returned to their old allegiance, and would fight in the van.² Governor Andrew, in a private letter, wrote that the plain duty for them as practical men was to give to Lincoln their energetic support.³ The tide having turned, the President helped the movement with the art of the politician. The sixth resolution of the Union National Convention virtually called for the removal of Montgomery Blair from the cabinet. During the gloomy summer, when everything seemed going wrong, when a smaller man would have complied with this demand, Lincoln did nothing, knowing that such an effort would be compared to the drowning man clutching at straws. But when the

home sorry that I went, I know. . . . Would n't I like to dine old Farragut, though! By Jove! the sea-service has n't lost its romance, in spite of iron turtles." — *Letters*, vol. 1. pp. 340, 341.

In August, when Chase was at the White Mountains with his devoted friend Edward L. Pierce, who urged that all must sink private griefs and support the Union nominations, he exclaimed, "Well, anyway, McClellan is a gentleman." Bowles wrote, Sept. 4: "Chase is going around, peddling his griefs in private ears, and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln." — *Merriam, Life of Bowles*, vol. i. p. 413. On the change of feeling of Chase, see letter of Sept. 20, *N. Y. Sun*, June 30, 1889; also, Schuckers, p. 510; letter to John Sherman, Oct. 2, *Sherman's Recollections*, vol. i. p. 340.

¹ *N. Y. Sun*, June 30, 1889.

² To the *St. Louis Democrat*, Sept. 21: "A private letter received here to-day from one of the prominent leaders in the radical movement now abandoned for another convention in Cincinnati, says: 'The conditions under which that call was issued were the general apathy and discontent and the apparent certainty of Mr. Lincoln's defeat. All this is changed. The outrage on the nation perpetrated at Chicago, the fall of Atlanta, the success of the cause in Vermont and Maine, render that impossible and unreasonable which then seemed our only safety. We must now place ourselves in the van of the fight; we shall not enjoy its honors, but we will do what we may to save the country; it shall not be said of us that we have played in this contest the part of Fitz John Porter at the Second Battle of Bull Run.' This statement, I have reason to know, fairly represents the views of the entire body of earnest Unionists with and for whom he has been acting, from Ben Wade and Winter Davis down. Whoever among our foes counts on disaffection or lukewarmness in our ranks in the coming contest reckons without his host." — *N. Y. Sun*, June 30, 1889.

³ *Ibid.*

current began to run in his favor, he was willing to make assurance doubly sure by lending himself to a bargain which should win the support of the still disaffected radicals who had placed Frémont in nomination, and of Wade and Davis, the authors of the manifesto and the most bitter of his opponents, who had influence and a considerable following. Frémont was to withdraw from the field, and the President was to request the resignation of Blair. The bargain was faithfully carried out. Frémont's letter of withdrawal to do his "part toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate" was published in the evening journals of September 22, and the next day the President requested the resignation of Blair.¹

To seal such a bargain was not a dignified proceeding on the part of the President of the United States, but it was a politic move. When we take into account the history of the candidacies of third parties, the earnest following of Frémont, and the estimated closeness of the vote in certain important States, the political shrewdness of Lincoln will be apparent. To consolidate the Republican party against its old-time opponent, to secure the energetic service of Wade on the stump, and the silence of Henry Winter Davis by a concession which had in it nothing of dishonor, and involved no injury to the public service, was a course to be adopted, without hesitation, by a master politician. Blair, with generosity and patriotism, made the sacrifice, and began at once to speak publicly and labor earnestly for the re-election of Lincoln.² The Union and Republican party, being now united, made an aggressive fight. Their epigrammatic interpretation

¹ *N. Y. Tribune*, evening ed., Sept. 22; *N. Y. Times*, Sept. 23; *Lincoln, Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 579; *Life of Z. Chandler*, *Detroit Post and Tribune*, p. 273 *et seq.*; *Julian's Polit. Rec.*, p. 248; *N. Y. Nation*, July 4, 1889. The despatches of the President to Blair, Sept. 1 and 3, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 571, would seem to indicate that he began to prepare for this change in his cabinet directly after the Chicago convention. There is not in Nicolay and Hay any intimation of this bargain, but in the light of the other evidence, pp. 335, 339 *et seq.*, vol. ix., are an indirect confirmation of it.

² Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 341; *Life of Chandler*, p. 277.

of the Democratic platform, Resolved that the war is a failure, was put forth on all occasions with the taunt that Farragut, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant had made this declaration forever and completely false; for Grant, the general of all the armies, shone in the reflected glory of his two lieutenants. Nothing could be more effective with the mass of the people than the contrast of these words of despair, written out carefully by Vallandigham, the most unpopular man of eminence in the country, with the victories on sea and land won by the ability and persistence of the admiral and generals who had been sustained by the hopefulness of the President and the people. In vain did Robert C. Winthrop urge, "If anybody is disposed to cavil with you about your platform, tell him that General McClellan has made his own platform, and that it is broad enough and comprehensive enough for every patriot in the land to stand upon." His supporters for the presidency, Winthrop continued, are not "scared from their position by any paper pellets of the brain, wise or otherwise, which ever came from the midnight sessions of a resolution committee in the hurly-burly of a National Convention."¹ But the record could not be blotted out. The salient resolution of the Democratic platform, or the epitome of it uttered every day by every Union newspaper and stump-speaker in all the villages, towns, and cities, was a damning argument which could not be overthrown. By way of parrying it, the Democrats glorified the generalship of McClellan, and made much of the alleged ill treatment of him by Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck, when he was in command of the Army of the Potomac. During July and August, when military re-

¹ Speech in New York City, Sept. 17, *Addresses and Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 598. Winthrop wrote in a private letter, Sept. 1: "It really seems to me as if the best hope of restoring the Union was in a change of administration, and I feel irresistibly compelled to support McClellan." — *Memoir by Robert C. Winthrop, Jr.*, p. 234. Again he wrote, Sept. 10: "I admit that the Chicago platform does not suit my fancy . . . but, on the whole, I do not see my way clear to prefer Lincoln and Johnson to McClellan and Pendleton. McClellan's letter of acceptance is admirable, and I can say Amen to it." — *Ibid.*, p. 235.

verses¹ were the food of reflection, there was a point to these arguments;² but the glory of Antietam paled when compared with the Atlanta campaign and the victories of Sheridan in the Shenandoah. The desperate character of the canvass for McClellan led the New York *World*, the ablest and most influential Democratic journal of the country, into an unworthy line of argument. Not content with the general charges of the "ignorance, incompetency, and corruption of Mr. Lincoln's administration," it cast imputations upon the personal honesty of the President. It asked these questions: "Mr. Lincoln, has he or has he not an interest in the profits of public contracts?" "Is Mr. Lincoln honest?" and gave these answers: "That Lincoln has succumbed to the . . . opportunities and temptations of his present place is capable of the easiest proof," and "This claim of honesty will not bear examination." Again it made this assertion, "'Honest Old Abe' has few honest men to defend his honesty."³ If anything in history be true, not only was there no just ground at this time for the slightest suspicions of the personal integrity of Lincoln, but it is, furthermore, certain that no more honest man than he ever lived.

From such campaign slanders it is agreeable to turn to the speeches of Horatio Seymour and Robert C. Winthrop, who advocated the election of a gentleman of honor in manner and words befitting their own high characters. At the end of the campaign, Winthrop quoted the injunction of an English orator and statesman, that "we should so be patriots as not to forget that we are gentlemen;"⁴ and while there may have been a tinge of sarcasm⁵ in this allusion, he him-

¹ I have given no account of the unfortunate Red River expedition of April and May. See Mahan's *Farragut*, pp. 245, 253; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 289 *et seq.* If Grant had achieved signal success in Virginia, the effect of it would have been obscured, but, as matters were in the summer, the memory of it reappears continually.

² The nomination of McClellan being a foregone conclusion.

³ N. Y. *World*, Sept. 22, 23, Oct. 1.

⁴ Speech in Boston, Nov. 2, *Addresses and Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 637.

⁵ Winthrop wrote, in a private letter from Boston, Oct. 23: "A very

self did not depart from the rule by a hair. Paying tribute to the strongest sentiment in the country at that time, love for the Union, both Seymour and Winthrop tried to impress it upon their hearers that the restoration of the Union would be more surely and quickly accomplished under the Democrats than by a continuance of the administration of Lincoln; and both gave their adherence to the party cry, "The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was." "Good Heavens!" exclaimed Winthrop, "what else are we fighting for?"¹ Both urged with force that Lincoln's "To Whom it may Concern" letter, in insisting upon the abandonment of slavery made an unnecessary and insuperable condition to the re-establishment of the Union, and both expressed their sincere belief that the Republican policy of emancipation and subjugation was an effectual hindrance to the pacification of the South.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the historian whose faith is in the anti-slavery cause can have no sympathy with the main line of Seymour's and Winthrop's arguments, but he will be recreant to his duty should he leave the impression that he approves the doctrine that in the stress of the nation criticism of the faults of the administration should be silent. Believing, as he must, from the political literature of the day and the sequence of events, that the good of the country and the good of mankind demanded the re-election of Lincoln, and that Seymour and Winthrop had chosen the wrong part, he may rejoice that on collateral points they spoke words of warning and of wisdom on which lovers of our country will do well to ponder. Seymour mentioned "the frauds and failures that in an unusual degree have marked the conduct of affairs during the last three and a half years. I do not mean to say," he continued, "that the administration is to be condemned because, under circumstances so unusual as those which have existed during this war, bad men have taken

insolent tone prevails here towards all who cannot find it in their conscience to support Lincoln." — *Memoir*, p. 257; see, also, *Addresses and Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 600.

¹ Sept. 17, *Addresses and Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 594.

advantage of the confusion in affairs to do acts of wrong. But I do complain that when these wrongs are done, the government deliberately passes laws that protect the doer, and thus makes wrongdoing its own act. Moreover, in an election like this, when the government is spending such an enormous amount of money, and the liability to speculation is so great, the administration that will say to contractors, as has been openly said in circulars: 'You have had a good contract, out of which you have made money, and we expect you to use a part of that money to assist to replace us in power,' renders itself a partner in fraud and corruption. The contractor will say to this government: 'You shall not make a peace that shall put an end to all my profits.'"¹ "The Republican party," declared Winthrop, "have so thriven and fattened on this rebellion, and it has brought them such an overflowing harvest of power, patronage, offices, contracts, and spoils, and they have become so enamoured of the vast and overshadowing influence which belongs to an existing administration at such an hour, that they are in danger of forgetting that their country is bleeding and dying on their hands."²

Worthy of note, too, is what both Seymour and Winthrop said, respecting the suppression of newspapers and arbitrary arrests. "In Great Britain," asserted Seymour, "the humblest hut in the kingdom, although it may be open to the winds and rains of heaven, is to the occupant a castle impregnable even to the monarch, while in our country the meanest and most unworthy underling of power is licensed to break within the sacred precincts of our homes."³ "When martial law," said Winthrop, "is deliberately and permanently substituted for almost every other kind of law; when it is promulgated and enforced in places and under circumstances where it has no relation whatever to military affairs;

¹ Speech in Philadelphia, Oct. 5, Public Record of H. Seymour, p. 257.

² Speech at New London, Conn., Oct. 18, Addresses and Speeches, vol. II. p. 615.

³ Speech in Philadelphia, Oct. 5, Public Record, p. 254.

when this extreme medicine of government is adopted and administered as its daily bread; when we see persons arrested and imprisoned . . . without examination or trial; . . . when we see newspapers silenced and suppressed at the tinkling of an Executive bell, a thousand miles away from the scene of hostilities; . . . when we hear those who have solemnly sworn to support the Constitution, proclaiming a prospective and permanent policy in utter disregard and defiance of that great charter of free government, and deriding and denouncing all who are for holding fast to it as it is, — who can help being alarmed for the future?"¹

The speeches of Winthrop and Seymour, however logical in appearance and finished in expression, were answered in the common mind by the bulletins of Sherman and Sheridan, the decline in gold and in the necessities of life, and the

¹ Speech in Boston Nov. 2, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 633, 634; Seymour's speeches at Milwaukee Sept. 1, in New York City Sept. 8, in Philadelphia Oct. 5, are printed in Public Record of H. Seymour. The speech in Philadelphia is especially dignified, high-toned, and patriotic. Winthrop's speeches in New York City Sept. 17, at New London Oct. 18, in Boston Nov. 2, are printed in vol. ii. of Addresses and Speeches. The New London speech was the *chef-d'œuvre*. It was printed in many Democratic newspapers. See N. Y. *World*, Oct. 20, Boston *Advertiser*, Oct. 21. Winthrop wrote in a private letter, Oct. 23: "The McClellan managers think so well of my New London speech that they have had it stereotyped, and besides my own edition, 200,000 copies are being circulated as campaign documents. My nomination at the head of the Democratic electoral ticket in this State was without my knowledge, but, feeling as I did, I could not refuse it, though I was sorry to be placed in a sort of antagonistic position to Everett" (who was at the head of the Union ticket). — Memoir, p. 258. He wrote, Dec. 10: "I dined yesterday with William Amory — the Friday Club — all of whom, as it turned out, had voted McClellan except Agassiz and Chief Justice Bigelow. Caleb Cushing was there as a guest, but his politics I doubt if any one can accurately define except himself. He and I walked home together about midnight, when he volunteered the remark that my New London speech was the most effective one on that side, and that if McClellan's cause had been uniformly advocated in the same spirit, and the campaign run on those lines, he might have been triumphantly elected. I had already learned, on good authority, that both Lincoln and Seward had expressed a substantially similar opinion, which I consider one of the greatest compliments ever paid me, there being no better judges of the ability of campaign speeches than these three men." — *Ibid.*, p. 261.

advance in price and continued large purchase of our bonds in Germany.¹ But persons given to reflection, who liked to see argument met by argument, found matter to their satisfaction in the campaign speeches of Carl Schurz, which, though not seemingly purposed as a direct answer to Winthrop and Seymour, shook their positions, demonstrating clearly and cogently the necessity for the re-election of Lincoln. Schurz maintained that the evidence was abundant and clear that the Confederates would not come back on the basis of reunion; that "the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy was a condition *sine quâ non* for all peace negotiations;" and that the Democratic argument, "while the rebel government is for war the Southern people are for peace," although specious, was in reality destitute of foundation. The sentiment which pervaded Winthrop's and Seymour's speeches he showed to be merely a "vague impression . . . that the union and universal good feeling may be restored by a policy of conciliation and compromise." But nothing could be clearer than that the only course to be pursued was to fight the war out. "We went into the war," he declared, "for the purpose of maintaining the Union and preserving our nationality. . . . Gradually it became clear to every candid mind that slavery untouched constituted the strength of the rebellion, but that slavery touched would constitute its weakness. . . . It became a question of life or death—the death of the nation or the death of slavery. Then the government chose. It chose the life of the nation by the death of slavery. . . . As soon as a man throws his whole heart into the struggle for the Union, he throws, at the

¹ Boston *Advertiser*, Sept. 24, Oct. 2, Chicago *Tribune*, Sept. 17, 28; city article London *Times*, cited in Boston *Advertiser*, Sept. 22. Carl Schurz said, in a speech in Philadelphia, Sept. 16: "You have heard of the people of Germany pouring their gold lavishly into the treasury of the United States [applause]. You have heard of a loan of a thousand millions having been offered and being now in progress of negotiation. Would those people who are standing by us so generously in our embarrassments, would they have done so if they did not trust in our ability and determination to carry through the war?"—Speeches, p. 289.

same time, his whole heart into the struggle against slavery." It is useless to talk of restoring the Union as it was. "Thank God, it is impossible" to revive slavery.¹

"There is not, now, the slightest uncertainty about the re-election of Mr. Lincoln," wrote Chase to John Sherman, October 2. "The only question is, by what popular and what electoral majority. God grant that both may be so decisive as to turn every hope of rebellion to despair!"²

October 11 State and congressional elections took place in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Ohio went Union by a majority of 54,751;³ Indiana gave Morton, for governor, 20,883 more votes than were received by his Democratic opponent, and all three States made material gains in Union members of Congress. These elections manifested a tendency of public opinion which gave an almost unerring indication of the election of Lincoln in November. Sheridan conveyed an augmented force to the movement, and infused enthusiasm into the last weeks of the canvass. In a despatch to Grant, at ten in the evening of October 19, he thus tells the story: "My army at Cedar Creek was attacked this morning before daylight, and my left was turned and driven in confusion; in fact, most of the line was driven in confusion with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery. I hastened from Winchester, where I was on my return from Washington, and found the armies between Middletown and Newtown, having been driven back about four miles. I here took the affair in hand, and quickly united the corps, formed a compact line of battle just in time to repulse an attack of the enemy, which was handsomely done at about 1 P. M. At 3 P. M., after some changes of the cavalry from the left to the right flank, I attacked, with great vigor, driving and routing the enemy, capturing, according to the last report, forty-three pieces of artillery and very many prisoners. . . . Affairs at

¹ Speeches of Schurz in Philadelphia, Sept. 16, in Brooklyn, Oct. 7. — Speeches, pp. 277, 278, 284, 290, 291, 338, 339, 340, 348, 356.

² Recollections of John Sherman, vol. i. p. 341.

³ 28,152 of this was contributed by the soldiers.

times looked badly, but by the gallantry of our brave officers and men disaster has been converted into a splendid victory."¹

"With great pleasure," telegraphed Lincoln to Sheridan, "I tender to you and your brave army the thanks of the nation, and my own personal admiration and gratitude for the month's operations in the Shenandoah valley; and especially for the splendid work of October 19, 1864."² "The nation rings with praises of Phil Sheridan," said the *Chicago Tribune*.³ In New York City his exploit was "recited in prose and chanted in verse."⁴ The most famous poem called forth by the battle was "Sheridan's Ride," written on the impulse of the moment by Thomas Buchanan Read, and delivered immediately after it was written to a large audience in Cincinnati by James E. Murdoch, a retired actor and celebrated reader, whose declamation in the dramatic style eight days before the election stirred the crowd and served as effective last words of the political campaign.⁵

¹ N. Y. *Times*, Oct. 21; O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 32; see Sheridan's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 68. In this connection the glimpses we get of Sheridan in Busch's *Bismarck* are interesting. Speaking of the battle of Gravelotte, Sheridan said, "Your infantry is the best in the world; but it was wrong of your generals to advance your cavalry as they did." — Vol. i. p. 74; see, also, pp. 97, 99, 107, 128.

² Oct. 22, *Complete Works*, vol. ii. p. 589.

³ Oct. 22.

⁴ N. Y. *Times*, Oct. 22.

⁵ *Cincinnati Commercial*, Nov. 1, 1864. A different account of the circumstances under which the poem was composed is given by David L. James, cited in the *Boston Eve. Transcript*, Oct. 31, 1898. The poem is printed in a volume, "A Summer Story, Sheridan's Ride and other Poems" (Phila., 1865); the great effect which it had must have been due largely to the exciting time when it appeared and the impressive delivery of Murdoch. It is a laudation of the horse (see Sheridan's *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 177) which bore Sheridan from Winchester to the battle-field; its keynote is

"Hurrah! hurrah for Sheridan!
Hurrah! hurrah for horse and man!"

The best stanza historically is

"The first that the general saw were the groups
Of stragglers, and then the retreating troops."

November 8 the presidential election took place. Lincoln carried States sufficient to give him 212 electoral votes, while McClellan would receive only 21, — those of New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky. In but one large State, New York, was there a close contest; Lincoln had a majority of the popular vote, in the whole country, of 494,567.¹ Another result of the elections of the year was that enough Republican and Unionist members of the House of Representatives had been elected to insure the requisite majority of two-thirds for the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.

"I give you joy of the election," wrote Emerson to a friend. "Seldom in history was so much staked on a popular vote. I suppose never in history."² "I thought that I should have much to say about the result of the election," wrote Motley from Vienna to his daughter. "But I am, as it were, struck dumb. The more than realization of my highest hopes leaves me with no power of expression except to repeat over and over again, —

'O Grosser Gott in Staube danke ich dir.' "³

Even with the wealth of experience which his country's history has since furnished him, the historian can add nothing to the fervor of these expressions of men who lived in the spirit. In the first election of Lincoln, the people of the North had spoken, had declared their antagonism to slavery; did they remain true to their highest aspirations, they could

What was done? what to do? A glance told him both,
Then striking his spurs with a terrible oath,
He dashed down the line, mid a storm of huzzas,
And the wave of retreat checked its course there, because
The sight of the master compelled it to pause.
With foam and with dust the black charger was gray;
By the flash of his eye, and the red nostrils' play,
He seemed to the whole great army to say,
'I have brought you Sheridan all the way
From Winchester, down to save the day.' " — P. 77.

¹ Stanwood, *Hist. of the Pres.*, pp. 307, 308.

² Cabot, p. 609.

³ Motley's *Correspondence*, vol. ii. p. 191.

not turn back, but must go forward. In spite of burdensome taxation, weariness of the war, and mourning in every household, they decided on this election day of 1864 to finish the work they had begun.¹

¹ My authorities for this account of the campaign other than already mentioned are the files of the *N. Y. Times*, *Tribune*, *World*, *Independent*, *Boston Advertiser*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Springfield Republican*, *Columbus Crisis*, Belmont's speeches, Aug. 29, Sept. 17; *Life of Vallandigham* by his brother; *Life of Chase*, Schuckers; *Julian's Political Recollections*; *Sherman Letters*; *Life of Bowles*, Merriam; *Life of Garrison*, vol. iv.; *Pierce's Summer*, vol. iv.; *Nicolay and Hay*, vol. ix.; *Greeley's Amer. Conflict*, vol. ii.; *Reminiscences of Lincoln*, Rice.

All writers on the Civil War owe their foremost and greatest obligations to the United States government for the publication of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. No such compilation was ever before possible (nor has it been since); and the government in seizing the opportunity has rendered a unique service to history. In this connection I am glad to acknowledge courtesies received from Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War.

The many references which I have made to Nicolay and Hay's history are by no means the full measure of my obligations to these authors, whose knowledge and industry have lightened very considerably the task of those who follow after them. During many years I had the opportunity of listening in the freedom of private conversation to Colonel John Hay's comments on public men and affairs, and my recollection of his brilliant talk has been a good annotation to his published work. I have also been helped by John T. Morse's *Lincoln* more than the references to it would seem to indicate.

My frequent conversations with Gen. J. D. Cox, Francis A. Walker, John C. Ropes, Charles F. Adams, Thornton K. Lothrop, and George H. Monroe have been of assistance to me in the use of my material, and in arriving at proper judgments of many of the men whose deeds I have attempted to recount.

I am under great obligations to my friend Professor Edward G. Bourne of Yale University for reading carefully this volume in manuscript, and for giving me the benefit of his historical knowledge and literary criticism. I am indebted to Miss Wyman for her efficient work as my secretary, to Miss Wildman of the Boston Athenæum for intelligent aid, to Mrs. M. S. Beall for care in the copy of material in the government archives at Washington, and to my son, Daniel P. Rhodes, for a valuable literary revision of this volume.

WHEN Force's *Life of General Sherman*, Gorham's *Edwin M. Stanton*, Foulke's *Oliver P. Morton*, and McCall's *Thaddeus Stevens* were published, the work of the printer was so far advanced that I was unable to make use of them. For an excellent comparison between Sherman and Thomas, see J. D. Cox in Force's *Sherman*, p. 198; for Sherman's post-bellum opinion of Thomas, *ibid.*, p. 337. For Stanton's support of McClellan during the Peninsular campaign, see Gorham's *Stanton*, vol. i. pp. 430, 431. On McClellan's celebrated despatch of June 28, 1862 (p. 43), *ibid.*, p. 454, note 1. Foulke writes, *Life of Morton*, vol. i. p. 289: "Morton originated the 'hundred days' movement" (see note 5, p. 498). The expression "robbed the cradle and the grave" (p. 525), which Grant used in his letter to Washburne, he quoted from Butler.—*Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 426. Senator George F. Hoar's remarks on the Fitz John Porter case (note, p. 138) in *Scribner's Magazine*, April, 1899, p. 464, will be read with interest. Concerning the sentiment of the masses in England (see p. 349), James Bryce wrote in the *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1898, p. 25: "In 1863 the masses of the English people were with Mr. Lincoln, but their sentiment told very little on the wealthy and the newspapers which the wealthy read. Now the masses have become politically predominant, and public opinion has adapted itself to the new conditions." Touching Carlyle's opinion on our Civil War (p. 361), Emerson's letter to him of October 15, 1870, is worthy of note: "Every reading person in America holds you in exceptional regard, and will rejoice in your arrival [at Boston]. They have forgotten your scarlet sins before or during the war. I have long ceased to apologize for or explain your savage sayings about America or other republics or publics, and am willing that anointed men, bearing with them authentic charters, shall be laws to themselves, as Plato willed. Genius is but a large infusion of Deity, and so brings a prerogative all its own. It has a right and duty to affront and amaze men by carrying out its perceptions defiantly, knowing well that time and fate will verify and explain what time and fate have through them said. We must not suggest to Michael Angelo, or Machiavel, or Rabelais, or Voltaire, or John Brown of Osawatomie (a great man), or Carlyle, how they shall suppress their paradoxes and check their huge gait to keep accurate step with the procession on the street sidewalk. They are privileged persons, and may have their own swing for me."—*Carlyle-Emerson Correspondence*, vol. ii. p. 372.

